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Abstract 
This study examines the extent to which Saudi pre-trial criminal procedural law and 
practice comply with international human rights standards, and provides suggestions 
that need to be made to the Saudi criminal justice system in order to make it fully 
consistent with these standards in areas in which it is deemed defective from the 
standpoint of international human rights law. The study cites the Islamic Shari'ah, the 
supreme law of Saudi Arabia, as the basis for the adopting international human rights 
standards applicable to the pre-trial stage in Muslim states, in general, and Saudi 
Arabia, in particular, in its attempt to overcome the challenge of cultural relativism, 
which represents the main obstacle to the advancement of human rights in the Muslim 
world. 
The issues discussed in this study include the constitutional status of the Shari'ah 
in Saudi Arabia, the development of the Shari ah as a body of law, its sources, and the 
power of the state to legislate under it. The extent to which the Shari'ah recognises the 
international human rights standards applicable to the pre-trial stage is examined. The 
status of human rights under Saudi law, and the position of the Saudi Government on 
international human rights instruments are also examined. The historical and 
philosophical origins of human rights, the development and sources of international 
human rights law are discussed. The controversy regarding the universality/relativity 
of human rights is examined, with a view to formulating an approach that takes into 
account both the need for universality and the reality of cultural diversity 
In part two of this study, international human rights standards applicable to the 
pre-trial stage of the criminal process, which constitute the evaluative criteria adopted 
by this thesis, are identified in detail. In addition, the rights of the accused in the pre- 
trial stage under the Canadian and the Saudi Arabian criminal justice systems within 
the framework of international human rights standards are comparatively analysed. A 
critical evaluation of the findings made by the process of comparison with the aim of 
determining the extent to which the Saudi criminal justice system complies with 
i 
international human rights standards regarding the rights of the accused in the pre-trial 
stage is provided. 
The conclusion of this study summarises its findings and highlights the changes 
required to be made to the Saudi criminal justice system in order to make it fully 
consistent with international human rights standards. 
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Introduction 
The need to promote and protect international human rights at the national level is an 
issue representing an axis of a continuing international debate. I The aim of this debate 
is to establish ways by which internationally guaranteed human rights can be 
adequately protected at the national level. Although the debate focuses upon a wide 
range of issues, the treatment of individuals suspected or accused of committing 
crimes is at its epicentre because of the severe consequences that may result from not 
respecting these individuals' rights. This thesis, therefore, will examine the issue of 
human rights in the context of Saudi criminal procedural law and practice. 
Saudi Arabia's position towards major international human rights instruments, 
which constitute the main source of international human rights law, has been 
controversial, to say the least. In 1948, Saudi Arabia abstained from voting on the 
widely adopted Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Z The basis for this 
abstention, as stated by Al-Barudi, the Saudi Ambassador to the United Nations at the 
time, was that the UDHR reflected aspects of Western culture that were frequently 
incompatible with the values of the Eastern States. The Saudi Arabian Government 
persisted with this argument throughout the debates held in 1954 and 1960, for the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR), 3 and 
consequently refused to sign up to it. 
However, in recent years and by way of a compromise, the Saudi Government has 
relaxed its opposition to abiding by international human rights standards by declaring 
its commitment to observe these standards where they do not explicitly conflict with 
the Islamic Shari 'ah, which remains the supreme law of Saudi Arabia. This approach, 
however, which seeks to preserve the cultural values of Saudi Arabia, and 
simultaneously conform, where possible, to international human rights standards, 
remains controversial. This is because international human rights law does not permit 
the departure from its norms on the basis of cultural distinctiveness alone. 
Nevertheless, the recent Saudi approach is recognised as being far more pragmatic 
1 See, e. g., Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by The World Conference on 
Human Rights, 2 June 1993, U. N. Doc. A/Conf. 157/24 (Part I), at 29 (1993). 
` Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 Dec. 1948, G. A. Res. 217A (III), U. N. GAOR, 
3rd Sess. (Resolutions, part 1), at 71, U. N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
3 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1996, entered into force 23 
Mar. 1976, G. A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U. N. GAOR, 21st Sess, Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U. N. Doc. A/6316 
(1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
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and sincere than its earlier position. This stems from the fact that although the modem 
concept of human rights originated in the West, it does not automatically follow that 
all international human rights standards are based exclusively upon Western values 
only. Therefore, some of these standards can be applied to non-Western countries as 
well, including Muslim countries, without prejudice to their cultural values. 
The area of criminal justice has been designated by the Saudi government as one 
of the areas that it seeks to reform in order to meet the requirements of international 
human rights law. The criminal justice system was neglected for a long time by the 
government, media, and legal researchers because, inter alia, the low crime rate made 
the system look fair and workable without the need for further adjustments. However, 
with the growing number of foreigners coming to live and work in Saudi Arabia, and 
the increasing interest of the outside world in the stability of the country due to its 
strategic importance as the world's largest oil producer and the heart of the Muslim 
world, as in Mecca and al-Medina it has the two most sacred places for Muslims 
around the globe, the Saudi criminal justice system started to come under constant 
scrutiny, particularly from non-governmental human rights organisations. These 
organisations pointed out several shortcomings in the criminal justice system, in 
particular, the lack of statutory rules to protect persons who were suspected, or 
accused of committing crimes. These criticisms were heightened by a number of cases 
documented over the years in which persons suspected or accused of committing 
crimes were denied the basic rights granted under international human rights law. 
This, to a certain extent, made the outcome of these cases look suspicious. These 
findings undermined the reputation of the Saudi criminal justice system, particularly 
in the eyes of the outside world. 4 
These harsh criticisms, over the decades, alerted the Saudi Arabian Government to 
the need to reform the criminal justice system in order to guarantee fair and dignified 
treatment to those individuals caught up in the criminal process. In response to this 
need, the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP)5 was issued in 2001 with the aim of 
adjusting the law and practice to the extent required in order to comply with 
a See, e. g., Amnesty International, Saudi Arabia: A Justice System without Justice (May 2000); Saudi 
Arabia: State of Denial (BBC Two television broadcast, 24 November 2002). 
5 Issued by Royal Decree No. M/39 (16 October 2001). Published on Unun al-Qura (the Saudi official 
Gazette) No. 3867 on 3 November 2001 [hereinafter CCPJ. 
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international human rights standards. 6 While this step apparently aims to improve 
human rights conditions in the criminal justice system, the question as to whether or 
not the CCP can fully achieve its intended aim is a matter that requires in-depth 
evaluation and scrutiny. 
In response to this need, this thesis seeks to examine, among other relevant 
legislations, the CCP and its implementation in practice to determine the extent to 
which it complies with international human rights standards, and to provide 
suggestions to make the law and practice consistent with these standards in areas in 
which they are deemed defective from the standpoint of international human rights 
law. Since the CCP is extensive and covers all stages of the criminal process, this 
thesis will concentrate only on the issues concerning the rights of the accused during 
the pre-trial stage, and hence it will not extend to the trial itself, or the appeal (where 
made). These warrant other studies in their own right. 
The study is divided into two parts. Part one, which includes chapters one, two 
and three, examines some preliminary issues that are highly relevant to the theme of 
this thesis. 
Chapter one provides a historical background of the evolution and development of 
the Saudi legal system. In addition, it will provide an analysis of the constitutional 
provisions concerning the status of the Islamic Shari 'ah within the framework of the 
constitution, and the sources of law. It will also introduce key Islamic concepts that 
are relevant to the theme of this thesis. 
Chapter two concerns human rights under the international human rights law and 
the Saudi legal system. Here, a discussion of the philosophical and historical origins 
of human rights and the sources of international human rights law will be provided. In 
addition, it examines the obstacle facing the advancement of international human 
rights in Muslim countries, namely the relativity of human rights, and the ways by 
which this obstacle can be overcome. The status of human rights within the 
framework of the Saudi constitution, and the Saudi Government's position on 
international human rights instruments will also be examined. 
G Special Rapporteur, Dato' Param Cumaraswamy, on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers: 
Report on the Mission to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Human 
Rights Resolution 2002/43, U. N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 59th Sess, Item 11(d) of the 
provisional agenda U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4/2003/65/Add. 3, para. 106. 
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The third chapter focuses on the rights of the accused under the Islamic Shari'ah 
rules. The chapter examines the status under the Islamic Shari'ah rules of those rights 
to which the accused is entitled under international human rights law. It seeks to 
demonstrate that there is nothing in the Islamic Shari'ah that precludes Saudi Arabia 
from complying with international human rights standards applicable to the pre-trial 
stage of the criminal process. To this end, the Shari 'ah general principles, 
jurisprudential rules, and juristic opinions relevant to the rights of the accused in the 
pre-trial stage will be analysed and examined in the light of international human rights 
standards. The chapter attempts to go beyond demonstrating that there is no conflict 
between the Shari 'ah and international human rights law in respect of the issues under 
consideration. It attempts to give international human rights standards a cultural 
legitimacy by showing that if the Shari'ah is interpreted in the light of modern 
circumstances, as dictated by the Shari 'ah itself, the adoption of these standards in a 
Muslim state is not just permissible, but in fact, obligatory. 
In the second part of this thesis, the focus will be on the evaluation of the rights of 
the accused in the pre-trial stage under the recent reforms, and on what is needed to 
make the Saudi criminal procedural law and practice fully compliant with the 
requirements of international human rights law. This part examines major 
international and regional human rights instruments in order to identify in detail the 
international human rights standards (which constitute the evaluative criteria adopted 
by this thesis) applicable to the pre-trial stage of the criminal process. The 
examination is not confined to the texts of these documents, but extends to the 
jurisprudence of the international or regional human rights courts where they are 
established under the instrument concerned to determine the exact scope of the rights 
under examination. In addition, a comparison of the rights of the accused in the pre- 
trial stage under the Canadian and the Saudi criminal justice systems within the 
framework of international human rights standards will be carried out. 
The basis for selecting the Canadian system for this comparative task is dictated 
by the objective of this comparison, which is, firstly, to determine the extent to which 
Saudi law and practice comply with international human rights law, and, secondly, to 
determine the nature of the changes that need to be made for better compliance with 
these standards. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982 recognises the 
rights of the accused in a manner comparable to that adopted by international human 
rights law. In addition, Canada is internationally considered to be a neutral country, 
4 
whose attitude towards Muslim countries is not perceived by Muslims, governments 
or people, as unfair or unbalanced, thus avoiding anything that could undercut the 
purpose of this comparative task of reforming the Saudi Arabian criminal justice 
system by drawing from the Canadian experience, where it is appropriate, with regard 
to the issues under examination. 
The rights under comparison are, namely, the right to an effective protection, the 
right against self-incrimination, the right to humane treatment, the right to liberty, the 
right to legal assistance and the right to privacy. These rights are comparatively 
analysed in chapters four, five, six, seven, eight and nine respectively. Part two will 
conclude by critically evaluating the discoveries made by the process of comparison 
with the aim of determining where the Saudi criminal justice system currently stands 
regarding the rights of the accused in the pre-trial stage, as far as international human 
rights standards are concerned. 
The conclusion of this thesis will summarise its findings and highlight the changes 
required to be made to the Saudi criminal justice system in order to make it fully 
consistent with international human rights standards. 
The choice of the Canadian system is also dictated by the accessibility of source materials and the 
researcher's language skills, and by the fact that, with regard to the issues under examination, the 





The Saudi Legal System 
In 1902, Abdulaziz, a descendant of the Al Saud family, (who, for two interrupted 
periods over the last two centuries had ruled substantial parts of the Arabian 
Peninsula), came out of exile in Kuwait to assert the rule of his family over the 
territories known now as Saudi Arabia. His campaign to reunite the country under his 
rule was successfully completed in 1926 and in 1932 he was declared the King of 
Saudi Arabia. ' Although King Abdulaziz did not adopt a written constitution, in all 
his speeches regarding this issue he clearly emphasised that the Holy Qu'ran and the 
Sunnah of Prophet Mohammed were to be used as the principal sources of 
adjudication by the judiciary and legislation by the state. 2 In essence, therefore, the 
ruling family did not object to the adoption of a written constitution per se, but saw no 
need for it, as they persistently argued that the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet 
(the principal sources of the Shari'ah), provided such a constitution. As Crown Prince 
Faisal, as he then was, put it `[a] constitution: What for? The Qur'an is the oldest and 
most efficient constitution in the world. '3 
However, when Crown Prince Faisal went on to assume the role of Prime Minister 
in 1962, he declared his intention to adopt a constitution based on the fundamental 
principles of Islamic Shari'ah in his ten-point programme. And then in 1964, when he 
succeeded his older brother King Saud, to the throne, he did indeed appoint a 
committee for the purpose of drafting the said constitution. However, as this pledge 
was provoked by the political instability of the time which was caused by a short- 
lived power struggle amongst the ruling family, once that was settled there, the pledge 
went unfulfilled. Although, every time there was a real threat to the power of the 
1 For a detailed discussion of the history of Saudi Arabia from 1744 when an agreement was made 
between the Al Saud family and Imarn Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab (the founder of the Wahhabi 
movement) which resulted in the establishment of the first Saudi state, until the country was unified for 
a third time by King Abdulaziz, see Al-Authemeen, S, Tari'q al-Mamlaka al-Arabiyyah al-Saudijyah 
(The History of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia), l 0th edn (Riyadh, 2001). 
2 See Al-Autibi, I, Tanz 1mal al-Dwalh f Aid al-Malik Abdulaziz (The Regulations of the State during 
King Abdulaziz's Period) (Riyadh: Al-Obekan Bookshop & Publishers, 1993), pp. 218-225. 
3 As quoted in Salameh, G, 'Political Power and the Saudi State', Merip Reports, 91 (1980), 5, p. 7, n. l . 
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ruling family, the pledge to enact constitutional reforms re-emerged, it was not until 
1992 when the constitutional reforms finally saw the light of the day. 4 
The package of constitutional reforms composed of three separate documents, 
most important of which are the Basic Law of Government (al-Nizarn al-Assasy ii- 
Hukum)5 and the Consultative Council Law (Nizam Majlis al-Shura). 6 In addition, a 
year later the Council of Ministers Law was promulgated. 7 The Basic Law is mainly 
concerned with constitutional matters including, inter alia, the sources of law, the role 
and powers of the king, and the power divisions within the state authorities. The 
Consultative Council Law is concerned with the newly established Consultative 
Council including, inter alia, definition of its powers, the appointment of its members, 
and its status vis-ä-vis the Council of Ministers (i. e., the executive branch). The 
Council of Ministers Law 1993, which replaced the Council of Ministers Law 1958, 
deals, inter alia, with the regulatory and executive powers assigned to the Council of 
Ministers in light of the recently adopted reforms. As these Laws deal with very 
important constitutional and legal matters, the provisions of these Laws, and other 
relevant laws, will be subject to detailed analysis regarding the sources of law, the 
structure of the judicial and regulatory (legislative) authorities and their sphere/role in 
the legislative process. In addition, as the Shari'ah constitutes an important and 
essential component of the Saudi constitution, a discussion of the status of the 
Shari'ah within the Saudi constitution, its legal theory, sources and development will 
be provided. 
Since that the aim of this thesis is to examine the extent to which the Saudi pre- 
trial criminal procedural law and practice conform with international human rights 
standards, the discussion in this chapter will be constructed with the aim of providing 
4 Tarazi, A, 'Saudi Arabia's New Basic Laws: The Struggle for Participatory Islamic Government', 
Hai-v. Int'1 L. J., 34 (1993), 258, pp. 259-264. For a discussion of the reasons that had led to the 
adoption of the constitutional reforms, see Aba-Namay, R, 'The Recent Constitutional Reforms in 
Saudi Arabia', Intl & Conip. L. Q., 42 (1993), 295, pp. 296-303. 
5Issued by Royal Order No. A/90 (1 March 1992). Published on Umn: al-Qura (the Saudi official 
Gazette) No. 3397 on 6 March 1992 [hereinafter Basic Law]. An English translation of the Basic Law 
can be found in, 'Saudi Arabia: The New Constitution', ALQ, 8 (1993), pp. 258-270. 
6 Issued by Royal Order No. A/91 (1 March 1992). Published on Unim al-Qura (the Saudi official 
Gazette) No. 3397 on 6 March 1992. Concurrently, the Provincial Administrative Law (Nizam al- 
Muqata'at al-Ida, yyah), issued by Royal Order No A/92 (1 March 1992). Published on Umm al-Qura 
(the Saudi official Gazette) No. 3397 on 6 March 1992. As the Provincial Administrative Law deals 
mainly with administrative powers assigned to provincial authorities, this Law falls outside the scope 
of this chapter and, therefore, is not included in the discussion. 
7 Issued by Royal Order No A/13 (21 August 1993). Published on Umn: al-Qura (the Saudi official 
Gazette) No. 3468 on 28 August 1993. 
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an introduction to the fundamental concepts and the distinguishing features of the 
Saudi legal system, the understanding of which is essential in allowing an 
understanding of the discussions provided in the following chapters. 
1.1 The supreme law of Saudi Arabia 
As indicated above, the promulgation of the Basic Law of Government was intended 
to give effect to long-awaited constitutional reforms that had been promised since the 
early 1960s. However, the essential question to be asked in the context of the Basic 
Law is whether this, arguably, constitutional document, is a substitute for the 
unwritten constitution (i. e., the Islamic Shari'ah) that pre-existed before the 
introduction of the Basic Law, or is it a mere subordinate to that unwritten 
constitution? In other words, does the Basic Law represent the Constitution of Saudi 
Arabia? 
Firstly, it is worth pointing out that when the government introduced the package 
of reforms, it deliberately avoided the use of the term 'Constitution' (Dustur) in 
reference to the Basic Law. Instead, the government used the tern `The Basic Law of 
Government' (al-Nizam al-Assasy 11-Hukum) to refer to this document. The reason for 
this, as pointed out by Aba-Namay, was partly because '[t]he term "constitution", 
Dustur, is not commonly used among the Saudi population since the Saudis believe 
that only the Muslim holy book of the Koran can be called a constitution, and the 
government has always maintained that the constitution of Saudi Arabia is the 
Koran. i8 However, this on its own is not the sole or even the main reason for not using 
the term constitution to refer to the Basic Law. Only a piece of legislation that 
represents the supreme law of the land in the sense that all other legislations have to 
conform with it, can be properly called a constitution. In scrutinising the Basic Law, 
one finds that this is not the case. 9 To start with, Article 1 of the Basic Law states that 
`[t]he Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic State with Islam as its 
religion; God's Book [i. e., the Holy Qur'an] and the Sunnah of His Prophet, God's 
prayers and peace be upon him, are its Constitution (Dustur).... ' In the same vein, 
Article 7 of the Basic Law stipulates that `[t]he regime derives its power from the 
8 Aba-Namay, supra note 4, p. 295. 
9 See Al-Marzugi, M, al-Sultah al-Tanzimiah fi al-Mamlaka al-A? abiyyah al-Saudiyyah (The 
Regulatory Authority in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) (Riyadh: Al-Obekan Bookshop & Publishers, 
2004), pp. 74-76. 
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Holy Qur'an and the Prophet's Sunnah. They are sovereign over this Law and other 
State Laws. ' Furthermore, Article 23 states that `[t]he State protects Islam; it 
implements its Shari'ah.... '10 
It is therefore clear from the above quoted Articles that, despite the introduction of 
the Basic Law, it is the Islamic Shari'ah that remains the supreme law of Saudi 
Arabia. It follows that if Saudi Arabia is to introduce any law it can only do so if it is 
consistent with the Shari'ah. This principle is explicitly stated in Article 67 of the 
Basic Law, which provides that `[t]he regulatory authority shall have the jurisdiction 
to enact regulations and bye-laws in order to attain welfare and avoid harm in the 
affairs of the state, in accordance with the general rules of Islamic Shari'ah. ' Thus, if 
such laws do not conform with the principles of Islamic Shari'ah, they will have no 
force or effect, and consequently will not be applied by the judiciary in cases brought 
before them. Article 48 reinforces this by stating that `[t]he courts shall apply the rules 
of the Islamic Shari'ah in the cases that are brought before them, in accordance with 
what is indicated in the Book and the Sunnah, and laws decreed by the Ruler which 
do not contradict the Book or the Sunnah. ' 11 
The above mentioned Articles suggest, in addition to the fact that the Shari'ah is 
the law of the land, that the state has the right to enact regulations to advance the 
welfare of the society on the condition that the Shari'ah is not violated thereby. It 
follows that in order to be able to determine the constitutionality of a given law, a 
proper understanding of the Shari'ah law and the powers of the state under it is 
essential. To provide such understanding to the reader there follows a brief discussion 
of Islamic legal theory from which the Shari'ah rules have stemmed and acquired 
their authority, the sources of Shari'ah and its development as a body of law. In 
addition, the concept of siyasa shar'iyya, which empowers the ruler to enact 
regulations to supplement the Shari'ah, under Islamic jurisprudence, the Saudi law 
and practice will be examined. 
10 In the same vien, Article I of the Consultative Council Law states that `following [the tradition of] 
the Prophet of God, may God prayers and blessings be upon Him, in consulting his companions, and in 
exhorting al-Ummah (nation) to engage in consultations, the Shura (Consultative) Council is created, 
and it exercises the tasks entrusted to it in accordance with this Law and the Basic Law of Government, 
with adherence to the Book of God and the tradition of His Prophet. ' In addition, Article 2 of the 
Consultative Council Law states `[t]he Shura (Consultative) Council is founded on adherence to God's 
bonds, and commitment to the sources of Islamic jurisprudence. ' 
11 See also the Basic Law, Arts. 8,17,26,46 and 55. 
9 
1.2 Islamic legal theory 
Shari'ah is considered by those of the Islamic faith to be the expression of God's will. 
Man, in Islam, does not possess the authority to create the law. This privilege under 
the Shari'ah belongs exclusively to God Almighty. 12 His law, furthermore, is, 
according to Islamic legal theory, immutable and valid for all time and for all human 
beings. It is stated in the Qur'an that `[t]hen We put thee on the [right] way of 
religion: so follow thou that [way], and follow not the desires of those who have no 
knowledge. "3 Thus, the role of Muslims is strictly confined to the application of 
Shari'ah. As an inherent and binding part of the application of God's law, Muslims are 
allowed, in fact are required, to apprehend and discover God's law. 14 However, such 
an important role can only be undertaken by a qualified Muslim jurist, or what is 
known under the Shari'ah, as a niujtahid (plural mujtihdeen). Ijtihad translates from 
Arabic as `endeavour' and in legal usage means `the endeavour of a jurist to formulate 
a rule of law on the basis of evidence (dalil) found in the sources. '15 
In exercising the faculty of itihad, a Muslim jurist is not left to his own reasoning 
in apprehending and discovering the law of God, but his exercise is governed by used 
al-figh (the roots of jurisprudence) to ensure that the law is properly inferred from the 
sources. Usul al-figh, thus, could be defined as the science that is `concerned with 
laying down procedural rules and principles in accordance with which the deduction 
of detailed substantive Islamic law would be regularised, standardised and freed from 
possible fallibilities. "6 
According to usul al-fiqh, Shari'ah is mainly derived from four sources. Namely, 
these are: the Qur'an (the Holy Book), which is believed by Muslims to be the very 
words of God himself, as revealed upon the Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings 
be upon him), over his lifetime; then there is Sunnah, the tradition of the Prophet 
Muhammad, which details the actions and sayings of the Prophet during his lifetime. 
12 Khadduri, M, 'Nature and Sources of Islamic Law', Geo. Wash. L. Rev, 22 (1953) 5, pp. 6-10. See 
also Abu Zahra, M, Usul al-Fiqh (The Roots of Jurisprudence) (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-Arabi, 1997), p. 
63. 
13 The Holy Qur'an, verse 45: 18. 
14 Weiss, B, 'Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory of Ijtihad', Ant. J. Camp. L, 26 (1978), 199, p. 
199. See also AI-Zuhili, W, 'Tajdeed al-Fiqh al-Islami (Renewing Islamic Jurisprudence)', in Tajdeed 
al-Fiqh al-Island (Renewing Islamic Jurisprudence), ed. by Dar al-Fikr, (Damascus: Dar al-Fikr, 
2000), p. 163. 
15 Ibid. p. 200. 
16 Zahraa, M, 'Characteristic Features of Islamic Law: Perceptions and Misconceptions', ALQ, 15 
(2000), 168, p. 171. 
10 
Thirdly there is ijma, or consensus of opinion, which could be defined as the 
agreement of Muslim jurists in any particular age on a legal ruling, and lastly there is 
qiyas, which translates from Arabic as analogy. In legal usage this means the method 
by which the jurist extends the application of a certain law of one case to another 
because they share a common nature (illa). 17 In addition to these main sources, there 
is muslaha mursala (public utility), which is considered to be the fifth source of the 
Shari'ah. Muslaha mursala is the only source, (whether within the classical sources of 
figh, or under the concept of siyasa shar'iyya, which empowers the ruler to act to 
advance the public interest), that is designed to provide practical answers to 
contemporary social and legal problems for which there is no revealed text, ijma or a 
valid qiyas to deal with, including a majority of the issues covered in the thesis. For 
this reason muslaha mursala as a source of law will be discussed in detail in due 
course. 
18 
The sphere within which the jurist can practice ijtihad is limited to the areas 
where the texts are equivocal and ambiguous (dalil zanni), or where there are no texts 
at all. However, if the text is clear and unequivocal (dalil gat'i, or muhkam), the 
jurist's role is restricted to declaring the ruling, but not being able to formulate it. 19 
The body of knowledge resulting from the practice of ijtihad is called figh 
(jurisprudence). 20 
It is apparent from the foregoing that the Shari'ah is not formulated by, neither 
can it be altered by secular institutions to meet the desires and aspirations of a given 
society, but it can be comprehended and formulated by a qualified Muslim jurist, in 
accordance with what is likely to constitute God's will. 21 
17 For an extensive discussion of the sources of the Shari 'a/i, see Vogel, F, Islamic Law and Legal 
System: Studies of Saudi Arabia (Boston: Brill, 2000), pp. 34-56; Ibrahim, M, Sources and 
Development of Muslim Law (Singapore: Malayan Law Journal, 1965), pp. 9-25; Abu Zahra, supra 
note 12, pp. 63-213. 
1s See infra para. 1.2.2. 
re See Al-Dura'n, A, Al-Tashri'a wa al-Ijtihad fi al-Islam: al-Tank wa al-Manln j (Legislation and 
Ijtihad in Islam: Histomy and Methodology) (Riyadh: al-Tuba Bookshop, 2001), pp. 295-301; Zahraa, 
supra note 16, p. 180; Al-Zuhili, supra note 14, pp. 189-192. 
`0 Vogel, supra note 17, pp. 4-5. 
'`t Al-Muhairi, B, 'Conflict and Continuity: Islamization and Modernization within the U. A. E. Penal 
Law' (unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Kent (on file with Kent University Library), 1994), p. 12. 
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1.2.1 Development of jurisprudence and the authority of juristic rulings 
By the end of the third century of Hi ra (900 A. D. ) four orthodox Sunni schools of 
jurisprudence were established. 22 Namely, these were: Maliki, Hanifi, Shafi'i and 
Hanbali schools. Each of these schools was named after the founding jurist who laid 
down the principles and doctrines applicable to legal matters, and the methodological 
rules by which ijtihad is governed (usul al-figh). 23 The legal methodology used by 
these four schools was the same, in particular with regard to their classification of the 
sources of law. However, due to geographical, social and economic conditions in 
which these schools were formed and developed, differences in the details of legal 
matters were soon forthcoming. These differences were mainly related to matters of 
selecting a certain tradition, or to showing a preference to one particular tradition over 
another etc. 24 
The students of these four distinguished masters of jurisprudence collected, and 
documented the principles and doctrines stated by each of them, and by the turn of the 
fifth century of Islam (1000 A. D), the doctrine of ijtihad was replaced by a new 
doctrine called taqleed (imitation), on the basis of alleged ijina. The application of 
this new doctrine meant that every qualified Muslim jurist lost the right to direct 
recourse to the original sources, and became obligated instead to imitate one of the 
four Sunni schools in applying the rules of the Shari'ah. The adoption of taqleed was 
based largely upon the belief that the four orthodox Sunni schools had established 
sufficient legal rules, as set out in their authoritative orthodox treatises, capable of 
dealing with any future developments. 25 In addition, the jurists of the first three 
generations of Islam, from the beginning of the Prophet's mission in 610 A. D., until 
the mid 9th century, are considered by subsequent Muslim jurists to be more skilled 
and knowledgeable about the Shari'ah than those jurists who emerged later, and 
consequently the opinions of those early jurists are considered to be more 
authoritative and weighty. 26 In effect this has resulted in a closing of the door of 
22 The discussion here is confined to these four Sunni schools, as Saudi Arabia is a follower of the 
Sunni tradition. 
23 For a discussion of the life of the founding jurists, see Doi, A, Shari'ah: The Islamic Law (London: 
Ta Ha Publishers, 1984); pp. 88-111; Ibrahim, supra note 17, pp. 58-67. 
24 Al-Dura'n, supra note 19, pp. 200,205; Amin, S, Islamic Law in Contemporamy World (Glasgow: 
Royston, 1985), p. 7. 
25 Regarding the implications of the closure of the door of Ytihad for subsequent jurists, see Coulson, 
N. J, A Histomy of Islamic Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh U. P., 1964), (photo. reprint 1997), pp. 80-85. 26 Vogel, supra note 17, at 57. 
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ijtihad and recourse, in practice, only to what is included in the four orthodox 
treatises of the four schools. 
It is noteworthy that some Muslim scholars doubt the validity or wisdom of 
closing the door of ijtihad. 27 However, there does seem to be a general consensus 
amongst traditional Muslim jurists who claim the right to ijtihad, that although a 
Muslim jurist could reject the opinions expressed in the four treatises, and exercise 
his own ijtihad, he is still obliged to adhere to the legal methodology formulated by 
the four Sunni schools in formulating his opinion. 28 
It is worth emphasising that the opinions expressed by the founding masters or 
their students, or by any Muslim jurist for that matter, are not definitive statements of 
God's will, but are only, in essence, the jurist's opinion of what is likely to constitute 
the law of God. Hence, difference in opinion among Muslim scholars is tolerated, and 
each opinion is considered equally authoritative as long as it is established by a 
qualified jurist, and that he adheres to the proper methods of jurisprudence (usul al- 
fiqh). 29 
1.2.2 Muslaha mursala 
Muslaha (plural musalih), can be approximately translated as public utility or public 
interest, and mursala means freed or unrestricted (by text). Thus, muslaha mursala 
means unrestricted muslaha (by text). Muslaha mursala should be distinguished from 
those musalih which are directly endorsed by text, such as the prohibition of alcohol. 
This latter type of muslaha is unanimously considered as a valid source of legislation 
by Muslim scholars, not by virtue of being muslaha per se, but because of the 
revealed text that gives it such definition. As such, such muslaha could be relied upon 
as illa (the shared nature) for analogy (qiyas), such as the extension of the prohibition 
of alcohol, which came through revelation (Qur'anic text), to marijuana, with regard 
27 In fact there are some Muslim jurists who prohibit blind taqleed on anyone including lay Muslims, 
by asserting that everyone has the right, in fact, is obliged, to practice ýtihad, and examine the proofs 
of given opinions and follow the one which his/her conscience favours. This is the dominant opinion in 
the Hanbali school, which explains why Saudi scholars reject unanimously the proposition that the 
door of Ytihad was closed. See ibid. pp. 67-81. See also the opinion of the distinguished and well- 
known Egyptian scholar Muhammad Abu Zahra in his book Usul al-Filth, supra note 12, pp. 341-347. 28 Ibid. 
















to which there is no textual revelation, as they both share the same illa, which is 
causing the person using them to lose control over his mind . 
30 
However, the former type of musalih, that is musalih mursala, which is the 
subject under discussion here, is claimed to be subject to controversy among scholars. 
This controversy has been caused by allegations that considering muslaha inursala as 
a source of law could introduce laws that are alien to the Shari'ah, as musalih 
mursala, which could be relied upon for legislation under both filth and siyasa, are not 
supported directly by revealed texts. Before commenting on this alleged controversy 
and the merits of the arguments of those who are seemingly opposed to musalih 
mursala as a source of legislation, it is important first to define musalih mursala and, 
then, discuss the conditions for its application. This will reveal the validity of the 
merits of such arguments. 
Scholars define muslaha mursala as `formulating a ruling based upon utility, 
which is neither specifically rejected nor endorsed by a text or Yma, and is consistent 
with inaqaasid al-shari'ah. '31 This definition of muslaha mursala reveals two of the 
five main conditions for using it as a source of legislation. The first condition, which 
can be described as the restriction-condition, is that legislating on the basis of 
muslaha mursala must not contradict a revealed text or ylna. As pointed out earlier, it 
is a subsidiary source to them. Thus, for example, legalising alcohol on the basis of 
the alleged muslaha that it gives pleasure to people who drink it, is invalid as the 
muslaha relied upon contradicts a revealed text that prohibits the drinking of alcohol. 
The second condition, which can be described as the inspiration-condition, is that 
muslaha must be consistent with maqaasid al-shari'ah. Muqssid (plural magaasid) 
means the objective or the goal, and, thus, magaasid al-shari'ah means the objectives 
and goals of the Shari'ah. As such, these nagaasid are inferred from the textual 
sources. Therefore, the provision of inaqaasid al-shari'ah makes the textual sources 
not only a restriction on legislating on the basis of inuslaha mursala, as it is required 
by the first condition, but also a source of inspiration for such legislation. While 
scholars disagree as to the details of what constitutes magaasid al-shari'ah, they are 
all in agreement that the ultimate goal of the Shari'ah is the securing of benefits for, 
30 Ibid. p. 343. See also Al-Zurqa, M, Istislah wa al-Musalih al-Mu Sala fi al-Shari'ah al-Islamiah wa 
Usul Fiqhiha (Public Utility in Islamic Shari'ah and Its Jurisprudential Sources) (Damascus: Dar al- 
Qulem, 1988), pp. 87-88. 
31 Al-Zurqa, supra note 30, p. 37. 
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and the prevention of harm to the Muslim community (julb al-masalih wa dur'a al- 
mufasid), under which all other subsidiary maqaasid fall. 32 
The third condition is that it must be shown that any legislation, which is based 
upon muslaha mursala, will certainly, or at least very likely secure benefit for, or 
prevent harm (mufisdah, plural mufasid) to the community. The fourth condition is 
that legislating on the basis of inuslaha inursala must aim to secure benefit, or prevent 
harm to the community at large. It is not to be used to serve the interest of a single 
individual or a small group of people at the expense of the larger community. The 
fifth and final condition is that legislating on the basis of maslaha mursala must take 
into consideration all masalih involved in a given situation, and if they cannot all be 
accommodated, the legislation, after balancing all the conflicting musalih, must be 
constructed to secure the overriding rnuslaha. 33 
In light of the forgoing discussion it is apparent that legislating on the basis of 
muslaha mursala must not be seen as a goal in itself, but as a means to secure the 
general objectives of the Shari'ah in light of the current circumstances. 34 Thus, if a 
given ruling, which has been based upon muslaha inursala, fails to achieve its 
objective, because of a change of circumstances due to, inter alia, the change of time, 
or place, the ruling must be updated to reflect these new realities. This requirement is 
explicitly expressed by scholars in the jurisprudential rule, which states that `rulings 
which are based upon public utility change according to change of time and place' (1a 
yunker taquer al-ahkam al-mbniah ala al-niuslaha bi taquer al-azminah wa al- 
35 amkunah). In this respect, Imam Ibn Burhan (a Shafi'i scholar, d. 518 H) stated that 
3z In this respect, see ibid. pp. 43-45; Al-Jawziyya, M, (known as Ibn Al-Qayyim) A'lam al- 
Muwak'eeen (Notable Signers), 3 (Beirut: Dar al-Kutob al-Elniiah, 1996), p. 11 [hereinafter A'lam]; 
Vogel, supra note 17, p. 343; Al-Yuabi, M, Maqaasid al-Shari'ah wa A'lagtulra bi al-Adilh al-Sharaiah 
(The Objectives of the Shari'ah and its Relation to the Sources of Law) (Riyadh: Dar Al-Hijrah For 
Publishing & Distributing, 2002), p. 391-392; Abdulraheem, W, al-Musalih al-Mursala wa Iktlaf 
Ulama Fiha (Unrestricted Utilities and the Disagreement of Scholars Over It) (Jidda: Dar al-Mujtm'a 
for Publishing & Distributing, 2000), p. 37-39; Al-Rabieah, A, A'elm Maqaasid al-Shr'a (The Science 
of the Objectives of Legislation) (Riyadh, 2002), p. 149; Umar, U, Maqaasid al-Shari'ah and al-Imam 
al-1z Ibn Abduslam (The Objectives of the Shari'ah According to the Imam al-Iz Ibn Abduslant) 
(Amman: Dar al-Nfais for Publishing & Distributing, 2003), pp. 76-78,87-89. 
33 For an extensive discussion of the conditions of mttslaha ntursala, see Al-Buati, M., Thuabit al- 
Muslaha fi al-Shari'ah al-Islanriah (The Restrictions on Utility in the Islamic Shari'ah), 5th edn 
(Beirut: Muasist al-Risaleh, 1986), pp. 119-328; Al-Rabieah, A., Adulit al-Tashri'a al-Muktulf ft al- 
Ilityaj Biha (The Sources of Law which are Subject to Disagreement) (Riyadh, 1986), pp. 227-228 
[hereinafter Sources]; Abdulraheem, supra note 32, pp. 148-149; Al-Yuabi, supra note 32, p. 393-400; 
AI-Zuhili, supra note 14, pp. 204-207; Umar, supra note 32, pp. 102-109,211-256. 
34 See Abdulraheem, supra note 32, p. 39; Umar, supra note 32, p. 276. 
35 See Al-Jawziyya., A'lam, supra note 32, Vol. 3, pp. 11-38; Al-Jawziyya, M, (known as Ibn Al- 
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`[n]ot every muslaha that is considered to be as such in a given time, [necessarily] 
constitutes muslaha in another time. An action can be said to constitute muslaha in 
one time, but constitutes inufisdah (harm) in another. Not all times are equal. '36 
That is to say any legislation, which is based on maslaha muslaha, whether it is a 
fiqh ruling or a siyasa law, must be subjected to constant evaluation to ensure that it 
meets the mnagaasid that the legislation was formulated to achieve. If it fails to do so, 
for whatever reason, the legislation must be overruled and a new legislation must be 
formulated to ensure that, in the light of the current circumstances, nzaqaasid al- 
shari'ah are properly secured. 37 
Regarding the alleged controversy surrounding inuslaha mursala as a source of 
law, the main argument against muslaha mursala is that to consider it as a source of 
law would introduce laws that are foreign to the Shari ah as there is no direct text or 
Uma in support of such musalih. The rebuttal of this argument is that the conditions of 
the application of muslaha mursala (in particular the fact that the revealed texts 
constitute a restriction on and source of inspiration for what can be considered as a 
niuslaha mursala, which provides the basis for legislation), would prevent the 
introduction of any laws that are contrary to the textual sources, Uma or a valid qiyas. 
In fact, those scholars who are opposed to muslaha mursala, including Imam al- 
Shafi'i, who described it as a man-made law, relied on muslaha mursala in 
formulating their rulings in areas where there is no revealed text, ijma or a valid 
giyas. 38 This suggests, therefore, that those who are opposed to muslaha mursala are 
not opposed to it per se, but are opposed to its application without restriction, as it 
would clearly make the Shari'ah subject to the will of people, not the contrary as it is 
dictated by Islamic legal theory and the methods of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh), as 
discussed above. 39 This fact has led recent scholars who have examined the 
arguments of both sides as to the authority of muslaha inursala as a source of law to 
(Beirut: Dar al-Kutob al-Elniiah, 1995), pp. 14-15 [hereinafter al-Siyasa]; Al-Zuhili, supra note 14, pp. 
179-181; Al-Sadlan, S, al-Quad al-Fiqhih wa ina Tafiia Minha (The Major Jurisprudential Rules and 
the Rules which are Derived from them), 2nd edn (Riyadh: Bansliyah for Publishing & Distribution, 
1999), pp. 426-449; Al-Zurqa, supra note 30, pp. 44-45. 
36 As quoted in Uniar, supra note 32, p. 394. 
37 See also Bulmahdi, Y, al-Bua'd al-Zamani wa al-Makani wa Athruhina fi al-Fatwa (The Impact of 
the Dimension of Time and Place on Legal Rulings) (Damascus: Dar al-Al-Skihab, 2000), pp. 160-162; 
Al-Qassem, A, al-Islam wa Tagnin al-Ahka, n fi al-Bilad al-Saudiyyah (Islam and Codification of 
Rulings in the Saudi State) (Cairo: al-Madni Press, 1966), pp. 147-151 [hereinafter al-Islam]; Umar, 
supra note 32, pp. 282-285; Al-Dura'n, supra note 19, p. 326. 
38 Al-Zurqa, supra note 30, pp. 65-73. 




















conclude that such disagreement is in fact inexistent. In this connection, Dr. Al-Buati 
stated: 
To sum up: al-musalih al-mursala is unanimously accepted [as a source of 
law] ... by the companions 
[of the Prophet] and their followers and the 
four founding jurists. 
There is nothing in the writings of the scholars of jurisprudence that 
contradict this unanimity, and the disagreement between scholars on this 
matter is in name rather in substance. 40 
To put the above discussion of inuslaha mursala into context, it can be concluded 
safely that where there is no revealed text, yina or a valid qiyas that can be applied to 
a given issue, qadis (i. e., judges, singular qadi) in Saudi Arabia, by exercising ijtihad 
can formulate a ruling based on muslaha inursala to deal with such an issue. 
However, this does not mean that the King of Saudi Arabia or any body authorised by 
him are precluded from exercising the same function to advance the public interest. 
As discussed below, muslaha inursala is not only the fifth source of figh but also the 
basis for law-making by the ruler under the concept siyasa shar'iyya. 41 
Given that Saudi ulama (i. e., the scholars who are specialised in Shari'ah law) are 
unanimously opposed to the concept of the closure of the door of ijtihad, one would 
assume that ijtihad is widely practiced in Saudi Arabia at least with regard to issues 
which have no ruling from the four main sources of the Shari'ah. To examine the 
validity of this assumption, attention will be focused next on the Saudi gadi's practice 
of ijtihad. However, before doing so, it is appropriate first to provide an overview of 
the independence of the judiciary in Saudi Arabia, its organisation and jurisdiction 
and conclude by discussing its practice of ijtihad. 
40 Al-Buati, supra note 33, at 407. Sheikh Kalaf similarly concluded that `[b]ased on the writings of 
scholars with regard to inuslaha inursala, there is no disagreement among them on the permissibility of 
legislating on the basis of it, and no scholar has contended that only rnuslaha that is specifically 
endorsed by text can constitute a valid basis for legislation, because ... the needs and necessities of one 
era may require new » : usalih (utilities), that did not exist at the era of legislation [i. e., the time of the 
Prophet], which need to be legislated for. ' Kalaf, A, Masader al-Tashri'a al-Islaini frma la Nass Fiah 
(The Sources of Islamic Legislation Where There is no Text) (Beirut: Dar Al-Qulem, 1972), at 175. The 
same conclusion has been reached by other scholars. See Al-Rabieah, Sources, supra note 33, pp. 257- 
271; Abdulraheem, supra note 32, pp. 102-103,210-211; Al-Yuabi, supra note 32, pp. 530-536. 41 See infra para. 1.4. 
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1.3 The judiciary 
The courts system in Saudi Arabia consists mainly of the Shari'ah Courts (al- 
Mahakem al-Shar'iyya), and the Board of Grievances (Diwan al-Mazalim). 42 While 
the Shari'ah Courts enjoy a general jurisdiction to try all cases, except those exempted 
by law, the Board of Grievances deals mainly with administrative cases, although the 
Law of Board of Grievances43 also allows its jurisdiction to be extended to other 
cases, if prescribed by law, even if they are not administrative in nature. 44 Article 49 
of the Basic Law states that `[w]ithout prejudice to Article 53 [concerning the Board 
of Grievances] the [Shari'ah] Courts shall have the jurisdiction to decide all disputes 
and crimes. ' Similarly, Article 26 of the Judicial Act 197545 reads '[t]he [Shari'ah] 
Courts shall have jurisdiction to decide with respect to all disputes and crimes, except 
those exempted by law.... ' Given the Shari'ah Courts have such a jurisdiction, which 
includes the majority of the issues relating to the subject-matter of this thesis, the 
following discussion will focus solely on the Shari ah Courts. 
1.3.1 Independence 
Classical Islamic political theory does not recognise the principle of the separation of 
powers. The judicial power is originally vested in the ruler. However, if the ruler is 
unqualified to practice such a function, or prefers it to be practiced by someone else, 
he can delegate his judicial power to any person who is qualified to perform such a 
job. While it is recognised that the ruler, if he chooses to delegate his judicial power, 
retains the power to restrict the judicial competence of a qadi or a court to certain 
cases, the fact that the qadi performs his job on the basis of the ruler's delegation, 
42 It should be noted that "other tribunals" also exist within the Saudi judicial system which were 
specifically established to deal with specific cases, which are governed wholly by siyasa laws, in which 
the Shari'ah Courts have refused to apply their law and instead adjudicated them according to fiqh. 
However, because the Basic Law does not recognise these tribunals, as they are considered to be a 
temporary solution until their jurisdiction is transferred to the Shari'ah Courts, when they agree to 
apply their laws, and as their jurisdiction covers cases which are irrelevant to the subject matter of this 
thesis, they are not included in the discussion. For a discussion of these tribunals, see Vogel, supra note 
17, pp. 292-295,302-308; Al-Dureeb, S, al-Tanzeem al-Qudai fi al-Mamlaka al-Arabiyyah al- 
Saudiyyah (The Organisation of the Judiciary in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) (Riyadh: Imam 
Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University Press, 1999), pp. 449-506; Al-Marzuqi, supra note 9, pp. 174- 
175. 
43 Issued by Royal Decree No. M/51 (11 May 1982). Published in Umm al-Qura (the Saudi official 
Gazette) No. 2918 (22 May 1982). 
44 Ibid. Art. 8(2). 
45 Issued by Royal Decree No. M/64,23 July 1975. Published on Umn: al-Qura (the Saudi official 
Gazette) No. 2592 on 5 September 1975. An official translation of the Judicial Act is available at 
<http: //www. moi. gov. sa/layout/Showpape. asp? art id=32> (last visited Jan. 2,2006). 
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does not mean that the ruler can interfere with the gadi's job in deciding the cases 
brought before him. Qadis are only subject to the provisions of the Shari'ah, and 
therefore, if their judgments comply with these provisions, they will not be subject to 
reversal, either by the ruler or a higher qadi. If qadis deviate, intentionally or by 
ignorance from this obligation, their judgments are subject to reversal; in addition to 
the religious responsibility they will bear in the hereafter. In this respect, the 
Prophetic report states that `[o]ne qadi is in Paradise and two qadis in the Hellfire. As 
for the one in Paradise, he is a man who knew what is right and adjudicates 
accordingly. A man who knew what is right but deviates from it is in the Hellfire. A 
man who adjudicates between people based on ignorance is [also] in the Hellfire. i46 
Therefore, the gadi's function is to apply what he believes is the Shari'ah ruling in a 
given case with the aim of pleasing no one except God. This latter requirement is 
what is meant by judicial independence from the political authority under classical 
Islamic political theory. 47 
The Saudi (written) law with regard to the independence of the judiciary is a 
reflection of this theory. With regard to the relationship between the King and the 
judiciary, Article 44 of the Basic Law states that `[t]he authorities of the state consist 
of the following: the judicial authority, the executive authority and the regulatory 
authority. These authorities co-operate with each other in the performance of their 
duties, in accordance with this and other laws. The King shall be the point of 
reference for all these authorities. ' While this Article apparently gives a supervisory 
role to the King over the judiciary, the law has restricted this function to an absolute 
minimum. In fact, the Basic Law itself, in a seemingly contradictory manner, states in 
Article 46 that `[t]he judicial authority is an independent power. In discharging their 
duties, qadis are subject to no authority other than that of Islamic Shari'ah. ' Similarly, 
Article I of the Judicial Act 1975 reads `[q]adis are independent and, in the 
administration of justice, they shall be subject to no authority other than the 
provisions of Shari 'ah and laws in force. No one may interfere with the Judiciary. ' 
46 Reported in Al-Rubi'ai, M (known as Imam Ibn Majah, d. 273 H) Sunin Ibn Majah, Report No. 2306; 
also reported in Al-Sujustani, S, (known as Imam Abi Dawad, d. 275 H) Sunin Abi Dawad, Report No. 
3102; also reported with the same meaning although with different wording in Al-Turmthi, M (known 
as Imam al-Turmthi, d. 279 H), Sunin al-Turmthi, Report No. 1244. 
47 See Coulson, N. J., 'The State and the Individual in Islamic Law', Intl & Comp. L. Q, 6 (1957), 49, 
pp. 57-58; Al-Qamadi, N, A1-Iktsas al-Qadai ft al-Fiqh al-Island (Judicial Jurisdiction in Islamic 
Jurisprudence) (Riyadh: Al-Rushd Bookshop, 2000), 79-109,487-502. 
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Therefore, it can be concluded that Saudi qadis, in deciding cases are independent 
from the political authority (i. e., the king), and only subject to the Shari'ah provisions 
and laws promulgated by the regulatory authority which do not contradict the Shari'ah 
precepts. 
1.3.2 Organisation and jurisdiction 
The Shari'ah courts system is comprised of the Summary Court, the General Court, 
the Court of Appeal (Mahkanzat al-Tamyiz), and the Supreme Judicial Council 
(SJC). 48 The Summary and the General Courts constitute the courts of the first 
instance. The jurisdiction over criminal cases, save those which fall into the 
jurisdiction of the Board of Grievances, 49 are divided between these two Courts. 
However, before highlighting the jurisdiction of these two Courts, it is appropriate 
first to shed light on the classification of crimes under the Shari'ah. Crimes under 
Islamic law fall into three categories: 50 
1) Crimes of al-Qisas and Diyat (Crimes of Retaliation and Blood Money): 
This category includes all crimes, whether intentional or unintentional, which are 
committed against the person. If the crime is intentional the victim, or her/his heirs, in 
the case that the victim is deceased, are entitled to apply to the qadi for qisas 
(retaliation), which means, literally, 'an eye for an eye'. However, if the victim or 
his/her heirs waive the right to retaliation, the application of retaliation is impossible, 
or the crime is unintentional, the victim or his/her heirs are entitled to diya (blood 
money). In addition, the ruler, or anyone who is delegated by him to exercise such 
power, is entitled to impose on the person convicted of the intentional qisas offence a 
ta'zir punishment if the victim or his/her heirs wavie the right to retaliation (qisas), or 
the application of retaliation is impossible and the imposition of such punishment is 
seen as necessary for the sake of the public interest. The requirement of proof for this 
category is two male witnesses or a confession. 
48 Judicial Act 1975, supra note 45, Art. 5. 
49 For a detailed discussion of the criminal jurisdiction of the Board of Grievances, see Al-Shadli, F, 
Juraim a1-Ta'zir al-Munzmah fi al-Mamlaka al-Arabiyyah al-Saudiyyah (Regulated Ta'zir Offences in 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) (Riyadh: King Saud University Press, 1989). 
50 The discussion of the categories of crimes under Islamic law draws on Abu Zahra, M, Al-Jeremah 
wa al-Awqubah (The Crime and Punishment) (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-Arabi, 1998); Awdah, A, al- 
Tashri'a al-Jenaei al-Island Muqaran be al-Qanun a! -Wadei (The Islamic Penal Legislation Compared 
with Positive Law), 14th (Beirut: Resalah Publishers, 2000); Bhnasie, A, Nthreat al-Ithbatfi al-Filth a! - Jenaei al-Islami (The Theory of Proof in the Islamic Criminal Jurisprudence) (Cairo: Dar al-Shoruq, 
1989). 
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2) Crimes of al-Hudud: 
The category of crimes of al-hudud (singular hadd) is concerned with those crimes to 
which the punishment is predetermined and considered as a right of God as they are 
designed to preserve God's limits from being crossed. These predetermined 
punishments distinguish this category of crimes from the crimes of tazir, whereby the 
punislunents here are unspecified and left to the discretion of the ruler. The fact that 
the punishment for a crime of al-hudud is considered as a right of Allah means that 
the punishment cannot be waived by anyone, as opposed to the punishment of a crime 
of al-qisas, in which it is possible for the victim or his/her heirs to waive the 
punishment, as discussed above. Crimes of al-hudud include: (1) adultery, (2) slander 
or defamation (qudij), (3) drinking alcohol (4) theft (5) brigandage or highway 
robbery (heraba) (6) apostasy and (7) rebellion against a legitimate Muslim ruler 
(bagi). 
As the punishments of al-hudud offences are very severe, such as the punishment 
of amputation for theft, or the punishment of stoning for adultery committed by a 
married person, the standard of proof for these offences is correspondingly very high. 
For instance, to prove an adultery offence four witnesses, all of whom have to have 
witnessed the act of sexual intercourse taking place, are required. Suffice to say that 
the application of al-hudud punishment is often dependent on the accused confessing 
to committing the alleged offence. However, even if the accused does confess to the 
crime, the qadi should encourage him/her to retract his confession, and if there is any 
doubt, whether reasonable or unreasonable, in the qadi's mind about the reliability or 
voluntariness of such a confession, he should not convict the accused of the al-hadd 
offences' It should be noted though that even if the accused is not convicted of the 
al-hadd offence he is accused of, this does not necessarily mean that he cannot be 
punished on the basis of the same evidence, by a way of tazir, as discussed below. 
(3) Crimes of al-Ta'zir 
All crimes which do not fall into the previous two categories, fall within the tazir 
category. This includes any act that is considered sinful, or declared by the ruler to be 
punishable because it is contrary to the public interest. The standard of proof in this 
category is lower and more flexible than is required for the offences of al-hudud, as 
two witnesses or a voluntary confession is sufficient to sustain a conviction. However, 
51 Vogel, supra note 17, pp. 243-244. 
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the application of a ta'zir punishment is not restricted to proven crimes of al-ta'zir, but 
it also extends to those crimes, whether they are qisas, hudud or tazir, in which the 
qadi, based upon the evidence presented before him, is convinced that the accused has 
committed the alleged offence but the evidence for which does not meet the 
requirements of proof for such an offence. 52 Although in this case the qadi is 
empowered to punish the accused for `the strong accusation' (al-tuhmah al-queah), 
the punishment must not exceed or reach, in severity, the punishment to be applied if 
the crime is fully proven. The flexibility offered by `punishment of accusation', in 
terms of the standard of proof, relieves the qadi from the burden of seeking out two 
male witnesses or a voluntary confession, which is the minimum requirement of proof 
under Shari'ah law, and very difficult to obtain in practice. This flexibility allows the 
qadi to punish the defendant, on the basis of other types of evidence which are readily 
available and which, from the qadi's standpoint, are equally reliable. 
In order to illustrate the difference between the application of ta'zir punishments 
for fully proven crimes and those for accusations, the record of a particular case 
obtained from the records of the Summary Court in Riyadh will be summarised here. 
This case was brought against a defendant, who had been charged with drug- 
trafficking, which is a ta'zir offence. The defendant was arrested after he had sold 
eight pills of the illegal substance (captagon) to an informer, whose testimony was 
considered as inadmissible. The evidence against the defendant was the testimony of 
the arresting officer, who arranged the undercover operation. The officer testified that 
although he did not see the actual exchange of the pills for money, the informer had 
been searched before he went to see the defendant and did not have any pills on him, 
and after he met with the defendant, came back carrying 8 pills. As the witness did not 
actually see the exchange, and as the other arresting officers, for various irrelevant 
reasons, did not testify, the only evidence against the defendant was that of the 
arresting officer. Although the qadi ruled that the charge of drug-trafficking had not 
52 For a discussion of the qadi's power to impose a ta'zir punishment on the basis of accusation, see Al- 
Jawziyya, al-Siyasa, supra note 35, p. 12; Ibn Taymiyya, A, (d. 728 H) Majmu'a al-Fatawa (Collection 
of Legal Opinions) (Compiled by AL-Qaseem, A), 34 (Riyadh, 1983), pp. 236-238; Al-Malki, B (known 
as Ibn Farhoun, d. 799 H), Tubsirat al-Hukam fi Usul al-Qutheah wa Mnahy al-Ahkam (Enlightening 
Rulers with regard to Cases and Legal Rulings), 2 (Beirut: Dar Alum Al-Kutob, 2003), pp. 129-13 1; 
Mohammad, A (Known as Ibn Khaldoun, d. 808 H), al-Mugaddimah (The Introduction) (Beirut: Dar 
al-Qulem, 1984), p. 222; Al-Mawardi, A (d. 450 H), al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya wa al-Walayat al-Diniyya 
(The Sultanic Judgments & Religious Authorities) (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 1973), pp. 273- 
275; Vogel, F, 'The Trial of Terrorists under Classical Islamic Law', Harv. Int'l L. J., 43.1 (2002), 53, 
pp. 57-58. 
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been proven, he still decided to sentence the defendant to a ta'zir punishment (seven 
months imprisonment and 100 lashes) because the accusation was strengthened by the 
testimony of the arresting officer, and by the accused's previous criminal record, 
which included four convictions, three of which were possession of drugs and one of 
trafficking. 53 
Regarding the jurisdiction of the Shari'ah Courts over criminal offences, the 
Summary Court has jurisdiction over tazir offences cases, (except those exempted by 
law), crimes of al-hudud, (except those crimes which are punished by death, stoning 
or amputation), and compensation for bodily injury, which does not exceed one-third 
of the blood money (diya) for death. 54 On the other hand, the General Court has a 
general jurisdiction over all cases except those cases which are exempted by law (i. e., 
cases which fall into the jurisdiction of either the Summary Court or the Board of 
Grievances). 55 
Sitting above these two Courts is the Court of Appeal. It consists of three 
divisions: the Criminal Division, the Personal Status Division, and the Other Cases 
Division. Any appeal must be submitted to and reviewed by the trial court qadi first. 
If the trial qadi believes, on the basis of the appeal, that his judgment should be 
amended, he is empowered to do so. If, however, he does not believe that the appeal is 
justified, he has to refer the appeal to the Court of Appeal. 56 The Court of Appeal has 
the right to affirm the trial gadi's decision or to overturn it. However, the Court of 
Appeal is not permitted to overturn a judgment without first engaging in a dialogue 
with the qadi who issued the judgment under question. If the Court of Appeal 
disagrees with a qadi's judgment, it has to note its views and refer them to the trial 
qadi to consider. If the trial qadi then agrees with the views of the Court of Appeal, he 
53 Summary Court in Riyadh, Qadi Monsour al-Hamzani, court record (criminal) No. 12 (1424 H, 
2004 A. D) (Dec. 2,2003). 
54 The Code of Criminal Procedure, issued by Royal Decree No. M/39 (16 October 2001). Published on 
Unim al-Aura (the Saudi official Gazette) No. 3867 on 3 November 2001 [hereinafter CCP]. 
55 Regarding criminal cases, according to Art. 129 of the CCP, supra note 54, its jurisdiction extends, 
inter alia, over: 
[C]ases wherein the sentence claimed is the death penalty, stoning, amputation or qisas in 
cases other than death. This court shall not be entitled to issue a death sentence by way 
of to iir, except pursuant to an unanimous vote. Should such unanimity be impossible, 
the Minister of Justice shall assign two other qadis in addition to the three qadis who 
shall together be entitled, either unanimously or by majority vote, to issue a death 
sentence by way of to iir. 
56 CCP, supra note 54, Arts. 196-197; the Code of Civil Procedure, issue by Royal Decree No. M/21, 
(19 August 2000). Published on Umm al-Aura (the Saudi official Gazette) No. 3811 on 15 September 
2000, Arts. 180-181. 
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will amend his judgment accordingly. If, however, he disagrees with the views of the 
Court of Appeal, he has to inform them of his opinion. If the Court of Appeal is 
satisfied by the trial qadi's response, it will affirm the judgment. If, however, it 
disagrees with his response, it will set aside his judgment and order the case to be 
heard by a different qadi. The Court of Appeal in the latter case is also empowered to 
decide on the case if it believes there are urgent circumstances for doing so, and that 
the case is ready for judgment. If the Court of Appeal does decide on the case, its 
judgment is final unless it involves the imposition of the death sentence, stoning, 
amputation or qisas, in which the case shall be referred onto the SJC. 57 
At the top of the judicial hierarchy is the SJC, which is considered to be the final 
Court of Appeal. The SJC has various functions, but here the focus will be upon its 
appellate function. The SJC reviews all cases which involve the imposition of death, 
amputation or stoning sentences, and cases which are referred by the King to the SJC 
for extraordinary reviews. 58 The process of reviewing a judgment by the SJC is the 
same as the one followed by the Court of Appeal, as shown above. 59 
1.3.3 Binding precedents vs. Freedom of ijtihad 
While the Judicial Act 1975 attempts to enshrine a system of binding precedents in 
the judicial practice, in which the precedents adopted by the Court of Appeal or the 
SJC become binding on the lower courts and on the Court of Appeal, in practice there 
has been little done to transform this ideal into a reality. The discussion here will start 
by highlighting the Judicial Act 1975 provisions which are designed to unify the 
judgments of the Shari'ah Courts via a system of binding precedents before turning to 
consider the obstacles to and the arguments for opposing it, namely the freedom of 
gadis to practice ijtihad. 
According to the Judicial Act 1975, the Court of Appeal is bound by its previous 
ijtihad (i. e., a ruling), and cannot depart from it unless such a departure is approved 
by a majority vote of two-thirds of the General Assembly of the Court of Appeal, 
which includes all appellate qadis. However, if the departure does not achieve the 
57 Ibid. Arts. 203-205. Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 56, Arts. 185,187-188. 
58 Judicial Act 1975, supra note 45, Art. 8 (2), (4); CCP, supra note 54, Art 11. 59 Special Rapporteur, Dato' Param Cumaraswamy, on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers: 
Report on the Mission to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Human 
Rights Resolution 2002/43, U. N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 59th Sess, Item 11(d) of the 
provisional agenda U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4/2003/65/Add. 3, para. 23 [hereinafter Commission on Human 
Rights Report] 
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majority vote required, or indeed it is approved by a majority vote, but the Minister of 
Justice is opposed to such a departure, the matter shall be referred to the SJC. G° In 
addition, the SJC is entitled to declare binding general Shari'ah principles on matters 
which are considered by the Minister of Justice to be necessary. 61 In order to 
strengthen the system of binding precedents, the Judicial Act 1975 established, within 
the Ministry of Justice, a technical department for research. Members of the 
mentioned department are selected from among Shari'ah Courts qadis or Shari'ah 
college graduates. Their function is to deduce principles from the judgments of the 
Court of Appeal, classify, and index, those principles and the principles which are 
established by the SJC for easy reference. 62 The technical department is also 
entrusted, inter alia, with selecting collections of judgments for publication, and 
reviewing judgments in order to give their opinions on the legal principles on which 
they are based as to their consistency with justice in the light of the changing 
circumstances and conditions, which are then referred to the Minister of Justice. The 
Minister of Justice is, in turn, entitled, if he believes it is necessary, to refer the 
opinions of the technical department to the SJC for establishing general principles on 
the referred matters, as explained earlier. 63 
If the system of binding precedents as envisaged by the Judicial Act 1975 had 
been adopted by the judiciary, many of the problems currently facing the judicial 
system regarding the need to unify judgments and to systematically develop the law, 
would have been solved. Unfortunately this has faced fierce resistance from the 
majority of ulama and senior qadis, which explains why, to date, such a system only 
exists in the statute book. In their opposition and refusal to implement the system of 
binding precedents, neither the SJC nor the Court of Appeal has sought to repeal the 
provisions concerning the system of binding precedent. They simply chose to ignore 
them. 64 The main argument for opposing such a system is that to do so would interfere 
with the qadi's right to tihad. 
However, such an argument does not stand up to much scrutiny. Ijtihad in the 
strict sense means deriving a ruling from the sources. Saudi qadis who have GS 
60 Judicial Act 1975, supra note 45, Arts. 14-15,20. 
61 Ibid. Art. 8 (1). 
62 Ibid. Art. 89 (a). 
63 Ibid. Art. 89 (b), (f). 
64 See Vogel, supra note 17, pp. 107-114. 
65 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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graduated from the judicial institutes are, by their own admission, not qualified to 
practice ijtihad in the mentioned sense, but are mere mugaldeen (imitators, singular 
muqalid). 66 Therefore, their practice of "ijtihad" is restricted to either examining the 
proofs on which figh rulings are based, and apply the one, which has the most 
strength, on the case before them. Or to select from amongst various figh rulings the 
one the qadi believes to best serve the muslaha in the light of the circumstances of the 
case before him, as all the four schools of jurisprudence historically derive from the 
same sources. 67 However, it is worth pointing out two facts in this connection. Firstly, 
none of the Shari'ah Court judgments have ever been published, which also 
undermines any system of binding precedents. 68 Secondly, qadis, in their judgments, 
tend to only mention the opinion that they have applied in the case under examination, 
without explaining why they have adopted one opinion over another. 69 Thus it can be 
argued that these judgments are more influenced by the gadi's allegiance to a 
particular school of jurisprudence, or a particular jurist, rather than by the strength of 
the proofs on which the ruling is based or the likelihood of achieving inuslaha. 
In addition, such practice creates other problems. Qadis in similar cases reach 
different conclusions. This is not restricted to the lower courts but also applies to the 
Courts of Appeal, as there are two separate appellate courts in Saudi Arabia, one in 
Riyadh and the other in Mecca, which further undermines any potential system of 
binding precedents. 70 Furthermore, as the Judicial Act 1975 rightly states there are 
66 Interview with Sheik Tameem Al-Aunizan, Qadi of the Summery Court in Riyadh, (July. 11,2004); 
interview with Sheik Suleiman Al-Hudiathi, Qadi of the General Court in Riyadh, (July. 18,2004); 
interview with Sheik Mohammed Al Jaarallah, Qadi of the General Court in Riyadh, (Aug. 2-3,2004); 
interview with Sheik Saleh Al-Aujri, Qadi of the General Court in Riyadh, (Aug. 4,2004). 
67 Vogel, supra note 17, pp, 130-135 
68 This happened despite the fact that the Judicial Act 1975 suggested that the `selected collection of 
judgments' would be published. Recently, however, the Council of Ministers has issued an order for 
publishing 'selected judgments'. Whether this decision faces the same fate as the provisions of the 
Judicial Act 1975 remains to be seen. See supra note 63 and accompanying text; Commission on 
Human Rights Report, supra note 59, para. 18. 
69 In the limited number of judgments that the present researcher has been able to see during his 
fieldwork period, lie has found little explanation for the rulings the qadis choose to apply to each case 
brought before them. In some cases, they mention the name of the scholar, whose opinion they chose, 
without citing the basis for it, whether it was textual or muslaha. Neither do they discuss alternative 
opinions applicable to the case under consideration. The same observation has been made by Professor 
Vogel, who has carried out extensive and insightful research on the practice of Utihad by Saudi qadis. 
See Vogel, supra note 17, p. 120. 
70 See the minority's opinion of the Council of Senior Islamic Scholars, (the highest religious authority 
in Saudi Arabia) in 'Fatwa' No. 8 (legal opinion), published in Lajnat al-Buhuth al-Llmiyya (the 
Commission of Scientific Research), al-Riyasa al-Amma li-Idarat al-Buhuth al-Llmiyya wa al-Ifta, 
(The General Department of Scientific Research and Guidance), 'Tadween al-Rajih min Aqwal al- 
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rulings based upon muslaha that need to be critically evaluated before being applied. 
There are also novel matters for which there are nofiqh rulings at all to deal withal In 
both cases, a systematic legislative intervention by the judiciary via Utihad and a 
system of binding precedents is required to ensure that the law is applied in a uniform 
and consistent manner, and in consistency with the public interest. 
Finally, and more importantly, even if one assumes, for the purposes of argument, 
that Saudi qadis are qualified mujtihdeen and do practice ijtihad, in my view, there is 
nothing, in principle, in a system of binding precedents that could be held as 
precluding qadis from Utihad. In fact, if anything, it is the contrary. A system of 
binding precedents would require the lower courts to follow the precedents reached by 
the superior courts. However, the qadis of the lower courts are entitled, through the 
practice of ijtihad, if they believe that a given precedent should not be applied to a 
given case, to decide it in accordance with what they believe to be just by 
distinguishing the facts of the case from those of the precedent, or by pointing out 
what they believe to be shortcomings in the precedent. It would be up to the superior 
court to reverse the qadi's decision, if it believes that the departure from the precedent 
is unjustified, or uphold it; by accepting that the facts of the case are distinguishable 
from that of the precedent, or by amending or overruling the precedent if it appears 
that continuing with it is unjust. 72 Therefore, it can be argued that the system of 
binding precedents could encourage the qadis to be creative (i. e., real mujtihdeen), 
albeit through a strictly regulated system, as opposed to precluding them from ijtihad 
as it is alleged by Saudi ularna who are opposed to such a system. 
As a consequence of the ulama's negative response, which is based partly on 
ignorance and partly on idealism that is totally divorced from reality, many scholars, 
including a minority of ulama, have demanded that the ruler ought to intervene to 
codify the Shari'ah and make extensive use of siyasa laws. However, if the 
conservative ularna refused to use the legislative tool which the Judicial Act 1975 has 
Fuqaha (Codifying the Persuasive Opinions of Jurists) (Part 3)', Islamic Research Journal, 33 (1412 
(H) 1992), 19, pp. 33-35 [hereinafter Fatwa]. 
71 See Atiah, J, 'al-Tajdeed al-Fiqhi al-Manshowd (The Desired Jurisprudential Renewal)', in Tajdeed 
al-Filth al-Islaini (Renewing Islamic Jurisprudence), ed. by Dar al-Fikr, (Damascus: Dar al-Fikr, 
2000), pp. 22-23; Al-Zuhili, supra note 14, pp. 167-168. 
72 For a comparative perspective on how the system of binding precedents fares under the English legal 
system, see generally Bailey, S. H. & Gunn, M. J, Smith & Bailey on the Modern English Legal 
System, 3rd edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1996), pp. 413-454. 
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provided them with, would they accept that the ruler performs a role that they have 
denied themselves? What follows is a discussion that attempts to answer this question. 
1.4 Siyasa shar'iyya 
While siyasa could be translated as the rules of governance, siyasa shar'iyya means 
legitimate siyasa or siyasa according to the Shari'ah. Under this doctrine, the ruler is 
vested with the power to act to advance the public interest (muslaha), provided that 
the Shari'ah is not violated thereby. While the first provision of this doctrine is not 
disputed, the latter is understood and applied very differently and is subject to much 
dispute in Saudi Arabia. 73 In order to determine the scope of the power which the 
ruler is entitled to under this doctrine, this section examines first the scholarship on 
this subject, which is to be found mainly in the writings of medieval jurists, before 
examining the provisions of the Saudi (written) law concerning this power and how 
they are applied in practice by exploring the Shari'ah Courts qadis' position on this 
issue. 
According to Imam In Taymiyya (a Hanbali scholar, d. 728 H), who is 
considered to be one of the leading scholars on this subject, the doctrine of siyasa 
shar'iyya is based on the Qur'anic verses which state that: 
Allah commands you to render back your trusts to those to whom they are 
due; and when ye judge between people that ye judge with [a sense] of 
justice * Obey Allah, and obey the Messenger, and those who are 
entrusted with authority among you; and if you are at variance over any 
matter, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you [truly] believe in Allah 
and the Last Day.... 74 
According to Imam Ibn Taymiyya's writings, two groups of people are mentioned in 
the above-quoted verses: the rulers and the citizens. While the rulers are obliged to 
govern in accordance with justice (i. e., the precepts of the Shari'ah), the citizens are 
obliged, as long as they are not ordered to do something that is prohibited by the 
Shari'ah, to obey the orders of their rulers. If there is a disagreement between the ruler 
and the citizens regarding the legality of the orders, or the policy of the ruler, their 
disagreement must be reviewed in the light of the Shari'ah to ensure that neither the 
73 Vogel, supra note 17, pp. 173-176. 
74 The Holy Qur'an, verses 4: 58-59. 
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ruler nor the citizens have violated their respective obligations. 
75 He also adds that the 
aim of the ruler's power is to advance the public good and protect it from any harm. 
76 
In short, Imam Ibn Taymiyya set two conditions to be met in order for the practice of 
siyasa to be legitimate: firstly, that it must not violate the Shari'ah; and secondly, that 
its aim must be to secure the public good and protect it from any harm. 77 
Imam Ibn Al-Qayyim, (a Hanbali scholar, d. 751 H) another leading jurist on this 
subject, defines siyasa shar'iyya as `the actions that lead the people to virtue and 
distance them from evil, even if it is not legislated for by the Prophet, or sanctioned 
through revelation. '78 This suggests that Imam Ibn Al-Qayyim, in essence, adopts the 
same view as Imam Ibn Taymiyya mentioned above. Imam Ibn Al-Qayyim goes 
further to support his argument by citing ancient precedents from the time of the 
Prophet, in which He practiced siyasa in his capacity as a ruler, and his successors 
(Khalifahs) in which their actions were taken without being, directly, sanctioned 
through revelation. These examples include, inter alia, the detention of a person 
suspected of committing a crime where there was circumstantial evidence against him 
or her (as it was done by the Prophet himself). Another is the collection of Qur'an in 
one book at the time of the Khalifah Autuman (the third successor to the Prophet). 
These actions were aimed at ensuring that crimes are properly investigated in the 
former example, and at protecting the religion from distortion in the latter. Both 
actions are considered, from the Shari'ah point of view, as legitimate as their aim is to 
secure a legitimate public interest. Finally, Imam Ibn Al-Qayyim concludes that the 
practice of siyasa, given that it meets the above-stated conditions, `cannot ... be said 
to be contrary to the Shari ah, but is compatible with its precepts, in fact it is part of it, 
and we only call it siyasa as a matter of terminology, but it is the justice of God and 
His Prophet. '79 
From the above mentioned opinions it can be concluded that a Muslim ruler has 
the power to act to advance the public interest, provided that the Shari'ah is not 
infringed thereby. Now attention will be focused on the Saudi law and practice to 
75 Ibn Taymiyya, A, al-Siyasa al-Shar'iyya f Islah al-Rraiy wa al-Rraiya (The Legitimate Policy for 
Reforming the Leader and the Nation) (Beriut: Dar al-Jeeal, 1993), pp. 11-12. 
76 Ibid. p. 67. 
77 See Vogel, supra note 17, p. 205. 
78 A1-Jawziyya, al-Siyasa, supra note 35, p. 3. 
79 Ibid p. 11-12. For further discussion, see ibid. pp. 10-19; AI-Jawziyya, A'lane, supra note 32, vol. 4, 
pp. 283-288. 
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determine the scope of such a power. There are three Articles in the Basic Law that 
deal with this issue. Articles 48,55, and 67, state respectively that: 
The courts shall apply the rules of the Islamic Shari'ah in the cases that 
are brought before them, in accordance with what is indicated in the Book 
and the Sunnah, and laws decreed by the Ruler which do not contradict 
the Book or the Sunnah. 
The King shall carry out the governing (siyasa) of the nation in 
accordance with siyasa shar'iyya in fulfilment of the rules of Islam.... 
The regulatory authority [i. e., the King at the suggestion of either or both 
the Council of Ministers or the Consultative Council] shall have the 
jurisdiction to enact regulations and bye-laws in order to attain welfare 
and avoid harm in the affairs of the state, in accordance with the general 
rules of Islamic Shari'ah. 
These Articles suggest that the King, or anybody authorised by him to regulate the 
law, can enact regulations that are necessary for securing the public interest, provided 
that they are inspired by the general principles of the Shari'ah and do not conflict with 
explicit texts from the Qur'an or the Sunnah. If these regulations conform with the 
above-mentioned requisites, they have a binding force on the judiciary, as Article 48, 
quoted above, clearly indicates. This fact is also supported by Article 1 of the Judicial 
Act 1975, which states that `[q]adis are independent and, in the administration of 
justice, they shall be subject to no authority other than the provisions of Shari'ah and 
laws in force. ' Similarly, Article I of Code of Civil Procedure80 states that `[c]ourts 
shall apply to cases brought before them the provisions of Shari'ah law, in 
accordance with the Qur'an and Sunnah of the Prophet (peace be upon him), and laws 
promulgated by the state that do not conflict with the Qur'an and Sunnah.... ' 
To this extent, it can be argued that the Saudi (written) law is nothing but a 
codification of the provisions of the doctrine of siyasa shar'iyya as expressed by 
medieval jurists. Given this fact one would expect the Shariah Court qadis in Saudi 
Arabia to apply siyasa laws without any hesitation, since as long as they meet the 
conditions of siyasa shar'iyya, they are not just legitimate laws but they also, as Imam 
Ibn Al-Qayyim put it `[are] part of [the Shari'ah]'. 81 
However, the majority of Saudi ulaina and senior qadis remain uneasy about the 
ruler's power to regulate. They argue that this power should be restricted to two 
80 Supra note 56. 
81 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
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spheres: crimes of al-ta'zir, and administration. 82 To better explain the ulama's 
opposition to siyasa laws, it is necessary to distinguish between those issues which 
are governed by equivocal texts, in which the opinions of scholars have varied 
depending on their understanding of these texts, and those issues where there are no 
texts to refer to. As explained earlier, these two areas fall within the realm of ijtihad, 
in which scholars exercise their ijtihad to arrive at what they believe is what God 
would have ruled. Thus, allowing the ruler to regulate in these areas would, according 
to those ulama who are opposed to such authority, constitute, just as binding 
precedents would do, an invasion on the right of qadis to decide cases according to 
their own ijtihad. 83 
This argument is solely based on the premise that Saudi qadis are qualified 
mujtihdeen practicing ijtihad, who believe that to allow the ruler to enact regulations, 
outside the spheres of crimes of al-tazir and administration would interfere with the 
authority assigned to them, by God, to comprehend His law. However, as discussed 
earlier, this premise is false as Saudi qadis are not qualified mujtihdeen, nor do they 
practice ijtihad in the strict sense of the word. 84 Thus the argument that to allow the 
ruler to enact regulations in areas where the opinion of the scholars are variable by 
exclusively selecting appropriate views from them based upon muslaha (i. e., to codify 
the figh), will affect the right of a qadi to ijtihad is at the very best, a weak one when 
one considers that such a right only exists in a hypothetical fashion. This is especially 
true, when one bears in mind the advantages that codification could bring to the 
judicial system as a whole including: inter alia, the uniformity of judgments, the 
Shari 'ah being accessible to lay citizens who lack the skill and knowledge to consult 
the Shari 'ah in its classical form, in order to know the applicable law to their cases, 
and the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by eliminating suspicion or doubt 
that qadis apply the Shari 'ah in an arbitrary or unfair manner. 85 
82 See Vogel, supra note 17, pp. 175-176. 
83 Ibid. p. 337-338. See also the majority's opinion of the Council of Senior Islamic Scholars, (the 
highest religious authority in Saudi Arabia) in Fatwa No. 8 (legal opinion), published in Lajnat al- 
Buhuth al-Llmiyya (the Commission of Scientific Research), al-Riyasa al-Aroma li-Idarat al-Buhuth al- 
Llmiyya wa al-Ifta, (The General Department of Scientific Research and Guidance), 'Tadween al-Rajili 
min Aqwal al-Fugaha (Codifying the Persuasive Rulings of Jurists) (Part 1)', Islamic Research Journal, 
31 (1411 (H) 1991); Abu Zayd, B, al-Taqnin wa al-Ilzam (Codification and Compulsion) (Riyadh: Dar 
Al-Hilal 11-Aufist, 1982), pp. 55-81. 
84 See supra para. 1.3.3. 
85 For further discussion of the arguments justifying the codification of filth and its advantages, see the 
minority's opinion of the Council of Senior Islamic Scholars, (the highest religious authority in Saudi 
Arabia), Fatwa, supra note 70, pp. 26-52; Abudlbur, M, Taqnin al-Fiqh al-Island: al-Mabid'a, al- 
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In addition, in areas where there are no texts, ijma or a valid qiyas to deal with a 
given issue, such issue will be governed by afiqh ruling based upon niuslaha mursala 
and it is very likely that was formulated in the medieval era. With regard to novel 
matters, there are not evenfiqh rulings to deal with them. Thus, in light of the judicial 
authority's inability or unwillingness to practice ijtihad and refusal to adopt the 
system of binding precedents, depriving the ruler, in the Saudi context, from the 
power to regulate in these areas would mean that there would legal problems that are 
left without being addressed adequately, or not being addressed at all. To elaborate 
further, rulings based upon muslaha need to change according to time and place in 
order to ensure that magaasid al-shari'ah (the overall objectives of the Shari'ah), 
which these rulings are designed to achieve, are properly secured in the light of the 
changing circumstances. Thus, if these rulings are not constantly critically evaluated 
before being applied to current circumstances, their application could be contrary to 
magaasid al-shari'ah, which these rulings were designed to achieve in the first 
place. 86 The magnitude of the problem is even greater where there is no figh ruling to 
deal with a given issue, as this situation would require qadis to practice ijtihad. 
However, given Saudi qadis do not practice ijtihad, it would seem that the only way 
to deal with these issues in an adequate and uniform manner, is to allow the ruler to 
enact regulations for them. 
Finally, there is nothing in the writings of either Imams Ibn Taymiyya or Ibn Al- 
Qayyim, whose opinions are widely respected and followed by Saudi ulama, that 
suggests that the ruler is precluded from acting, at least, in areas where there are no 
texts, yma or a valid qiyas to deal with pressing social problems. In fact the writings 
of these scholars can only be understood as legitimising the actions of the ruler in 
such areas. 87 In this respect, Professor Vogel made the following remarks: 
Notice ... 
[ulama's] position-both as to the content of the laws and as to 
the jurisdictions to enforce them - take a far more niggardly view of the 
king's legislative powers than is justified by the fiqh doctrine that 
ostensibly govern the issue, the doctrine of siyasa shar'iyya, can the 
'ulama' really claim that these laws, drafted with solicitude for figh and 
usually in consultation with the 'ulama', offend fundamental rules of 
Manhgyyiah wa al-Tadpeeq (The Codification of Islamic Jurisprudence: Principle, Methodology and 
Practice), 2nd edn (Doha: The Department for Renewing Islamic Heritage, 1986), pp. 35-75; Al- 
Qassem, al-Islam, supra note 37, pp. 41-166; Vogel, supra note 17, pp. 338-353; Al-Zuhili, supra note 
14, p. 262. 
86 See supra para. 1.2.2. 
87 See Kalaf, A, al-Siyasa al-Shar'iyya (The Legitimate Policy) (Cairo: Dar al-Ansaar, 1977), pp. 4-24. 
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shari'a to the degree that they must be ignored wholesale? Similarly, 
while the shari'a courts' refusal to enforce the nizams [i. e., siyasa laws] is 
very real, the rest of their position is somewhat unreal. It seems insincere 
for the 'ulama' to oppose most of the content of these laws and most of the 
adjudication enforcing them when they offer as yet nothing to put in their 
place. Do they really intend the repeal of [, for example, ] traffic laws? If 
they were serious about deciding nizam cases by f qh, then they have to 
perform a major effort of Utihad to draft filth rules to replace the nizams, 
this is not occurring .... 
8ß 
That is to say, the power of the ruler to enact regulations, even in areas which are 
governed by equivocal texts, is, in my view, not only supported by doctrinal 
considerations but also, and equally compellingly, by practical ones. As siyasa laws 
would be redundant if they were, either directly or indirectly, not respected by the 
judiciary, and as the subject matter of this thesis is the rights of the accused in the pre- 
trial stage in Saudi Arabia, mostly of which regulated through siyasa laws, the effect 
of this controversial position on the implementation of these laws and the best way to 
deal with them, will be discussed in-depth later. 89 
1.4.1 The regulatory authority (al-sultah al-tanzimiyya) 
As pointed out above, the ruler under the concept of siyasa shar'iyya has the power to 
issue laws to supplement, but not contradict, the Shari'ah for the purposes of 
advancing public interest. This section discusses the authorities entrusted with and the 
mechanisms for issuing siyasa laws. It is interesting to note the non-use by the Saudi 
government of the terms `legislation' and `legislature' when referring to siyasa laws, 
and the body who issues them. As discussed above, under Islamic legal theory, God is 
the sovereign in the sense that His law is the supreme law and that only He has the 
power to legislate. Therefore, out of respect for this belief, the Saudi government has 
replaced the term legislation (tashri'a) with `regulation' (nizarn, plural anzinzah). 
Likewise, the authority that makes siyasa laws is referred to as the `regulatory 
authority' (al-sultah al-tanzhniyya). 90 To avoid any confusion resulting form the 
translation of Saudi legal terms regarding the various types of laws issued by the 
regulatory and executive authorities, in the remainder of this section, the term `statute' 
88 Vogel, supra note 17, pp. 176-177. See also, Al-Qassem, A& Al-Nasri, A. 'al-Buniah al-Tashri'aiah 
wa al-Qudaiah fi al-Mamlaka (The Legislative and Judicial Infrastructure in the Kingdom). ' Riyadh 
Economic Forum, ed. (Riyadh, 2003), pp. 47-51. 
89 See infra pp. 285-287,296-299. 
90 Al-Marzuqi, supra note 9, pp. 23-25; Aba-Namay, supra note 4, pp. 209-210. 
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will be used to refer to `nizam, or regulation' in the strict sense, as explained below, 
the term `regulation' will be used to refer to bye-laws (laiha, plural luaih), and the 
term `law' will be used to refer to both types of nizams (i. e., statutes and regulations). 
As already mentioned, the regulatory authority has the power to issues laws, as 
long as they advance public interest and do not contradict the Islamic Shari'ah. Article 
67 of the Basic Law clearly states that `[t]he regulatory authority shall have the 
jurisdiction to enact statutes and regulations in order to attain welfare and avoid harm 
in the affairs of the state, in accordance with the general rules of Islamic Shari'ah. ' 
What the Basic Law fails to define, however, is who exactly the regulatory authority 
is. This is exacerbated further by the constitutional reforms of 1992 that created more 
than one body with the right to regulate. Currently, both the Council of Ministers and 
the Consultative Council share the task and right to propose and draft new laws. 
The Council of Ministers Law entitles every Council Minister to propose a statute 
or regulation, which pertains to his Ministry's field of work. 91 The process begins with 
a prepared draft developed by the relevant department at the Council of Ministers 
(i. e., the Bureau of Experts, which is composed of a number people who are highly 
specialised in modern law), 92 in consultation with the relevant Ministry. This is then 
sent for consideration and approval by the Council of Ministers and the Consultative 
Council. 93 As long as the two Councils have agreed on the formulation and content of 
the proposed draft, and it gained the King's approval, it will be issued as a law. 
However, if the two Councils differ on the proposed law, the draft will be referred 
back to the Consultative Council for further consideration and then it is referred to the 
King to decide what he `deems fit'. 94 
The Consultative Council, in addition to its role as outlined above, was also 
entrusted with the right to propose laws, and amend existing laws, on the suggestion 
of ten of its members. However, from when it was first established until very recently, 
it had not been able to exercise this right effectively. The reason for this was that the 
Consultative Council Law required that any proposal must first be approved by the 
King before the Council could prepare any draft. However, in practice, this approval 
91 Council of Ministers Law, supra note 7, Art. 22. 
92 Ibid. Art. 30. For a discussion of the role of the Bureau of Experts in drafting laws, see Al-Marzuqi, 
supra note 9, pp. 323-328. 
93 Consultative Council Law, supra note 7, Art. 15 (c). 
94 Ibid. Art. 17 as amended by Royal Decree No. A/198 (26 November 2003). 
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had never been given. 95 In acknowledgment of this defect, the King, as recently as 
2003, amended the Consultative Council Law by allowing the Council to propose and 
study any law draft, or seek to amend an existing law on the suggestion of ten of its 
members and the approval of its Chairman. It remains that on the completion of the 
study and drafting of a law or the suggested amendment of an existing law by the 
Council, the proposal shall still be submitted to the King by the Council Chairman. 96 
The Council also has the authority to interpret laws. 97 The decision of the Council 
on the proposed interpretation is then reviewed by the Council of Ministers. If both 
Councils agree on the proposed interpretation, and it is granted the King's approval, a 
Royal Decree is then issued providing the interpretation with a legally binding effect 
if it concerns a statute, or a Council of Minister Order if it concerns a regulation. If, 
however, the two councils adopt different views on the interpretation of a given law, 
the draft will be referred back to the Consultative Council for further consideration. 
After it has been reconsidered by the Consultative Council, its decision is referred to 
the King, who has the right to decide what he `deems fit'. 98 It should be noted though, 
that to the best of this writer's knowledge, this function has never been exercised by 
the Consultative Council. 
It is therefore clear, that even after the establishment of the Consultative Council, 
it is the Council of Ministers who actually has the upper hand in the regulatory 
process. 99 Needless to say that it is the King who has the ultimate power over the 
regulatory process, as members of both Councils are appointed and dismissed by 
him, 100 and there is no proposed law, amendment to an existing law, or interpretation 
of a law, even if approved by both Councils, that can have any legal effect without the 
King's approval. 101 
1.4.2 The hierarchy of laws 
There is no formal hierarchical classification of siyasa laws in Saudi Arabia, but there 
is an unsystematic emerging hierarchy based on western legal concepts, particularly 
95 Al-Saud, F, al-Tutuer al-Siyasi fi al-Mamlaka al-Arabiyyah al-Saudiyyah wa Tageem Majlis a! - 
Shura (The Political Development in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and an Evaluation of the 
Consultative Council) (Riyadh: AI-Obekan Bookshop & Publishers, 2002), p. 281. 
96 Consultative Council Law, supra note 6, Art. 23 as amended by Royal Decree No. A/198 (26 
November 2003). 
97 Ibid. Art. 15 (c). 
98 See supra note 94. 
99 See Al-Saud, supra note 95, p. 207. 
100 Council of Ministers Law, Art. 8; Consultative Council Law, Art. 3. 
101 See Aba-Namay, supra note 4, pp. 305-306,314. 
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those of France. 102 Based on the primacy of law, the siyasa laws in descending order 
are the basic statutes, the ordinary statutes, and regulations. 103 The following is a brief 
description of these three types of laws. 
1.4.2.1 Basic statutes (al-anzimah al-asassiah) 
This category of basic statutes includes: the Basic Law of Government, the 
Consultative Council Law, and the Council of Ministers Law. There are a number of 
considerations that suggest these statutes have a superior status over other laws. First, 
the extraordinary way by which these laws were drafted and promulgated. As 
mentioned above, ordinary statutes are drafted by the Consultative Council and the 
Council of Ministers and, on the King's approval, they are promulgated by a Royal 
Decree, whereas the basic statutes were drafted by a special committee, whose 
members were appointed by the King especially for the purposes of drafting the basic 
statutes. This was done away from both the Consultative Council, which did not exist 
at the time, and the Council of Ministers which had, and still has, a significant 
regulatory role. 104 
Secondly, as already mentioned, ordinarily all statutes are reviewed and amended 
by the Council of Ministers, in consultation with the Consultative Council, and 
amendments to laws are issued by a Royal Decree. 105 However, according to Royal 
Decree M/23 issued on 26/8/1412 H (1993), the basic statutes are exempted from 
being reviewed or amended by the ordinary mechanism, and according to specific 
clauses attached to each of these statutes, they may only be amended in the same way 
as they were promulgated, i. e., Royal Orders as opposed to Royal Decrees. 106 Finally, 
the Royal Orders, by which the basic statutes were promulgated, include specific 
provision requiring that other laws should be amended to conform to these statutes. 107 
All these considerations suggest that these statutes have a superior status over other 
State laws. 108 
102 See Hanson, M, 'The Influence of French Law on the Legal Development of Saudi Arabia', ALQ, 2 
(1987), 272; Vogel, supra note 17, p. 290. 
103 It should be noted that all state laws are subordinate to the Islamic Shari'ah under the Saudi 
constitution. See supra para. 1.1. 
104 Al-Marzuqi, supra note 9, pp. 64-66. 
105 See supra para. 1.4.1. 
106 See the Basic Law, Art. 83; the Consultative Council Law, Art. 30; Council of Ministers Law, Art. 
32. 
107 See supra notes 5-7. 
108 See al-Marzuqi, supra note 9, pp. 84-85 
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1.4.2.2 Ordinary statutes (anzimah adiah) 
This category includes all statutes which follow the ordinary procedure in drafting 
laws and which are promulgated by Royal Decrees. 109 While these statutes have a 
superior status over regulations, they have, at least in theory, as discussed above, a 
subordinate status to the basic statutes. 
It should be noted, however, as there is no constitutional court within the Saudi 
judicial system entrusted with reviewing the constitutionality of any given law, the 
significance of the distinction between the basic statutes and ordinary statutes only 
has effect when ordinary statutes are being drafted. However, if a subordinate law 
(i. e., an ordinary statute) is, allegedly, incompatible with a superior law (i. e., a basic 
statute), there is no mechanism by which such alleged incompatibility is reviewed 
and, if indeed exists, eliminated in order to preserve the hierarchy of laws. ' 10 
1.4.2.3 Regulations (luaih) 
The main difference between regulations and ordinary statutes is that a regulation can 
be promulgated either by a Council of Ministers Order or by a Ministerial Order by a 
Council Minister (as long as there is a specific statute that gives a Council Minister 
such an authority), and the publication of it is not required before it becomes 
effective. Whereas ordinary statutes, as discussed above, can only be promulgated by 
a Royal decree and must be published in the official gazette, to take effect on the date 
of publication unless another date is specified. "' The main type of regulation that has 
come about is implementing regulations, which are enacted for the purpose of 
implementing existing statutes. ' 12 As such, implementing regulations are subordinate 
to statutes, and must not, therefore, contradict them. 
109 See supra para. 1.4.1. 
10 See Al-Qassem, supra note 88, p. 74. This is equally applicable to siyasa laws which are, allegedly, 
incompatible with the Islamic Shar-Pah. It should be noted, however, that the practice of the Shari'ah 
Courts is to ignore any laws, which are believed by qadis to be incompatible with the Shari'ah law, and 
apply the applicable Shari'ah provision on the case under consideration, without expressly declaring 
such law as unconstitutional. See Vogel, supra note 17, p. 111. 
11 The Basic Law, Art. 71. Under French law the same distinction regarding the requirement of 
publication exists between statutes (loi) and 'regulation (reglement). In this respect, see generally 
Dickson, B, Introduction to French Law (London: Pitman Publishing, 1994), pp. 7-8. 
112 This type of regulation is known under the French law as reglement d'application (implementing 
regulations) or decrets d'application (implementing decrees), which are enacted in order to implement 
Acts of Parliament. In this respect, see generally West, A, et al, The French Legal System, 2nd edn 
(London: Butterworths, 1998), pp. 28-29,33. 
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As regulations are enacted by the executive authority, as opposed to statutes, 
which are issued by the regulatory authority, 113 regulations are, in essence, considered 
to be administrative decisions which, if their legality is challenged by the relevant 
persons, are reviewable by the administrative court (i. e., the Board of Grievances). If 
they are found to, inter alia, contradict a superior law they are subject to 
annulment. ) 4 
1.5 Conclusion 
The Shari'ah holds the dominant place in the constitution and practice in Saudi 
Arabia. The introduction of the Basic Law has not lessened the Shari'ah's status, in 
fact, if anything, it has enhanced it. The most striking feature of the Saudi legal 
system has been the existence of two distinct and yet, supposedly, complementary 
types of laws: filth and siyasa. The former is the product of the exercise of ijtihad by 
ulama, while the latter is the product of the King's power to regulate under the 
concept of siyasa shar'iyya. However, the stalemate is created by each legislative 
parties (i. e., the ulama and the King) assuming to have a wider scope of legislative 
power than the other party is willing to concede. Given that the conservative ulama 
have a firm hand on the judiciary, which has the ultimate responsibility for applying 
the law, and that siyasa laws, which deals with matters outside the spheres of al-ta'zir 
offences and administration, are viewed by ulama as an invasion of what they 
consider the qadi's right to ijtihad, although this right is not exercised in practice, 
many siyasa laws exist in the statute book but not in practice. 
On the other hand, the problem regarding the legitimacy of siyasa laws is not 
only created by the judiciary's ideological and impractical stance on the issue of the 
scope of the ruler power's to regulate, but the government has made its own 
contribution to complicating the problem further. Many of the siyasa laws, including 
113 Although this distinction might be obscure due to the fact that the Council of Ministers is the 
supreme regulatory and executive authority. 
114 Hekel, A, al-Qanun al-Idari al-Saudi (The Saudi Administrative Law) (Riyadh: King Saud 
University Press, 1994), pp. 212-216. According to Article 8 of the Law of Board of Grievances, supra 
note 43: 
1- The Board of Grievances shall have the jurisdiction over: 
(b) Lawsuits which are submitted by relevant persons contesting an administrative order when 
the reason is due to ... 
its incompatibility with statutes.... 
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those which govern the issues examined in this thesis, have been transplanted from 
other jurisdictions, namely from Egypt. It will be shown that this has occurred on the 
unexamined assumption that they fulfil muslaha and do not contradict the textual 
sources and are therefore justified by the doctrines of siyasa shar'iyya and muslaha 
mursala. 
As a consequence of these problems, the legal system has been unable to 
transform itself to meet current needs. As the aim of this thesis is to examine the 
extent to which the Saudi pre-trial criminal procedural and practice comply with 
international human rights standards, the effect of these problems on the Saudi 
system's ability to provide effective protection to human rights, and the best way to 
deal with these problems in relations to the issues examined in this thesis will be 
discussed in depth in due course. 
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Chapter Two 
International Human Rights Law 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Shari'ah is the supreme law of Saudi Arabia. 
Since the aim of this thesis is to examine the extent to which the Saudi pre-trial 
criminal procedural law and practice comply with international human rights 
standards, this chapter focuses upon international human rights law. 
Throughout the history of international law until recently, the matter of a 
government's treatment of its own citizens was considered to be wholly a domestic 
affair. International law was solely concerned with regulating the relationship 
between states as sovereign entities. Hence, if a country refrained from providing its 
citizens with any rights or mistreated them, it could not be criticised or compelled to 
do otherwise. If another state decided to interfere in such a matter, the interfering 
country could be accused of violating the sovereignty of another state and 
subsequently being in violation of international law. I 
However, after the Second World War in which crimes against humanity were 
committed by governments against their own citizens - particularly those crimes 
committed by the Nazi government against the Jews during World War II - there was 
a growing realisation on the part of the post-War powers of the need to establish an 
effective system for protecting individual rights, to prevent the atrocities of the War 
from ever happening again. The idea was that all states should be obliged to comply 
with minimum standards of human rights in the treatment of their citizens. 2 When the 
United Nations was established in 1945, the ambitious idea of creating an 
international system for protecting human rights topped its agenda. The unanimous 
adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 by the United Nations 
General Assembly paved the way for the development of an international human 
rights system. Almost sixty years on, a large number of human rights treaties have 
been adopted by the United Nations which include enforcement machinery for 
ensuring the practical implementation of the recognised rights. In addition, the 
1 See Sohn, L, 'The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of the Individuals Rather than 
States', Ani. U. L. Rev., 32 (1982), 1, pp. 9-11 [hereinafter International Law]; Bilder, R, 'An Overview 
of International Human Rights Law', in Guide to International Human Rights Practice, 2nd edn, ed. by 
H Hannum, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), p. 4. 2 See Buergenthal, T, 'The Human Rights Revolution', St. May's L. J., 23.1 (1991-1992), 3. 
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concern over human rights has been a preoccupation at the regional level, resulting in 
the establishment of regional human rights systems, with the aim of enhancing the 
protection of the individual's universal rights. 
Despite this impressive development in the field of human rights, in practice 
massive human rights violations are still commonplace. Hence, the purpose of this 
chapter is twofold: firstly, to highlight the development of international human rights 
law and the concepts upon which it is based; secondly, to discuss what is considered 
to be the major conceptual problems hindering the practical implementation of human 
rights, particularly in Muslim countries. The claim that human rights are based on 
Western concepts, which arguably makes them unsuitable for other cultures, is a 
serious threat to the progress of the human rights movement. Thus a careful 
consideration of the debate surrounding the universality of human rights with the aim 
of providing a satisfactory answer to the question of the relativity/universality of 
human rights is essential, before proceeding to evaluate the Saudi Arabian system on 
the basis of international human rights standards with regard to the theme of this 
thesis. 
In order to do so, the chapter is divided into four parts. Part one explores the 
philosophical and historical roots of the modern human rights concept on which the 
international human rights system is based. Part two discusses the sources of 
international human rights, and the existing enforcement methods for implementing 
human rights at the international and regional levels. In the third part, attention will be 
focused on the relativity/universality debate of human rights. The final part considers 
the question of the universality of human rights in relation to Saudi Arabia's laws and 
policies. 
2.1 Historical and philosophical origins of human rights 
The question regarding the philosophical and historical origins of the modern concept 
of human rights is not an academic one; as will be discussed, it has influenced and 
still greatly influences human rights discourse. 3 The modem concept of human rights, 
which considers human rights as entitlements which one has merely because he/she is 
3 See infra para. 2.3. 
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a human being, 4 is a relatively recent development. Although some attempts have 
been made to trace the modem concept of human rights back to the rise of Islamic 
civilisation fourteen centuries ago, 5 its historical and philosophical grounds are rooted 
in the philosophical and political revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. John Locke and the philosophers of the Age of Enlightenment, building 
upon the theory of natural law, perceived human beings to be possessed of certain 
inalienable rights in the state of nature before they entered into society. As all human 
beings have equally the same basic nature, natural rights which are based on that 
nature are considered to be universally and equally held by all. To avoid the 
inconveniences and dangers of the state of nature, individuals entered into 'a social 
contract' by which they mutually agreed to establish the civil society and government. 
The sole aim of establishing the government is to protect individuals' natural rights. 7 
These revolutionary ideas shaped the political landscape of their time. 'Natural 
rights' and 'the rights of man', another term for natural rights, become the moral 
justification and tool by which the people fought their struggle against injustices 
committed by colonising and authoritarian governments. 8 The Americans in their 
revolt against colonisation by the British protested their'natural rights' and declared in 
the Virginia Declaration of Rights 1776 that 'all men are by nature equally free and 
independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of 
° See Donnelly, J, 'Human Rights as Natural Rights', Hum. Rts. Q., 4.3 (1982), 391 [hereinafter Natural 
Rights]; Donnelly, J, The Concept of Human Rights (London; Sydney: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 8 
[hereinafter Human Rights]. 
$ See e. g., Chaudluy, M, Human Rights in Islam (Lahore: Impact Publications, 1993), pp. 13-16; 
Berween, M, 'The Fundamental Human Rights: An Islamic Perspective', Int'l. J. Hum. Rts., 6.1 (2002), 
pp. 62-63. That is not to say, however, that the Islamic Shari'ah does not recognise the concept of 
human rights, but merely to note that its approach to the issue of human rights is different from that of 
natural rights theory on which the modern concept of human rights is based. The concept of human 
rights under Islamic law is discussed infra para. 2.4.1. 
6 See Marks, S, 'From the "Single Confused Page" to the "Decalogue for Six Billion Persons": The 
Roots of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the French Revolution', Hum. Rts. Q., 20.3 
(1998), 459, pp. 463,467,469,473,511; Henkin, L, The Age of Rights (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1990), pp. 1-6. 
For an extensive discussion of natural rights theory, see Shestack, J, 'The Philosophic Foundations of 
Human Rights', Hum. Rts. Q., 20.2 (1998), 201, p. 206-208; Donnelly, J, Universal Human Rights in 
Theory and Practice (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 89-90 [hereinafter Theory 
and Practice]; Macdonald, M, 'Natural Rights', in Theories of Rights, ed. by J Waldron, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 26-27; Lauren, P, The Evolution of International Human Rights: 
Visions Seen, 2nd edn (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), pp. 15-16; Davidson, S, 
Human Rights (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1993), pp. 27-29; Donnelly, Human Rights, supra 
note 4, pp. 8-9,27. For a discussion of other human rights theories, see generally Shestack, ibid. pp. 
208-227. 
8 Luard, E, 'The Origins of International Concern over Human Rights', in The International Protection 
of Human Rights, ed. by E Luard, (London: Thames & Hudson, 1967), pp. 7-8. 
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society, they cannot by any compact deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the 
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, 
and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety. '9 Again, on 4 July 1776 the 
Americans in the American Declaration of Independence proclaimed that '[w]e hold 
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by 
their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and 
the pursuit of Happiness... to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among 
Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.... i1° 
Closer to home, the French revolutionaries, having disposed of their King and the 
privileged elite, and inspired by their philosophers and the American Declaration of 
Independence, decided to adopt a declaration of 'universal rights'. " On 26 August 
1789 the National Assembly of France, which adopted the Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and Citizen, declared, inter alia, that: 
1. Men are born, and always continue to be, free and equal in respect of 
their rights.... 
II. The end of all political associations is the preservation of the natural 
and imprescriptible rights of man; and these rights are liberty, property, 
security, and resistance of oppression. 
III. The nation is essentially the source of sovereignty; nor can any 
individual, or any body of men, be entitled to any authority which is not 
expressly derived from it. 12 
Although natural rights theory entered the political national stage in the eighteenth 
century, it was not until the 20th century that natural rights became 'universal rights' 
as the issue of human rights entered the international stage. After the atrocities of the 
Second World War, the victors, having established the United Nations, were 
determined to provide international protection for human rights, in order to prevent 
these atrocities recurring. In 1947, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organisation Committee (UNESCO Committee) carried out an inquiry into 
the theoretical foundations of international human rights declaration. The inquiry was 
conducted in the hope that it would be 'useful to the Commission on Human Rights 
9 The Virginia Declaration of Rights' in Hunan Rights: Meaning and History, ed. by M Palumbo, 
(Malabar, Florida: R. E. Krieger, 1982), pp. 142-144. 
10 The Declaration of Independence in Congress' in Palumbo, supra note 9, pp. 145-146. 
11 See Lauren, supra note 7, pp. 17-18; Hunt, L, 'Introduction', in The French Revolution and Human 
Rights: A Brief Documentary History, ed. & trans by L Hunt, (Boston: Bedford Books of St. Martin's 
Press, 1996), pp. 13-15. 
12 The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen' in Palumbo, supra note 9, pp. 119-121. 
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of the Economic and Social Council [charged with drafting the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR)] both in suggesting common grounds for agreement and 
in explaining possible sources of differences. ' 13 With regard to the nature of human 
rights, the UNESCO Committee concluded that human rights 'may be seen to be 
implicit in man's nature as an individual and as a member of society' 14 and '[a]ll 
rights derive, on the one hand, from the nature of man as such and, on the other, 
since man depends on man, the stage of development achieved by the social and 
political groups in which he participates. i15 
Although the Commission on Human Rights in drafting the UDHR did not draw 
directly on the UNESCO Committee's document, 16 and when the UDHR was adopted 
in 1948 it did not include any explicit reference to any theory of human rights, its 
various provisions suggest that the framers of UDHR, as the members of UNESCO 
Committee, were greatly influenced by the natural rights theory. The UDHR, as 
observed by Hunt: 
[P]roclaimed that "recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundations of 
freedom, justice and the peace in the world. , [17] 
This broad claim summarises the essence of the concept of human rights 
as it has developed since the seventeenth century. To declare the existence 
and political relevance of human rights in this fashion implies that (1) all 
human beings have certain inherent rights simply be virtue of being 
human being, not by virtue of their status in society; (2) these rights are 
consequently imagined as "natural", as stemming from human nature 
itself, and they have in the past often been called "natural rights".... 18 
The framers of the UN declaration of 1948 closely followed the model 
established by the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 
1789, while substituting "human" for the more ambiguous "man" 
throughout. 19 
13 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, The Grounds of an International 
Declaration of Hunan Rights, Report of the UNESCO Committee on the Philosophic Principles of the 
Rights of Man to the Commission of Hunan Rights of the United Nations (Paris, July 31,1947), p. 1, 
available at <http: //unesdoe. unesco. org> (last visited Jan. 2,2006). 
14 Ibid. p. 8. 
is Ibid. 
16 Waltz, S, 'Universal Human Rights: The Contribution of Muslim States', Hum. Rts. Q., 26.4 (2004), 
799, p. 800. 
17 Similarly, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, in its first and second 
preambular paragraphs similarly states that 'recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace 
in the world, [and that human] rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person'. 
18 Hunt, supra note 11, pp. 1-2. 
19Ibid. p. 3. See also Sohn, L, International Law, supra note 1, pp. 17-18. 
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From this it can be safely concluded that the origins of the modem concept of human 
rights is essentially of Western origin. 20 The critical question which logically arises 
from this conclusion is, as Pollis and Schwab put it, 'whether there is a universal 
consensus regarding the Western definition of human rights based on natural right'. 21 
Before discussing this question, it is appropriate first to highlight the sources of 
international human rights law and its means of implementation. 
2.2 Sources of international human rights law 
There are two main sources for international human rights law, namely treaties and 
international custom. 
2.2.1 Treaties 
International and regional treaties are the main source of creating binding 
international obligations, including those of respecting human rights. As with all 
treaties, joining human rights treaties is voluntary, and, hence, State Parties to such 
treaties ought to fulfil their obligations under these treaties without the need for a 
monitoring body. However, experience has shown that what ought to happen does not 
always occur. Therefore, it has been recognised that in order to give a meaningful 
protection to human rights recognised by human rights treaties, such treaties should 
include an effective method of enforcing these treaties within the jurisdiction of the 
States Parties. 22 What follows is a discussion of international and regional human 
rights instruments and the enforcement machinery which they adopt for enforcing the 
recognised rights. 
2.2.1.1 International instruments 
The United Nations (U. N) since its establishment in 1945 has played an instrumental 
role in providing human rights with international protection. Over the last sixty years, 
20 The same conclusion has been reached by other scholars. In this respect, see supra note 6; Pollis, A 
& Schwab, P, 'Human Rights: A Western Construct with Limited Applicability', in Hunan Rights: 
Cultural and Ideological Perspectives, ed. by A Pollis &P Schwab, (London: Praeger, 1979), pp. 3-4, 
8; Tibi, B, 'Islamic Law/Shari'a, Human Rights, Universal Morality and International Relations', Hum. 
Rts. Q., 16.2 (1994), 277, p. 280-28 1; Davidson, supra note 7, pp. 2,7; Donnelly, Theory and Practice, 
supra note 7, pp. 28-29,64. 
21 Pollis, supra note 20, p. 4. 
22 See Buergenthal, T, International Human Rights in A Nutshell (Saint Paul, Minnesota: West 
Publishing Company, 1995), (photo. reprint 1996), p. 20; Sohn, L, 'Human Rights: Their 
Implementation and Supervision by the United Nations', in Human Rights in International Law: Legal 
and Policy Issues, ed. by T Meron, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 369 [hereinafter 
Human Rights]. 
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the U. N has gone through various stages to finally come up with a coherent system for 
the protection of human rights. It started its mission on human rights by initially 
expressing the international concern over human rights under the United Nations 
Charter 1945, to declaring a list of universal rights in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights 1948, to the elaboration of the internationally protected rights and 
providing enforcement mechanisms to ensure the practical implementation of these 
rights at the national level in the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
1966, and the International Covenant of on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
1966.23 The Declaration and the two Covenants represent the U. N Bill of Rights. 
2.2.1.1.1 U. N Charter 
The United Nations Charter 194524 was the first international treaty to recognise 
human rights as a matter of international concern. The main effect of the U. N Charter 
on human rights is that it has transformed it from an issue that fell exclusively within 
the domestic jurisdiction of states, into a matter of concern to the wider international 
community. 25 The U. N Charter in various articles expresses its Member States' 
concern over human rights. 26 Article 1 (3) states that one of the purposes of the U. N is 
'[t]o achieve international cooperation ... 
in promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion'. In addition, members to the United Nations 'pledge themselves 
to take joint and separate action in cooperationi27 with the U. N to promote 'universal 
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion ., 
28 
Yet although the Charter prohibits discrimination with regard to the enjoyment of 
'human rights and fundamental freedoms', it left these human rights and fundamental 
23 See Sohn, International Law, supra note 1, pp. 11-12. It should be noted that there are human rights 
conventions dealing with issues of special concern to the world community, such as torture and 
inhuman treatment or punishment and discrimination against women. As these conventions only deal 
with specific issues, they fall outside the scope of this chapter and, therefore, are not included in the 
discussion here. 
24 United Nations Charter, signed June 26,1945,59 Stat. 1031, T. S. No. 993,3 Bevans 1153 (entered 
into force Oct. 24,1945) [hereinafter UN Charter], available at <http: //www. ohchr. org/englisli/> (last 
visited Jan. 2,2006). 
25 Sohn, International Law, supra note 1, p. 14; Buergentlial, supra note 22, pp. 24-25. 
26 Although originally only 50 States were Members of the U. N when it was founded in 1945, by 2002 
its membership is enjoyed by 191 States. 
27 UN Charter, Art. 56. 
28 Ibid. Art. 55 (c). 
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freedoms undefined, which led to the second stage of human rights development 
under the U. N., as discussed next. 
2.2.1.1.2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
Soon after the U. N Charter came into force in October 1945, the Commission on 
Human Rights was established by the Economic and Social Council of the U. N in 
June 1946.29 The main task of the Commission was to draft an International Bill of 
Rights. However, soon after the Commission had started its work, it became apparent 
that it would be difficult to reach an agreement among the Member States on the 
nature and wording of the rights, and the machinery enforcing them. Therefore, the 
Commission decided that it would be easier to draft, as a first step, a declaration of 
principles in the form of a non-binding resolution of the U. N General Assembly 
instead of drafting a detailed, comprehensive and binding treaty. 30 This solution were 
proved to be fruitful, as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR or 
Declaration) was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly in 1948.31 It should 
be noted, however, that six States abstained from voting on the Declaration, including 
Saudi Arabia. 32 The Declaration in its final form included civil, political, economic, 
social, and cultural rights. 
Given the fact that the Declaration was not intended to be a binding treaty, it is 
not surprising to note that it did not contain any enforcement mechanism to secure the 
enjoyment of the rights recognised by the Declaration. 33 Hence, it was the subsequent 
mission of the Commission on Human Rights to draft a binding human rights treaty to 
give effect to the principles embodied in the UDHR, as discussed next. 
2.2.1.1.3 The two Covenants 
After the General Assembly adopted the UDHR, the Commission on Human Rights' 
next task was to draft an international binding treaty to give effect to, and elaborate on 
the principles recognised by UDHR. The aim was not confined to turning the 
29 Morsink, J, The Universal Declaration ofHunian Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), p. 12. 
30 For an extensive discussion of the process which led to this result, see ibid. pp. 12-20. 
31 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted Dec. 10,1948, G. A. Res. 217A (III), U. N. GAOR, 
3rd Sess. (Resolutions, part 1), at 71, U. N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR], available at < 
http: //www. ohchr. org/english/> (last visited Jan. 2,2006). 
32 Other states which abstained from the voting on the UDHR include the USSR, the Ukrainian Soviet 
Socialist Republic (UKSSR), the BSSR, Yugoslavia, Poland, and South Africa. Saudi Arabia's position 
on the issue of international human rights in general and on UDHR in particular is discussed infra para. 
2.4.2. 
33 Davidson, supra note 7, p. 13. 
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principles of UDHR into positive law, but also to providing enforcement mechanisms 
to ensure that these principles are respected, in practice, by the states parties. 
However, soon after the Commission have resumed its work, controversy regarding 
the appropriate methods of enforcement for the different categories of human rights 
(i. e., civil and political rights favoured by the West on the one hand, and economic, 
social and cultural rights, favoured by the Communist camp, on the other) arose 
between the members of the Commission. Eventually, by way of a compromise, it 
was agreed to draft two separate documents each dealing with a different category of 
human rights and including different methods of enforcement. 34 
After 18 years of negotiations, this process produced the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR), 35 and International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 1966 (ICESCR). 36 It took a decade further 
before they came into force in 1976, after receiving the required number of 
ratifications in accordance with Article 49 of the ICCPR and Article 27 of ICESCR. 
As the accused's legal rights, which form the theme of this thesis, fall within ICCPR, 
the ICESCR falls outside the scope of this thesis and is thus not included in the 
discussion. 
As of June 2004, the ICCPR had been ratified by 152 States. 37 The Human Rights 
Committee (the Committee or HRC), has been established in accordance with Article 
28 (1) of the ICCPR, for monitoring the States Parties' compliance with the ICCPR. 
The HRC consists of 18 members who must be nationals of the State Parties to the 
Covenant. The members must be elected from persons of high moral character and 
recognised competence in the field of human rights. These members serve in their 
personal capacity and not as representatives of their countries. 38 Since the HRC 
34 /bid. pp. 13-14,75. 
35 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16,1966, entered into force Mar. 
23,1976, G. A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U. N. GAOR, 21st Sess, Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U. N. Doc. A/6316 
(1966) [hereinafter ICCPR], available at <http: //www. ohclu. org/english/> (last visited Jan. 2,2006). 
36 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16,1966, entered into 
force Jan. 3,1976, G. A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U. N. GAOR, 21st Sess. Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U. N. Doc. 
A/6316 (1966) [Hereinafter ICESCR], available at <http: //www. ohchr. org/english/> (last visited Jan. 
2,2006). 
37 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Status of 
Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties, June 9,2004 [hereinafter Statue of 
Ratifications], available at <http: //www. tinliclir. ch/pdf/rep2EL.. paif> (last visited Jan. 2,2006). 
38 ICCPR, Art. 28 (2), (3). 
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started its activities in 1977, it has exercised its supervisory role through two main 
procedures. 39 
Firstly, the ICCPR requires States Parties to submit an initial report to the 
Committee within one year of the entry of the Covenant into force, and whenever the 
Committee requests it, thereby establishing what has become known as the reporting 
system. 40 In practice, the Committee established a five-year reporting system, and in 
exceptional circumstances the Committee may request supplementary or emergency 
reports . 
41 It should be noted, however, that although submitting the report on time is 
mandatory, experience has shown that some parties do not submit their report on time 
and some do not submit their reports at all. 4` The Committee, having received and 
considered the State's reports, adopts its concluding comments on the specific report 
by consensus. The adopted comments are not legally binding, thus their impact is 
dependent upon the state itself. 43 
In addition to the concluding comments, which are specific to the report under 
consideration, the Committee adopts what is called 'General Comments', as required 
by Article 40 (4) of the ICCPR. The General Comments, unlike the concluding 
comments, are directed to all States Parties. The significance of these Comments is 
that, notwithstanding their non-binding nature, they represent an authoritative source 
of interpretation, as they are adopted by consensus after an extensive discussion 
between the members of the Committee, who are experts in the human rights field and 
elected by the States Parties to represent universal views on the meaning of the rights 
44 protected under the Covenant. 
39 In addition to these two main procedures, there is the inter-state procedure, which has been 
established under Article 41 of the ICCPR. However due its apparent ineffectiveness as a monitoring 
procedure as no state has yet resorted to it, it is not included in the discussion. For a discussion of the 
inter-state system, see generally Nowak, M, 'The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights', 
in An Introduction to the International Protection of Human Rights, ed. by R Hanski &M Suksi, 
(Turku/Abo: Institute for Human Rights, Abo Akademi University, 1999), pp. 94-95. 
40 ICCPR, Art. 40 (1). 
41 Nowak, supra note 39, p. 92. 
42 Harris, D, 'The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the United Kingdom: An 
Introduction', in The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the United Kingdom 
Law, ed. by D Harris and S Joseph, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 23. 
43 Ibid. p. 26. 44 See Nowak, supra note 39, p. 94; Harris, supra note 42, p. 27, Buergenthal, supra note 22, p. 46; 
McGoldrick, D, The Human Rights Committee: Its Role in the Development of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 92-96. 
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Secondly, the HRC also exercises its supervisory role under the individual 
communications system established under the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. 45 
Ratifying the Optional Protocol by a given State Party to the ICCPR, which is 
voluntary, authorises the HRC to receive communications from individuals subject to 
the jurisdiction of that State. As of June 2004,104 State Parties to the ICCPR have 
recognised the competence of the HRC to receive communications from individuals 
alleging violations of their ICCPR's rights. 46 The system of individual 
communications under the Optional Protocol shares many similarities with individual 
petition system under the European Convention of Human Rights, discussed below, 
not least with regard to their admissibility requirements. 47 However, there are also 
very striking and significant differences between the two, in particular with regard to 
the nature of the supervisory body and the power it possesses over the states parties. 
As acknowledged by the HRC: 
The two systems [adopted by the ICCPR and the European Convention] 
differ 
... 
in that the Committee has no power to hand down binding 
decision as does the European Court of Human Rights. States Parties to 
the Optional Protocol (OPI) endeavour to observe the Committee's views, 
but in case of non-compliance the Optional Protocol does not provide for 
an enforcement mechanism for sanctions. 48 
Thus, complying with the 'views' of the Committee is sadly up to the State concerned. 
While there are some States which have complied with the Committee's views, there 
are some States which have completely ignored them. In an attempt to activate the 
Committee's views, the Committee in 1990 adopted a `follow-up' procedure. 
Defendant states are requested to report to the Committee on the measures that have 
been taken to give effect to the Committee's views. While there are positive replies, 
there are some replies which reject the Committee's findings for various reasons. The 
Committee responded by adopting the policy of 'naming and shaming' of non- 
45 The First Optional Protocol. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, adopted Dec. 16,1966,999 U. N. T. S. 302 (entered into force Mar. 23,1976), G. A. Res. 2200 
(XXI), 21 U. N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 59, U. N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter Optional Protocol]. 
46 See Status of Ratifications, supra note 37. 
47 For a comprehensive comparative analysis between the two systems, see Heffernan, L, 'A 
Comparative View of Individual Petition Procedures under the European Convention on Human Rights 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights', Hum. Rts. Q., 19.1 (1997), 78. It should 
be noted, however, that Heffernan's article does not cover the changes brought to the European petition 
system by virtue of the Eleventh Protocol, which came into force in 1998, as discussed below. See infra 
ýara. 2.2.1.2.1. 
As quoted in Harris, supra note 42, p. 53. 
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complying states by publishing the details of the result of its follow-up activities in its 
annual report. 49 
2.2.1.2 Regional instruments 
Regional human rights systems are adopted, ideally, to enhance universal standards. 50 
Currently, there are three human rights systems which operate at the regional level. 
These are the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 1950, the American Convention on Human Rights 1969, and 
the African Charter on Human and People's Rights 1981. In addition, efforts have 
been made to adopt Islamic declaration on human rights by Islamic counties and a 
regional human rights treaty for Arab countries. These efforts have not materialised, 
as they either resulted in the adoption of non-binding declaration, 51 or a binding 
treaty; but neither has the treaty come into force because it has not been ratified by a 
sufficient number of states, nor does it include an enforcement machinery for ensuring 
the rights recognised are respected by the States Parties. 52 That is to say that these 
documents are without significance in terms of impact on promoting and protecting 
human rights of individuals in the Arab or Muslim world, and hence will not be 
included in the discussion. 
2.2.1.2.1 The European system 
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR or the Convention) adopted by the Council of Europe in Rome on 4 
November 1950 and entered into force on 3 September 1953, which makes the ECHR 
49 Ibid. pp. 38-39. For further discussion of the communications system, see ibid. 30-38; Davidson, 
supra note 7,79-88; Lewis-Anthony, S, 'Treaty-Based Procedure For Making Human Rights 
Complaints Within the UN System', in Guide to International Hunian Rights Practice, 2nd edn, ed. by 
H Hannum, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992); pp. 41-49; McGoldrick, supra 
note 44, ch. 4. For a critical evaluation of the communications system, see Steiner, H, 'Individual 
claims in a world of massive violations: What role for the Human Rights Committee', in The Future of 
UN Hunian Rights Treaty Monitoring, ed. by P Alston &J Crawford, (Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
so Higgins, R, 'The European Convention on Human Rights', in International Low: Legal and Policy 
Issues, ed. by T Meron, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 498-499. 
51 See e. g., the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam 1990, adopted by the Foreign Ministers of 
the Organisation of Islamic Conference, Aug. 5,1990,19th Sess (Session of Peace, Interdependence 
and Development), Cairo, Arab Republic of Egypt. For a critical evaluation of the Declaration, in 
addition to other so-called "Islamic" human rights documents, see Mayer, E, Islam and Human Rights: 
Tradition and Politics, 3rd edn (Colorado: Westview Press, 1999). 
52 See e. g., Arab Charter on Human Rights 1994, adopted by the League of Arab States, Sept. 15,1994, 
Sess 102, Res. 5437. According to Article 42 (b) of the Charter, the Charter will come into force when 
it has been ratified by seven Arab League States. However, to date the Charter has been only ratified by 
two states, Tunisia and Palestine. For a discussion of the Arab Charter, see generally Rislunawi, M, 
'The Arab Charter on Human Rights: A Comment', Interights Bulletin, 10 (1996), 8. 
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the oldest human rights treaty in existence. 53 The main intention behind adopting the 
ECHR, to use the words of the Convention's preamble, was 'to take the first steps for 
the collective enforcement of certain of the Rights stated in the Universal Declaration' 
in Europe. 54 It is noteworthy that the ECHR is based on earlier draft of what is now 
the ICCPR, as it became apparent at the time to the States of the Council of Europe 
that it would take a long time before members of the U. N would agree on the content 
of a legally binding human rights instrument. 55 By 2004,45 Member States of the 
Council of Europe, out of its 46 Member States, have ratified the ECHR. 56 The 
ECHR, like its international counterpart (i. e., ICCPR), is primarily concerned with 
civil and political rights. 
Yet what distinguishes the ECHR from other human rights instruments is not just 
its longevity, but more importantly the effectiveness of its supervisory bodies. 57 Over 
the last five decades since it became effective, the ECHR in terms of the content of its 
rights, and its enforcement machinery, has gone through progressive transformation 
by means of adopting supplementary Protocols. The main enforcement machinery 
adopted under the ECHR is the individual petition system, which is administered by 
the European Court of Human Rights (European Court), whose role is 'to ensure the 
observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the 
Convention and the Protocols thereto .... i58 
53 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for 
signature Nov. 4,1950, Eur. T. S. No. 5,213 U. N. T. S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3,1953). For a 
historical background to ECHR, see Robertson, A, Human rights in Europe (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1963), ch. 1; Beddard, R, Human rights and Europe, 3rd edn (Cambridge: Grotius, 
1993), ch. 2. 
54 For a discussion ECHR in relation to UDHR, see Higgins, supra note 50, pp. 495-498. ss See Buergenthal, supra note 22, pp. 106-107; Drzemczewski, A, European Human Rights 
Convention in Domestic Law: A Comparative Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), pp. 7-8. 
56 Namely, Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Serbia and 
Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom. The status of accessions to the ECHR is available at, 
<http: //conventions. coe. int/> (last visited Jan. 2,2006). 
S' There are other factors which distinguish the ECHR from other human treaties including, inter alia, 
the quantity of its jurisprudence, its impact on the domestic law of the States Parties, and the 
considerable literature arising from it. In this respect, see Harris, D, et al, Law of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (London: Butterworths, 1995), pp. 28-34; Davidson, supra note 7, pp. 
17-18; Drzemczewski, supra note 55, pp. 3-4. 
58 ECHR, Art. 19. 
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The individual petition system has been completely restructured by virtue of 
Protocol 11, which has become an integral part of the ECHR. 59 As of November 1, 
1998, the date in which the Eleventh Protocol came into force, individuals belonging 
to any State Party to the Convention can apply directly to the European Court, for a 
redress for any alleged violation of his/her ECHR's rights. In addition, Protocol 11 has 
transformed the optional jurisdiction of the European Court to receive individual 
complaints into a mandatory one. 60 Once the European Court has delivered its verdict, 
the State concerned must, according to Article 46 (1) of the ECHR, 'abide by the final 
judgment of the Court .... ' The 
Committee of Ministers, which is composed of the 
Foreign Ministers of the Member States of the Council of Europe, is entrusted with 
supervising and ensuring the execution of the European Court's final judgments. 
61 
Finally, it is worth noting that the States Parties' attitude towards the Court judgments 
has been a positive one. 62 
Given this fact, it is not surprising to note that the European system has been 
characterised as the most effective and advanced system for the protection of human 
rights in existence today, compared to other regional or international human rights 
systems. 63 However, the secret behind the success of ECHR cannot be solely 
attributed to the effectiveness of its supervisory bodies; it is due - in addition to the 
political will of the European States to promote and protect human rights in the 
European continent - as Beddard noted, to 'the fact that the European states make up a 
culturally identifiable unit and their like-mindedness has meant easier agreement on 
what are considered to be basic human rights. '64 
2.2.1.2.2 The inter-American system 
The American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) was signed in Costa Rica in 
1969 by Member States of the Organization of American States (OAS) and entered 
59 Protocol No. 11 (ETS No. 155), adopted July 11,1994 (entered into force Nov. 1,1998). 
60 ECHR, Art. 34. For a comparison between the 'old' and the 'new' individual petition system, see 
Rowe, N& Schlette, V, 'The Protection of Human Rights in Europe After the Eleventh Protocol to The 
ECHR', E. L. Rev., 1 (1998), 23; Ovey, C& White, R, The European Convention on Human Rights, 3rd 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 6-9. It should be noted though, that the unanimous 
ratification of Protocol 11 was required before it could come into force. 
61 Ibid. Art. 46 (2). For an extensive discussion of other aspects of the European enforcement 
mechanism, which have not been considered here, see Clements, L, et al, European Human Rights: 
Taking a Case under the Convention, 2nd edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999). 
62 See ibid. pp. 105-106; Harris, supra note 57, p. 26. 
63 See supra note 57. 
64 Beddard, supra note 53, p. 1. This line of reasoning is also expressed in the preambular paragraph of 
the ECHR, which states that 'the Governments of European countries ... are 
like-minded and have a 
common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law.... ' 
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into force in 1978.65 To date, twenty-five of the OAS 35 Member States have ratified 
the American Convention. 66 The American Convention has been modelled on the 
ECHR, and, hence it is mainly concerned with civil and political rights. 67 To ensure 
the 'fulfilment of the commitments made by the States Parties to [the] Convention', 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (the Commission), and the Inter- 
American Court of Human Rights (the Court), were established by virtue of Article 33 
of the ACHR. The ACHR, like the ECHR, entitles those who are allegedly victims of 
violations of the ACHR's provisions to submit a petition. However, the mechanism 
adopted by the American system differs from that adopted by the European system, in 
that complaints are addressed to the Commission rather than the Court. 
Once the Commission has received the complaint, examination of its admissibility 
is carried out. If the complaint is ruled admissible, the Commission will examine the 
allegation, seek information from the government concerned and investigate the 
facts. 68 The Commission should concentrate its effort first in reaching a friendly 
settlement of the matter between the complainant and the State concerned. 
69 If the 
Commission succeeds in its efforts, a report describing the facts of the case and the 
settlement is prepared and transmitted to the States Parties to the Convention. 70 
If, on the other hand, a friendly settlement is not reached, the Commission shall 
prepare a report which includes the facts of the case, the conclusions that have been 
reached and any recommendations that the Commission wish to make. Once the 
report is completed, it is forwarded to the State concerned. 71 If, after three months 
from the date of transmitting the Commission's report to the State concerned, the case 
has not been settled or referred to the Court, the Commission may, by a vote of 
absolute majority, decide on the question under consideration and make any necessary 
recommendations. If the Commission is of the opinion that the Convention has been 
violated, it should include in its report, which is to be transmitted to the State 
65 American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22,1969, O. A. S. T. S. No. 36 
centered into force July 18,1978), available at <http: //www. ois. org> (last visited Jan. 2,2006). 
Namely, Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Dominica, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Granada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Dominican Republic, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. It should be noted, 
however, that die Government of Trinidad and Tobago has denounced ACHR in 1998. The status of 
accessions to the ACHR is available at <http: //www. cidh. oas. or£> (last visited Jan. 2,2006). 
67 Davidson, supra note 7, p. 19. 
69 ACHR, Art 48 (1). 
G91bid. Art 48 (1) (f). 
70 Ibid. Art 49. 
71 Ibid. Art 50. 
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concerned, the measures required to rectify the violation and any time period within 
which its recommendations to be executed. If a period is prescribed for remedying 
the violation, the Commission shall, after the expiry of that period, decide, by a vote 
of absolute majority, whether the State concerned has complied with its 
recommendations or not. 72 However, the ACHR does not state that parties to a case 
brought before the Commission are bound by its opinion. This suggests, therefore, 
that although the Commission's opinion may be considered as an authoritative ruling 
as to whether the State Party has violated its obligations under the ACHR or not, it 
has, nonetheless, no binding effect on the States Parties to the ACHR. 73 
In addition to the above outlined procedure, the complaint could be referred to the 
Court, by a State Party, which is a party to a given case, or the Commission, to decide 
on the matter, which is known as the contentious procedure. 74 The decision of the 
Court is final and is not subject to appeal. 75 Non-compliance with the Court's decision 
would constitute, on itself, a violation to the specific obligation required by Article 68 
(1) of the ACHR. 7G The Convention does not contain any specific mechanism to 
ensure the enforcement of the Court's judgment or sanctions on the non-complying 
state. It does, however, provides that '[t]o each regular session of the General 
Assembly of the Organization of American States the Court shall submit, for the 
Assembly's consideration, a report on its work during the previous year. It shall 
specify, in particular the cases in which a state has not complied with its judgment, 
making any pertinent recommendations'. 77 Once the Assembly receives the report, it 
will discuss its content with regard to the non-complying State and take the 
appropriate measures. However, this power is limited by the fact that the Assembly 
does not have the authority to adopt any resolutions that are legally binding on the 
Member States. 78 
72 Ibid. Art. 51. See also Rules Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
Approved by the Commission at its 109th special session held from December 4 to 8,2000, amended at 
its 116th regular period of sessions, held from October 7 to 25,2002 and at its 118th regular period of 
sessions, held from October 7 to 24,2003, art. 45, available at <http: //www. cidh. oas. org> (last visited 
Jan. 2,2006). 
" Buergenthal, supra note 22, p. 205. 
74 Ibid. Art. 61 (1) in conjunction with Art. 62 (3). 
75 Ibid. Art. (67) 
76 It states that '[t]he States Parties to the Convention undertake to comply with the judgment of the 
Court in any case to which they are parties. ' 
77 ACHR. Art. (65). 
78 Buergenthal, supra note 22, p. 214. 
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Furthermore, it is noteworthy that, in practice, cases are rarely referred to the 
Court due to several reasons. Firstly, the Court may only hear cases where the State 
concerned has accepted the Court's optional jurisdiction, 79 the Commission has 
completed its lengthy investigation, which has been outlined above, and the case has 
been referred to the Court either by the Commission or the State concerned within 
three months of the release of the Commission's report, as individuals do not have 
direct access to the Court. 80 Secondly, the Commission has discretionary power as to 
whether to refer the case to the Court or not. Unfortunately, and for unknown reasons, 
the Commission have preferred not to refer most of the cases to the Court even if they 
fit the criteria set by the Court as guidance for the Commission on deciding on the 
matter of referral. 81 
Experience has shown that the non-binding effect of the Commission's opinion 
combined with the fact that individuals do not have a direct access to the Court, have 
hindered the Commission and the Court's ability to fulfil their role as a guardian of 
human rights in the Western Hemisphere. In this respect, Wilt and Krsticevic 
observed that: 
In practice, this distinction proved to be relevant since most decisions of 
the Commission are not complied with, in spite of the fact that the State 
concerned is aparty to ACHR. However, those same States Parties which 
have not complied with the final decisions of the Commission ... 
have for 
82 the most part respected the decisions of the Court . 
79 ACHR. Art. 62. It should be noted, however, that the number of States recognising the jurisdiction of 
the Court has steadily increased over the last decade, as it grew from 13 States in 1992 to 23 States to 
date. The status of ratifications of the jurisdiction of the Court is available at 
<http: //www. cidh. oas. org> (last visited Jan. 2,2006) 
80 Ibid. Art. 61. 
81 Former Judge Maximo Cisneros of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in his concurring 
opinion in the Compulsory Membership Case, expressed his frustration over this fact in the following 
terms: 
Now, whereas in signing this Advisory Opinion I am performing my last act as a judge of 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, I wish to say that the "love" that we have put 
into our work has not been sufficient to avoid the sense of frustration that I feel in leaving 
the Court before it has had the opportunity to hear a single case of a violation of human 
rights, in spite of the sad reality of our America in this field. 
Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 
and 29 of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, November 13, 
1985, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (Ser. A) No. 5 (1985). See also, Farer, T, 'The Rise of the Inter-American 
Human Rights Regime: No Longer a Unicorn Not Yet an Ox', Hunt. Rts. Q., 19.3 (1997), 510, p. 544; 
Wilt, H& Krsticevic, V, 'The OAS System for the Protection of Human Rights', in An Introduction to 
the International Protection of Hunnan Rights, ed. by R Hanski &M Suksi, (Turku/Abo: Institute for 
Human Rights, Abo Akademi University, 1999), p. 337, p. 337 n. 12; Davidson, supra note 7, pp. 149- 
150. 
82 Wilt, supra note 81, p. 373. 
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Therefore, it is can be concluded that ensuring the respect of human rights recognised 
in the ACHR, is mainly dependent on the States Parties, and the role of the 
Commission and the Court is primarily either that of a promoter of or an advisor on 
human rights issues, but not that of enforcement. 83 
2.2.1.2.3 The African system 
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established in 1963 and it has a 
membership of 53 states. The OAU adopted the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights (the Charter) in 1981, and it entered into force in 1986.84 Currently, 
the Charter has been ratified by all OAU Member States. 85 Although the OAU was 
replaced by a new African body, the African Union (AU) in 2001, by virtue of the 
Constitutive Act (2000), 8G the African Charter remains the principal human rights 
treaty in the African continent. 87 
The African Charter differs from ECHR and ACHR in a number of respects. 
Firstly, the Charter is not just concerned with political and civil rights, but it also 
covers economic, social and cultural rights (second generation rights), 88 and collective 
rights of the people (group rights). 89 Secondly, the Charter is not just confined to 
conferring rights on individuals and peoples, but, with equal measure, it imposes 
duties upon them. 90 Thirdly, although the Charter does not include a derogation 
clause, it provides the States Parties with a very wide power to restrict and limit the 
rights recognised in the Charter, which have become known as `clawback clauses'. 
With regard to certain rights, the Charter is formulated in a way that is designed to 
al This is supported by the fact that the Court's advisory opinions under Article 64 of ACHR, which 
have no legally binding effect, considerably, outnumber its judicial judgments which are binding. In 
this respect, see Buergenthal, supra note 22, pp. 217-227. 
8' African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27,1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 
rev. 5,21 I. L. M. 58 (1982), entered into force Oct. 21,1986 [hereinafter the Charter], available at 
<http: //www. africa-union. oru> (last visited Jan. 2,2006). 
83 The status of accessions to the Charter is available at <Iittp: //www. africa-union. ore> (last visited 
Jan. 2,2006). 
86 Constitutive Act of the African Union, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/23.15, entered into force May 26, 
2001, available at <http: //www. africa-union. org> (last visited Jan. 2,2006) 
87 For a historical background to the Charter, see Gittleman, R, 'The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights: A Legal Analysis', Va. J. Intl L., 22.4 (1981-1982), 667, pp. 667-673. 
as Including e. g., the right to work, the right to health, and the right education. See Charter, arts. 15-18. 
89 Including e. g., the right to peace and security; healthy environment; and to economic, social and 
cultural development. See Charter, Arts. 20-40. 
90 See Flinterman, C& Henderson, C, 'The African Charter on Human and People's Rights', in All 
Introduction to the International Protection of Human Rights, ed. by R Hanski &M Suksi, 
(Turku/Abo: Institute for Human Rights, Abo Akademi University, 1999), p. 388-390. 
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give each State Party a full discretionary power to restrict the exercise of those rights 
by individuals to the extent that these rights could be deprived of much meaning. The 
right to liberty and security of person, for example, which is enshrined in Article 6 of 
the Charter, is a case in point. Article 6 reads: 
Every individual shall have the right to liberty and to the security of his 
person. No one may be deprived of his freedom except for reasons and 
conditions previously laid down by law. In particular, no one may be 
arbitrarily arrested or detained. 
This Article, although it prohibits arbitrary deprivations of the right to liberty, it 
leaves the situations in which the right to liberty can be interfered with undefined, and 
does not provide any safeguards to ensure its protection. Therefore, Article 6, in 
essence, does not impose any restrictions on the state's power to limit the right to 
liberty, except that the interference with the right to liberty is permitted under the 
national law. The danger inherent in such an approach, as Flinterman and Henderson 
have noted, is that 'Governments are traditionally the most frequent violators of 
human rights, and they also have the power to create and change the law, the Charter 
makes human rights especially vulnerable to the very institution which attacks them 
very often. '91 
The final and the most striking difference is that the Charter did not require the 
establishment of a court in which allegations made by individuals against their states 
could be reviewed. To rectify this deficiency, a resolution for establishing the African 
Court was adopted by the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of OAU in 
1998.92 It came into force in January 2004, after it had received the required number 
of ratifications. However, to date the Court has not yet been established, and hence it 
would be premature to attempt here to evaluate its prospects. 
Until the Court is fully functional, the principal body entrusted with 'promot[ing] 
human and peoples' rights and ensur[ing] their protection in Africa'93 remains to be 
the African Commission on Human and People's Rights (the Commission). The main 
enforcement machinery adopted by the African system is the individual 
communications system, which is currently administered by the Commission. If an 
91 Ibid. p. 319. For an excellent and comprehensive discussion of the clawback clauses of the Charter, 
see Gittleman, supra note 87, pp. 691-709. 
92 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Establishment of an African 
Court on Human and People's Rights, June 9,1998, OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III), 
entered into force Jan. 25,2004, available at <http: //www. achpr. org> (last visited Jan. 2,2006). 
93 The Aferican Charter, Art. 30. 
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individual complaint is considered admissible, the complaint needs the approval of a 
simple majority of the Commission members, in order for the merits of the complaint 
to be considered by the Commission. 94 If the complaint 'reveals the existence of a 
series of serious or massive violations of human or peoples' rights'95 the Commission, 
before it can investigate the case under consideration, is required to notify the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the complaint . 
96 It is within the 
discretionary power of the Assembly to decide whether the Commission should act on 
such complaint or not, irrespective of the seriousness of the situation. 97 If the 
Commission is permitted to review the complaint, a factual report accompanied by its 
findings and recommendations is made and submitted to the Assembly. The report 
prepared by the Commission cannot be published without the permission of the 
Assembly and it has to remain confidential until such permission is granted. 98 Finally, 
the Charter does not include a provision for ensuring that the recommendations of the 
Commission are complied with. 99 
It is apparent from the forgoing that the Commission responsible for protecting 
the rights recognised by the Charter is not provided with sufficient powers in order to 
fulfil its role effectively. The Commission acts under the mercy of the Assembly, 
'which is a political body that is not likely to be an enthusiastic guardian of human 
rights as currently constituted. "°° 
2.2.2 International custom 
The main deficiency of human rights treaty-based systems is that these treaties are 
only binding on the states that ratify them. Thus, without finding another binding 
source for international human rights law, non-State parties to human rights treaties 
would be left free to violate human rights without being accused of being in violation 
of international human rights law. 101 However, a majority of scholars contend that 
94 Ibid. Art. 55. 
95 Ibid. Art. 58 (1). 
961bid. Art. 58 (2). 
97 With the exception of cases of emergency, in which a request to carry an in-depth study into the 
situation can be directly made to the Chairman of the Assembly, in accordance with Article 58 (3) of 
the Charter. However, even then there is no guarantee that a permission to investigate the case by the 
Commission will be granted. 
98 The Charter, Art. 59 (1). 
99 Flinterman, supra note 90, p. 394. 
100 Buergenthal, supra note 22, p. 247. 
101 See Simma, B& Alston, P, 'The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General 
Principles', Aust. YBIL, 12 (1988-1989), 82, pp. 82-83; Schachter, 0, International Law in Theory and 
Practice (Dordrecht; London: Nijhoff, 1991), p. 335. 
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international human rights norms, as embodied in the U. N Bill of Rights and in 
particular those of the UDHR, have become part of customary international law, and 
thus binding on all states. 102 The advantage of this view is that all states, whether they 
have ratified international human rights documents or not, are bound by its norms as 
part of customary international law. 
It should be noted though that this view is disputed on the basis that states' 
practices, which involve wide disregard for and violations of international human 
rights norms, mean that states, in practice, still do not feel obliged to follow 
international human rights norms, which is a prerequisite for a norm to be considered 
as a customary rule. 103 This inescapable reality, it is argued, denies international 
human rights norms the status of customary international rules. 104 However, even if 
these norms are not considered as binding customary international norms, the charge 
that a state is in violation of international human rights norms is a grave one, which 
explains, for instance, some states' rhetorical but not actual commitment to human 
rights. 105 Thus even if these documents are not legally binding on states which have 
not ratified them, they are at least considered in general to be politically and morally 
binding on all states. 106 
2.2.3 Concluding remarks 
The above presented discussion of the sources of human rights law shows that 
however lofty the international human rights norms are, or effective the enforcement 
machinery adopted by international or regional treaties, the implementation of human 
rights in the final analysis is subject to the national rather than the international will. 
Therefore, even if one assumes, for the purposes of argument, that all international 
human rights norms as embodied in the UN Bill of Rights are binding on all states by 
virtue of being rules of customary international law, the essential question in this 
context remains; who could force non-complying states, whether they are Parties to 
102 See e. g., ibid. p. 84; Solm, International Law, supra note 1, pp. 12-13,16-17; Buergenthal, supra 
note 22, pp. 33-38. 
103 For a discussion of customary international law, see generally Brownlie, I, Principles of Public 
International Law, 6th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 6-12; Thirlway, H, The 
Sources of International Law', in International Law, ed. by M Evans, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), pp. 124-130. 
104 See, e. g., Simma, supra note 101, pp. 88-100; Schachter, supra note 101, p. 336-337. 
105 Donnelly, Theory and Practice, supra note 7, p. 1. 
106 See Bilder, supra note 1, p. 10-11; Davidson, supra note 7,66-67. 
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international or regional human rights instruments or not, to comply with these human 
rights treaties and the decisions of its supervisory organs? 
Or, to pose the question differently, even if one assumes, for the purposes of 
argument, that States either individually or collectively under the auspices of the 
U. N, can legally force non-complying States to respect human rights within their 
territories, can the former States be trusted to act at the international level 
consistently with the aim of protecting human rights? 107 Experience suggests that the 
answer to this question is, unfortunately, in the negative. States' foreign policies are 
always interest-led; thus where the goal of protecting human rights conflicts with 
what is considered to be a national interest (whether military, economic, social or 
ideological), the goal of human rights is sacrificed. 108 In fact, States' attitude - 
particularly of those States which claim that human rights are number one on their 
list of foreign policy agenda - towards human rights violators could be argued to be 
an impediment to the promotion of human rights in states with poor human rights 
records, as their attitude over human rights violations is tainted by hypocrisy and 
double standards. ' 09 As Douzinas put it: 
[H]uman rights, like arms sales, aid to the developing world and trade 
preferences or sanctions, are tools of international politics used, according 
to the classical Greek saying, to help friends and harm enemies.... 
107 For a discussion of the legality of using force for humanitarian reasons, see generally Chinkin, C, 
'International Law and Human Rights', in Human Rights Fifty Years On. A Reappraisal, ed. by T 
Evans, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998). 
108 See Schachter, supra note 101, pp. 345-346; Donnelly, Theory and Practice, supra note 7, p. 183. 
109 Amnesty International with regard to the United State Government's policy on human rights abroad, 
which is claimed to be aimed at "spreading freedom around the world", remarked in its 2005 Annual 
Report that: 
The blatant disregard for international human rights and humanitarian law in the "war on 
terror" continued to make a mockery of President George Bush's claims that the USA was the 
global champion of human rights. 
The USA, as the unrivalled political, military and economic hyper-power, sets the tone for 
governmental behaviour worldwide. When the most powerful country in the world thumbs its 
nose at the rule of law and human rights, it grants a licence to others to commit abuse with 
impunity and audacity. 
Amnesty International, Annual Report (London, Amnesty International, 2005), available at, 
<http: //www. aninesty. org> (last visited Jan. 2,2006). That is not to say, however, that hypocrisy is 
exclusively exercised by U. S Government, but merely to say even those governments, which claim to 
be interested in protecting human rights at the global level, are, based on their record of double 
standards, for reasons related to what they consider as their national interests, incapable and unfit for 
doing so. For a discussion of examples which are perceived by Muslims as well as by objective 
observers as Western hypocrisy over human rights issues in Muslim countries, see Falk, R, Human 
Rights Horizons: The Pursuit ofJustice in a Globalizing World (New York; London: Routledge, 2000), 
ch. 8; Mayer, supra note 51, pp. 4-6. 
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The criticism of hypocrisy is valid, therefore, only in relation to 
governmental claims that foreign affairs can be guided by ethics or human 
rights. The foreign policy of governments is interest-led and as alien to 
ethical consideration as the investment choices of multinational 
corporations. ' 10 
Thus, it is justified to conclude, despite the considerable development of international 
human rights law, the only way to protect human rights effectively is through 
domestic law. In fact, international and regional human rights treaties give priority to 
domestic means of implementation over international ones. Article 2 of the ICCPR, 
for example, requires States Parties, where it is not already provided for, 'to take the 
necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the 
provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be 
necessary to give effect to the rights recognised in the ... Covenant'. 
" Hence, 
international means of enforcing human rights are considered to be supplemental to 
the national ones, and cannot be resorted to unless the latter fails to provide the 
required protection or remedy. ' 12 
However, this proposition presupposes the existence of agreed-upon international 
human rights standards, which domestic laws and practices of all states have to be 
amended in order to comply with. In the remainder of this chapter, attention will be 
focused on examining this issue and its implications for the question that this thesis 
seeks to answer, in particular, and for the promotion and protection of international 
human rights in Muslim states, including Saudi Arabia, in general. 
2.3 Universalism vs. Relativism 
The human rights discourse has been dominated by the issue of whether 'universal' 
human rights as embodied in the U. N Bill of Rights are in fact universal. The UDHR, 
which is the principal document upon which the human rights system has been 
subsequently built, in its preambular paragraph was proclaimed by the U. N General 
Assembly as 'a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations'. 
However, as pointed out earlier, the concept of human rights upon which the UDHR 
110 Douzinas, C, The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century (Oxford: 
Hart, 2000), p. 128. 
111 See Sohn, Human Rights, supra note 22, pp. 369-372. 
112 See Donnelly, Theory and Practice, supra note 7, ch. 13. 
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is based is a Western one. 113 Thus the question which arises here, as indicated earlier, 
is whether or not there is a consensus among the U. N Member States on the Western 
definition of human rights? ' 4 
First of all it is worth pointing out as a matter of historical fact that the 
foundations of the international human rights project were laid down when most of 
the Third World countries, including many Muslim countries, were under colonial 
regimes. Thus, when these countries gained their independence in the 1950s, they 
participated in the formulation of the subsequent documents within a philosophical 
framework that was established in their absence. 115 In addition, the West and the 
United States in particular played a dominant role in the negotiation process of the 
UDHR. "6 Due to this, the Western civilization was unduly represented in the process 
of formulating universal human rights norms at the expense of other civilisations. In 
this respect, Douzinas noted that: 
The ideological colours of the Universal Declaration were evidently 
Western and liberal. The members of preparatory committee were Mrs 
Eleanor Roosevelt, a Lebanese Christian and a Chinese. John Humphrey, 
the Canadian Director of the UN Division of Human Rights,... was asked 
by the committee to prepare a first draft [of the Declaration] ... which was 
substantially adopted by the committee.... 
The Iravaux preparatoires he used to prepare his draft came, with only 
two exceptions, from Western English language sources with the 
American Law Institute submission a main influence. Only one of the 
seven principal drafters was not Christian... 117 
Although this process resulted in the proclamation of 'universal' rights, the central 
issue remains, how can they be considered universal rights when they are perceived as 
reflecting Western values rather than universal ones? The universalists and the 
cultural relativists provide strikingly contrasting answers to this question. 
113 See supra para. 2.1. 
114 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
115 An-Na'im, A, 'Human Rights in the Muslim World: Socio-Political Conditions and Scriptural 
Imperatives -A Preliminary Inquiry', Hanv. Hum. Rts. J., 3 (1990), 13, p. 15 [hereinafter Human 
Rights]. 
116 Renteln, A, International Human Rights: Universalism Versus Relativism (Newbury Park: Sage, 
1990), pp. 30-32 [hereinafter Human Rights]. 
117 Douzinas, supra note 110, p. 123. In addition to the dominant role played by Western Governments 
in the Declaration drafting process, Western civil society was also actively engaged in the process 
through a number of non-governmental organisations. In this respect, see Humphrey, J, Human Rights 
& The United Nations: A Great Adventure (Dobbs Ferry; New York: Transnational, 1984), pp. 30-31; 
Waltz, supra note 16, pp. 842-843. 
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Universalists, on the one hand, argue that although human rights are Western in 
origin, given that human rights are possessed by human beings merely because they 
are human beings, human rights are, by definition, universal. Hence, human beings 
everywhere are entitled to them, regardless of their cultural background. ' 18 In 
addition, they argue that culture is used by repressive regimes to rationalise violations 
of international human rights. 19 Furthermore, the universalists cite international 
human rights instruments in support of their position as these instruments adopt 
universal teens such as 'everyone has ... ', 'every 
human being has ... ', 
'all human 
beings have... ' and 'no one shall ... ' etc. 
1 20 
Cultural relativists, on the other hand, argue that different cultures have different 
moral codes, and thus, what is considered to be a right in a given culture can be 
considered anti-social in another culture. Since there is no universal moral code, one 
cannot judge which culture is, morally, 'right or wrong'. 121 Given that the relativists 
view the international human rights system as a product of Western culture, they 
consider using it as a standard of judgment is a form of Western ethnocentricity, as it 
assumes that Western values are superior to other cultures' values. '22 
The universalists' response to this argument is that there is a widespread 
endorsement of the UDHR and ratifications of the U. N Covenants. This fact, it is 
argued, suggests that there is an international consensus on the universality of human 
rights. 123 However, the rebuttal has been that 'countries endorse or ratify human rights 
standards because they wish to uphold national culture (the West) or because they 
wish to impress the outsiders (the rest). ' 124 Hence, verbal acceptance of human rights 
or ratification of a given human rights document does not necessarily reflect a 
genuine commitment to uphold them nationally, but could be used to serve political 
interests, including, inter alia, conferring international legitimacy on unelected and 
118 See e. g., Donnelly, Theory and Practice, supra note 7, pp. 12-19,23-25,60-65; Henkin, supra note 
6, pp. 1-10. 
119 See Shestack, supra note 7, pp. 231-232. 
120 See Steiner, H& Alston, P, International Hunan Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals, 2nd edn 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 366; Donnelly, J, 'Post-Cold War Reflections on the 
Study of International Human Rights', Ethics & Int'l Aff, 8 (1994), 97, p. 110. 
121 See American Anthropological Association, 'Statement on Human Rights', American 
Anthropologist, 49.4 (1947), pp. 542-543; Renteln, Human Rights, supra note 116, pp. 65-69. 
122 Renteln, Human Rights, supra note 116, p. 12,51-53; Pollis, supra note 20, pp, 11,13-14. 
123 Donnelly, Theory and Practice, supra note 7, pp. 23-25. 
124 Waltz, supra note 16, p. 841. 
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unpopular governments. 125 Finally, some states, which adopt practices clearly at 
variance with international human rights standards, justify their actions precisely on 
the basis that these standards are actually not universal but rather Western, and 
therefore they are not bound by them. 126 
The two strikingly contrasting positions taken by universalists and relativists mark 
the difference between theory (universalism) and reality (relativism) of human rights. 
The heated debate between the two sides, which is underlined by the fact that 'the 
[relativists] see as Western what the [universalists] see as universal', 127 has hindered 
the emergence of a middle-ground approach capable of reconciling between the need 
of universality and the reality of cultural diversity. Hence, there has been a growing 
realisation in the human rights discourse that neither of the two positions is valid on 
its own. As Bauman put it: 
[W]hile universal values offer a reasonable medicine against the oppressive 
obtrusiveness of parochial backwaters, and communal autonomy offers an 
emotionally gratifying tonic against the stand-offish callousness of the 
universalists, each drug when taken regularly turns into poison. Indeed, as 
long as the choice is merely between the two medicines, the chance of 
health must be meagre and remote. 128 
2.3.1 A pragmatic approach 
The relativists/universalists debate, summarised above, reflects a number of concerns 
that have to be taken into account in formulating an appropriate approach for 
establishing truly universal human rights. Firstly, without acknowledging the 
125 See Renteln, A, 'The Unanswered Challenge of Relativism and the Consequences for Human 
Rights', Hum. Rts. Q., 7.4 (1985), 514, p. 519 [hereinafter Relativism]. Iraq's practices on human rights 
under the former regime of Sadam Hussein, which endorsed the UDHR and is a Member Party to 
ICCPR since 1971, provides an illustration of the fact that ratifications of human rights instruments do 
not signify a genuine commitment to abide by them. For a review of Iraq's record on human rights 
under the former regime, see e. g., Report of the Special Rapporteur, Max Van Der Stoel on the 
Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution 
1996/72, U. N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 53rd Sess, Item 10 of the provisional agenda U. N. Doc. 
E/CN. 4/1997/57; Report of the Special Rapporteur, Max Van Der Stoel on the Situation of Human 
Rights in Iraq, Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1997/60, U. N. 
ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 54th Sess, Item 10 of the provisional agenda U. N. Doc. 
E/CN. 4/1998/67. 
126 An-Na'im, Human Rights, supra note 115, p. 15. This argument is often advanced by the 
Government of Saudi Arabia whenever its practices are criticised as violating international human 
rights standards. The Saudi Government's position on human rights standards is discussed infra para. 
2.4.2. 
127 Huntington, S, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 1996), p. 66. 
128 Bauman, Z, Postinodern Ethics (Oxford, Blackwell, 1993), p. 239. See also Douzinas, supra note 
110, pp. 136-139. 
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existence of universal standards, the world would be paralysed in face of gross human 
rights violations. In fact, without first agreeing on universal standards, one's 
judgments on what constitute human rights violations would be characterised as 
relative to his/her own culture. Secondly, what one considers to be a universal truth is 
not necessarily so. Therefore, in order to be able to have truly universal standards, 
they can not be asserted as self-evident truths, but rather there is need to advance 
appropriate justifications for them. In addition, concluding that the international 
human rights system is based upon a Western concept, does not necessarily mean that 
international human rights standards are automatically inapplicable to non-Western 
cultures. In fact, human rights standards as embodied in international and regional 
human rights documents provide, in my view, an appropriate framework within which 
one can examine which standards are truly universal and which are not. 
Furthermore, any claim of cultural distinctiveness must be approached cautiously, 
and, in assessing such a claim, it must be determined who is claiming to be speaking 
on behalf of that culture. It is no doubt that some repressive governments portray their 
violations of international human rights standards as keeping with local traditions and 
values, when they are in fact violating the traditions and values that they are claiming 
to protect. Thus, while due respect must be accorded to local cultures, when they are 
in conflict with international norms, unless one is prepared to force international 
norms against the local people's will, which is unthinkable, claims of cultural 
distinctiveness must not be taken at face value. 
Finally, generalisations on the issue of the compatibility or clash of a given 
culture with human rights system must be avoided. Therefore, in order to construct an 
accurate picture of the extent to which a given culture is compatible with the human 
rights system, which is a prerequisite for establishing truly universal human rights 
standards, there is a need to identify which aspects of that culture are [in]compatible 
with the human rights system. However, it is not sufficient for promoting and 
protecting universal human rights, particularly in cultures in which the conception of 
human rights is thought not to exist, to identify the areas where there is no conflict 
between that culture and the human rights system. If human rights are to take root in 
that culture, there is a need to justify them strictly from the local culture standpoint. 
Thus local people, who in the final analysis will enjoy and implement these rights, can 
view them as their own, not enforced upon them by outsiders. 
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I believe an approach which takes into account the above mentioned elements, is 
capable of establishing genuinely universal standards. 129 It might be argued that this 
approach may result in establishing fewer universal standards, compared to what is 
currently considered as 'universal' standards. 130 However, the past sixty years has 
shown that the claim of the universality of human rights as they currently stand has 
not advanced the cause of human rights. Only values which are universally shared can 
be universally protected. If the charge of cultural imperialism, which is the main 
criticism to the current human rights system, is to be defused, support for universal 
standards must come from all cultures of the world, not just from one of them. 
In order to contextualise the above discussion within the theme of this thesis, the 
concept of the universality of human rights in relation to Saudi Arabia' laws and 
policies is examined next. 
2.4 Saudi Arabia and human rights 
The relationship between international human rights standards and Saudi Arabia is 
quite complex, and a major source of controversy. To appreciate this complex 
relationship, and hopefully resolve it, two aspects of it will be examined here. Firstly, 
the extent to which the Saudi Arabian law recognises international human rights 
standards; secondly, the position that is taken by the Saudi Arabian Government on 
international human rights documents and standards. 
2.4.1 Human rights under the Basic Law 
As discussed in Chapter one, the Shari'ah, according to the Basic Law, is the supreme 
law of Saudi Arabia. 131 Therefore any legal issue, including issues of human rights, 
must be regulated in accordance with the Shari'ah. Unsurprisingly, this fact is 
embodied in the Basic Law itself, which, without a precedent, was the first codified 
129 This approach draws principally upon Renteln, Human Rights, supra note 116; Renteln, Relativism, 
supra note 125; An-Na'im, A, 'Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining International Standards 
of Human Rights', in Human Rights in Goss-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus, ed. by A 
An-Na'im, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992); An-Na'im, A, 'Conclusion', in 
Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus, ed. by A An-Na'im, 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992). Also relevant Pollis, A, 'Cultural Relativism 
Revisited: Through a State Prism', Hum. Rts. Q., 18.2 (1996), 316; Donnelly, Theory and Practice, 
supra note 7, Falk, supra note 109; Caney, S, 'Human Rights, Compatibility and Divers Cultures', in 
Human Rights and Global Diversity, ed. by S Caney &P Jones, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 
2001). 
130 See Jones, P, 'Human Rights and Diverse Cultures: Continuity or Discontinuity', in Human Rights 
and Global Diversity, ed. by S Caney &P Jones, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), pp. 34-37. 
131 See infra para. 1.1. 
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law in the Saudi legal history to recognise the concept of 'human rights'. Article 26 of 
the Basic Law states that `[t]he State protects human rights in accordance with the 
Islamic Shari'ah. ' 
However, as the aim of the approach outlined above is to examine the universality 
of human rights in the eyes of people in a given society, the question to be asked in 
this context is whether the provisions of the Basic Law regarding the constitutional 
status of the Shari'ah under the Saudi law reflect the will of the Saudi populace or 
not? If the provisions of the Shari'ah were imposed upon the Saudis against their will, 
it would be meaningless to consider the Shariah in this context, as the Saudi people, 
given the chance to decide freely, would not choose to be governed by it. Thus, if the 
question were answered in the negative, the right course would be to repeal those 
provisions, determine what the cultural beliefs of the Saudi people are, and then 
examine them comparatively with human rights standards to determine the extent to 
which the two converge and diverge, as it is the people who will, in the end, 
determine the law by which they want to be governed. 
Given that the Saudi political regime is not of a democratic nature, in which the 
people can express their will freely through general elections or referendums on 
policy issues, one needs to find other ways of providing an accurate answer to this 
critical question. The answer to this question is, in my view, in the affirmative for two 
main reasons. Firstly, every major reformative movement has declared the 
implementation of the Shari'ah provisions as its supreme objective. ' 32 Although these 
movements differ in the details of their proposals, the fact that the Shari'ah is cited as 
the law to be implemented in any reform signifies, apart from the ideological beliefs 
of these movements, the fact that the Shari'ah is a major source of legitimacy and 
acceptability of these movements and their proposals in the eyes of the Saudi 
populace. 
Secondly, and, perhaps, more tellingly, Saudis in the municipal elections held in 
2005, although indirectly, but clearly, have expressed a popular support for a system 
based on the Shari'ah law. The municipal elections, in which candidates competed for 
half of the municipal Council seats, as the other half are filled by appointments, was 
the first time in three decades in which Saudis were allowed to choose their 
132 See Tarazi, A, 'Saudi Arabia's New Basic Laws: The Struggle for Participatory Islamic 
Government', Harv. Intl L. J., 34 (1993), 258, pp. 261-263. 
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representatives for public offices. The results of this election reflect, in my view, a 
good measurement of the public opinion on the issue regarding the nature of the 
system that they want to be governed by. The results of the elections show that those 
candidates, who are characterised as Islamists, either because they are considered as 
religious people, and/or because they had been endorsed by religious scholars, scored 
an impressive victory against their rivals, who include liberals, businessmen and 
tribesmen. 133 The landslide victory of the Islamists underscores the fact that the Saudi 
people, generally speaking, in terms of appropriateness, legitimacy, or morality, use 
Islam as the basis for their judgments. These two considerations suggest that the 
constitutional status that the Shari'ah enjoys under the Basic Law, far from being 
imposed on the Saudi people, is a reflection of their will. 
Thus, given the fact the Shari'ah is central to both the Saudi Arabian constitution 
and the Saudis' way of life, the critical question that arises here is whether there are 
conceptual differences between the Islamic definition of human rights and the 
Western concept of human rights, upon which the international human rights system 
is based, which could hamper the implementation of international human rights 
standards in Saudi Arabia. As pointed out earlier, the Western concept of human 
rights conceives human rights as entitlements which individuals have merely because 
they are human beings. In addition, the exercise of these rights is regulated under'the 
social contract', which reflects the will of people, or what is, currently, known as `the 
popular sovereignty'. This, in turn, entitles the people to change an existing law or 
create a new one, to respond to social changes in a given society and in a given time. 
On the other hand, under Islamic Shari 'ah, God, and God alone is the sovereign, and 
therefore Muslims must regulate their actions to comply with His law, i. e., the 
Shari'ah at all times. ' 34 As the Divine will is the source of all laws, including those 
relating to human rights, human rights can be seen as entitlements from God, which 
individuals have, not by virtue of their nature as human beings, but merely by virtue 
of the Divine will. 
133 See Steve Coll, Islamic Activists Sweep Saudi Council Elections, Washington Post (Apr. 24,2005), 
at A 17; Salah Nasrawi, Islamists Dominate Saudi Arabia Elections, Associated Press (Apr. 24,2005). 
134 See infra para. 1.2. See also Chaudluy, supra note 5, pp. 14-16; Al-Hageel, S, Human Rights in 
Islam and Their Application in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, trans. by 0 Atari (Riyadh: Al-Humadie 
Press, 2001), p. 34-36; Coulson, N. J., 'The State and the Individual in Islamic Law', Intl & Comp. L. Q, 
6 (1957), 49, p. 50. 
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The implication of this conclusion for human rights under the Shari 'ah law, and 
by implication the Saudi law, is that human beings are only entitled to those rights 
granted them by the Shari 'ah. Thus, the question that arises here is that; does the 
existence of the above-mentioned conceptual differences between the Shari'ah law 
and the international human rights system mean that they do not share common 
values? In order to determine whether they do share common values or not, and to 
determine what these are if this is the case, each aspect of the two systems must be 
comparatively analysed. This task is undertaken in the following chapter with regard 
to the rights which form the focus of this thesis. 
2.4.2 The Saudi Government and human rights 
The Saudi Government's position on international human rights standards and 
documents has been, to say the least, controversial over the years. Their position was 
initially demonstrated when Saudi Arabia abstained from voting on the UDHR in 
1948. The Government's objection - voiced through Al-Barudi, the Saudi 
Ambassador to the U. N at the time - was that the UDHR reflected aspects of 
Western 
culture that did not sit comfortably with the cultural values of Eastern States. 
135 Saudi 
Arabia's particular objection was against Article 18 of the UDHR. This Article gives 
individuals the right to change their religious faith, which, as stated by the Saudi 
Ambassador, is incompatible with the teachings of the Islamic Shari'ah, which 
specifically forbids Muslims from ever changing their religion. ' 36 Saudi Arabia 
persisted with their incompatibility argument throughout the debates for the ICCPR 
held in 1954 and 1960. The proffered objection to joining ICCPR was based similarly 
on that of Article 18 of the Declaration mentioned above, as the ICCPR also 
guarantees freedom of religion including the freedom to change one's faith. 137 
However, while the Saudi Government's position on the UDHR and ICCPR seems 
to suggest that its non-endorsement and non-ratification of international human rights 
135 Yearbook of the United Nations (1948-1949), p. 528. 
136 For a discussion, see Arzt, D, 'The Application of Human Rights Law in Islamic States', Hunº. Rts. 
Q., 12.2 (1990), 202, pp. 216-217; Waltz, supra note 16, pp. 813-822; Morsink, supra note 29, pp. 24- 
26. 
137 Ibid. p. 217. It should be added here that Saudi Arabia also objected to the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 (ICESCR), on the basis that Article 9, which guarantees 
social security including social insurance, is a Western concept, which the Shari 'ah, allegedly, adopts 
better methods for improving the conditions of the needy. However, since this thesis is only concerned 
with legal rights, Saudi Arabia's position on the ICESCR falls outside of the scope of this thesis, and 
therefore it is not included in the discussion. For a discussion of the Saudi Arabian position on the 
ICESCR, see generally ibid. p. 218. 
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instruments is due solely to their incompatibility with the Shari'ah, it is undeniable 
that there are also political elements to this position. This is evident from the Saudi 
Government's position on the ICCPR and the norms it embodies. The non-ratification 
of the ICCPR by the Saudi Government can be explained with reference to the fact 
that it cannot ratify and honour the ICCPR without violating the Shari 'ah, or to 
modify its obligations under the ICCPR without violating the object and the purpose 
of the Covenant, as I have discussed elsewhere. 139 However, this fact does not explain 
why Saudi Arabia does not incorporate the provisions of the ICCPR which are 
compatible with Shari'ah into its domestic law and implement them in practice, given 
that its opposition to ratifying the ICCPR is based on the non-compatibility of some 
the ICCPR provisions with Islamic law. Since international human rights standards 
are meant to be domestically protected, as discussed above, the fact that Saudi Arabia 
cannot for whatever reason ratify international human rights instruments, does not 
give it the right, morally or legally, to disregard those rights which are compatible 
with the Shari'ah. 
In addition, the Government of Saudi Arabia, when accused of violating human 
rights, has always contended that its policy has been guided by the Shari'ah, even 
when it is in fact contrary to it. For example, former King Fahd in 1992, in response 
to external calls for holding general elections in Saudi Arabia said that: 
The prevailing democratic system in the world is not suitable for us in this 
region; our peoples' composition and traits are different from the traits of 
that world. We cannot import the way other peoples deal [with their own 
affairs] in order to apply it to our people; we have our own Muslim faith 
which is a complete system.... Free elections are not suitable for our 
country, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia .... 
'39 
However, this statement is misleading, to say the least. Elections, although they may 
take a different form than in the West, are considered the legitimate way of choosing 
an Imam or Khalifah (i. e., governor or president) under Islamic law. 140 Currently, 
Saudis do not have any say in choosing the person who governs them as, under the 
Basic Law, the '[r]ule passes to the sons of the founding King, Abdulaziz Bin 
138 See Al-Hargan, A, 'Saudi Arabia and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966: 
A Stalemate Situation', mnt'l. J. Huni. Rts., 9.4 (2005), 419. 
139 As quoted in Tarazi, supra note 132, p. 259, n. 8. 
140 See Wafi, A, Human Rights in Islam, trans. by D Derar (Riyadh: Naif Arab Academy for Security 
Sciences Press, 1998), pp. 263-268. 
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Abdurrahman al-Faysal Al Saud, and to their children's children'. 14' That is to say 
denying the Saudi people the right to vote, which is enshrined in Article 25 (b) of the 
ICCPR, has no Islamic rationale, as the King attempted to portray. Nor does 
restricting the rule to King Abdulaziz's sons and grandchildren have any Islamic 
justification. Hence, the laws and practices of the Saudi Government, or any Muslim 
government for that matter, which are claimed to be based on Islamic principles, must 
be tested against these principles to determine whether they do in fact conform with 
them. 142 
Furthermore, the argument that Saudi Arabia should not recognise and implement 
a given right because it (allegedly or actually) originated in the West is at best, from 
an Islamic point of view, invalid. Under the Shari'ah the legitimacy of a given issue is 
not determined by its origins but rather by its compatibility with Islamic principles 
and its appropriateness for advancing inaqaasid al-shari'ah (the overall goals of the 
Shari'ah). 143 The Prophet himself did not reject anything that had existed before Islam 
was revealed upon him, but determined its legitimacy solely on the principles of the 
Shari'ah. This is evident from what the Prophet said with regard to an alliance known 
as hell al fodooal, which members of Qurish tribe in Mecca had formed. Members of 
the mentioned alliance vowed to fight oppression in Mecca and to help the oppressed 
to recover what was rightfully theirs. ' 44 The Prophet, after Islam had been revealed 
upon him, did not prohibit this sort of alliance because its roots were in the period 
before Islam, which Islam considers as the Era of Ignorance (Aser al-Jahliah). He 
rather said: 
I have witnessed, before Islam, an alliance being concluded at the house of 
Ibn Jud'an, which I would not exchange for a herd of red camels. If it were 
called for, now that we have Islam, I would readily participate in it. 145 
Thus, refusing to recognise human rights solely on the pretext that they originated in 
the West is, from a strictly Islamic viewpoint, invalid. If the Government of Saudi 
141 Basic law, Art. 5 (b). 
142 See Zahraa, M, 'Characteristic Features of Islamic Law: Perceptions and Misconceptions', ALQ, 15 
(2000), 168, pp. 172-175. 
143 See infra para 1.2.2. See also Haleem, M, 'Human Rights in Islam and the United Nations 
Instruments', in Democracy, the Ride of Law and Islam, ed. by C Eugene &A Sherif, (London; 
Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999), pp. 444-445. 
144 See Al-Suhaili, A (known as Abu al-Qassem, d. 591 H), al-Rawd al-Anaif fi Shurh al-Sirah al- 
Nabawiyah li Ibn Hishant (The Lofty Garden Interpreting the Prophetic Biography by Ibn Hisham), 1 
(Beirut: Dar al-Kutob Al-Ilmiyah, 1998), pp. 424-428. 
145 Reported in ibid. p. 242. The translation is from Haleem, supra note 143, p. 435. 
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Arabia is sincere about its commitment to protect human rights in accordance with the 
Shari'ah, as dictated by the Basic Law, then the sole criterion for examining the 
suitability and compatibility of international human rights norms with Saudi law, must 
be those which the Islamic Shari'ah adopts. In recent years and by way of a 
compromise the Saudi Government seems, at least rhetorically, to adopt this position 
by declaring its commitment to abide by international human rights standards where 
they do not explicitly conflict with the Islamic Shari'ah. 146 In the following chapters, 
this commitment with regard to the accused's pre-trial rights is subjected to scrutiny. 
2.5 Conclusion 
The international human rights revolution forged by the adoption of the UDHR in 
1948 changed the status of the individual vis-ä-vis the state. Individuals are no longer 
considered subjects of a given state, which can treat them as it sees fit, but rather as 
autonomous human beings with inalienable rights. To ensure the protection of these 
inalienable rights, international and regional human rights systems have been 
established. 
However, as the human rights movement was solely concerned with promoting 
and protecting what they consider 'universal' rights, it ignored the conceptual 
differences that exist between the various cultures of the world on the nature of 
human rights. This attitude has not lead to the disappearance of these conceptual 
differences, as the human rights movement seemed to think. It rather delayed its 
emergence until the question of the practical implementation of 'universal' rights has 
arose with regard to cultures, whose definition of human rights differ from that of the 
West, upon which international human rights system is based. In order to 
accommodate these conceptual differences, establish truly universal human rights, 
and thereby provide better chances for ensuring the practical implementation of these 
rights universally, a pragmatic approach, whose main elements have been drawn from 
various studies conducted in this field, has been suggested. The essence of this 
16 See the speech delivered by Prince Torki Al-Kabeer on behalf of the Saudi Government to the 56th 
Session of the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva (Apr. 6,2000). See also Reservations of the 
Saudi Arabian Government on the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, adopted Dec. 21 1965,660 U. N. T. S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4,1969), available at 
<http: //www. unhchr. ch> (last visited Jan. 2,2006). 
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approach places emphasis on the values that all cultures of the world have in 
common, which have been lost in debate of the universality/relativity of human rights. 
By employing this approach in the following chapter with regard to the rights of 
the accused under Islamic law, which is considered to be lacking a conception of 
human rights, it is hoped that it will show that by focusing on the commonly shared 
values, human rights will gain in legitimacy, which is currently lacking human rights 
in Muslim societies. Admittedly, this approach might not lead to resolve all the 
conflicts between the Islamic law and international human rights law. Nonetheless, I 
believe it will provide the first step in that direction. Differences can be only 
negotiated and hopefully resolved, when the common grounds have been clearly 
identified, and willingly implemented. 
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Chapter Three 
The Status of the Accused under the Islamic Shari 'ah 
As argued in the previous chapter only universally shared values can be universally 
implemented. As discussed in Chapters one and two, the Shari'ah is the law of the 
land in Saudi Arabia, and represents a moral code for the Saudi people. Hence, this 
chapter seeks to demonstrate that the Shari 'ah does not represent a constitutional or 
cultural obstacle to the promotion and protection of international human rights 
standards applicable to the pre-trial stage of the criminal process in Saudi Arabia. ' 
The aim of this chapter, however, is not confined to establishing that there is no 
conflict between the Shari ah law and human rights standards, but rather to show that, 
given the Islamic Shari'ah is interpreted and understood in light of current 
circumstances, as required by the Shari'ah itself, the adoption of human rights 
standards in Saudi Arabia is not just permissible, but in fact, obligatory. 
The importance of this task cannot be overstated for two main reasons. Firstly, 
without providing human rights standards with Islamic legitimacy, the whole task of 
evaluating the Saudi criminal procedure, which is allegedly an authentic product of 
the Islamic culture, on the basis of human rights standards would be open to 
objection. This would be on the basis that the evaluative criteria employed would be 
seen as representative of Western values, rather than of common values shared by the 
two cultures. Thus, such evaluation would violate the principle of cultural relativism. 2 
Secondly, providing human rights standards with cultural legitimacy is essential to 
encourage Saudis, both people and institutions, to promote and protect these standards 
in Saudi Arabia, instead of having international institutions or Western non- 
governmental human rights organisations as the sole guardian of the application of 
these standards in their homeland. 3 The lack of cultural legitimacy, therefore, would 
severely undermine the objective and findings of this thesis and render the whole 
project of little practical importance. 
1 The term 'international human rights standards' refers to those standards which are identified in the 
second part of this thesis as constituting the minimum standards required by international human rights 
law to protect the interests of those persons who are suspected or accused of committing a criminal 
offence at the pre-trial stage of the criminal process. 
2 See supra para. 2.3. 
3 To use Tibi's words 'to make [Saudis] speak the language of human rights in their own tongue'. Tibi, 
B, 'Islamic LawlShari'a, Human Rights, Universal Morality and International Relations', Hum. Rts. Q., 
16.2 (1994), 277, p. 293. 
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In carrying out the task outlined above, the underlying principles of the Islamic 
criminal justice system in light of international human rights standards will be 
examined, to determine whether the two converge or diverge in terms of the values 
they adopt with regard to the treatment of the accused in the pre-trial stage. The 
analysis of the rights of the accused under the Shari'ah is confined to the writings of 
classical jurists and how it was implemented by the Prophet and his companions. As 
pointed out in the previous chapter, practices of current Muslim government do not 
necessarily reflect the ideals of the Shari'ah. 4 Hence, these practices are not 
considered in this chapter. 
Juristic opinions regarding criminal procedure will be examined and, where these 
rulings are based upon public utility (muslaha murslah), as opposed to opinions based 
upon explicit texts, they are subjected to critical evaluation, as the Shari 'ah 
jurisprudential rule states that `rulings which are based upon public utility change 
according to change of time and place' (1a yunker taquer al-ahkam al-mbniah ala 
muslaha bi tqueer al-azminah wa al-amkunah). 5 It is noteworthy that most rulings 
regarding the criminal procedure are not based upon explicit texts but rather upon 
individual opinions guided by public utility. 6 Since what was considered to serve 
public utility, for example ten centuries ago, does not necessarily serve public utility 
in modern times, these rulings must be assessed in the light of their suitability to serve 
public utility in modern times. In order to do so, one cannot study these rulings in the 
abstract, without considering the context in which they are meant to be applied. 
Hence, juristic rulings, where necessary, will be assessed on the basis of applying 
them in Saudi Arabia. 
Where the Shari 'ah does not provide any rules for a given situation, the rule will 
be derived from the general principles governing the Islamic criminal justice system 
and the dictates of public utility. It is worth mentioning that the Shari'ah is a duty- 
based system rather than a right-based system in the sense that Shari 'ah does not state 
explicitly that a given individual has certain rights, but instead it imposes a duty on 
citizens or on the state to adhere to certain obligations in dealing with a given 
individual or a given situation. However, this fact does not mean that these duties 
° See supra para. 4.2.2. 
3 See supra para. 1.2.2. 
6 Al-Ageel, S, 'Huquq Al-Muta'hm fi al-Shari'ah Al-Islamiah (The Rights of the Accused in the Islamic 
Shari'ah)', Al Adl Journal, 9 (2001), 53, pp. 65-68. 
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cannot be constructed in the form of rights as the duty on X to respect B, entitles B to 
the right to be respected by X. 7 
The chapter is divided into seven parts. Each part considers, in the context of the 
pre-trial stage of the criminal process, each of the following issues: limitations on 
individual rights, the right to dignity, the right against self-incrimination, the right to 
liberty, the right to privacy, the right to justice and the right to an effective remedy. 
3.1 Limitations on individual rights 
Under the Shari 'ah rules individual rights could be restricted on the basis of specific 
texts authorising such restrictions. In addition to that there is a jurisprudential rule 
which states that `necessity makes forbidden things permissible' (al-darurat tubeeah 
al-mahthurat). 8 Thus, the rule permits the state to interfere with individual rights 
when it is necessary. Taking the rule at face value one might be led to believe that the 
rule basically allows the state to impose whatever limits it deems necessary even 
where these limits could not be objectively justified as necessary to achieve the 
underlying objective of the interference with an individual right. In fact, this is a very 
premature judgment, when one considers the conditions governing the application of 
this rule. 
Before discussing these requirements, two preliminary remarks appear necessary. 
Firstly, interference with individual rights, as a general rule, is forbidden. Secondly, 
investigating and resolving crimes is a necessity which justifies the interference with 
individual rights. 10 It may seem that both observations are common sense, and 
applicable to any criminal justice system, although with different emphasis, but for 
the sake of a proper understanding of this rule a restatement of these common sense 
rules is essential. 
For a discussion of duty-based systems in relation to international human rights law, see generally 
Renteln, A, International Human Rights: Universalism Versus Relativism (Newbury Park: Sage, 1990), 
rp. 41-44. 
Al-Ageel, supra note 6, pp. 70-72. 
9 The rule does not just permit the state to violate individual rights on the basis of necessity, but also 
allows ordinary citizens to violate their fellow citizen's rights when necessity exists. This could be 
illustrated by the killing of a person, which is according to the general rule is forbidden by the 
Shari'ah, in the form of self defence, as it is necessary to preserve one's life against unlawful attempt 
to take it away. 
10 Awad, A, 'The Rights of the Accused under the Islamic Criminal Procedure', in The Islamic Criminal 
Justice System, ed. by C Bassiouni, (London; New York: Oceana Publications, 1982), p. 100. 
77 
Muslim jurists have developed certain conditions in order for a limit on an 
individual right to be justified on the basis of necessity, and therefore to be 
compatible with the Shari 'ah rules. These conditions are, firstly, acting on the basis of 
necessity must aim to protect a legitimate and substantial interest. Secondly, there 
must be good reasons to believe that necessity actually exists. Thirdly, there is no 
other legitimate and less restrictive means by which the harm, which will result from 
not acting in accordance with the necessity, can be adequately dealt with. Fourthly, 
the measures that are taken on the basis of necessity must not exceed what is 
absolutely necessary to achieve the objective of acting on the basis of necessity. I i 
Since most of the restrictions on individual rights are justified on the basis of this 
jurisprudential rule rather than on the basis of specific texts, those restrictions are 
discussed in the relevant sections. However, it is instructive here to provide an 
illustration of how the rule of necessity is designed to strike an appropriate balance 
between, on the one hand, the public interest in investigating and solving crimes, and, 
on the other hand, the individual interest of the accused to be protected from 
unjustifiable interference with his rights. For instance, there is no explicit text which 
gives the state the right to search private homes, and the general rule is that private 
homes are protected against state's interference. 
Suppose, therefore, that an individual is caught with drugs on his person, and the 
amount appears to be more than might be used for personal consumption, which raises 
the suspicion that he/she has committed a drug trafficking offence. In applying the 
above stated conditions one could determine whether or not it is justifiable to interfere 
with the accused's right to privacy, by searching his home. The first condition is met 
in this case, as searching the accused's home aims to protect the public interest in 
investigating crimes, which is a legitimate and substantial interest. The second 
condition is also met as the quantity of drugs that the accused caught with provides a 
good reason to believe that the accused has committed a drug trafficking offence. 
Since the public interest in investigating an alleged drug trafficking offence cannot be 
secured without violating the accused's right to privacy by searching his home, the 
third condition is also satisfied. The fourth condition in this case is not applicable to 
 For an extensive discussion of the rule of necessity, see Al-Zuhili, W, Nudert al-Dururah al-Shari'aih 
Muqaraneten m'a al-Qanun al-Wadei (The Theory of Necessity under the Shari'ah Compared with 
Positive Law), 4th edn (Beirut: Dar El-Fikr al-Muaser, 1997), pp. 182-289; Al-Sadlan, S, al-Quad al- 
Fiqhih wa ma Tafria Minha (The Major Jurisprudential Rules and the Rules which are Derived from 
them), 2nd edn (Riyadh: Bansliyah Publication & Distribution House, 1999), pp. 247-309. 
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the actual search but rather to the manner in which the search is conducted. Therefore, 
if the search is carried out in an abusive fashion, the measures taken on the basis of 
necessity would be considered illegal as they exceeded what is necessary for 
investigating the alleged offence. However, if the search is carried out strictly in a 
manner that seeks to find out whether or not there are drugs concealed in the house, 
the fourth condition is certainly met. 
From the discussion of the accused's rights under the Shari'ah rules in the 
following sections, the issue of how this fundamental tenet of the Shari 'ah law 
operates to strike an appropriate balance between the public interest in effective law 
enforcement and the individual interest of the accused in being protected from 
unjustifiable interference with his rights will become evident. 
3.2 Right to dignity 
The right to dignity under the Shari 'ah is based upon on the rule of `the five protected 
essentials' (al-darurat al-kums). These essentials namely are: the preservation of 
one's religion, the preservation of one's reputation, the preservation of one's mind, 
the preservation of oneself and the preservation of one's property. These essentials 
constitute the five fundamental interests which the Shari 'ah seeks to protect, because, 
according to the Shari 'ah, individuals cannot enjoy this life and fulfil their aspirations 
if these interests are not adequately protected. What this discussion is concerned with 
is the essential of preserving oneself. The preservation of oneself does not just 
encompass the right to life, but also, and equally important, the right to live with 
dignity. 12 Since the preservation of oneself is a fundamental right, in the sense that it 
is inviolable, it could be concluded safely that any conduct which is contrary to 
human dignity is contrary to this fundamental right and therefore is illegal. 
In addition, human dignity is considered under the Shari 'ah rules as an 
entitlement from God, as He states in the Qur'an that `[i]ndeed We have honoured the 
Children of Adam.... ' 13 Therefore, the right to dignity cannot be violated by a fellow 
man, as what is given by God can only be taken by Him. The following authority is a 
case in point. Muhammad ibn Al-Ass, who is a son of the Governor of Egypt, hit an 
12 See Abu Zahra, M, Usul al-Figh (The Roots of Jurisprudence) (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-Arabi, 1997), 
pp. 244-245 & 319-321 [hereinafter Usul]. 
Verse, 17: 70. See also verses, 2: 30 & 33: 72; Chaudhry, M, Human Rights in Islam (Lahore: Impact 
Publications, 1993), p. 11. 
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Egyptian man. The man complained to the Khalifah Umar ibn Al-Khattab, the second 
successor to the Prophet, about the governor's son's action. The Khalifah summoned 
the Governor of Egypt and his son Muhammad. When they came, the Khalifah told 
the Egyptian man to hit Muhammad in the same way that he was hit. Then the 
Khalifah said to the Governor: `When did you enslave people, since they are born 
free? ' 14 
The Shari 'ah does not include detailed rules with regard to what could amount to 
a violation of human dignity, and therefore what is considered to be forbidden. 
However, the Shari 'ah does provide some examples from which a rule could be 
inferred for determining whether or not an action, or words for that matter, to be 
contrary to human dignity. The Qur'an states that `[o] ye who believe! Let not one 
people deride another people. . . nor call one another by nick-names. 
Giving bad names 
is evil after belief, and those who do not repent, they are the wrongdoers. ' 15 In this 
verse, the Qur'an declares, inter alia, the mere use of nicknames as evil because it 
could make a person feels embarrassed or inferior. 16 If this is so, any words or indeed 
actions that are considered to cause embarrassment or to be harmful to individual 
dignity are equally forbidden as the verse clearly indicates. 
This is just a brief account of the right to dignity under the Shari 'ah rules, as the 
discussion here is only concerned with the right to dignity in relation to criminal 
procedure. Hence, the right to dignity will be expanded upon under the right against 
self-incrimination next. 
3.3 Right against self-incrimination 
The right against self-incrimination is not explicitly recognised by the Shari'ah rules. 
However, this right can be inferred from two Shari'ah principles: the principle of 
innocence and the prohibition of subjecting the accused to coercion in order to make 
him confess. 
The principle of innocence is a central one in the Islamic criminal justice system. 
Muslim jurists have inferred the principle of innocence from two jurisprudential rules, 
14 As quoted in Al-Tantawy, A& Al-Tantawy, N, Akbar Umar and Akbar Abdullah bin Umar (The 
News of Umar and the News of Abdullah bin Umar), 12th edn (Jiddah: Dar AI-Munar, 2001), pp. 143- 
145. 
15 Verse, 49: 11. 
16 See Ibn Kutheer, H (d. 774 H), Tafseer Al-Qur'an Al-Adeenn (The Interpretation of the Holy Qur'an), 
4 (Beirut: Dar al-Muarifah, 1991), p. 227. 
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the essence of which is that a man is born free from obligations and wrongdoings. 
This original status is a certainty which can be only negated by a similar certainty, but 
not by doubt (al-yaqeen la yasoul bi al-shk wa al-asul brait al-dhimmh). Therefore, 
the original status of the accused as innocent is a certainty. Since the innocence of the 
accused is a certainty this certainty, as the jurisprudential rule dictates, cannot be 
negated by doubt (e. g., suspicion or circumstantial evidence), but can only be negated 
by a similar certainty (i. e., full proof in accordance with the Shari 'ah rules of proof). 
Hence, doubt under the Shari 'ah rules is interpreted in favour of the accused. 17 The 
implication of the principle of innocence is that any one who disputes this certainty 
bears the burden of establishing the contrary. In other words, if the accused is faced 
with an accusation of committing an offence, he is not required to provide any 
evidence in his/her defence because his innocence is a certainty. It is the accuser who 
bears the burden of supporting his allegation with evidence, as required by the 
Prophetic report which states that `[i]f people were given what they claim [without 
providing proof], the life and the property of the nation would be lost, but the accuser 
bears the burden of proof. ' 18 
Thus, the principle of innocence provides a strong legal basis for the right to 
silence as this principle dictates that it is the duty of the accuser to establish the 
truthfulness of his allegations, and in the absence of such proof, the accused must be 
acquitted. As observed by Professor Vogel: 
As to the standard and burden of proof [under the Shari 'ah rules of proof], 
the presumption of innocence is fundamental, and the state must prove its 
case. The defendant has no obligation to respond to the accusation against 
him, and he may do so by simple denial. '9 
If this is the case, the accused is entitled to remain silent in the face of the charges 
presented against him, as his innocence is a certainty that does not need further proof. 
In addition, under the Shari'ah law the accused has the right to silence because 
there is no obligation upon him to speak. The omission of mentioning this right in the 
17 See Awad, supra note 10, p. 94; Al-Suwalim, B, A1-Muta'hm: Muamaltu'h iva Huqugh fi Al-Fiqh a! - Islami (The Treatment and Rights of the Accused in Islamic Jurisprudence) (Riyadh: Naief Academy 
for Security Sciences Press, 1987), pp. 383-386; Al-Sadlan, supra note 11, pp. 108-125; Al-Aua, S, 'al- 
Asul Brait al-Muta'hm (The Presumption of Innocence)', in al-Muta'hm wa Huquqh fr al-Shari'ah al- 
Islantiah (The Accused's Rights in Islamic Shari'ah), ed. by Naief Academy for Security Sciences, I 
(Riyadh: Naief Academy for Security Sciences Press, 1986), pp. 343-347. 8 Reported by Al-Nisbouri, M (known as imam Muslim, d. 261 H), Sahih Muslim, Report No. 3228. '9 Vogel, F, 'he Trial of Terrorists under Classical Islamic Law', Hari,. Int'! L. J., 43.1 (2002), 53, p. 56. 
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work of classical Muslim jurists, which may have led some writers to mistakenly 
conclude that such right does not exist, is because the trial was seen as an opportunity, 
in fact a right for the accused to speak and to clarify his position, as he is in the best 
position to refute the case against him. Defendants were encouraged to speak - not for 
the reason that confessions could be obtained from them, but in order for them to 
present their case and to refute the allegations presented against them. The emphasis 
was upon the right of the defendant to speak rather than on his right to silence, as 
silence could lead the defendant to be convicted if the evidence of the accuser is left 
unchallenged. 20 
Finally, the right to silence can also be inferred from the Shari'ah jurisprudential 
rule which prohibits inferring guilt from silence. This rule states that `silence cannot 
be interpreted' (1a yunsab lisaket gool). The essence of this rule in this context is that 
silence cannot be held as evidence of guilt. 21 The combination of the two rules (i. e., 
the principle of innocence and the prohibition of inferring guilt from silence), and the 
fact that there is no explicate texts that oblige the accused to speak, means that if the 
accused, in the face of the police or the judge questioning, refuses to provide any 
answers, his silence cannot be held as the sole basis for a conviction. Nor can his 
silence be held as supportive evidence, where there is prima facie evidence already 
that does not meet the standard of proof required by the Shari 'ah, because the accused 
is not obliged to provide evidence in the first place. 22 
Regarding the prohibition of coercing the accused to confess, a minority of 
Muslim scholars, including the Imams Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728 H) and Ibn Al-Qayyim 
(d. 751 H), argue that torture could be used to force the defendant to confess, because 
it is contrary to the public interest to release the accused in every case where the 
20 This is evident from the fact that according to the right to defence the judge is required to hear what 
the accused has to say in his defence before he can rule in the case before him. See infra para. 3.6.1 21 See Al-Sadlan, supra note 11, pp. 186-187; Ibn Dhufair, S, al-Nudaan al-Iyurai al-Jenaeifi al- 
Shari'ah al-Islamiah wa Tadbigat'h ft al-Mamlaka al-Arabiyyah al-Saudiyyah (Criminal Procedure 
System in the Islamic Shari'ah and its Application in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia), 2nd edn (Riyadh, 
2000), p. 124. 
22 See also Al-Fadlie, J, 'al-Asul Brait al-Muta'hm fi al-Shari'ah al-Islamiah (The Principle of the 
Innocence of the Accused in Islamic Shari'ah)', in al-Mutahhn: wa Huquqh fi al-Shari'ah al-Islamiah 
(The Accused's Rights in Islamic Shari'ah), ed. by Naief Academy for Security Sciences, 1 (Riyadh: 
Naief Academy for Security Sciences Press, 1986), pp. 195-199; Matloub, A, 'al-Asul Brait al-Thumah 
(The Principle of Innocence)', in al-Muta'hm iva Huquqh fi al-Shari'ah al-Islamiah (The Accused's 
Rights in Islamic Shari'ah), ed. by Naief Academy for Security Sciences, I (Riyadh: Naief Academy 
for Security Sciences Press, 1986), pp. 231-238. 
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standard of proof is not fully met. 23 According to them, in cases of theft where there is 
prima facie evidence against the defendant, and the defendant is a persistent offender, 
torture could be used to make him/her confess. 24 
This minority base their opinion primarily on one incident in which a man from 
the Jewish community, who lived in the Islamic state and had already violated a treaty 
with the Prophet of not supporting the enemy of the Sate, was suspected of violating 
another treaty. The second treaty dictated that the lives of the Jewish community 
would be spared if they left the Islamic State and took with them anything that they 
could carry, but not to hide anything, and anything left, would go to the State 
Treasury. However, the man accused of violating the second treaty had received a 
large quantity of musk just before he was ordered to leave, which he neither took with 
him, nor gave to the State Treasury. The man claimed that he had already consumed 
the musk, but the Prophet did not accept the excuse and ordered one of his 
companions to subject the accused to torture. Shortly after that, the Prophet was 
23 The use of torture on the basis of circumstantial evidence, or what was known under the Roman- 
Canon law of proof as 'half proof, was adopted by Western European legal systems during the 13th 
century until the mid of the 18th century, for the same reason that the minority justify inflicting torture 
on accused persons, i. e., the inability of judges to convict what they perceive as criminals. For an 
extensive discussion of judicial torture under those systems, see Langbein, J, Torture and the Law of 
Proof (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), ch. 1; Langbein, J, The Origins of Adversary 
Criminal Trial (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 338-343 [hereinafter 
Adversary]. 
24 See Al-Jawziyya, M, al-Turuq al-Hukmiyya ft al-Siyasa a! - Shar'iyya (The Wise Ways to Legitimate 
Policy) (Beirut: Dar al-Kutob al-Elmiah, 1995), pp. 79-80 [hereinafter al-Siyasa]; Al-Malki, B (known 
as Imam Ibn Farhoun, d. 799 H), Tubsirat al-Hukam fi Usul al-Qutheah wa Mnahij al-Ahkam 
(Enlightening Rulers with regard to Cases and Legal Rulings), 2 (Beirut: Dar Alum Al-Kutob, 2003), 
pp. 116-130. This view is not confined to some classical Muslim scholars, but also adopted by some 
contemporary Muslim scholars, most notably the President of the Saudi Supreme Judicial Council 
(SJC), Sheikh Saleh Al-Luhaydan, and well-known retired appellate Qadi, Sheikh Suleiman Al-Munia, 
who consider the use of torture to be consistent with the public interest in solving crimes. See Al- 
Lahaydan, S, Turuq al-Ithbt al-Sharai (The Rules of Proof under the Shari'ah)', in al-Naduah al-Ibniah 
li Dirast Tadpeeq al-Tashria al-Jenaei al-Islami wa Athrh fi Mukafhet al-Jeremiah fi al-Mamlaka a! - Arabiyyah al-Saudiyyah (Scientific Conference for Studying the Application of the Islamic Criminal 
Law and its Impact in Reducing Crimes in The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia), 1 (Riyadh: The Ministry of 
Interior, 1976), pp. 113,135-136; Al-Munia, S, 'Nadari'at Brait al-Muta'hm Hta Tathbut Idanth (The 
Theory of the Innocence of the Accused until lie is Found Guilty)', in al-Muta'hm wa Huquqh fi a! - Shari'ah al-Islatniah (The Accused's Rights in Islamic Shari'ah), ed. by Naief Academy for Security 
Sciences, 1 (Riyadh: Naief Academy for Security Sciences Press, 1986), 267-282. It is noteworthy also 
that some contemporary Saudi scholars who are in favour of the use of torture argue that its use is not 
restricted to cases of theft, but extend to any case where the accused is a persistent offender and there is 
a prima facie evidence against him. See, e. g., Al-Suwalim, supra note 17, pp. 180-183; Al-Faysal, F, 
'Intz'a al-I'atiraf min al-Muta'lim bi al-Tadeeb: Al-Athar al-Mutratbh alilt wa Tadpeeqath al-Amliah 
(Extracting Confession from the Accused by Tourture: Its Impact and Judicial Practice)' (unpublished 
Master's Thesis, Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University, Riyadh (on file with the Higher 
Institute of the Judiciary Library), 2002), pp. 132-175. The position of the Saudi qadis on the issue of 
the use of torture for the purposes of extracting confessions is examined infra para. 5.3.1.1. 
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informed that the accused man was seen to be hiding something in the ruins, which 
had been searched and the musk had been found. 25 
However, this incident does not provide a legal justification for subjecting the 
accused to torture. This is because the incident, cited by the minority, concerned a 
man in a state of war, in which he violated a treaty, and when he signed another, he 
did not honour either. 26 It is also worth pointing out that even the minority do not 
consider the coerced confession as admissible evidence per se. However, when the 
information in the accused's confession reveals that he is the actual perpetrator (e. g., 
when the confession reveals the place in which the stolen goods are hidden), the 
independent evidence resulting from the confession could constitute the basis for a 
conviction. 27 
Finally, and more importantly, the essence of the story cited by the minority as 
well as their opinion is that torture can be only used against the accused if it is in the 
public interest to do so, as the power to torture falls under the siyasa shar'iyya power, 
the exercise of which must be guided by the public good. 28 Therefore, even if one 
accepts for the purposes of the argument the validity of the opinion of the minority, 
their opinion only applicable where it is in the public interest to torture the accused. 
Hence, if it is demonstrated that it is not in the public interest to torture the accused, 
the story mentioned by the minority as well as their opinion can be cited as the basis 
for prohibiting the torture of the accused. 
On the other hand, the majority of Muslim scholars are of the opinion that any 
confession obtained under physical coercion is inadmissible, even if the evidence is 
reliable. 29 The arguments of the majority are based, on the one hand, on the principle 
that torturing the accused is against the Shari'ah rules, and, on the other, that allowing 
the torture of the accused is contrary to the public interest. With regard to the former, 
25 Reported by Al-Jawziyya, al-Siyasa, supra note 24, pp. 6-7. 
26 Al-'Alwani, T, 'The Right of the Accused in Islam (Part One)', ALQ, 10 (1995), 238, pp. 243-244. 27 Ibid. pp. 244-245. 
29 In respect of the concept of siyasa shar'iyya, see supra para. 1.4. 29 For classical writings advancing this position, see e. g., Al-Shafi'i, M (known as Imam Shafi'i, d. 
204), AI-Auin (The Mothei), 3 (Beirut: Dar El Fikr, 1990), pp. 240-241; Al-Ghazali, M, (Known as Abi 
Hamed Al-Ghazali, d. 505), Shefa'a al-Gallil (Cure) (Baghdad: Mutbat al-Irshad, 1971), pp. 228-234; 
Al-Andalusi, A (Known as Ibn Hazm, d. 456 H), Al-Muhla (The Embellished), 11 (Beirut: Dar al-Afaq 
al-Judidah, 1935) pp. 140-145. For contemporary writings, see e. g., Abu Zahra, Usul, supra note 12, 
309-312; Abu al-Layl, M, 'Al-Muagabh ala al-Tuhmah fi al-Fiqh al-Islarni (The Punishment on the 
Basis of Accusation in the Islamic Jurisprudence)', in al-Muta hnt wa Huquqhfi al-Shari'ah al-Islamial: 
(The Accused's Rights in Islamic Shari'ah), ed. by Naief Academy for Security Sciences, 2 (Riyadh: 
Naief Academy for Security Sciences Press, 1986), pp. 51-58; Al-'Alwani, supra note 26, p. 245. 
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the majority cite the Qur'an, the Sunnah of the Prophet and the actions of His 
companions and followers as the basis for the position that coercion in any shape or 
form is forbidden under the Shari 'ah, and renders any subsequent action by the person 
subjected to it of carrying no legal effects. 
It is stated in the Qur'an that `[a]ny one who disbelieves in Allah after he had 
believed, excepting the case of one who is forced to make a declaration of disbelief 
while his heart rests securely in faith, but one who opens his mind wide to disbelief, 
on him is Allah's wrath and shall have a grievous punishment. '30 In this verse the 
Qur'an states clearly that a person who is subjected to coercion in order to force him 
to change his religion, which is a criminal offence punishable by death penalty, is not 
legally responsible for his actions because he does not possess a free will and, 
therefore, cannot be convicted of apostasy on the basis of the coerced confession. By 
analogy, if the accused under coercion confesses to any criminal offence, his 
confession cannot be legally accepted as evidence of guilt, as the free will, which is a 
precondition for a valid confession as the quoted verse clearly requires, is absent. 31 
The Prophet was reported to have said '[v]erily, your blood, your wealth, your 
reputation and your skin are sacred to you. '32 As has been stated earlier, the right to 
life, which is implied by the term blood, encompasses the right to dignity. The 
Prophetic report also recognises the sanctity of the human body, which is implied in 
the term skin. Thus, to allow the accused to be tortured or even subjected to a 
degrading or inhuman treatment, contradicts both the right to dignity and the sanctity 
of the human body. 33 
In addition, it was reported that the Prophet said `[t]he responsibility for mistakes, 
forgetfulness, and coercion has been lifted from my umnah (nation). '34 Also Ibn 
Msaud, a companion of the Prophet and a legal jurist stated that `[i] would speak of 
any words that would prevent me from being beaten before a ruler. '35 In addition, 
Umar bin Abdulaziz was reported to have said `[b]y God, it is better that they [those 
accused of committing criminal offences] should face God with their offences than I 
10 Verse 16: 106. 
31 See Al-Suwalim, supra note 17, pp. 180-184. 
32 Reported by Al-Bukhari, M (d. 256 H), Sahih Al-Bukhmri, Report. No. 6551. 
33 See Al-Andalusi, supra note 29, vol. 11, p. 141; AI-`Alwani, supra note 26, p. 241. 34 Reported by A1-Rubi'ai, M (Known as Imam Ibn Majah, d. 273 H) Sunin Ibn Majah, Report No. 
2053. 
35 Reported by Al-Andalusi, supra note 29, vol. 11, p. 142. 
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should have to meet God for torturing them. '36 What these authorities clearly indicate 
is that anyone subjected to coercion is not legally responsible for his actions. 
Therefore, any confession obtained under coercion cannot be held as evidence of guilt 
against the confessor. In fact, these authorities criminalise the action of subjecting 
anyone to physical coercion, and any person who does so is guilty of a criminal 
offence, which is also evident from what the Prophet reported to have said 'God shall 
torture on the Day of Recompense those who inflict torture on people in [this] life. '37 
In this respect, Imam Ibn Hazm (d. 456 H) stated the following: 
In a case, if there is no more [evidence] than a confession obtained under 
physical coercion then it will amount to nothing, for such a confession is 
condoned by nothing in the Qur'an, the Sunnah, or ijma. Moreover, the 
sacredness of a person's flesh and blood is a certainty. Thus, nothing of 
that may be made lawful save by virtue of a text or ijma.... The person 
who has been subjected to physical coercion is also entitled to retaliate 
against the person who had subjected him to torture, whether it was the 
ruler or anyone else, as subjecting the accused to physical coercion 
constitutes a transgression, and Allah says: "Whoso transgress against 
you, punish him for his transgression to the extent to which he has 
transgressed against you, and fear Allah and know that Allah is with those 
who fear Him [Qur'an, verse, 2: 194]". 38 
Furthermore, the majority argue that it is contrary to the public interest to use torture 
against accused persons for the purposes of forcing them to confess. They argue 
allowing coercion to be used as an investigative technique could lead to catastrophic 
outcomes, as it is difficult in practice to control its use. This will undoubtedly lead to 
innocent people being convicted on the basis of confessions obtained through 
coercion. Since, according to the jurisprudential rule, that `preventing harms overrides 
bringing benefits' (dra' al-mafasid mugadam ala julb al-musalh), it is more important 
to protect innocent persons from being tortured or convicted on the basis of a 
confession obtained through coercion than convicting guilty persons on the basis of a 
coerced confession, which is in fact genuine and reliable. 39 
In addition, the adoption of coercion as a legitimate investigative technique could 
have adverse and damaging effects on the administration of justice. A person who is 
36 Reported by AI-Juazi, A (d. 501 H), Seurt Umar bin Abdulaziz (The Biography of Umar bin 
Abdulaziz) (1985), pp. 68-69. 
3' Reported by Ibn Hanbal, A (d. 241 H), Al-Musned, Report No. 15285. 
38 Al-Andalusi, supra note 29, vol. 11, p. 142. 39 See Ahmed, A, al-Murkas al-Qanuni lbnutahm fr Murahlt al-Tahqeeq al-Ibtdai (The Accused Legal 
Status in The Preliminary Stage of Investigation) (Cairo: Al-Nahdate Arabic House Press, 1989), pp. 
350-35 1; Al-Sadlan, supra note 11, pp. 514-562; Abu al-Layl, supra note 29, pp. 68-69. 
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subjected to physical coercion is likely to confess to the offence accused of, not 
necessarily because he is guilty of the offence, but in order that the physical coercion 
ceases. If this is case, non-voluntary confession is unreliable, and therefore, it is 
contrary to the public interest as well as to the principles of the Shari'ah to allow 
unreliable evidence to be used as the basis for conviction. Finally, what if the accused 
who had been subjected to torture refused to confess, or the real culprit was caught 
after the accused had been subjected to torture? The only remedy that the accused 
could resort to under the Shari 'ah rules, as pointed out by Imam Ibn Hazm, quoted 
above, is retaliation against the person who ordered the torture (i. e., the judge). 40 I do 
not suppose those who want to apply the opinion of the minority in our time consider 
this approach as an effective way of running the criminal justice system. 
Therefore, it seems that the opinion of the majority is more consistent with the 
underlying principles of the Shari 'ah, as they forbid convicting innocent persons on 
unreliable evidence, give the human body and dignity a special sanctity, and forbid 
any action that is considered to be contrary to the public interest. 
Since it has been concluded that coercion renders any subsequent confession 
inadmissible, it is important here to determine what could amount to coercion in this 
context. Muslim jurists do not provide clear cut criteria by which an action could be 
determined to amount to coercion or not. They do, however, provide some examples 
that in their view amount to coercion. According to Qadi Shurayh (d. 78 H) 
`[c]onfinement is coercion, a threat is coercion, prison is coercion, and beating is 
coercion. i41 The Khalifah Umar stated that `[a] man would not be secure and would 
incriminate himself if you starved, frightened or imprisoned him. '42 In addition, Imam 
Ibn Malik considers promises as a form of coercion, as the accused confesses in order 
to obtain what he has been promised, rather than voluntarily supplying the truth. 43 
From these examples one can safely conclude that any physical coercion, in the form 
of torture or beating, or psychological coercion in the form of promises or threats, 
could amount to coercion, which would render any subsequent evidence obtained 
through these methods inadmissible in evidence. 44 
40 See supra note 38 and accompanying texy. 
41 Reported by Al-Andalusi, supra note 29, vol. 11, p. 143. 42 As quoted in Al-Tantawy, supra note 14, p. 109. 43 Al-Malki, supra note 24, vol. 2, p. 122. 44 See also Abu Zahra, Usul, supra note 12, pp. 309-312; Bhnasie, A, 'Ikrah al-Muta'hm ala al-I'atraf: 
Hukmah fi al-Shari'ah al-Islamiah (The Position of the Shari'ah with Regard to Forcing the Accused to 
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3.4 Right to liberty 
The term liberty does not appear in the Qur'an, the Sunnah or in the writings of 
classical Muslim jurists. However, the essence of the right in the criminal law sphere 
which is that individuals are entitled to move as they please is recognised by the 
Qur'an, which states that `He who has made the earth submissive to you, so traverse 
along its sides, and eat of His provisions. '45 The prohibition of imposing arbitrary 
restrictions on the right to liberty under the Shari 'ah could be inferred from the 
prohibition, on individuals as well as on public officials, to level accusations against 
someone on the basis of mere suspicion. The Qur'an states that: 
Why did not the believers, men and women, when they heard of the affair 
[the accusation of adultery without evidence] thought well of their people and 
say, "this is clearly a manifest lie? Why did not they bring four witnesses to 
prove it? " [The standard of proof required in adultery cases]. Since they have 
not brought the required witnesses, they are indeed liars in the sight of 
Allah... 
. 
When you received it and then talked about it with your tongues, and 
you uttered with your mouths that of which you had no knowledge, and you 
thought it would be a light matter, while it was a grievous thing in the sight of 
Allah. 46 
In these verses, Allah condemned those who made allegations without supporting the 
allegations with evidence, which means that making unsubstantiated allegations is 
forbidden by law. Therefore, restricting the right of individuals to liberty on the basis 
of mere suspicion is, by analogy, forbidden, as arresting or detaining a suspect is more 
harmful to him than just levelling allegations against him without restricting his 
liberty. While the story emphasises the need to meet the standard of proof required by 
the Shari 'ah, before bringing charges against the accused, the essence of the story is 
that accusations or mere suspicion cannot form a valid ground for restricting the rights 
of the accused. In fact such a restriction is forbidden, and is punishable in this life and 
the hereafter. 47 
Confess)', Public Security Journal, 17 (1962), 45; Farrar, S, 'Islamic Jurisprudence and the Role of the 
Accused: A Re-examination', Legal Studies, 23.4 (2003), 587, pp. 597-599. 45 Verse, 67: 15. In this respect, see Al-Andalusi, supra note 29, vol. 11, p. 141; Awad, supra note 10, 
pp. 102-104. 
Verses, 24: 12-13 & 15. 
47 Under the of al-hudud offences category, there is an offence known as qudif (defamation), which 
criminalises the action of levelling accusation of adultery without proof. However, the punishment of 
defamation is not restricted to unsubstantiated allegations of adultery, but extends to any allegations 
made without proof, but they are instead dealt with under al-tazeer offences category. In this respect, 
see Awdah, A, aI-Tashria al-Jenaei al-Islami Muqaran be al-Qanun al-Wadei (The Islamic Penal 
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The Qur'an also states in another verse that `[o] ye who believe avoid most 
suspicions; for suspicion in some cases is a sin. '48 In the same vein, the Prophet was 
reported to have said `[a]void suspicion as suspicion is [in essence] a mere lie. 49 
These texts require individuals not to be suspicious of each other if there are no 
plausible grounds for such suspicion, and consider those suspicions which are not 
justified by plausible reasons as a sin as the Qur'anic verse clearly indicates. 50 If this 
is the case, public officials, who are entrusted with the protection of the public and 
individual rights, should be mindful of their obligation not to act on the basis of mere 
suspicion. If this obligation is not honoured by public officials, the use of their 
coercive powers is considered contrary to the instructions of the Qur'an and the 
Prophet, and therefore, is illegal. From the foregoing it can be concluded that 
arbitrary restriction on the accused's right to liberty, or on any right for that matter, is 
forbidden by law. 
Therefore, the question which arises here is when can an arrest or detention be 
legally made? The followings sections will explore this issue. 
3.4.1 Arrest 
There are two opinions with regard to the circumstances in which the arrest could be 
legally made. On the one hand, according to the first opinion, the existence of good 
reasons to believe that the accused has committed an offence is not required, but it is 
sufficient that allegations have been made against someone to authorise the judge to 
summon him. If the "accused" refuses to appear before the judge, the judge is 
empowered to issue an arrest warrant . 
51 However, this opinion is in conflict with the 
Legislation Compared with the Positive Laiv), 2,14th edn (Beirut: Resalah Publishers, 2000), pp. 455- 
495. 
411 Verse, 49: 12. In the same vein, the Qur'anic verse, 53: 28, states that `[c]onjecture avails nothing 
against the truth'. As discussed above, the innocence of the accused under the Shari'ah piles is a 
certainty, and therefore the essence of the this verse in this context is that the rights of the accused, 
whose innocence is a certainty, cannot be restricted on the basis of mere suspicion. See supra para. 3.3. 49 Reported by Al-Bukhari, supra note 32, Report No. 6229. In this respect, see Ahmed, supra note 39, 
823; Al-Suwalim, supra note 17, pp. 95-100. 0 See Ibn Kutheer, supra note 16, vol. 4, pp. 227-232. 51 See Ibn Dhufair, supra note 21, pp. 74-8 1. Farrar argues that a Muslim sinner or a non-Muslim could 
be interrogated (which would require summoning him and if it does not appear voluntarily, brought by 
force) even without a good reason on the basis of a mere accusation. He cites the authority in which a 
Muslim girl's head was crushed by a stone, and the girl before dying told the Prophet that a Jewish man 
was the offender. On the basis of what the girl said, the Prophet interrogated the Jewish man. Farrar 
comments on this authority by stating that '[t]here is no mention of any evidence in the reports other 
than this accusation. In relation to the Muslim sinner and non-Muslim, therefore, interrogation of the 
accused could occur on the basis of accusation alone. ' However, there is nothing in the authority 
which is relied upon by Farrar to suggest that a Muslim sinner or a non-Muslim could be interrogated 
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principle of innocence and the burden of proof under the Shari 'ah rules, since if there 
are no, at least, good reasons to link the accused to the alleged offence, what is the 
purpose of requiring the accused to appear before the judge, as there is no evidence 
against him to be rebutted, and his innocence is a certainty that does not need further 
proof? 52 
On the other hand, the second opinion, which seems to be more consistent with 
the underlying principles of Islamic criminal justice, states that a judge, who has been 
informed that someone has committed an offence, and the allegations contain 
reasonable grounds upon which the judge could believe that the suspect has 
committed the alleged offence, is empowered to summon the accused first, before he 
could issue an arrest warrant. If the accused refuses to appear before the judge, or 
there is a necessity (e. g. the accused might flee), the judge is empowered to bring him 
by force (i. e., order his arrest). 53 In addition, public officials and members of the 
public are also empowered to carry out the arrest themselves without a warrant, where 
it is considered necessary (e. g., the accused was seen red-handed), as necessity, as 
explained earlier, knows no law. 54 This opinion is also supported by what Abdullah 
ibn Abi reported: 
I set out some riders, when we arrived at Dhu al Marwah; one of my 
garment bags was stolen. There was a man among us looked suspicious, so 
my companions said to him: "Hey, you give him back his bag. " But the 
man answered: "I didn't take it. " When I returned, I went to Khalifah 
Umar ibn Al Khattab and told him what had happened. He asked me how 
many we had been, so I told him how many we had been there. I also said 
to him: "I wanted to arrest the man". Umar replied: "You wanted to arrest 
the man, and yet you did not have any evidence nor you have an 
authorisation from me to do so. I will not compensate you, nor will I make 
inquiries about it. " Umar became very upset. He never compensated me 
nor did he make any inquiries. 55 
in the absence of a good reason. The incident as reported by AI-Nisbouri, supra note 18, Report No. 
4142, was that '[a] girl was found with her head crushed between two stones. They asked her as to who 
had done that [they mentioned a couples of names, and she indicated with the nod of her head: No], 
until they mentioned a Jew. She indicated with the nod of her head [that it was so]. ' The fact that the 
girl was dying, and that she identified a specific person as the offender, as the reported incident clearly 
shows, provides not just a good reason to interrogate the accused but also justifies restricting his liberty 
until the alleged murder is fully investigated whether the alleged offender is a Jew or a pious Muslim. 
See Farrar, supra note 44, pp. 596-597. 52 See supra para. 3.3. 
53 See Ahmed, A (Known as Ibn Qudamah, d. 620 H) & Muhammad, A (Know as Ibn Qudamah al- 
Muqadisi, d. 682), al-Mghni wa Walshrh al-Kabeer (The Sufficer and the Great Explanation), 11 
Beirut: Dar El-Kitab Al-Arabi, 1983), pp. 410-413; Al-Suwalim, supra note 17, pp. 65-74. 
See supra para. 3.1. See also Al-Suwalim, supra note 17, pp. 75-79; Ibn-Dhufair, supra note 24,82- 
86. 
55 Reported by Al-Andalusi, supra note 29, vol. 11, p. 132. 
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It is clear, therefore, from the latter opinion and from the above quoted authority, that, 
in the absence of necessity, there are three requirements for a valid arrest. Firstly, an 
arrest must only be resorted to where other means have failed to make the accused 
appear before the judge voluntarily. Secondly, an arrest must be authorised by a judge 
before it is carried out. Thirdly, there must be, at least, good reasons to believe that 
the accused has committed an offence, or was on his way to commit an offence. 56 
If the accused is arrested, he will ultimately be either released without bail, 
released on bail, or detained pending investigation, or pending trial if he is charged 
with a criminal offence. Since releasing the accused on bail, or detaining him is 
considered to be an aspect of restriction upon liberty, these issues are treated 
separately next. 
3.4.2 Detention 
Muslim jurists are divided upon the permissibility of detention. There are three 
opinions in this respect. Imam Ibn Hazm, among some other jurists, are of the opinion 
that detaining the accused before he is convicted of a criminal offence is not 
permissible, because the accused is innocent and the detention amounts to a 
punishment of the accused who has not been convicted of any wrongdoing. 57 The 
second opinion, which is adopted by the Hanafi school, distinguishes between the 
type of offence that the suspect is accused of. If the offence is a qisas or hudud 
offence, which carries the severest punishment under the Islamic penal law, the 
detention is permissible. If, on the other hand, the offence is a ta'zir one, detaining the 
accused is not permissible because a custodial sentence is the maximum punishment 
that the accused could be sentenced to if found guilty. Therefore, according to this 
opinion, detention in this case amounts to a punishment before the accused is found 
guilty which is forbidden by the Shari 'ah. However, according to the third opinion, 
which is adopted by the majority of Muslim jurists, detention is permissible in all 
offences. 58 
56 See Al-Suwalim, supra note 17, pp. 75-79; Saeed, M, Tawiad al-Muta'hm (Compensating the 
Accused)', in al-Muta'hm wa Huquqh fi al-Shari'ah al-Islamiah (The Accused's Rights in Islamic 
Shari'ah), ed. by Naief Academy for Security Sciences, 2 (Riyadh: Naief Academy for Security 
Sciences Press, 1986), pp. 325-327. 57 Al-Andalusi, supra note 29, vol. 11, pp. 131-133. 58 See Al-Suwalim, supra note 17, pp. 90-95. 
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The first opinion is defective because it allows the accused in all circumstances to 
stay at large, irrespective of the seriousness of the offence and the dictates of the 
public interest in a given case. The second and the third opinions are persuasive, 
although they both appear to overlook two important issues. The first issue concerns 
the balance between, on the one hand, the principle of innocence, and, on the other 
hand, the impact of releasing the accused on the public interest. The function of 
detention in any system, including the Islamic criminal justice, is to ensure that the 
public interest is protected where an accused person, against whom there are 
sufficient grounds to believe that he has committed an offence, and if released he 
might flee, commit another offence, or interfere with the course of justice. 59 The 
principle of innocence requires that the restrictions on the accused during the criminal 
process are kept to a minimum, unless it is contrary to the public interest which 
necessitates and justifies interfering with the accused's rights, as necessity makes 
forbidden things permissible. If there is no fear that the accused will flee, commit 
another offence, or interfere with the course of justice, there are no reasonable 
grounds to support that it is necessary to detain him, and hence detaining him is 
forbidden. 
The other issue concerns the seriousness of the offence, which has been partly 
addressed by the second opinion. However, the second opinion argues that because 
imprisonment is the maximum punishment that the accused could be given, detention 
amounts to punishment. What the second opinion overlooks is that detention pending 
investigation or trial is limited in duration and usually lasts a short time, whereas if 
the accused is found guilty of a tazeer offence, depending on its seriousness, he could 
be sentenced for up to a life imprisonment. 60 Therefore, if the accused, for instance, is 
suspected of committing an offence, the maximum penalty of which is a fine, it would 
be unjustifiable and wrong to detain him, because the detention exceeds the 
punishment of the offence which the accused is suspected of committing, or has been 
charged with. 
Therefore, it is more consistent with the Islamic Shari'ah rules (which recognise 
both the principle of innocence and the right to liberty, on the one hand, and the right 
59 Ibid. pp. 95-97. What could justify detention on the basis of the public interest is not limited to these 
grounds, but these grounds are provided as examples of detention as necessary to protect the public 
interest. 
60 Awdah, supra note 47, vol. 1, pp. 694-699. 
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of the state to interfere with the accused's rights only where it is necessary, on the 
other), that the seriousness of the offence and whether or not his release would be 
detrimental to the public interest should be the determinative factors upon which the 
detention or releasing the accused upon bail, or without bail should be decided. 
This conclusion is reinforced if it has been taken into account, in particular, the 
adverse effects of detention on those individuals who had been detained pending 
investigation or trial but subsequently were declared innocent by the court, as 
detention not just affects their right to liberty but also puts them under other 
unfavourable conditions. In this respect, Professor Ashworth remarked that: 
Detention without trial is widely regarded as an incident of totalitarianism, 
or at least an expedient to be contemplated only in an extreme kind of 
national emergency. It therefore follows that any argument for depriving 
unconvicted individuals of their liberty in civil society ought to have 
peculiar strength. Indeed, that point is reinforced when one considers the 
potential consequences for the defendant of a loss of liberty before trial - 
not just the deprivation of freedom to live a normal life, often 
compounded by incarceration under the worst conditions in the prison 
system, but also restricted ability to prepare a defence to the charge, loss 
of job, strain on family relations and friendships, and often appearance in 
court in a deteriorated or demoralised condition. The higher rates of 
suicide or self-injury for unconvicted rather than convicted prisoners may 
have much to do with these adversities. 61 
The accused, as explained below, has an enforceable right to compensation under the 
Shari'ah rules if he had been tried and found innocent, and the criminal proceedings 
had caused financial or moral damage to him/her. 62 That is to say the accused, who 
has been detained and subsequently acquitted in trial, is undoubtedly entitled to 
compensation, as the detention, regardless of its lawfulness, would result in financial 
or moral damage or both to the acquitted individual, as pointed out by Professor 
Ashworth. If detention is widely adopted, regardless of the specific circumstances of 
each case, the public interest would be adversely affected, as public resources will be 
spent on compensating acquitted individuals in cases in which detention could have 
been avoided. Therefore, detention must only be resorted to in exceptional cases, 
where the public interest requires such a detention; in order to ensure that the 
61 Ashworth, A, The Criminal Process: An Evaluative Study, 2nd edn (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1998), p. 209. 62 See infra para. 3.7.2. 
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principle of innocence and the right to liberty are protected, and public resources are 
saved for a better use. 
As it has been concluded that detention is only permissible where it is necessary, 
the final question which arises in this respect is who could authorise the detention? 
Classical Muslim jurists do not address this question in detail, because under the 
ancient justice system there was no separate investigation stage, and the judge was the 
master of the investigation and the only person who was empowered to authorise any 
coercive actions to be taken against the accused. 63 Since an arrest can only be 
authorised by a judge, it is axiomatic to conclude that, in the absence of necessity, the 
accused cannot be detained without a judicial authorisation. 
3.4.3 Right to bail 
Muslims jurists have not written extensively on the right of the accused to bail under 
criminal law. Therefore, the right to bail will be addressed in the light of the 
underlying principles of Islamic criminal justice system which are highlighted 
throughout this chapter. Since detention must only be resorted to in exceptional cases, 
the investigation authority or a court judge should make use of the bail system, as 
although it is considered to be a restriction on the accused's rights, its adverse effects 
on the accused's rights is comparatively lower. It would be consistent with the 
principle of innocence that any person who has been suspected of or charged with an 
offence, and there is no fear that his release would be detrimental to the public 
interest, should be released on bail. The bail system represents a compromise 
between, on the one hand, the right to liberty and the principle of innocence, and, on 
the other and, the public interest. Therefore, the conditions of bail must be dependent 
on the circumstances of the case concerned in order to prevent the accused from 
fleeing, interfering with the course of justice or committing another offence while he 
is at large. If any of the bail conditions is not considered necessary for the public 
interest in the light of the circumstances of a given case, such condition would be 
considered as a violation of the accused's right to liberty, as the extent of the 
interference with the accused's rights must not exceed what is absolutely required to 
achieve the objective of acting on the basis of necessity, i. e., the preservation of 
public interest. 
ea Awad, supra note 10, p. 96. 
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3.4.4 Right to be informed promptly of the reasons for arrest 
If an arbitrary and unlawful detention is forbidden, informing the arrestee or the 
detainee of the reasons for his arrest or detention is essential. This is because the 
accused cannot challenge the legality of the arrest or detention without knowing the 
reasons behind the arrest or detention, and the arrest or detention cannot be 
determined to be arbitrary or unlawful or not without reviewing the grounds upon 
which the accused was arrested or detained. Thus, allowing public officials to carry 
out an arrest or detention without informing the accused of the reasons behind it 
would lead' inevitably to the power to arrest or detain to be used in an arbitrary or 
unlawful manner. 
The principle of 'sed al-thar'a' (actions which lead to forbidden consequences are 
forbidden) provides, in my view, a compelling case for the right to be informed of the 
reasons for his arrest or detention. In explaining the application of this principle, 
Imam Abu Sarah stated that `the action takes the ruling of what it is likely to lead to, 
regardless of whether the person intends to achieve that result or not, so... if the 
action leads to something forbidden, it is forbidden. '64 Since allowing public officials 
to carry out an arrest or detention without informing the accused of the reasons behind 
it would lead inevitably to the power of arrest or detention being exercised in a 
forbidden manner (i. e., arbitrary or unlawful manner), arresting or detaining the 
accused without informing him of the reasons is equally forbidden. 
Even if it is argued that the principle of sed al-thar'a cannot justify the right to 
inform the accused of the reasons for his arrest or detention, public utility could 
undoubtedly provide the basis for such right. It is considered to be muslaha murslah 
(public utility) any means that enforce the underlying principles of the Islamic 
Shari'ah. 65 This is expressed in the jurisprudential rule that states 'ma la ytem a! - 
wajeb ila bih fho wajeb' (what is required for the realisation of something obligatory 
is itself obligatory). 66 Since the right against arbitrary or unlawful arrest or detention 
64 Abu Zahra, Usul, supra note 12, p. 245. See also Al-Jawziyya, M (known as Imam Ibn AI-Qayyim d. 
751 H), A'Iam al-Muivak'eeen (Notable Signers), 4 (Beirut: Dar al-Kutob al-Elmiah, 1996) [hereinafter 
A'lam], pp. 108-126. 
e5 Al-Ageel, supra note 6, pp. 65-67. 66 Haleem, M, 'Human Rights in Islam and the United Nations Instruments', in Democracy, the Rule of 
Law and Islam, ed. by C Eugene &A Sherif, (London; Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999), p. 
439. For further discussion of this principle, see Al-Jawziyya, A'lant, supra note 64, vol. 3, pp. 108- 
109; Al-Yuabi, M, Maqaasid al-Sharaiah wa A'lagtuha bi al-Adilh al-Sharaiah (The Objectives of the 
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which is recognised under the Shari 'ah cannot be adequately and meaningfully 
safeguarded without informing the accused of the reasons behind his arrest or 
detention, it is obligatory on public officials to inform the accused of the grounds for 
his arrest or detention. 
3.4.5 Right to be tried within a reasonable time 
The right to be tried within a reasonable time seeks to ensure that the adverse and 
unavoidable effects resulting from the criminal proceedings on the accused's liberty, 
social and family life, and physical and psychological wellbeing are kept to a 
minimum. Under the Shari'ah rules, the right to be tried within a reasonable time as 
an individual right can be inferred from the jurisprudential rule, which literally means 
that causing harm is forbidden (`la darer wla derar ). This rule in this context places 
the state under two distinct obligations. Firstly, the state, in exercising its powers to 
investigate and prosecute alleged criminals, is required to resort to the least coercive 
measures available to them during the criminal process, as long as it is not contrary to 
the public interest, in order to ensure that the accused suffers the least amount of 
damage as a result. In short, the restrictions on the accused's rights must be kept to a 
minimum. 67 The second obligation is that the state must compensate the accused, 
whose physical, psychological or financial interests have been adversely affected as a 
consequence of his involvement in the criminal process and found not guilty. 68 
The discussion here is confined to the first obligation, as the second obligation is 
discussed under the accused's right to an effective remedy. 69 The criminal 
proceedings are bound to disrupt the accused's life, who is presumed innocent, and 
places his liberty under enormous restrictions. These adverse effects on the accused 
are likely to increase if he is not tried speedily. Since the jurisprudential rule requires 
the state to ensure that the adverse and avoidable effects of the criminal proceedings 
on the accused's interests are kept to a minimum, unjustifiable delay would amount to 
a violation of the state's obligation, and, hence, a violation of the accused right to be 
tried speedily. 70 
Shari'ah and its Relation to the Sources of Law) (Riyadh: Dar Al-Hijrah For Publishing and 
Distribution, 2002), pp. 458-481; Abu Zahra, Usul, supra note 12, pp. 160- 161. 67 Al-Sadlan, supra note 11, pp. 498,508-511. 68 Ibid. p. 493. 
69 See infra para. 3.7.2. 
70 Al alShiak, H, 'Mbd'a Sura't al-Bat fi Al-Qud'a al-Sharie (The Principle of a Speedy Trial under the 
Shari'ah law)', Al Ad1 Journal, 8 (2001), 113, p. 116. 
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3.4.6 Right to habeas corpus 
As mentioned earlier, in order for an arrest or detention to be valid it must be 
authorised by a judge, otherwise the arrest or detention is unlawful. However, in 
certain circumstances, necessity could be held as a valid basis for carrying out an 
arrest or detention without authorisation. This power is not without checks and 
balances, as the accused has the right to review the lawfulness of his arrest or 
detention before an impartial and independent judge. In this respect, it is reported that: 
The Prophet was once delivering a lecture in the mosque. Then a man rose 
and said: "0 Prophet of God, for what crime have my neighbours been 
arrested? " The Prophet appeared not to hear the question and continued 
his lecture. The man rose again and repeated the question. The man rose a 
third time and repeated the question. Then the Prophet ordered the man's 
neighbours to be released. 7' 
Al-Mawdudi commented on this authority by stating: 
The reason why the Prophet had not answered when the question was 
asked twice earlier was that the police officer who carried out the arrest 
was present in the mosque. If there had been valid reasons for the arrest he 
would have got up to give them. Since the police officer did not, the 
Prophet ordered that the arrested persons to be released.... The fact that 
the police officer did not give any reasons for the arrests in open court was 
sufficient for the Prophet to give immediate order for release of the 
arrested men. 72 
It is clear therefore, that although the books of jurisprudence does not state 
specifically this right, as the arrest or detention was usually authorised beforehand, the 
tradition of the Prophet, and the need to ensure that public officials do not abuse their 
powers or the rights of the accused, dictate that an arrest or a detention which has not 
been authorised by a judge before it is carried out, must be reviewed by a judge after 
it has taken place. 
71 Reported by Al-Andalusi, supra note 29, vol. 11, p. 131-132. The tradition was also reported by Al- 
Sujustani, S, (known as Imam Abi Dawad, d. 275 H) Swim: Abi Dawad Report No. 3147; also reported 
with the same meaning although with different wording by Ibn Hanbal, supra note 37, Report No. 
19187. 
72 Mawdudi, A, Human Rights in Islam, 2nd edn (Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1980), (photo. reprint 
1986), p. 26. 
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3.5 Right to privacy 
The Shari 'ah adds special sanctity to the privacy of individuals. Private life is 
considered by the Shari 'ah as an area of autonomy where individuals should enjoy the 
freedom from outside interferences with their private lives. The Qur'an, in several 
verses set legal rules that must be observed by individuals when they intend to enter 
private homes so that they do not intrude on the privacy of others. The Qur'an states 
that `[o] ye who believe! Enter no houses other than your own until you have asked 
permission and saluted the inmates thereof... and if you find no one therein, do not 
enter them until you are given permission. If it is said to you "Go back", then go back, 
that is purer for you. '73 In fact, Muslim jurists interpret the quoted verse as requiring 
even the owner and the occupier to announce their presence when they enter their 
homes, so that they do not, unintentionally, intrude on the privacy of other people 
who are also living in the same place. 74 
The prohibition on interference with the right to privacy is not confined to 
physical interference but extends to any action which intrudes on the privacy of 
individuals even if the intrusion is non-physical (e. g., covert surveillance). This is 
based upon the authority in which: 
A man peeped through a round hole into the dwelling place of the Prophet, 
while the Prophet had a midra (an iron comb) with which he was 
scratching his head. When the Prophet knew about what the man did, he 
said: "Had I known you were looking [through the hole], I would have 
pierced your eye with it [i. e., the comb]. Verily! The order of taking 
permission [before you enter into private premises] has been enjoined 
because of sight, [that one should not look unlawfully at the state of 
others]. '75 
In addition, the right to privacy is not confined to private homes but extends to 
anything which is connected with the private sphere including correspondence, 
private communications etc. The legal basis for this rule is based upon several texts 
some of which have been mentioned in the Qur'an and the others have been 
mentioned in the Prophet's Sunnah. The Qur'an states that `[o] ye who believe.. . do 
73 Verses, 24: 27-28. 
" Ibn Kutheer, supra note 16, vol. 3, pp. 289-293. This is also supported by the Qur'anic verse, 24: 61, 
which reads '[w]hen you enter houses, salute people with the greeting of peace, a greeting from your 
Lord full of blessing and purity.... ' 75 Reported by Al-Bukhari, supra note 32, Report No. 2060. 
98 
not spy.... '76 According to Muslim jurists the prohibition on spying on a person 
within the meaning of the quoted verse extends to protect any information which is 
considered by the person disclosing it to be private. The prohibition on spying also 
extends to any method used to collect any private information without the owner's 
consent. 77 The Prophet was also reported to have said `[w]hoever listens to people's 
conversations without their permission, he will have melted lead poured in his ears on 
the Day of Judgment. '78 
It must be emphasised here that these rules are not just applicable to ordinary 
citizens so that public officials are not exempted from them. The only valid basis for 
intruding on the privacy of an individual by the state is necessity, and where necessity 
does not exist, public officials cannot violate these rules in the name of advancing law 
enforcement goals. The Khalifah Umar Ibn Al-Khattab, in one incident suspected that 
a person had committed the offence of drinking alcohol. This suspicion was not based 
upon evidence, or even good reasons, but rather on an intuition. The Khalifah 
proceeded upon this suspicion and entered a private home by jumping the wall and 
found the owner of the house drinking alcohol. The following conversation took 
place: 
He [the Khalifah] said to him: "I have prevented you from drinking but 
you have drunk. " The owner of the house replied: "If I have committed 
one sin, you have committed three sins. God has forbidden you from 
spying, but you have. God has ordered you to enter the house from the 
door, but you have not. God has ordered you not to enter private premises 
without permission, but you have. " Umar after a brief reflection left him 
without taking any further action. 79 
It is clear therefore in order for an interference by the state with the right to privacy to 
be justifiable, a necessity must be established. In order to meet the requirement of 
76 Verse, 49: 12. 
77 See Al-Qurtibi, M (d. 671 H), al-Jam'a li Alrkain al-Qur'an (The Compiler of Qur'anic Rulings), 13, 
5th edn (Beirut: Dar al-Kutob al-Ilmiyah, 1996), pp. 33-34; Al-Ghazali, M, (Known as Abi Hamed Al- 
Ghazali, d. 505), Ihya' Aoulum Eddeen (Reviving Religion Sciences), 2 (Cairo: Al-Halbi for Publishing 
and Distribution, 1967), pp. 254-256 [hereinafter Reviving]. 
78 Reported by Al-Bukhari, supra note 32, Report No. 6520. Also reported by Al-Sujustani, supra note 
71, Report No. 4370; Al-Turmthi, M (known as Imam al-Turmthi, d. 279 H), Sunin al-Turnithi, Report 
No. 1673; Ibn Hanbal, supra note 37, Report No. 2103. In this respect, see Awad, supra note 10, p. 
102; Al-Saleh, 0, 'The Rights of the Individual to Personal Security in Islam', in The Islamic Criminal 
Justice System, ed. by C Bassiouni, (London; New York: Oceana Publications, 1982), p. 69; Mawdudi, 
supra note 72, p. 25. 
79 Reported by Al-Ghazali, Reviving, supra note 77, p. 256. Also reported by Al-Souyouti, J (d. 911), 
Addour al-Manthour fi al-Tafseer al-Manhour (The Spread Pearls on Interpreting by the Prophetic 
Aphorisms), 7 (Beirut: Dar EI-Fikr, 1983), p. 568. 
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necessity there must be good reasons to believe that the interference with the right to 
privacy of the person concerned is necessary for preventing or investigating crimes. 80 
With regard to the power of the state to interfere with the home, the Shari 'ah imposes 
two additional requisites because of the paramount importance of home to individuals, 
as home is the ultimate place where individuals expect to be protected from outside 
intrusions. Firstly, public officials should not enter a private home, for whatever 
reason, in the absence of the house's owner. 81 Secondly, public officials should, to use 
the Qur'an's term, salute the people within the house. This means that public 
officials must declare their presence and obtain permission before they can enter a 
private house forcibly, even if they have a search warrant. The last requisite is based 
upon the authorities which have been already quoted, 82 compounded with the 
Qur'anic verse which reads `[i]t is not righteous that you come to houses by the back 
thereof; but truly righteous is who fears God. And you should come into houses by the 
doors thereof.... '83 
Books of jurisprudence do not require a prior judicial authorisation to interfere 
with the home, in order to ensure that the necessity exists from an objective 
viewpoint. However, it seems to be consistent with the requirement of necessity and 
the special sanctity of private homes recognised under the Shari 'ah rules that, except 
in urgent circumstances, the grounds on which necessity is based to justify an 
interference with the accused's right to home to be assessed by a judge before the 
interference is taken place. Thus, unjustified interferences are prevented before they 
occur rather than declared unjustified after they have taken place. However, if the 
circumstances make the compliance with any of these above stated requirements 
impracticable (e. g., puts the life of the police officers conducting the search at risk), 
necessity could provide a valid basis for departing from the general rules, as necessity 
makes forbidden things permissible. 
8° As it is required by the rule of necessity that there must be good reasons to believe that necessity 
actually exists. See supra para. 3.1. 
8I See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 82 See supra notes 73-74,79 and accompanying text. 83 Verse, 2: 189. 
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3.6 Right to justice 
The Shari 'ah in all aspects of life requires that justice must be a characteristic feature 
of the actions and dealings of people among themselves. The Qur'an mentions the 
word justice at least fourteen times, and the phrase justice and equity (al 'quest) at 
least sixteen times. 84 It is appropriate here to quote two of these verses to demonstrate 
the importance of the right to justice as a basic principle underlying Islam as a 
religion and as a legal code. The Qur'an states '[v]erily, Allah commands you... 
when ye judge between people that you judge with [a sense of] justice. '85 It also states 
in another verse that `[o] ye who believe! Be steadfast in the cause of Allah, bearing 
witness in equity, and let not a people's enmity towards you incite you to act other 
than with justice. Be always just, as that is nearer to righteousness.... '86 
From these verses, in addition to other verses and Prophetic reports which cannot 
all be cited here, it is clear that the accused must be accorded the right to justice. 87 If 
justice means anything in the context of the criminal justice system, it would 
encompass, at least, the right not to be wrongly convicted. Wrongly convicting an 
individual would cause two injustices: one which is suffered by society, as the real 
culprit is walking free, and one which is suffered by the innocent individual, who has 
been wrongly convicted. Therefore the benefit of securing the right to justice must not 
be seen as exclusive to the accused, but something that will be enjoyed by society as a 
whole, including the accused. The right not to be wrongly convicted also finds its 
origin in the Prophetic report which states that `[i]f the Imam errs it is better that he 
errs in favour of innocence [i. e., acquittal] than in favour of guilt [i. e., conviction]. '88 
However, this right, unlike other procedural rights, is an end rather than a means, 
in the sense that it cannot be secured unless certain rights are guaranteed. The focus 
here is upon the right to defence which is essential in order to secure the right to 
justice, and thereby eliminate the risk of wrongly convicting an innocent person, or at 
least minimise such risk to an acceptable level. 
AI-Saleh, supra note 78, p. 80. 
85 Verse, 4: 58. 
86 Verse, 5: 8. 




87 For a discussion of the right to justice outside the criminal law sphere, see Al-Areenei, A, 'Tagreer 
al-Adl Beyn Al-Afrad wa al-Duwal (The Recognition of Justice between Individuals and States)', Al 
Adl Journal, 1 (1999), 99; Abti Zahra, Usul, supra note 12, pp. 317-318. 88 Reported by Al-Turmthi, M (d. 279 H), Sunin al-Turinthi, Report No. 1344. 
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3.6.1 Right to defence 
The right to defence under the ancient Islamic justice system meant principally that 
the accused was entitled to speak in order to answer and refute the allegations against 
him. This is evident from the instructions of the Prophet to Ali, the fourth successor to 
Prophet, when he was appointed as a judge in Yemen. The Prophetic report states '[o] 
Ali, people will appeal to you for justice. If two adversaries come to you for 
arbitration, do not rule for the one, before you have similarly heard from the other. It 
is more proper for justice to become evident to you, and for you to know who is 
right. '89 These instructions have become an integral rule of the Shari'ah, which is 
evident from the report in which Umar bin Abdulaziz (who is considered to be the 
fifth righteous Khalifah, d. 101 H) instructed his judges fifty years after the Prophet's 
death, by saying `[i]f an adversary, whose eye had been blinded by another, comes to 
you, do not rule [in his favour] until the other party attends. For perhaps the latter had 
been blinded in both eyes. i90 Since the discussion here is concerned with the pre-trial 
stage, three essential components of the right to defence in the pre-trial stage will be 
discussed next. 
3.6.1.1 Right to legal assistance 
Contemporary Muslim legal writers differ in their stance with regard to the right of 
the accused to legal assistance. This is not because they adopt different interpretations 
of the textual sources, as there is no explicit texts in the Shari 'ah which prohibit or 
permit the right to legal assistance, but that their disagreement stems principally from 
their view of whether lawyers will hinder or help (i. e., muslaha or mufisdah) the 
achievement of justice in the criminal process. Those writers, who view lawyers as an 
impediment to a proper administration of justice, are, understandably, opposed to the 
granting of such a right. They argue that lawyers are not interested in uncovering the 
truth, but in winning the case even if it requires the resort to improper or inappropriate 
tactics to deceive the judge. 91 In addition, they argue that in the early stages of Islam 
89 Reported by Al-Sujustani, supra note 71, Report No. 3111. 
90 As quoted in Awad, supra note 10, p. 97. 
91 This concern was also raised in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries during the debate of 
whether the accused should be represented by a lawyer in the criminal trial in England. Despite the 
forcefulness of this argument, the accused from the nineteenth century gradually won the right to be 
represented by a lawyer, mainly due to the fact that change in prosecutorial practice, by allowing a 
professional lawyer to conduct the prosecution, required an equivalent change in the defence practice 
by allowing the accused to obtain a legal assistance in conducting his defence (i. e., the equality of 
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this right did not exist, and this factor did not lead the system to function poorly or to 
be brought into disrepute. Finally, they argue that judges are capable of protecting the 
interests of the accused, and therefore there is no need for allowing the accused to 
obtain legal assistance, as it would only make the criminal process more complex, 
costly and lengthier than it already is. 92 
It is appropriate to present the case for advocating the accused's right to legal 
assistance by pointing out the defects of the arguments of those who are opposed to 
such a right. As those who are opposed to the right legal assistance in their opposition 
to this right do not distinguish between the pre-trial and trial stages of the criminal 
process, I will advance the arguments for entitling the accused the right to legal 
assistance at both stages. First of all, lawyers at the trial stage, particularly in the 
inquisitorial system, which is similar to the Islamic criminal procedure system, plays a 
less influential role in the determination of the outcome of the case than their 
counterparts in the adversarial system. Judges, on the other hand, have almost 
unfettered power over the proceedings as they are entitled to resort to whatever means 
they deem necessary, unless they are forbidden, to arrive at the proper determination 
of the case. That is to say, even if ones assumes, for the purposes of argument, that 
lawyers are not concerned with the proper administration of justice, judges have other 
means to arrive at the proper outcome. 
Secondly, the Shari 'ah jurisprudential rule states that `things which are not 
expressly forbidden by the Shari'ah are permissible' (al-usal fi all al-ashea' al- 
ibah). 93 Since there are no explicit texts in the sources of the Shari 'ah that forbids 
seeking legal assistance by the accused, he is entitled to seek whatever assistance he 
requires in order to protect his interests, which are at stake because of the criminal 
proceedings. In fact, some texts of the Shari 'ah do touch on the importance of seeking 
the assistance of those who are capable of presenting the case of the weak party in a 
arms). For an insightful discussion of the factors that led to the introduction of defence lawyers in the 
English courts, see Langbein, Adversary, supra note 23, chs. 1&3. 
92 See Jalu, D, al-Muhmat fi al-lqh al-Islayni wa al-Qanun (Advocacy under Islamic Jurisprudence and 
Positive Law) (Riyadh: Naief Academy for Security Sciences Press, 2003), pp. 185-191. These 
arguments are also advanced by some Saudi gadis, the majority of which are opposed to allowing the 
accused to be assisted by a lawyer. See Special Rapporteur, Dato' Param Cumaraswamy, on the 
Independence of Judges and Lawyers: Report on the Mission to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2002/43, U. N. ESCOR, Comm! n on 
Hum. Rts., 59th Sess, Item 11(d) of the provisional agenda U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4/2003/65/Add. 3, para. 36- 
37. The position of Saudi qadis on the right to legal assistance is discussed infra paras. 8.3-8.4. 93 Al-Zamel, A, Shurh Al-Quad al-Sadiah (Explaining al-Sadiah Rules), 2nd edn (Riyadh: Dar Atles, 
1999), pp. 65-72. 
103 
more eloquent and coherent manner. The Qur'an mentions the story in which Allah 
instructed Prophet Moses to go to Pharaoh and his Chiefs, to inform them of the 
message of Allah. Prophet Moses pleaded politely to Allah to permit him to acquire 
the assistance of his brother in accomplishing his mission. The Qur'an states that 
`[h]e [Moses] said "My Lord... my brother Aaron is more eloquent in speech than I: 
So send him with me as a helper, to confirm [and strengthen] me, for I fear that they 
may accuse me of falsehood. " He [Allah] Said: "We will strengthen thy arm with thy 
brother.... "' 94 
What can be understood from these verses is that even the Prophet of God, who, 
according to Islamic theology, carries the true message from the Lord, felt the need 
for moral and presentational support in order to convince the people sent to, and who 
might doubt the truthfulness of his message. 95 The accused, by analogy, is in an 
extremely difficult situation. Even if he is capable of defending himself adequately, he 
might find himself so overwhelmed by the power of the state and confused by the 
evidence presented against him, and as a consequence be incapable of defending 
himself adequately. Thus, it would be inconsistent with the principle of innocence and 
the right of the accused to defence, which are both recognised by the Shari 'ah, to 
deny the accused the right to obtain legal assistance. 
In the early stages of Islam the accused did not require the assistance of a 
professional lawyer for two key reasons. Firstly, there was equality between 
opponents, as the accused and the accuser (who was the injured party or a member of 
the public who witnessed the alleged offence), were ordinary citizens and possessed 
relatively the same resources to collect evidence and present their case to the judge. 96 
Secondly, at that stage of Islam the criminal process consisted of only one stage, that 
is the trial stage. The trial stage was public and widely attended by legal experts, and 
any inequality between the opponents, or unfairness, whether to the accused or the 
victim, would have been eliminated by the presence and participation of those 
experts. 97 To demonstrate the latter point, it is instructive to cite the story that 
occurred when Khalifah Umar ibn Al-Khattab summoned a woman to question her 
94 Verse, 28: 34-35. 
95 See Ibn Kutheer, supra note 16, vol. 3, p. 400. 96 See Bhnasie, A, Ntlureat al-Ithbatfi al-Filth al-Jenaei al-Islammi (Tire Theozy of Proof in the Islamic 
Criminal Jurisprzudence) (Cairo: Dar al-Shoruq, 1989), pp. 12-14; Ahmed, supra note 39, p. 30. 97 See Al-'Alwani, supra note 26, p. 239; Awad, supra note 10, p. 98. 
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about allegations that she was running illegal activities in her house. The report states 
that: 
When she was told that the Khalifah Umar Ibn Al-Khattab had summoned 
her to explain her behaviour, she exclaimed: "Woe unto me! What chance 
do I have with someone like Umar? " On her way she was overcome with 
fear and began to have pains. Unable to continue, she stopped at a house 
and immediately gave birth to a baby, who after delivery, screamed twice 
and died. Umar sought the counsel of several companions. They told him 
that he was not responsible for what happened. Then he turned to All [the 
fourth successor to the Prophet], who was silent, and asked [him] his 
opinion. Ali replied: "If they spoke on the basis of their opinions, then [in 
my view] their views are mistaken. If they have spoken to please you, 
their advice will not benefit you [in the hereafter]. My opinion is that you 
are responsible and must pay blood money (diya). After all, you were the 
one who frightened her. If you had not frightened her so, she would not 
have given birth prematurely. " So Umar instructed that the money be 
paid. 
The injured party in this case did not need to sue the ruler, who was responsible for 
the death of her baby, let alone retain a lawyer, in order to secure her right to 
compensation. If the system today were to function in the same manner and with the 
same simplicity, those opposed to the right to legal assistance are correct. However, 
changes in society as well as in the criminal justice system require a different 
approach to ensure that the competing interests involved in the criminal process are 
equally protected. The interests of the state in modem times in both the pre-trial stage 
and the trial stage are protected by the police, the investigation authority and the 
public prosecutor, while in the absence of the right to legal assistance, the interests of 
accused to be treated fairly and with dignity are left unprotected. These changes 
require that the accused is provided with more protection to match the growing power 
of the state. 
What also made the ancient justice system function fairly without the need to 
provide the accused with legal assistance, as mentioned earlier, is that the criminal 
process consisted of only one stage. Therefore the judge could oversee all the 
procedures taken against the accused from the time that a crime was committed, until 
the judgement was issued. In contemporary criminal justice systems, even if judges on 
their own are capable of protecting the interests of the accused in the pre-trial stage 
(which is still questionable), the judges' role, as far as the rights of the accused are 
98 Reported by Al-Andalusi, supra note 29, vol. 12, p. 369. 
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concerned, is of a remedial nature in the sense that he cannot undo the damage already 
suffered by the accused. The importance of the presence of a lawyer in the pre-trial 
stage stems from the need to make the system proactive in protecting the rights of the 
accused. Lawyers can supervise the actions taken against the accused, ensure the 
legality of the criminal procedures, and challenge any illegal procedures intended to 
be taken by the police or the investigation authority. This is without doubt more 
consistent with the objective of procedural safeguards and the obligation on the state 
to prevent violations occurring, rather than taking remedial actions after violations 
have taken place. 99 
In addition, the pre-trial stage of the inquisitorial system, which is the mode of 
process adopted by the Saudi criminal procedure, is of paramount importance, as most 
of the evidence gathering and examination takes place at this stage. Providing the 
accused with effective legal assistance at this stage would provide the accused with a 
real opportunity to rebut the suspicions against him, and in the event that the suspect 
is determined not to be involved in the alleged offence, the proceedings against him 
would be discontinued at an early stage of the criminal process. This would 
undoubtedly minimise the adverse effects on innocent suspects, allow the 
investigation authority to focus on other potential suspects, and thereby save public 
resources for a better use. 
Finally, legal assistance could provide the accused with other benefits in the pre- 
trial stage, which eventually will benefit the justice system as a whole. These benefits, 
inter alia, include: enabling the accused to understand the nature of the offence of 
which he is suspected or accused of, presenting the case for bail pending investigation 
or pending trial, and increasing the openness of the investigation by bringing an 
outsider to observe the practices of the investigation authority. 
Those who are opposed to the right to legal assistance, among other procedural 
safeguards, fail to observe or take account of the changes in society and in the 
criminal justice system. 100 These opponents reached their conclusion on the right to 
legal assistance by focusing solely on what they perceive to be negative aspects of this 
right, without considering the benefits which the right could bring to the justice 
99 The obligation on the state to act proactively to prevent violations of individual rights is discussed 
infra para. 3.7.2. 
100 See Bassiouni, C, 'Sources of Islamic Law, and the Protection of Human Rights in the Islamic 
Criminal Justice System', in The Islamic Criminal Justice System, ed. by C Bassiouni, (London; New 
York: Oceana Publications, 1982), p. 42. 
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system as a whole. Since there are no explicit texts in the Shari 'ah that permit or 
forbid legal assistance, the analysis of whether the right to legal assistance should be 
granted to the accused or not should be based on balancing the potential advantages 
and disadvantages (inusalih and mufasid) of such right in light of the underlying 
objectives and principles of the Islamic criminal justice system. In light of the 
arguments for and against the right to legal assistance, as examined above, it is 
justified to conclude that the accused must be allowed legal assistance at all stages of 
the criminal proceedings. 
Since the basic grounds on which the right to legal assistance is based are the 
needs to redress the balance between the accused and the state, and to enable the 
accused to exercise his right to defence effectively, would it be right to say that the 
protection of law is conditional on the accused being able to afford to pay for legal 
assistance? In other words, is the right to the protection of law limited just to those 
who can afford it? Contemporary Muslim writers, including those who advocate the 
right to legal assistance, have omitted addressing this issue. The question should be 
answered by determining whether Islam guarantees the right to equality or not. One of 
the basic values which Islam is based upon is equality. In this respect al-Saleh stated: 
Islam places a great emphasis on justice and equality. The word "justice", 
which implies equality, is used in the Qu'ran more than 14 times, and the 
word al'quest, which means justice and equality appears in the holy text 
more than 16 times. 
The tradition of the Prophet is equally insistent upon universal justice and 
equality. 101 
Therefore, to say that the Shari 'ah grants the right to legal assistance, without 
providing legal assistance to those who lack the means to afford it, is to say that Islam 
denies the right to equality. Since this is not the case, it can be safely concluded that 
the state is obliged to secure legal assistance free of charge to those who lack the 
means to pay for it. Failing to do so, where this resulted in a prejudice towards the 
accused's interest, would be seen as violating a basic value, which Islam as a religion 
and a legal code is based upon. 
3.6.1.2 Right to be informed of the charges 
The right of the accused to be informed of the charges and evidence against him is an 
essential part of the right to defence. 102 This is because if the accused is not informed 
101 Al-Saleh, supra note 78, p. 80 
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of the charges and the evidence against him, he cannot answer and refute allegations 
which he is not aware of. As public utility considers any means that enforce the 
underlying principles of the Islamic Shari 'ah to be obligatory, the accused is entitled 
to be informed of the charges and evidence against him. 103 Therefore, where the 
accused's right to be informed of the charges and evidence against him had been 
violated, and such violation limited his ability to prepare a defence to the charge, his 
right to defence and ultimately the right to justice are effectively denied. 
3.7 Right to an effective remedy 
Under the Shari 'ah rules there are various mechanisms, which the accused could 
resort to when his rights have been violated in order to obtain a remedy. As has been 
already discussed, the remedy for obtaining a confession in violation of the of the 
right against self-incrimination, is the exclusion of such a confession. However, the 
rules of excluding evidence are not confined to confession evidence, but also apply, 
with different considerations, to any evidence obtained in violation of the law. In 
addition, there are sufficient authorities to suggest that the remedy of stay of 
proceedings could be adopted where there is an abuse of power. 104 Furthermore, the 
Shari'ah entitles the accused to compensation, when it is established that he has 
suffered damage as a result of a public official's [mis]conduct. Finally, the Shari 'ah 
seeks to enforce the accountability of public officials and the protection of the rights 
of the accused by prosecuting those who abuse their power or the rights of the 
accused. These remedies are discussed next. 
3.7.1 Staying the proceedings and the exclusionary rule 
The remedy of staying the proceeding against the accused as a result of an abuse of 
power by public officials, or the remedy of excluding evidence obtained in violation 
of the accused's rights, apart from confession evidence, have no mention in the books 
of classical Muslim jurists. They seem to be inclined to discipline the investigation 
authority, and compensate the victim of a public official's misconduct through other 
remedies, as discussed below. This does not mean, however, that there is no legal 
102 Ibid. p. 97. 
103 See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text. 
104 This remedy is similar to the remedy of a stay of proceedings adopted by the common law to deal 
with specific cases where, inter alia, the action of the police or the prosecution amounts to a serious 
failure to adhere to the rule of law, which could make the trial an abuse of process. 
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basis for adopting these drastic remedies, as it will be argued below, but rather that it 
is a matter of determining what the public utility dictates. In two widely reported 
stories, the Khalifah Umar Ibn Al-Khattab did set a precedent for staying the 
proceedings because of an abuse of power, which could also be cited as a legal basis 
for excluding evidence obtained by improper means. However, for unknown reasons, 
subsequent Muslim jurists did not build upon this precedent. 
It is worth quoting again the report in which the Khalifah Umar abused his power 
to detect crimes. The report states that: 
The Khalifah Umar Ibn Al-Khattab was wondering the street of Al- 
Madina and he heard someone singing in his house, so Umar climbed the 
wall of that house and found the owner of the house drinking alcohol. He 
said to him: "I have prevented you from drinking but you have drunk. " 
The owner of the house replied: "If I have committed one sin, you have 
committed three sins. God has forbidden you from spying, but you have. 
God has ordered you to enter the house from the door, but you have not. 
God has ordered you not to enter private premises without permission, but 
you have. " Umar after a brief reflection left him without taking any further 
action. 105 
In a similar incident, Abdelrahman Ibn Awf reported that: 
One night, I was on guard with the Khalifah Umar in Madina. We noticed 
a nightlight through hole of a closed door, and when we approached it we 
heard of loud and noisy voices of some people coming from the house. 
Umar took my hand and said: "Do you know whose home this is? " I said 
no. He said "it is the home of Rabiaa ibn Omaya ibn Khalef and they are 
now drunk. " He asked me what we should do. I replied that Allah forbids 
spying and I think this is what we have just done. Umar left them without 
taking any further action. '06 
Some Muslim writers, who have considered these authorities, characterise the action 
of the Khalifah Umar as pardoning the defendants, who were caught red-handed. 107 
However, this characterisation is incorrect, as under the Shari'ah rules neither the 
ruler nor the judge has the right to pardon the defendant in the al-hudud offences, 
which include the offence of drinking alcohol. 108 Therefore, the only explanation why 
105 See supra note 79. 
106 Reported by Al-Ghazali, Reviving, supra note 77, vol. 2, p. 255. Also reported by Al-Souyouti, 
supra note 79, vol. 7, p. 567. 
10 See e. g., Ibn Dhufair, supra note 21, p. 60. 
108 Ibn Taymiyya, A, al-Siyasa al-Shar'iyya fi Islah al-Rraiy wa al-Rraiya (The Legitimate Policy for 
Reforming the Leader and those he Leads) (Beriut: Dar al-Jeeal, 1993), pp. 82-86; Abu Zahra, M, Al- 
Jeremah (The Crime) (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-Arabi, 1998), pp. 282-286 [hereinafter Al-Jeremah]; 
Awdah, supra note 47, vol. 1, pp. 81,774-775. 
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the Khalifah Umar did not take any further action against the defendants, although 
they were caught red-handed in both stories, is because the action of the Khalifah 
constituted an abuse of power. 
If the remedy of the stay of proceedings is recognised under the Shari 'ah rules, it 
could be persuasively argued that there is nothing in the Shari'ah which precludes 
judges from excluding evidence obtained by improper means. This is because in cases 
where there is sufficient evidence of guilt, as in the two stories described above, a stay 
of proceedings would inevitably lead a guilty person to walk free. However, the effect 
of the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is limited to the contaminated evidence 
in the sense that the accused still can be convicted if there is sufficient evidence, apart 
from contaminated evidence, that meets the requirement of proof. In addition, as 
stated earlier, the majority of Muslim jurists are of the opinion that evidence obtained 
by coercion should be excluded even if it is reliable. If this is the case, why cannot 
other kinds of evidence obtained by illegal means be excluded, since the basis for the 
exclusion is the illegality of the methods by which the evidence is obtained? 109 
It must be added that in relation to the two stories cited above, the offences 
committed were minor, and yet the violations of the defendants' rights were serious. 
As the first story clearly indicates, when the defendant said: `If I committed one sin, 
you [the Khalifah Umar, who was acting in his capacity as an investigator when he 
found the defendant red-handed] committed three sins. ' Thus, it would be wrong to 
conclude from these two authorities that any abuse of power, or illegality which led to 
a piece of evidence being uncovered should automatically lead to a stay of 
proceedings, or the tainted evidence being excluded. Therefore, which of these two 
drastic remedies should be adopted, if any, should be determined in the light of the 
circumstances of a given case. It is regrettable that Muslim jurists did not build on 
those precedents as public utility could provide a valid and creative basis for 
establishing rules to deal with such an issue of paramount importance. Condoning 
serious and blatant disregard of the rule of law by admitting evidence obtained 
through serious violations of the accused's rights could undermine the public interest 
both in protecting the rights and dignity of individuals from being interfered with by 
the state, and in preserving the integrity of the judicial process. 
109 See supra para. 3.3. 
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3.7.2 Compensation 
Whenever the accused's rights have been violated, and such a violation caused 
damage to that person, he is entitled to compensation. In fact, Muslim jurists do not 
require that there must be a violation of the accused's rights, but it is enough to 
establish that the person concerned has suffered damage as a consequence of the 
official's conduct. This is based on the jurisprudential rule, which has been already 
mentioned, that causing harm is forbidden. For example, if the accused has been 
charged with an offence and was eventually acquitted after he had been tried, but 
during the trial he suffered loss of reputation or income, the individual concerned does 
not have to establish that the prosecution was malicious. It is sufficient that he 
establishes that the restrictions on his liberty during the criminal proceedings, or his 
involvement in the criminal process have resulted in pecuniary or non-pecuniary 
damage. 11° 
The right to compensation, even where there is no misconduct by a public official, 
is supported by the story already cited, where the Khalifah Umar summoned a woman 
who was anxious about attending the questioning, and this anxiety caused her to 
miscarry when she was on here way to see him. In this story, the Khalifah Umar in 
exercising his investigative powers, did nothing wrong which could be held as the 
cause for the anxiety of the woman summoned. However, since the woman was 
anxious because of the Khalifah Umar's action and this anxiety led to the death of her 
child, she was entitled to compensation. "' This is why Muslim jurists interpret the 
rule not just as entitling the accused to a remedy for any damage suffered by him, but 
as a rule which requires the state to act proactively to prevent the damage before it 
occurs. "2 
Regarding the responsibility for damages, Muslim jurists are not unanimous on 
this, and the persuasive opinion is that it must be distinguished between two 
situations. On the one hand, if the damage suffered by the accused was not as a result 
of a violation of his rights, or the violation was not intentional, the state, as an 
110 See Al-Suwalim, supra note 17, pp. 378-383. For a discussion of compensation for non-pecuniary 
damage, see generally Al-Zuhili, W, Nudert al-Duman: Deras'lt Muqarnh (Theory of Tort: A 
Comparative Study) (Beirut: Dar El-Fikr al-Muaser, 2003), pp. 23-25. 
111 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. See also Al-Ageel, supra note 6, pp. 75-76; Abu Saq, M, 
AI-Taiviad an al-Durer ft al-Filth al-Islami (Compensating for Damage in Islamic Jurisprudence) 
(Riyadh: Dar Ashbilia for Publishing and Distribution, 1999), pp. 129-135. 
112 See supra note 67. 
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employer of the official whose [mis]conduct caused the damage, is responsible for 
paying the compensation. ' 13 
On the other hand, where the violation of the accused's right was intentional or 
malicious, and such violation resulted in damage to the accused, the official 
responsible will be held responsible for paying the compensation, in addition to the 
criminal liability resulting from the abuse of power or the accused's rights as 
discussed below. 14 The justification for the personal responsibility for the wrongful 
and intentional actions taken by an official is to deter public officials from abusing 
their power or the accused's rights, and thereby enforcing the accountability of the 
investigation authority and the protection of the rights of the accused. 
3.7.3 Disciplinary and criminal actions 
It is first worth pointing out that the Shari 'ah does not distinguish between 
disciplinary offences and criminal offences. This is because when the official abuses 
his power or the accused's rights, he has committed a sin by violating the rules of the 
Shari 'ah or those set by the ruler, which do not contradict the Shari 'ah, and therefore 
his actions will amount to a criminal offence. ' 15 This is based upon the Qur'anic verse 
which states: `O ye who believe! Obey Allah, and His Messenger and those who are 
charged with authority among you.... ' 16 For the sake of clarity, however, the term 
disciplinary offences will be used to refer to an official's misconduct which is 
contrary to the rules governing his job, and the term criminal offences will be used to 
refer to criminal offences in the strict sense. 
Disciplinary offences fall within al-ta'zir offences category. The judge has a wide 
discretionary power with regard to the punishment to be imposed on the wrongdoer. It 
includes apology, suspension or dismissal from duty, financial compensation to be 
paid to the victim or imprisonment. The judge has the power to impose one or more 
sentences on the wrongdoer, depending on the judge's assessment of the seriousness 
of the misconduct of the convicted official, the damage suffered by the victim and the 
dictates of the public interest. "' 
113 See Saeed, supra note 56, p. 338; Al-Lahim, A, 'Al-Tawiad an al-Sujen (Compensation for 
Imprisonment)', Al Adl Journal, 11 (2002), 96-100. 
114 See ibid. p. 337; Al-Lahim, supra note 113,96-100. 
Its See supra para. 1.4. See also Awdah, supra note 47, vol. 1, pp. 74-77 & 80-82; Abu Zahra, Al- 
Jeremah, supra note 108, pp. 174-175,219-229. 116 Verse 4: 59. 
117 Awdah, supra note 47, vol. 1, pp. 685-708. 
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On the other hand, if the offence committed by a public official does not fall with 
the category of disciplinary offences, the nature of the offence will determine the 
punishment that can be imposed in the event that the public official is found guilty. 
Offences, which relate to this discussion, either fall within the category of al-qisas 
offences or within category of al-ta'zir offences. "8 If the alleged offence involves 
inflicting a physical harm on the accused, the offence will fall within the category of 
the al-qisas offences. The punishment for al-qisas offences is either retaliation by 
inflicting the same harm suffered by the victim on the wrongdoer, unless it is 
impracticable or the victim pardons the offender, or alternatively paying financial 
compensation (diya). The judge is also empowered, where retaliation is not imposed, 
to add one sentence or more, if he considers it to be necessary for the public interest. 
Other offences, which are not considered to fall within al-qisas offences category, 
will fall within al-ta'zir offences category, the punishment of which has been already 
explained. 
3.8 Conclusion 
It is clear from the foregoing analysis of the rights of the accused in the Islamic 
criminal justice system that there is nothing in the textual sources, the principles or 
the jurisprudential rules of the Shari 'ah that precludes the recognition and adoption of 
internationally accepted human rights applicable to the pre-trial stage of the criminal 
process in a Muslim state. In fact, the two systems share the common objective of 
ensuring that those persons who are suspected or accused of committing a criminal 
offence are treated in a dignified and fair manner, without prejudicing the public 
interest in effective law enforcement. Thus, it is justified to conclude that international 
human rights standards applicable to the pre-trial stage of the criminal process are not 
based exclusively upon Western values, but rather are based upon values which are 
equally embodied in the Islamic Shari'ah. It therefore follows that Saudi Arabia, 
whether it has signed up to the major international human rights instruments or not, is 
obliged to comply with those standards by virtue of the Saudi Basic Law of 
Government which recognises human rights in accordance with the Shari 'ah, which 
"8 It should be noted that under the Shari 'ah criminal law there is a third category of offences known 
as al-hudud category. However, since these offences are considered to be committed against God, as 
opposed to those committed against persons or the state, they fall outside the scope of our discussion. 
For a brief account of al-hudud offences, see supra para. 1.3.2. 
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uphold those standards with its full substance, as clearly shown in this chapter. That is 
to say, a violation of those standards by Saudi Arabia is, by definition, a violation of 
its own cultural and legal standards. 
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Part Two 
Comparison & Evaluation 
Introduction 
As mentioned earlier, the recent Saudi criminal procedure reforms have been adopted 
with the aim of adjusting Saudi law and practice to meet international human rights 
standards. ' Hence, in this part the focus will be on the main theme of this thesis, 
which is to evaluate the extent to which the recently adopted reforms concerning the 
pre-trial stage of the criminal process are achieving their goal, and to suggest how the 
Saudi system could be improved, where it is considered to be defective from an 
international human rights viewpoint, in order to achieve its principal goal. In order to 
achieve this dual objective, firstly, international human rights standards applicable to 
the pre-trial stage of the criminal process, which constitute the evaluative criteria 
adopted by this thesis, are identified in detail. The main international treaty that deals 
with the rights of the accused is the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 1966 (ICCPR). Hence, this part relies principally on the ICCPR, and the 
decisions of its supervisory organ, i. e., the Human Rights Committee, for identifying 
the minimum human rights standards applicable to the pre-trial stage of the criminal 
process. In order to provide a detailed description of the rights under examination, 
reference will be also made, where appropriate, to other international human rights 
treaties, including the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984 (CAT), 2 and the jurisprudence of its 
supervisory organ, i. e., Committee Against Torture (CT), and regional human rights 
treaties, mainly the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 1952 (ECHR), and the American Convention on Human 
Rights 1969 (ACHR), and the decisions of their supervisory organs, i. e., the European 
Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
Secondly, a comparison between the Saudi and the Canadian criminal justice 
systems with regard to the theme of this thesis will be provided. The principal focus 
of this comparison is how international human rights, examined in this thesis, fare 
under the two systems under comparison. Once a particular right has been thoroughly 
defined under international human rights law, a detailed descriptive analysis of each 
system under comparison with regard to the right under examination will be provided, 
See supra pp. 2-3. 
2 Adopted Dec. 10,1984, G. A. Res. 39/46, U. N. GAOR 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at art. 4, U. N. Doc. 
A139/51, (1985) (entered into force June 26,1987) [hereinafter CAT], available at 
<http: //www. ohchr. org/english/> (last visited Jan. 2,2006). 
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followed by a comparative analysis of the approaches adopted by the systems under 
comparison with regard to the right under examination. 3 The discussion of the Saudi 
system focuses primarily on the Basic Law of Government 1992, the Code of 
Criminal Procedure 2001 (CCP), 4 and the Code of the Investigation and Public 
Prosecution Commission 1989 (CIPPC). 5 While the Basic Law and the CIPPC are not 
part of the recently adopted reforms, the discussion of these legislations nonetheless is 
essential in order to give a complete picture of the impact of the recently adopted 
reforms on the rights under examination. 
In the light of the fact that the reforms under evaluation have only recently come 
into effect, and given the non-existence of a case law reporting system, which could 
shed some light on how the recent reforms are implemented in practice, fieldwork on 
the implementation of the recent reforms has been conducted. The fieldwork was 
conducted in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia, between May and November 2004. 
The empirical information was gathered mainly through one-to-one semi-structured 
interviews with a sample of individuals representing most of the participants in the 
criminal process, including police officers, members of the Investigation and Public 
Prosecution Commission, qadis, defence lawyers, and accused persons. The questions 
were tailored to the interviewee's particular responsibilities or experiences. The 
adoption of this method proved useful in that it allowed the researcher to restrict the 
discussion to specific topics and to request clarification and details when the need 
arose. In addition, it allowed the establishment of trust between the interviewee and 
the interviewer, which was necessary for encouraging interviewees to discuss some 
sensitive issues. 6 In addition, the method of participant observation was employed 
either in order to verify the information gathered through interviews, or to generate 
new information that, for various reasons, could not be obtained through the interview 
3 For a discussion of comparative law methodology, see Kamba, W, 'Comparative law: A Theoretical 
Framework', Int'1. & Comp. L. Q., 23(3) (1974), 485; Zweigert, K& Kcotz, H, Introduction to 
Comparative Law, trans. by T Weir (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1998), pp. 15-46. 
4 Issued by Royal Decree No. M/39 (16 October 2001). Published on Umm al-Qura (the Saudi official 
Gazette) No. 3867 on 3 November 2001 [hereinafter CCP]. 
5 Issued by Royal Decree No. M/56 (30 May 1989). Published on Umm al-Qura (the Saudi official 
Gazette) No. 3264 on 24 June 1989 [hereinafter CIPPC]. 
6 For a discussion of the interview method, see Stroh, M, 'Qualitative Interviewing', in Research 
Training for Social Scientists: A Handbook for Postgraduate Researchers, ed. by D Burton (Sage: 
London, 2000); Clarke, A& Ruth, D, Evaluation Research: An introduction to Principles, Methods 
and Practice (Sage: London, 1999), pp. 71-79. 
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method. 7 Additional information on the implementation process has been also 
obtained through reading court records and case files that have been made available to 
the present researcher. The analysis of the implementation process focuses on the 
extent to which the CCP requirements are complied with in practice and, in cases 
where there are disparities between the law and practice, the reasons for these 
disparities. 
The discussion of the Canadian system will focus primarily on the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982 and the jurisprudence of the Canadian courts, in 
particular the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada. However, since the 
Charter is not an exhaustive catalogue of rights, but more a representation of the 
minimum standard below which the law must not fall, in order to provide a complete 
picture of the extent of the protection of the rights under discussion, a reference to the 
statute and common law is also made. 
The rights which form the focus of this part are, namely, the right to an effective 
protection, the right against self-incrimination, the right to humane treatment, the right 
to liberty, the right to legal assistance and the right to privacy. These rights are 
comparatively analysed in chapters four, five, six, seven, eight and nine respectively. 
Part two will conclude by critically evaluating the recently adopted reforms in the 
light of the findings made by the process of comparison. 
7 For a discussion of the participant observation method, see Jorgensen, D, Participant Observation: A 




The Right to an Effective Protection 
A. International human rights law 
4.1 Right to an effective remedy 
Article 2(3) of the ICCPR states that: 
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: 
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein 
recognised are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding 
that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official 
capacity; 
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right 
thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative 
authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal 
system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; 
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies 
when granted. 
Article 2(3) of the ICCPR guarantees the right to an effective remedy. This right, 
according to the HRC, is absolute in the sense that it cannot be restricted even during 
a public emergency that threatens the life of the nation. ' The term 'effective remedy' is 
commonly used to refer to either the mechanism by which the violation is determined 
to have occurred, the redress granted to the victim if a violation is found to have 
occurred, or to both. 2 The ICCPR requires specific remedies with regard to certain 
rights, such as the right of detainees to challenge their detention by way of habeas 
corpus and to be released if their detention is determined to be unlawful (Article 
9(4)), and the right of an unlawfully detained person to compensation (Article 9(5)). 
Here, only the specified remedies with regard to both aspects, the mechanism (i. e., the 
review of detention by a 'court') and the redress (i. e., release and compensation if the 
detention is found to be unlawful), can be considered as an effective remedy within 
the meaning of Article 2(3). 3 
1 See infra para. 4.2.2. 
2 Cf. Shelton, D, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), p. 4, n. 9. 
See Magana ex-Philibert v. Zaire, Communication No. 90/1981, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 at 124 
(1990), paras. 7.2-9. Cf. De Jong, et al v. The Netherlands (1986) 8 E. H. R. R. 20, para. 60. 
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However, where the ICCPR does not specify a particular remedy for a given 
alleged violation, the question as to whether the right to a remedy has been violated or 
not will be dependent entirely on whether the remedy is effective or not. Before 
considering the requirement of effectiveness however, it is important first to 
determine the point at which Article 2(3) comes into play, and, as a consequence, the 
individual becomes entitled to an effective remedy. 
4.1.1 Engaging the right to an effective remedy 
According to Article 2(3)(a) of the ICCPR, the State is obliged to provide an effective 
remedy to 'any person whose rights or freedoms are ... violated.... ' 
What is 
problematic with the wording of this Article is that the literal reading of it leads to the 
conclusion that only when the HRC determines that a given right has been violated, 
Article 2(3) comes into play. In this sense, an effective remedy means the redress that 
the person receives after his/her Covenant right has been determined by the HRC to 
have been violated. This literal reading is, at least, inconsistent with the aim of 
international human rights, which is, as argued in Chapter two, to ensure the 
enjoyment of the international human rights within the jurisdiction of each State 
Party. 4 In addition, a subsequent decision by the HRC to grant a remedy to a given 
person after his/her right has been violated is less effective in combating human rights 
violations, compared to domestic mechanisms, which can be easily accessed, and can, 
if a violation is found to have occurred, grant an enforceable remedy with immediate 
effect. 5 Thus, the literal reading of Article 2(3)(a) would deprive person of the right to 
effective remedy, and, by implication, the other guaranteed rights under the Covenant 
from much of the protection that the Covenant attempts to afford to individuals 
against the State. 
Oddly enough, the HRC had initially adopted this reading. It stated in a 
communication against Argentina that 'under article 2 the right to a remedy arises 
only after a violation of a Covenant right has been established. ' This restrictive 
interpretation of the right to an effective remedy has led the HRC to adopt 
contradictory statements, particularly with regard to fundamental freedoms such as 
See supra para. 2.2.3. 
5 Cf. Harris, D, et al, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (London: Butterworths, 
1995), p. 446. 
6 S. E. v. Argentina, Communication No. 275/1988, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/38/D/275/1988 (1990), para. 
5.3. 
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the freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 7 of 
the ICCPR. On the basis of the above adopted interpretation, it was argued before the 
HRC that the right to an effective remedy does not imply the obligation on the part of 
the State to provide a prior regime by which allegations of torture or cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment can be investigated. 7 The HRC rejected this argument and 
referred to its General Comment 20, in which it stated that '[a]rticle 7 should be read 
in conjunction with article 2, paragraph 3.... The right to lodge complaints against 
maltreatment prohibited by article 7 must be recognised in the domestic law. 
Complaints must be investigated promptly and impartially by competent authorities so 
as to make the remedy effective. '8 Despite the paramount importance of the freedom 
from torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, there is nothing in the 
language of Article 2(3) to suggest that the meaning of the right to an effective 
remedy is dependent on the right involved. 
By contrast, the European Court of Human Rights (European Court) has applied a 
different interpretation to the corresponding provision in Article 13 of the ECHR, 
which provides that '[e]veryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this 
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority ... 
' 
The European Court in rejecting the literal reading, which was adopted by the HRC as 
shown above, held that: 
In the Court's view, Article 13 requires that where an individual considers 
himself to have been prejudiced by a measure allegedly in breach of the 
Convention, he should have a remedy before a national authority in order 
both to have his claim decided and, if appropriate, to obtain redress. Thus, 
Article 13 must be interpreted as guaranteeing an 'effective remedy before 
a national authority' to everyone who claims that his rights and freedoms 
under the Convention have been violated. 
The HRC recently in its General Comment 31 seems to have abandoned its previous 
approach with regard to the meaning of the right to an effective remedy under Article 
2(3) of the ICCPR. In this respect, it stated: 
7 Rodriguez v. Uruguay, Communication No. 322/1988, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/322/1988 (1994), 
ara. 12.3. 
Human Rights Committee, General Comment 20, Article 7 (Forty-fourth session, 1992), Compilation 
of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U. N. 
Doc. HRI\GEN\l\Rev. I at 30 (1994), para. 14. 9 Klass and Others v. FRG (1979-80) 2 E. H. R. R. 214, para. 64. Cf also Silver v. United Kingdom 
(1983) 5 E. H. R. R. 347, para. 113(a); Soering v. United Kingdom (1989) 11 E. H. R. R. 43, para. 120. 
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Article 2, paragraph 3, requires that in addition to effective protection of 
Covenant rights States Parties must ensure that individuals also have 
accessible and effective remedies to vindicate those rights.... The 
Committee attaches importance to States Parties' establishing appropriate 
judicial and administrative mechanisms for addressing claims of rights 
violations under domestic law. '° 
Thus, it can be concluded that the right to an effective remedy under Article 2(3) of 
the ICCPR comes into play once the individual has an arguable claim that his/her 
Covenant right has been violated. '' This right will trigger, in the first place, the State's 
obligation to provide the individual concerned with an effective mechanism to test his 
claim, and in the second place, to grant effective redress to the victim if his/her right 
is found to have been violated. In the next section, attention will be focused on the 
requirement of effectiveness under Article 2(3) of the ICCPR. 
4.1.2 The effectiveness requirement 
As mentioned above, the term 'remedy' refers to both the mechanism by which the 
allegations of human rights violations are tested, and the redress to be granted where a 
violation has been found to have occurred. With regard to the former, Article 2(3)(b) 
of the ICCPR requires allegations of human rights violations to be reviewed by the 
'competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other 
10 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States 
Parties to the Covenant, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add. 13 (2004), para. 15 [hereinafter General 
Comment 31]. It is noteworthy that the change of HRC's approach to the right to effective remedy was 
signalled in earlier communication against Cyprus in 2003. In that case the applicant invoked, inter 
alia, Article 27 (the right to participate in public service) in conjunction with Article 2(3) (the right to 
effective remedy), to challenge his non-appointment as a judge. Although the HRC held that the 
communication was inadmissible because it was unsubstantiated, its comments on the right to an 
effective remedy seems to suggest that the HRC has, effectively, adopted the European Court's 
approach in this respect including the so-called 'arguability test'. In this respect, the HRC has stated the 
following: 
A literal reading of [Article 2(3)(a)] seems to require that an actual breach of one of the 
guarantees of the Covenant be formally established as a necessary prerequisite to obtain 
remedies such as reparation or rehabilitation. However, article 2, paragraph 3(b), obliges 
States parties to ensure determination of the right to such remedy by a competent 
judicial, administrative or legislative authority, a guarantee which would be void if it 
were not available where a violation had not yet been established. While a State party 
cannot be reasonably required, on the basis of article 2, paragraph 3(b), to make such 
procedures available no matter how unmeritorious such claims may be, article 2, 
paragraph 3, provides protection to alleged victims if their claims are sufficiently well- 
founded to be arguable under the Covenant. 
Kazantzis v. Cyprus, Communication No. 972/2001, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/972/2001 (2003), para. 
6.6. 
11 Compare Dijk, P, et al, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, 3rd edn 
(The Hague; Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1998), 699-700; Harris, supra note 5, pp. 447-449, for 
what constitute an arguable claim under the ECHR. 
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competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the 
possibilities of judicial remedy. ' It is clear from this Article that, although State 
Parties are obliged to develop judicial remedies, they are nonetheless not obliged, at 
least not yet, to provide judicial ones. 
However, the HRC in its General Comment 31 indicated that, where the remedy is 
not judicial, it is incumbent on the State to establish mechanisms that are 'independent 
and impartial' in order to satisfy the requirement of effectiveness under Article 2(3). 12 
In addition, the HRC has indicated that where the alleged violations concern 'basic 
human rights', non judicial remedies will not be sufficient to meet the requirement of 
effectiveness. 13 Furthermore, the authority concerned must be able to grant a remedy 
to the victim if a violation of a Covenant right is found to have occurred. Thus, 
national authorities, which lack the power to issue legally binding decisions, cannot 
be considered as an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 2(3). 14 Finally, 
once the remedy is granted by the competent authority, the remedy must be 
enforced. 15 
If the national authority, which is entrusted with reviewing alleged human rights 
violations, is found to be effective, and a violation of a Covenant right is found to 
have occurred, the question of effectiveness will turn to the redress granted to remedy 
the violation. 16 The HRC seems to consider financial compensation for redress as 
generally required by the Covenant to satisfy the requirement of effectiveness. In 
addition, and where appropriate, in order to satisfy the requirement of effectiveness, 
redress 'can involve restitution, rehabilitation and measures of satisfaction, such as 
public apologies, public memorials, guarantees of non-repetition and changes in 
relevant laws and practices, as well as bringing to justice the perpetrators of human 
rights violations. 17 The remedy of excluding evidence obtained in violation of the 
accused's rights guaranteed under the Covenant can be also added to these forms of 
redress. It should be noted, however, that whether a given form of redress is effective 
or not will depend on the circumstances of the case concerned and the substantive 
12 General Comment 31, supra note 10, para. 15. See also Gilboa v. Uruguay, Communication No. 
147/1983, U. N. Doe. CCPR/C/OP/2 at 176 (1990), para. 7.2. 
'} Vicente, et al v. Colombia, Communication No. 612/1995 (14 June 1994), CCPR/C/60/D/612/1995, 
? ara. 5.2. 
C v. Australia, Communication No. 900/1999, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/76/D/900/1999 (2002), para. 7.3. 
15 ICCPR, Art. 2(3)(c). 
'G General Comment 31, supra note 10, para. 16. 
17 Ibid. 
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right involved. 18 For this reason, relevant forms of remedy will be considered in 
conjunction with the rights under consideration as a means for remedying their 
violation in the relevant sections. 
4.2 Restrictions on individual rights and, freedoms 
Under the ICCPR, certain individual rights and freedoms can be subjected to 
restrictions because the very provisions protecting them include clauses that permit 
the restriction of the protected right if certain conditions are met, or because of the 
existence of a public emergency that threatens the life of the nation. Here only the 
restrictions that can be imposed during a public emergency are discussed, as 
restrictions concerning the rights under discussion, which are permissible under 
specific limitation clauses, are treated in detail in the relevant sections. Restrictions, 
which can be imposed on human rights and freedoms guaranteed under the ICCPR 
during a public emergency that threatens the life of the nation are regulated under 
Article 4 of the ICCPR, which states that: 
1. In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and 
the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the 
present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations 
under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not 
inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not 
involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, 
religion or social origin. 
2. No derogation from articles 6,7,8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11,15,16 and 
18 may be made under this provision. 
3. Any State Party to the present Covenant availing itself of the right of 
derogation shall immediately inform the other States Parties to the present 
Covenant, through the intermediary of the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, of the provisions from which it has derogated and of the reasons 
by which it was actuated. A further communication shall be made, 
through the same intermediary, on the date on which it terminates. 
Article 4 of the ICCPR allows States Parties to derogate from their obligations under 
the Covenant where a public emergency threatening the life of the nation exists. The 
ECHR and ACHR equally recognise the State Party's right to do the same where a 
public emergency threatening the life of the nation exists. ' However, the right of a 
18 Nowak, M, U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Strasbourg: N. P. Engel, 1993), p. 60. 19 See ECHR, Art. 15; ACHR, Art. 27 
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State Party to derogate from its obligations is not without limitations. Firstly, the State 
Party's right to restrict human rights, even if a public emergency does exist, does not 
extend to limiting certain rights, which are considered as absolute in the sense that 
they are subject to no limitations whatsoever, irrespective of the exigencies of the 
situation faced by the State. Secondly, there are certain conditions that must be met in 
order for the State Party to be able to justify its derogatory measures on the basis of 
public emergency, namely: 
" the existence of'public emergency which threatens the life of the nation'; 
" the measures taken to deal with the public emergency must not exceed the 
'extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation'; 
" the measures taken to deal with the public emergency must not contravene 
the state' other international law obligations; and 
" there must be an official proclamation of public emergency. States Parties to 
the ICCPR must be notified of the derogatory measures and the reasons for 
them through the Secretary General of the U. N. 
What follows is a discussion of the above-mentioned requisites. 
4.2.1 Public emergency threatening the life of the nation 
Exceptional restrictions on international human rights can be justified only by the 
existence of a public emergency that threatens the life of the nation. Apart from the 
circumstances resulting from an armed conflict, which are considered, generally 
speaking, as 'public emergency' within the meaning of Article 4(1), there is no clear 
cut criterion by which given circumstances can be judged as a public emergency 
within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the ICCPR. 20 The HRC's jurisprudence provides 
little help in this respect. The Siracusa Principles, which were formulated by a group 
of distinguished international law experts, consider a public emergency within the 
meaning of Article 4(1) of the ICCPR to have three essential characteristics. In order 
for a given situation to be characterised as public emergency, it must: 
(a) affect[] the whole of the population and either the whole or part of the 
territory of the State, and 
(b) threaten[] the physical integrity of the population, the political 
independence or the territorial integrity of the State or the existence or 
20 See Human Rights Committee, General Comment 29, States of Emergency (Article 4), U. N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev. l/Add. 11 (2001), para. 3 [hereinafter General Comment 29]. 
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basic functioning of institutions indispensable to ensure and protect the 
rights recognised in the Covenant. 
40. Internal conflict and unrest that do not constitute a grave and 
imminent threat to the life of the nation cannot justify derogations under 
Article 4. 21 
Similarly, the European Commission on Human Rights in the Greek Case, 
22 stated 
that a public emergency within the meaning of Article 15(1) of the ECHR, which 
corresponds literally to Article 4(1) of the ICCPR, must have the following 
characteristics: 
(1) It must be actual or imminent. 
(2) Its effects must involve the whole nation. 
(3) The continuance of the organised life of the community must be 
threatened. 
(4) The crisis or danger must be exceptional, in that the normal measures 
or restrictions, permitted by the Convention for the maintenance of the 
public safety, health and order, are plainly inadequate. 23 
Thus, in order for a given set of circumstances to be qualified as a public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the ICCPR, the 
threat resulting from these circumstances must be imminent, general and capable of 
making ordinary means of protecting the public interest inadequate. However, 
following the terrorist attacks in the United States of America on September 11,2001, 
the Madrid bombings on March 11,2005 and the recent terrorist attacks on London's 
transportation system on July 7,2005, the issue of whether the threat posed by 
terrorism is capable of creating a public emergency within the meaning of Article 4(1) 
is an issue subject to controversy. Courts, whether national or international, might 
find it difficult to question a sovereign country or a democratically elected 
government's assessment of a given situation as a public emergency within the 
meaning of Article 4(1). However, the proportionality requirement, which is 
reviewable by the competent domestic and international authorities, is designed to 
21 'The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights', Hum. Ris. Q., 7.1 (1985), 3, paras. 39-40, [hereinafter Siracusa 
Principles]. These principles were formulated at a conference in 1984 in Siracusa, Sicily, by a group of 
31 distinguished experts in international law. 
22 12 YB 1 (1969). 
23 Ibid. p. 72. A public emergency within the meaning of Article 15(1) of the ECHR, was defined by 
the European Court as 'an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects the whole 
population and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the community of which the State is 
composed. ' Lawless v. Ireland (1961), (1979-1980) 1 E. H. R. R 15, para. 28. 
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limit the adverse consequences of the declaration of public emergency on human 
rights and freedoms as much as possible, as discussed next. 
4.2.2 'Strictly required by the exigencies of the situation'/ and 
non-derogable rights 
Article 4(l) makes it clear that derogatory measures are only permissible as long as 
they are 'strictly required by the exigencies of the situation'. The language of Article 
4(1) embodies the principle of proportionality between, on the one hand, the 
exigencies of the situation faced by the State, and, on the other hand, the duration, 
geographical scope, and the severity of the derogatory measures taken to deal with 
them. 24 In order to meet the proportionality test in terms of the duration of the 
application of the derogatory measures, the measures must be repealed and a state of 
normalcy be restored as soon as the public emergency ceases to exist. 
25 With respect 
to the severity of the derogatory measures, these measures must constitute the least 
restrictive measures available to the State to deal with the threat resulting from a 
public emergency. Hence, if ordinary measures permissible under the ICCPR are 
capable of adequately dealing with a public emergency, the derogatory measures will 
be considered as failing to meet the test of proportionality. 26 
It is noteworthy that irrespective of the exigencies of the situation, a public 
emergency can never justify imposing derogatory measures on those rights and 
freedoms that are considered as non-derogable under the ICCPR. 27 With respect to the 
accused's pre-trial rights, Article 7 of the ICCPR, which guarantees the right not to be 
subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, is recognised by the 
Covenant as non-derogable. 28 In addition, the HRC has extended the category of non- 
derogable rights to include some rights that have not been expressly recognised by the 
ICCPR as non-derogable. 29 According to the Committee, the category of non- 
derogable rights includes inter alia, the right to an effective remedy (Article 2(3)), 
30 
24 General Comment 29, supra note 20, para. 4; Siracusa Principles, supra note 21, para. 51. 25 Ibid. para. l. 
26 Siracusa Principles, supra note 21, para. 53. 27 ICCPR, Art 4(2). See also Siracusa Principles, supra note 21, para. 8. 29 Ibid. Similarly, the ECHR (Art. 15(2)) and the ACHR (Art. 27(2)) recognise the freedom from 
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment as non-derogable. 29 General Comment 29, supra note 20, paras. 11,13-16. See also Siracusa Principles, supra note 21, 
aras. 59-60,70. 
° Ibid. para. 14. 
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the right of detainees to humane treatment (Article 10(1)), 31 the right to habeas corpus 
(Article 9(4)), and the right to a fair trial (Article 14). 32 
The reason behind expanding the category of non-derogable rights is not uniform. 
With regard to the right of detainees to human treatment under Article 10(1) of the 
ICCPR, the Committee seems to consider this right a fundamental one given its 
apparent connection to the freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment under Article 7, which is expressly recognised by the Covenant as non- 
derogable. Hence, the right to humane treatment under Article 10(1) of the ICCPR 
constitutes, according to the Committee, a peremptory norm of general international 
law, which States are obliged to abide by even during a public emergency threatening 
the life of the nation. 33 With regard to the rights to an effective remedy, habeas 
corpus, and a fair trial, the rational behind qualifying them as non-derogable lies in 
their function as indispensable guarantees designed, inter alia, to 'ensure enjoyment of 
[the express] non-derogable rights [, ] provide an effective remedy against their 
violation', 34 and to preserve the rule of law that the Covenant as a whole is based 
upon. 35 
From the foregoing it is clear that the Committee adopts a very strict test of 
proportionality, or indeed, it applies Article 4 to the letter as it allows only certain 
derogations and only 'to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. ' 
The expansion of the category of non-derogable rights has not yet been challenged 
31 Ibid. para. 13(a). 
32 Ibid. paras. 15-16. 
33 Ibid. para. 13(a). See also infra para 4.2.3. According to Art. 53 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, adopted 22 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980, U. N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 
(1969), a peremptory norm of general international law is 'a norm accepted and recognised by the 
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and 
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same 
character. ' It is noteworthy in this respect that Art. 27(2) of ACI-IR considers the right to humane 
treatment enshrined in Art. 5 of the ACHR as non-derogable. 
34 Siracusa Principles, supra note 21, para. 70. See also General Comment 29, supra note 20, para. 15. 
It is noteworthy that Art. 27(2) of the ACHR prohibits derogations from a number of guaranteed rights, 
and 'the judicial guarantees essential for the protection of such rights'. The Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights has defined these judicial guarantees as 'those [guarantees] that ordinarily will 
effectively guarantee the full exercise of the rights and freedoms protected by [the] provision [of non- 
derogable rights] and whose denial or restriction would endanger their full enjoyment. ' Hence, the 
Inter-American Court concluded that, notwithstanding that the right to judicial remedy under Art. 25(1) 
and the right to habeas corpus under Art. 7(6) of the ACHR are not expressly non-derogable under Art. 
27(2), they are nonetheless non-derogable as they constitute 'judicial guarantees' within the meaning of 
Art. 27(2), the derogation from which is prohibited. See Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 
27(2) and 7(6) of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, January 
30,1987, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (Ser. A) No. 8 (1987) [Hereinafter Advisory Opinion OC-8/87]. 
35 General Comment 29, supra note 20, para. 16. 
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before the Committee, and it remains to be seen whether the Committee will alter its 
view in this respect. 
4.2.3 Conformity with international law 
A derogation from the Covenant is considered impermissible under Article 4(1) if it 
constitutes a violation of any of the State's other international law obligations, even if 
the derogation is permissible under the Covenant itself. The HRC has declared that as 
part of its function to monitor the compliance of States Parties with Article 4, it is 
empowered to review the obligations of the States Parties concerned under 
international law to ensure that their derogatory measures do not violate their other 
international law obligations. Thus far, this obligation has not been advanced before 
the HRC to challenge the legality of any given derogation. However, the HRC, as 
pointed out above, used this obligation, albeit indirectly, to expand the category of 
non-derogable rights. It has declared, inter alia, the right of detainees to humane 
treatment under Article 10(1) of the ICCPR as a peremptory norm of general 
international law, which is non-derogable under the Vienna Convention of Treaties 
1969,36 and, consequently, non-derogable under Article 4(1) of the Covenant. 
4.2.4 Non-discrimination 
Article 4(1) prohibits applying derogatory measures solely on a discriminatory basis. 
It should be noted also that applying the derogatory measures solely on a 
discriminatory basis could lead to those measures failing the proportionality test as 
well. This is because if the derogatory measures are found to be applied solely on a 
discriminatory basis, these measures could be argued to be a priori disproportionate 
to the exigencies of the situation and hence in violation of Article 4(1). Although this 
argument has not yet been tested before any international human rights organ, its 
soundness is undeniable. 
It is worth mentioning in this respect that the English House of Lords has reviewed 
this argument under Article 15(1) of the ECHR, 37 most of which has been 
incorporated into the English law by virtue of the Human Rights Act 1998, in the case 
36 See supra note 33. 
" It provides that '[i]n time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High 
Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the 
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not 
inconsistent with its other obligations under international law. ' 
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of A and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department. 38 The facts of the case 
were that the United Kingdom, in response to the threat of terrorism following the 
terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11,2001, has derogated from the 
right to liberty guaranteed under Article 5 of the ECHR. The derogation was designed 
to allow the Home Secretary under the Anti-Terrorism Act 2001 to detain indefinitely 
non-UK nationals, who are suspected of terrorism and cannot be deported, but does 
not extend to British nationals who are suspected terrorists, and, by virtue of their 
British nationality, cannot be removed from the UK. Given that the threat posed by 
suspected terrorists is the same, irrespective of their nationality, applying the 
derogatory measures exclusively to non-UK nationals was found to be discriminatory 
and, hence, disproportionate to the exigencies of the situation. As Lord Hope 
eloquently explained: 
I would hold that the indefinite detention of foreign nationals without trial 
has not been shown to be strictly required, as the same threat from British 
nationals whom the government is unable or unwilling to prosecute is 
being met by other measures which do not require them to be detained 
indefinitely without trial. The distinction which the government seeks to 
draw between these two groups - British nationals and foreign nationals - 
raises an issue of discrimination. But, as the distinction is irrational, it 
goes to the heart of the issue about proportionality also. It proceeds on the 
misconception that it is a sufficient answer to the question whether the 
derogation is strictly required that the two groups have different rights in 
the immigration context. So they do. But the derogation is from the right 
to liberty. The right to liberty is the same for each group. If derogation is 
not strictly required in the case of one group, it cannot be strictly required 
in the case of the other group that presents the same threat. 39 
Therefore, if the State wishes to limit the application of its derogatory measures either 
to a specific geographical location or to a specific group of people there must be a 
rational for this differential treatment. Otherwise, the derogatory measures will be 
held as discriminatory, and, hence, disproportionate as well. 40 
J6 [2005] 3 All ER 169. 
39 Ibid. para. 132. 
40 The European Court of Human Rights in the case of the Republic of Ireland v. The United Kingdom 
(1979-80) 2 E. H. R. R. 25, para. 229, did not find the derogatory measures taken by the British 
Government in Northern Ireland against one terrorist group (the Irish Republican Army (IRA)), but not 
the other (the Loyalists) as discriminatory. This was because while the threat posed by the latter group 
could be contained under ordinary law measures; the threat emanating from the former group could be 
only tackled by employing derogatory measures. 
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4.2.5 Declaration and notification of public emergency 
Article 4(3) of the ICCPR requires a State that wishes to adopt derogatory measures 
under Article 4 to declare a public emergency and to notify other States Parties to the 
Covenant, through the United Nations Secretary General, of these measures and the 
reasons for them. The discussion here is confined to the requirement of proclaiming a 
state of public emergency as it is relevant to the enforcement of the Covenant's 
provisions by domestic means, rather than by international ones as the requirement of 
the notification intends. The proclamation of a state of public emergency must be 
done in accordance with the constitutional and legal framework of the State Party 
derogating from the Covenant. In addition, the derogatory measures must be precise 
and clear to ensure that is not arbitrarily applied . 
41 These requirements are essential to 
ensure that the population concerned are informed of the limitations that are to be 
imposed on their Covenant's rights, and to ensure that the rule of law is respected 
when it is especially needed. 42 In addition, the proclamation of a public emergency is 
essential in order to enable the persons whose Covenant rights and freedoms have 
been allegedly affected by illegal derogatory measures to exercise their right to an 
effective remedy under Article 2(3) in order to challenge the legality of these 
measures before an independent and impartial authority, as discussed next. 
4.2.6 Effective remedy against derogatory measures 
As mentioned earlier, the right to an effective remedy may not be derogated from 
even if there is a public emergency within the meaning of Article 4(l) of the ICCPR. 
Without ensuring the respect for this right during a public emergency, the State 
authorities could misuse their power to adopt derogatory measures under Article 4. 
The right to an effective remedy will ensure that the State meets its obligations under 
Article 4, particularly with regard to whether there is a public emergency within the 
meaning of Article 4(1), and whether or not the derogatory measures are 
proportionate to the exigencies of the situation or are discriminatory. 
As discussed above, the State is obliged to provide a mechanism by which alleged 
violations of the ICCPR are reviewed by an independent and impartial authority, 
although not necessarily judicial, in order to comply with the requirement of an 
41 See Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, Nepal, U. N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add. 42 (1994), para. 9; Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, 
Zambia, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 62 (1996), para 11. 
42 General Comment 29, supra note 20, para. 2. 
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effective remedy under Article 2(3) of ICCPR. However, as the HRC have correctly 
noted, the review of alleged violations of 'basic human rights' must be judicial to 
satisfy the requirement of effectiveness under Article 2(3). Given the importance of 
preserving the rule of law during a public emergency, when it is most needed, and the 
far-reaching consequences of employing derogatory measures under Article 4 for the 
protection of the Covenant as a whole, it is highly doubtful that a non judicial review 
of the compatibility of the derogatory measures with Article 4 requirements can be 
considered as an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 2(3). 43 
It is worth pointing out in this connection that the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights has taken an unequivocal stance on the nature of the remedy required for 
reviewing the compatibility of derogatory measures with the provisions of the ACHR. 
Relying on Article 27(2) of the ACHR, which prohibits derogations from a list of 
rights and the judicial guarantees for their protection, the American Court concluded 
unanimously that the right to judicial remedy guaranteed under Article 25(1) of the 
ACHR is a non-derogable right. Therefore, individuals are entitled to challenge 
derogatory measures before the national courts. 44 
B. Canada 
4.3 Right to an effective remedy 
Before discussing the right to an effective remedy under the Canadian Charter it is 
appropriate first to highlight the status of the human rights prior to the introduction of 
the Charter. Prior to 1982, human rights under Canadian law had not enjoyed the 
protection of the constitution; they had, instead been partially protected under the 
common law. However, this protection was recognised as being limited, as it was not 
permissible, under the common law, for the courts to strike down any legislation on 
the basis that it violated human rights. During the 1950s, this recognition resulted in 
the requirement for a human rights legislation, leading to the Bill of Rights being 
adopted in 1960. However, this Bill had its own deficiencies and came under 
intensive criticism as it failed to achieve its underlying objective of protecting human 
rights. This failure was due to a number of factors: the first and foremost of these was 
13 Ibid. See also supra para. 4.1.2. 
44 See Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, supra note 34, paras. 39-40,42-44. 
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that the Bill was a statutory document, thereby leaving the courts powerless to 
invalidate any legislation not in conformity with the rights guaranteed under the Bill. 
Secondly, the Bill of Rights was only applicable to federal jurisdiction, but did not 
extend to provincial law, thereby not allowing any consistency. 45 As a result of this 
criticism, the Canadian Constitution was amended in 1982 to include the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms (the Charter). 46 Since the Constitution is the supreme law of 
Canada, generally speaking, all other laws must be consistent with the rules set out in 
the Constitution. If they are not, they are at risk of being invalidated. The impact of 
the Charter on the area of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Canada stems 
from this status, as it enables individuals to resort to the domestic courts in order to 
enforce protection of these constitutional rights. The Charter also transformed the 
function of the judiciary, from merely applying the law, to reviewing the policy 
decisions and ensuring that any statutory act is compatible with the requirements of 
the Charter. 47 
Regarding the right to an effective remedy under the Charter, section 24(1) 
provides that '[a]nyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have 
been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such 
remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances. ' The first 
issue that arises under s. 24(1), is that, what type of authority can be considered, for 
the purposes of s. 24(1) of the Charter, to be 'a court of competent jurisdiction' to 
grant remedies for Charter violations? In Mills v. The Queen48 it was held that a court 
of competent jurisdiction within the meaning of s. 24(1) is the court that has the 
jurisdiction 'over the offences and persons and [has the] power to make orders 
sought. '49 This would mean that the trial judge is the competent court within the 
meaning of s. 24(l) to grant criminal law remedies for violations of the accused's 
Charter rights. However, where there is an alleged violation of the accused's Charter 
45 Manfredi, C, Judicial Power and the Charter, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 
15-16. 
46 Hereinafter the Charter. 
01 See Sharpe, R, The Impact of A Bill of Rights on the Role of the Judiciary: A Canadian Perspective', 
in Promoting Human Rights Through Bills of Rights: Comparative Perspectives, ed. by P Alston, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999). 
48 [1986] 1 S. C. R. 863, para. 261 49 Ibid. para. 265. 
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rights, and a trial judge has not been appointed, an application for a remedy under s. 
24(1) can be made to a provincial superior court. 5° 
A review of claims for remedies under s. 24(1), will involve the determination of 
two issues: firstly, whether there has been a violation of a Charter right, and if there 
is, secondly, what is the 'just and appropriate remedy' for the violation? 
" With regard 
to the former issue, it was held in Collins52 that the person who is seeking a remedy 
under s. 24(1) of the Charter bears the burden of establishing, on the balance of 
probabilities, that his Charter right(s) has been violated. However, the granting of a 
remedy under s. 24(1) is not dependent on establishing that a violation of a Charter 
right has actually occurred, but whether there is a prospective violation of a Charter 
right, where it is established that 'there is a very real likelihood that in the absence of 
that relief an individual's Charter rights will be prejudiced. '53 
With regard to the latter issue, as is apparent from the wording of s. 24(1), the 
court is not restricted to any particular form of remedy, but has the discretion to grant 
the remedy that is'just and appropriate in the circumstances. 51 Criminal law remedies 
for violations of pre-trial rights include an adjournment, bail, ordering disclosure, 
entering stays, the institution of disciplinary or criminal proceedings against the 
official responsible for the violation of the accused's right(s), the exclusion of 
evidence obtained in violation of the Charter rights, and the invalidation of laws that 
are inconsistent with the Charter to the extent of the inconsistency. These forms of 
remedy are discussed in the relevant sections. 
4.4 Permissible limitations on the Charter rights 
The Canadian Charter does not include absolute rights or freedoms as they are all, 
according to section 1 of the Charter, subject 'to such reasonable limits prescribed by 
law as can be justified in a free and democratic society. ' During the criminal 
proceedings, the accused can challenge, before the trial court, the constitutionality of 
any law relevant to the proceedings against him. If the law is not found to be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1, the law in question, 
S0 Ibid. See also Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting corp, [1994] 3 S. C. R. 835, para. 16. 
51 Ibid. para. 275. 
52 [1987] 1 S. C. R. 265,277. 
53 Phillips v. Nova Scotia (Westray Mine Inquiry), [1995] 2 S. C. R. 97, p. 110. 
54 Mills, supra note 48, para. 278. 
133 
to the extent of the inconsistency, will be declared of no force or effect under s. 52 of 
the Constitution Act 1982, which states that '[t]he Constitution of Canada is the 
supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect. '55 
The test upon which the limitation on constitutional rights or freedoms is 
determined to be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society or otherwise, 
was established by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Oakes. 56 The Court in this 
case was faced with the question of whether section 8 of the Narcotic Control Act, 
R. S. C. 1970, c. N-1, which provided that if the accused was found in possession of a 
narcotic, the accused was presumed to be in possession for the purpose of trafficking 
and that, unless the accused is able to establish to the contrary, on the balance of 
probabilities, he must be convicted of trafficking. The Court held the 'reverse onus' 
clause to be unconstitutional because it violated the presumption of innocence 
enshrined in section 11(d) of the Charter. In effect, the Court was left with the more 
important question of whether the limit imposed by section 8 of the Narcotic Control 
Act could be justified under section 1 as a reasonable limit. In addressing this 
question, the Court established what has become known as the Oakes test, which has 
practically substituted the formula of section 1.57 In the following sections, the 
Oakes's test and its implications for the constitutional rights that the accused enjoy 
during the pre-trial stage of the criminal process will be discussed. 
4.4.1 The Oakes test 
Before discussing the Oakes test, it is imperative first to determine the meaning of the 
clause that states that a limit on a constitutional right or freedom has to be prescribed 
by law, as a prerequisite to meeting the constitutional requirement of overriding an 
individual right. Le Dain J., of the Supreme Court, in his dissenting reasons in R. v. 
Therens, 58 stated that: 
The limit will be prescribed by law within the meaning of s. 1 if expressly 
provided for by statute or regulation, or result by necessary implication 
from the prescription from the terms of a statute or regulation or from its 
55 See R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd, [1985] 1 S. C. R. 295. 
56 [1986] 1 S. C. R. 103. 
57 Stuart, D, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 3rd edn (Scarborough: Carswell, 2001), p. 14. 
58 [1985] 1 S. C. R. 613. 
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operating requirements. The limit may also result from the application of a 
common law rule. 59 
It follows that, where a violation of a Charter right is determined to be a result of 
police action rather than the operation of the law, the violation cannot be justified 
under section 1, and consequently there is no need to consider the violation under the 
Oakes test. GO On the other hand, if the violation is determined to be a consequence of 
the operation of the law within the meaning articulated above by Le Dain J., the 
Oakes test comes into play. Regarding the burden of proof, while establishing that a 
violation of constitutional rights or freedoms has occurred always rests with the party 
seeking the protection of the allegedly impugned right, once a prima facie violation 
has been established, the burden shifts to the party attempting to justify the violation, 
which is usually the State. 61 According to the Oakes test, in order to meet the 
constitutional requirement of section 1 to override an individual right or freedom, the 
limit imposed has to meet two criteria. 
The first criterion is that the objective that the measures adopted seek to achieve 
must be of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a right or freedom guaranteed 
under the Charter. The Court emphasised that the standard must be high, and, hence, 
in order for an objective to meet the required standard, the objective, according to the 
Court, must `relate to concerns which are pressing and substantial in a free and 
democratic society. 62 If the limit fails to meet the first criterion, the analysis ceases 
here. However, if it is established, on the balance of probabilities, that the objective of 
the limitation is of sufficient importance, the analysis will proceed to the 
proportionality test stage. At this stage, the collective interest in limiting a right or 
freedom is weighed against the interests of the individual or group whose right or 
freedom has been violated. 
The proportionality test consists of three components. Firstly, the measures 
adopted must be carefully tailored to meet the objective that has been identified as of 
sufficient importance. Briefly, the measures must be based on rational, fair, and non- 
arbitrary considerations. Secondly, the measures adopted must not impair the right or 
59 Ibid. 645. Dickson C. J., Beetz, Estey, Chouinard, Wilson, McIntyre and Lamer JJ, agreed on this 
point. This approach was subsequently adopted by the unanimous Court in R. v. Thomsen [1988] 1 
S. C. R. 640,650. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Oakes, supra note 56,136-137. 
621bid. 138. 
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freedom in question more than is required to achieve the targeted objective and 
finally, there must be proportionality between the effects of the measures that are 
responsible for limiting the right or freedom under question and the objective that has 
been identified as of sufficient importance. 63 It is noteworthy that the Supreme 
Court's jurisprudence indicates that where the objective is deemed to be of sufficient 
importance in the Court's view, the test will depend almost entirely on the second 
component of the second criterion, which has become known as `the minimum 
impairment test'. 64 
4.4.2 Section 1 and the accused's constitutional rights 
The question this section seeks to explore is whether the rights of the accused, as 
enshrined in ss. 7-12 of the Charter are subject to restrictions demonstrably justified 
under s. l. It is noteworthy that certain rights, to which the accused under the Charter 
is entitled in the pre-trial stage of the criminal process, are qualified rights in the sense 
that the very sections that guarantee these rights contain clauses upon which 
restrictions in the public interest can be justified, as will be discussed in the relevant 
Chapters below. With regard to section 7, which protects life, liberty, and the security 
of person in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice, Justice Lamer, as 
he was then, speaking for the majority in the commonly cited case of Re B. C Motor 
Vehicle Act, 65 was strongly opposed even to contemplating the conception of 
subjecting the respected rights to further balancing except in a state of public 
emergency. As his Lordship put it, '[s]ection I may, for reasons of administrative 
expediency, successfully come to rescue of an otherwise violation of s. 7, but only in 
cases arising out of exceptional conditions, such as disasters, the outbreak of war, 
epidemics, and the like. '66 
In New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J), 
67 
Lamer C. J., who was speaking for the majority of the Supreme Court, seemed to have 
retreated from his initial position expressed in Re B. C. Motor Vehicle Act, cited 
63 Ibid. 139-140. For further discussion of the 'proportionality test', see Sharpe, R, 'The Impact of A Bill 
of Rights on the Role of the Judiciary: A Canadian Perspective', in Promoting Human Rights Through 
Bills of Rights: Comparative Perspectives, ed. by P Alston, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), pp. 445- 
449; Stuart, supra note 57, pp. 13-25. 
64 Stuart, supra note 57, p. 14. See, e. g., R. v. Swain, [1991] 1 S. C. R. 933; Adler v. Ontario, [1996] 3 
S. C. R. 609. 
65 [1985] 2 S. C. R. 486. 
66 Ibid. 518. (Dickson C. J., Beetz, Chouinard and Le Dain JJ, concurred). 
67 [1999] 3 S. C. R 46. 
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above, when he did not rule out the possibility of saving a violation of section 7 by 
resorting to section 1, even if no exceptional conditions exist. However, the 
significance of this shift in position is limited, as his Lordship expressed the difficulty 
of justifying such violations under section 1. According to his Lordship, the difficulty 
is due to two factors. Firstly, the protected rights under section 7 (i. e., life, liberty and 
security of the person) are of considerable importance and, therefore, cannot be, save 
in exceptional circumstances, overridden by competing social interests. Secondly, it is 
difficult to imagine where an infringement of one of the rights protected by section 7, 
which does not accord with the principles of fundamental justice, could be reasonably 
justified in a free and democratic society as required by section 1.68 It is noteworthy 
that the Supreme Court thus far has not saved any violation of section 7 that does not 
accord with the principles of fundamental justice. 
The question regarding the relationship between section 1 and the right to be 
secure against unreasonable search and seizure enshrined in section 8, was first raised 
in Hunter v. Southam. b9 However, since the question was not necessary for the 
determination of the case, the Court left answering the question to another day. 
70 
Although the Supreme Court did not rule out the possibility of saving violations of the 
right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure, whether in fact it is possible 
to show that unreasonable searches or seizures are demonstrably justified is highly 
questionable, as so far arguments to that effect have been rejected. 71 
With regard to section 9, which prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, the 
Supreme Court has thus far subjected the relevant section to only one exception. In 
Hufsky, 71 the appellant, whose driving showed nothing unusual, was stopped at 
random in a spot check by the police. The spot check was carried out for the purposes 
of checking licences, insurance, the mechanical fitness of the cars, and the sobriety of 
the drivers with the only guideline being that at least one marked police vehicle be 
engaged in spot check duty. As the Supreme Court observed that the spot check 
required a brief stop, it held that the spot check was detention within the meaning of 
section 9.73 The Court stated that while the procedure was carried out for lawful 
68 Ibid. 92 (Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Major and Binnie JJ., concurred). 
69 [1984] 2 S. C. R 145. 
70 Ibid. 169-170. 
71 See, e. g., R. v. Duarte, [1990] 1 S. C. R. 30,56-57. 
72 [1988] 1 S. C. R. 621. 
73 Ibid. 631-632. 
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purposes authorised by s. 189a(1) of the Quebec Highway Traffic Act, R. S. O. 1980, c. 
198, it was nonetheless arbitrary in the sense that there were no criteria, standards, 
guidelines or procedures to determine which vehicles should be stopped. 74 As a result, 
the question to be addressed was whether such arbitrary statutorily permitted conduct 
was justified under section 1 of the Charter. 
After stressing the importance of highway safety as an objective of sufficient 
importance, the Court turned to the role that the random check procedure played in 
reinforcing the safety of the highway. The Court noted that as motor vehicle offences 
cannot be detected by mere observation of the drivers, the spot check procedure was 
the only measure capable of ensuring the safety of the highway. Therefore, the Court 
concluded that the procedure in question was demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society, within the meaning of section 1 of the Charter. 
75 It is noteworthy, 
however, that as the random stop procedure could be used in an arbitrary and 
discriminatory fashion, the Court has imposed upon the police certain limits to ensure 
that the power is used for purpose that is legislated for (i. e., the enforcement of 
highway safety). These limits, according to Cory J., who was speaking for the 
majority of the Supreme Court in R. v. Ladouceur, 76 are that: 
Officers can stop persons only for legal reasons, in this case reasons 
related to driving a car such as checking the driver's licence and insurance, 
the sobriety of the driver and the mechanical fitness of the vehicle. Once 
stopped the only questions that may justifiably be asked are those related 
to driving offences. Any further, more intrusive procedures could only be 
undertaken based upon reasonable and probable grounds. Where a stop is 
found to be unlawful, the evidence from the stop could well be excluded 
under s. 24(2) of the Charter. 77 
With regard to the rights of detainees, or those persons who are charged with a 
criminal offence, as enshrined in sections 10 and 11 respectively, to date, they have 
not be subjected to any restriction on the basis of s. 1 of the Charter. Finally, in 
relation to section 12, which prohibits cruel and unusual treatment, although it is 
theoretically subject to limitations by virtue of section 1, in practice it is difficult to 
imagine that the Supreme Court would allow any restrictions on such a fundamental 
74 Ibid. 632-633. 
75 Ibid. 637. 
76 [1990] 1 S. C. R. 1257. 
77 Ibid. p. 1287. It was subsequently adopted by the unanimous court in R. v. Mellenthin [1992] 3 
S. C. R. 615,628-629. 
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right. This proposition is based upon two considerations. Firstly, the Court has not yet 
considered any application for restricting such a right, let alone accepted a violation of 
it as a demonstrably justified limit in a free and democratic society. Secondly, the 
corresponding provisions in Article 7 of the ICCPR and Article 2(2) of the CAT, both 
of which Canada is a Member Party, recognise such a right as an absolute one, which 
cannot be subjected to any limitations, nor can it be derogated from. 
78 
C. Saudi Arabia 
4.5 Right to an effective remedy 
There is no general right to a remedy under Saudi law. However, according to Article 
6(2) of the Civil Procedure Code 2001,79 in conjunction with Article 188 of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure 2001 (CCP), it is within the jurisdiction of the trial court to 
review the legality of any procedural act taken during the course of the criminal 
proceedings. Hence, the accused is entitled to request the trial court to annul any 
procedural act taken during the pre-trial stage of the criminal process, if such an act 
violates his right(s) under Saudi law. The trial court shall annul such an act if it is 
'inconsistent with the principles of the Shari 'ah or the laws derived therefrom.... ' 80 
With regard to the effect of the annulment, the CCP determines that the procedural 
acts taken before or/and subsequent to the annulled act to be valid as long as they are 
not based on the annulled act. 81 Thus, a procedural act, which is taken on the basis of 
an annulled procedure, is invalid too. 82 
However, the Saudi criminal courts, in practice, do not engage in reviewing the 
legality of procedural acts taken during the pre-trial stage of the criminal process, with 
the exception of acts relating to confession evidence obtained by torture. The reason 
78 See Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2002] 1 S. C. R. 3, pp. 38-45. 
79 According to Article 6(2) of the Civil Procedure Code 2001, it is within the jurisdiction of the trial 
court to examine the legality of the actions taken in the case before it came to trial. It should be noted 
here that provisions of the Civil Procedure Code apply, in accordance with Article 221 of the CCP, 
when there are no provisions provided herein, and in matters that are not inconsistent with the nature 
of the criminal proceedings. ' 
so CCP. Art. 188. 
81 Ibid. Art. 191. 
82 The annulment provisions under the CCP have been drawn from the French criminal procedural law. 
For a discussion of the annulment proceedings under the French law, see generally Vogler, R, 
'Criminal Procedure in France', in Coinparative Criminal Procedure, ed. by J Hatchard, et al, (London: 
B. I. I. C. L., 1996), pp. 48-49; West, A, et al, The French Legal System, 2nd edn (London: Butterworths, 
1998), pp. 244,263. 
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advanced by Qadis for not conducting the legality review is that the CCP provisions 
with regard to annulment are vague. Hence, they cannot apply them until the 
implementing regulation of the CCP is issued in order to clarify the annulment 
provisions. 83 Another reason is that Qadis consider their role to be confined to what 
takes place in the court room. Therefore, the review of procedural irregularities 
committed during the pre-trial stage is considered to fall outside the jurisdiction of the 
trial court. 84 
That is not to say, however, that the accused, whose right(s) has been violated, 
cannot obtain a remedy at all, but rather that the accused has to resort to avenues other 
than the trial court, in order to obtain a remedy. Remedies available under Saudi law 
include the subjection of the official responsible for the violation of the accused's 
right(s) to disciplinary or criminal proceedings, the ordering of disclosure, the 
invalidation of law that is inconsistent with the accused's constitutional rights under 
the Shari'ah or/and the Basic Law of Government, and the exclusion of evidence 
obtained in violation of the accused's rights. These forms of remedy are discussed in 
the relevant sections. 
4.6 Permissible limitations on human rights 
Article 62 of the Basic Law of Government regulates the State's powers during a state 
of public emergency. It states that '[w]ithout prejudice to Article 7, [which states that 
"the regime derives its power from the Holy Quran and the Prophet's Sunnah. They 
are sovereign over this Law and other State Laws. "], no provision of this law 
whatsoever may be suspended unless it is temporary in a time of war or during the 
declaration of a state of emergency. This temporary suspension will be in accordance 
with the terms of the law. ' According to Article 61 of the Basic Law, the King is 
empowered to 'declare[] a state of emergency, general mobilisation and war.... ' Thus, 
Article 62, in essence, subjects the declaration of a state of emergency and emergency 
measures, as other provisions of the Basic Law, to the principles of the Islamic 
Shari'ah. As discussed in Chapter three, limitations on individual rights under the 
83 Interview with Qadi Tameem Al-Aunizan, Summary Court, Riyadh (July. 11-12,2004); interview 
with Qadi Muhammad Al Jaarallah, General Court, Riyadh (Aug. 2-3,2004); interview with Qadi 
Saleh Al-Aujri, General Court, Riyadh (Aug. 4,2004). 
u Ibid. 
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Shari'ah are only permitted where a necessity exists, and where the following 
conditions apply: 
" there must be good reasons to believe that a necessity actually exists; 
" acting on the basis of necessity must aim to protect a legitimate and 
substantial interest; 
" there is no other legitimate and less restrictive means by which the harm that 
will result from not acting in accordance with the necessity can be adequately 
dealt with; and 
" the measures that are taken on the basis of necessity must not exceed what is 
absolutely necessary to achieve the objective of acting on the basis of 
necessity. 85 
It is worth mentioning here that Article 62 of the Basic Law has never been invoked 
in practice in order to justify imposing extraordinary measures on human rights 
guaranteed under the Shari'ah and/or the Basic Law even when Saudi Arabia was 
subjected to an intensive terror campaign by Islamist extremists in 2003, which could 
have arguably justified the application of Article 62.86 
The question that arises is whether the courts have the power to review any 
measures, be they ordinary or emergency, to ensure their compliance with the 
constitution, and to strike them down if they are not. It is worth recalling first that the 
King in Saudi Arabia is empowered to enact regulations in areas where the Shari'ah 
does not provide explicit texts, on the prerequisites that these regulations serve the 
public interest and are guided by the general principles of the Shari'ah. This is clearly 
stated in Article 67 of the Basic Law, which states that 'the regulatory authority [i. e., 
the King) shall have the jurisdiction to enact regulations and bye-laws in order to 
attain welfare and avoid harm in the affairs of the State, in accordance with the 
general rules of Islamic Shari'ah. ' 
85 See supra para. 3.1. 
86 For a chronology of the terrorist attacks committed on Saudi soil by Islamic extremists since they 
started their terrorist campaign in May 2003, see BBC, Timeline: Saudi Attacks (6 December 2004), 
available at <http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/world/middle east/3760099. stm> (last visited Jan. 2,2006). 
For further discussion of the emergency provisions under the Saudi Basic Law, see Tarazi, A, 'Saudi 
Arabia's New Basic Laws: The Struggle for Participatory Islamic Government', Hal-v. Intl L. J., 34 
(1993), 258,264-265. 
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However, the courts, which are entrusted with applying the law, are empowered, 
theoretically speaking, to review any law and strike it down if it conflicts with the 
Islamic Shari'ah, which is, as previously discussed, the law of the land in Saudi 
Arabia. 87 This power can be inferred from Article 48 of the Basic Law, which states 
that '[t]he courts shall apply the rules of the Islamic Shari'ah in the cases that are 
brought before them, in accordance with what is indicated in the Book and the 
Sunnah, and laws decreed by the Ruler which do not contradict the Book or the 
Sunnah. ' As the courts have the power to refuse to apply any siyasa law that conflicts 
with the Islamic Shari'ah, this implies that, essentially, the courts have the power to 
review the consistency of any law with the Islamic Shari'ah in order to determine the 
constitutionality of such a law, first, and consequently determine whether to apply it 
or not in the case before it. 
In practice, however, the Shari'ah courts either choose to apply the siyasa laws or 
not on the basis of whether it within the jurisdiction of the ruler to enact these laws 
(i. e., matters which are to be regulated by siyasa laws), or whether they fall within the 
realm of filth, which should be left for judges to decide upon according to their 
ijtihad. 8ß Therefore, if the matters are considered to fall within the realm of siyasa, 
judges will not consider whether the law in question serves the public interest and/or 
is consistent with the Shari'ah general principles as required under Article 67 of the 
Basic Law. Additionally, the courts, as mentioned above, are only concerned with 
matters directly related to the court proceedings, as pre-trial matters are considered to 
fall outside the jurisdiction of the trial court. Hence, if a given law is not directly 
applicable to the court proceedings (e. g., deals with pre-trial matters), and such a law 
is allegedly deficient in meeting the constitutional conditions under Article 67 (i. e, the 
fulfilment of the public interest, and the compatibility with the Shari'ah general rules), 
there is no mechanism by which that law can be challenged before a judicial authority 
and consequently, if indeed found to be deficient, struck down. 89 
87 See supra para. 1.1. 
88 See supra para. 1.4. 
89 See Al-Qassem, A& AI-Nasri, A. 'al-Buniah al-Tashriaiah wa al-Qudaiah ft al-Mamlaka (The 




The Saudi and Canadian systems diverge and converge on a number of issues in terms 
of the scope of the protection they afford the accused during the pre-trial stage of the 
criminal process. In terms of convergence, the two systems consider the constitution 
(Canada, the Charter; Saudi Arabia, the Shari'ah), under which the rights of the 
accused are protected, to have supremacy over legislative bodies including the 
Parliament in Canada, and the King in Saudi Arabia. Thus, any state legislation has to 
conform to the constitution; otherwise, it will have no force or effect. In addition, 
under the two systems all constitutional rights and freedoms can be, theoretically 
speaking, restricted if certain conditions are met. Furthermore, the two systems adopt, 
in substance, the same requirements for limiting an individual right or freedom, 
namely, that the restriction must aim to secure a legitimate and substantial interest that 
could justify overriding an individual right, there is a direct link between the 
limitation measures and the objective sought, and that the limitation measures must 
constitute the least restrictive alternative available to the State. 
However, the two systems differ, in particular, in relation to the mechanism by 
which the constitutional compatibility of the State's legislations and actions relating to 
the pre-trial stage of the criminal process can be reviewed. While the Saudi law seems 
to entrust the courts with the task of reviewing the constitutionality of the state's 
legislations and actions, in practice the Saudi courts, for the reasons discussed above, 
do not exercise such a function. By contrast, the Supreme Court of Canada, relying 
upon the Charter, has created a mechanism by which the compatibility of any state's 
legislations or actions with the Charter can be impartially and independently 
reviewed, to declare its incompatibility, if it is indeed found to incompatible with the 
Charter, and to afford the accused a just and appropriate remedy in the light of the 
circumstances of the case. This difference is crucial, and its implications for the 
protection of the rights of the accused under the Saudi and the Canadian systems will 
become apparent from the discussions in following Chapters. 
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Chapter Five 
The Right Against Self-incrimination 
A. International human rights law 
5.1 Right against self-incrimination 
The right against self-incrimination is protected under the ICCPR through Article 7, 
which prohibits subjecting the accused to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment, whether it aims at the extraction of a confession from the accused or not, 
and through the privilege against self-incrimination and the presumption of innocence 
enshrined in Article 14. In the following sections the right against ill-treatment, the 
privilege against self-incrimination, the presumption of innocence and the remedy for 
violating them will be discussed. 
5.1.1 Right against ill-treatment 
Article 7 of the ICCPR states that 'no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. ' The right not to be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment aims to protect the inherent 
dignity and the physical and mental integrity of the individual. ' It is one of the most 
fundamental rights that the ICCPR seeks to protect. Hence, the right against torture 
and other forms of ill-treatment can be neither restricted during a public emergency 
that threatens the life of the nation, nor can it be subjected to any restrictions on 
grounds of public interest. The universal recognition of the significance of this right 
led to the adoption of specialised conventions with enforcement machinery designed 
solely to ensure its protection. 2 Under the auspices of the U. N, the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
1 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 20, Article 7 (Forty-fourth session, 1992), Compilation 
of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U. N. 
Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev. 1 at 30 (1994), para. I [hereinafter General Comment 20]. 
2 Including the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, adopted Dec. 9,1985 
(entered into force Feb. 28,1987); and the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted June. 26,1987 (entered into force Feb. 1, 
1989). 
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(CAT) was adopted in 1984.3 As of April 2004,136 States had ratified the CAT, 
including Saudi Arabia and Canada. 4 Under Article 17 of the CAT, the Committee 
against Torture (CT) was established to monitor the States Parties' compliance with 
the CAT provisions. The CT exercises its powers under the CAT through the 
reporting system, by which States Parties are obliged to submit periodical reports to 
the CT ,5 and through the individual communications system 
if the State Party 
concerned recognises the CT's competence to receive such communications. 
6 
Therefore, in determining the meaning and scope of Article 7 of the ICCPR, and 
the States Parties' obligations under it, in addition to considering the jurisprudence of 
the HRC, the CTA provisions and CT's jurisprudence will be taken into account, as 
the two documents and their enforcement mechanisms in respect of the right under 
consideration aim to achieve the same goal, which is to ensure its protection. 
5.1.1.1 Scope of Article 7 
Article 7 protects against four forms of ill-treatment: torture, and cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment. However, cruel and inhuman treatment has the same meaning in 
the context of Article 7.7 The main difference between the three forms of ill-treatment 
is the intensity of the pain inflicted. 8 While torture carries the strongest level of 
severity of the pain inflicted, cruel and inhuman treatment covers treatments which 
inflict less severe pain on the victim than that of torture, but more severe pain than 
that of degrading treatment, which carries the weakest level of the severity of pain 
inflicted on the victim. These forms of ill-treatment can be defined as follows: 
" Torture: '[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining 
from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an 
act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or 
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the 
3 Adopted Dec. 10,1984, G. A. Res. 39/46, U. N. GAOR 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at art. 4, U. N. Doc. 
A/39/51, (1985) (entered into force June 26,1987), available at <http: //www. ohchr. org/english/> (last 
visited Jan. 2,2006) [hereinafter CAT]. 
4 The status of ratifications of the CAT is available at <http: //www. ohchr. org/english/> (last visited 
Jan. 2,2006). 
s CAT, Art. 19. 
6 Ibid. Art. 21. 
7 Nowak, M, U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Strasbourg: N. P. Engel, 1993), p. 131. s Cf. Republic of Ireland v. The United Kingdom (1979-80) 2 E. H. R. R. 25, para. 172. 
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instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering 
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. '9 
" Inhuman or cruel treatment: A treatment that 'cause[s] severe suffering, mental 
or physical, which, in the particular circumstances, is unjustifiable'. 
10 
" Degrading treatment: A treatment that 'grossly humiliates [an individual] 
before others or drives him to act against his will or conscience. '" 
It should be noted, however, that the distinction between these forms of ill-treatment 
is, as correctly observed by the HRC, irrelevant for the purposes of determining 
whether a violation of Article 7 has occurred or not. Thus, in order to engage Article 
7, the alleged victim does not need to establish that the violation falls specifically 
within one of the three categories of prohibited treatment. Rather, it is sufficient to 
engage Article 7 by establishing that the suffering inflicted upon the alleged victim as 
a result of the alleged treatment that he/she has been subjected to reaches a minimum 
level of severity. 12 If the treatment passes the threshold test, the HRC will declare a 
violation of Article 7, without necessarily qualifying the ill-treatment as torture, or 
cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment. 13 
5.1.1.2 The State's obligations under Article 7 
Article 7 only prohibits ill-treatment without providing safeguards against such a 
treatment. However, the HRC's jurisprudence and the CAT impose on the State Party 
the duty to take certain steps to ensure the practical protection of Article 7, including, 
inter alia, the following: 
" criminalising all forms of ill-treatment and assigning appropriate penalties for 
offences of ill-treatment. '4 
" informing its population of the prohibition of all forms of ill-treatment within 
the meaning of Article 7. The aim of this obligation is to allow individuals to 
9 CAT, Art. 1(1). 
10 Greek Case, 12 YB 1 (1969), p. 186. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Vuolanne v. Finland, Communication No. 265/1987, U. N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/44/40) at 311 
(1989), para. 7.2. Cf. Republic of Ireland v. The United Kingdonº, supra not 8, para. 162. 
13 See General Comment 20, supra note 1, para. 4. See also Nowak, supra note 7, pp. 128-129. 
14 Ibid. para. 13. Article 4 in conjunction with Article 16(1) of the CAT adopts the same requirement 
but applies only to forms of ill-treatment which amount to torture, but not to acts which constitute 
inhuman or degrading treatment. 
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be aware of this fundamental right, which, consequently, enables them to 
challenge any practices that threaten to violate it. 15 
" Given that most acts of ill-treatment take place in detention, the State is 
obliged to put into place a system of safeguards to ensure that detention 
centres are not used for inflicting ill-treatment on detainees. In addition, the 
State must ensure that detention centres are free from any equipment or tools 
that are likely to be used for inflicting ill-treatment on detainees, and that 
detainees are not cut off from the outside world, by allowing them to be 
regularly visited by family members, lawyers, and physicians. 16 
" In order to discourage the use of ill-treatment as a means for obtaining 
confessions, the State is obliged to make confessions obtained through ill- 
treatment and in particular by torture, legally inadmissible as evidence in any 
judicial proceedings against the victim of the ill-treatment. 17 
5.1.2 The presumption of innocence and freedom from self- 
incrimination 
According to Article 14(2) of the ICCPR, any person charged with a criminal offence 
within the meaning of Article 14 is entitled to be presumed innocent until proven 
otherwise according to law. The presumption of innocence implies that the accuser 
(i. e., the State) bears the burden of proving the guilt of the accused according to law, 
and in the absence of such proof, the accused must be acquitted . 
18 Given that the State 
bears the burden of establishing the guilt of the accused, the State cannot compel the 
accused to provide evidence against himself. 19 The freedom from self-incrimination is 
also explicitly guaranteed by Article 14(3)(g) of the ICCPR. The specific aim of the 
freedom from self-incrimination is to ensure that the accused is not compelled, 
15 Ibid. para. 10. Cf. CAT, Art. 10 in conjunction with Art. 16(1). 
16 Ibid. para. 11. 
1' Ibid. para. 12. Also Article 15 in conjunction with Article 16(1) of the CAT adopts the same 
requirement but it applies only to confessions obtained by torture, but not to confessions obtained by 
inhuman or degrading treatment. 
18 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 13, Article 14 (Twenty-first session, 1984), 
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies, U. N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev. 1 at 14 (1994), para. 7 [hereinafter General Comment 13]. 
19 Cf Saunders v. United Kingdom (1997) 23 E. H. R. R. 313, para. 68. Cf also Cheney, D, et al, 
Criminal Justice and the Human Rights Act 1998,2nd edn (Bristol: Jordans, 2001), p. 84. 
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physically or psychologically, to provide evidence against himself. 20 In addition, as a 
result of the recognition of the presumption of innocence and the freedom of self- 
incrimination, the accused is entitled in the face of the accusation presented against 
him to remain silent, which also cannot be held as evidence of guilt. 21 
5.1.3 Remedies 
An alleged violation of Article 7 will trigger the State's duty to provide the alleged 
victim with an effective remedy. Providing an effective mechanism, by which 
complaints of ill-treatment are investigated, is considered indispensable for 
discharging the State's duty under Article 7 in conjunction with Article 2(3) (the right 
to an effective remedy) of the ICCPR. In order for the complaints mechanism to be 
considered effective, it must be administered by an independent and impartial 
authority. To meet the requirement of impartiality the investigating authority must be 
independent from the authority that allegedly violated an individual's Covenant right. 
Thus, in the view of the HRC, investigating violations of human rights allegedly 
committed by the police, by the police themselves does not provide an effective 
remedy within the meaning of Article 2(3). 22 With regard to the requirement of 
independence from the executive authority, the European Court held in Khan v. UK23 
that the English Police Complaints Authority lacked the required standards of 
independence to constitute an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 13 of 
the ECHR (Article 2(3) of the ICCPR). The European Court reached its conclusion by 
referring, in particular, to the fact that an executive body (the Home Secretary) can 
appoint, remunerate and dismiss members of the Police Complaints Authority; and 
that the Police Complaints Authority must pay due regard to the guidance issued to it 
by the Home Secretary regarding the withdrawal or preferring of disciplinary charges 
and criminal proceedings. 24 
20 Singarasa v. Sri Lanka, Communication No. 1033/2001, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/D/1033/2001 
(2004), para. 7.4. Cf. Saunders v. United Kingdom, supra note 19, para. 68. 
21 Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, U. N. Doc. CCPR/CO/73/UK (2001), para. 17. Cf. Funke v. France (1993) 16 
E. H. R. R. 297, para. 44; Saunders v. United Kingdom, supra note 19, para. 69. But see Murray v. 
United Kingdom (1996) 22 E. H. R. R. 29; Condron v. United Kingdom (2001) 31 E. H. R. R. 1, in which 
the European Court held that, provided there are appropriate safeguards in place, drawing adverse 
inference from silence does not violate the right to a fair hearing under Article 6 of ECHR. 
22 Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, Hong Kong, U. N. Doc. A/50/40, paras. 
408-435 (1995), para. 11. 
23 (2001) 31 E. H. R. R. 45. 
24 Ibid. paras. 45-47. 
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Furthermore, for a system to meet the effectiveness requirement within the 
meaning of Article 2(3), it must confer on those individuals, who have been allegedly 
subjected to ill-treatment, the legal right to lodge a complaint to the competent 
authority. The competent authority is in turn required to investigate the complaint 
promptly, whenever there are reasonable grounds to believe that an act of ill- 
treatment has taken place. However, that does not mean that the victim needs to lodge 
a formal complaint against the alleged ill-treatment in order to trigger the State's duty 
to carry out an investigation into the alleged incident of ill-treatment. Rather, the 
State's duty is engaged once the alleged victim brings the facts of his treatment to the 
attention of the State authorities. 25 Failing to provide such a system constitutes, on its 
own, a violation of the right to an effective remedy under Article 2(3). 26 If the 
investigation of the alleged violation of Article 7 reveals that the allegations are well- 
founded, the persons responsible must be prosecuted, and, if found guilty, punished 
appropriately. Again, failure to do so constitutes, on its own, a violation of the right to 
an effective remedy. 27 
Finally, the victim of a violation of Article 7 must be granted appropriate redress, 
including compensation and rehabilitation. 28 Whether admitting evidence obtained 
through ill-treatment will violate the right to an effective remedy is unclear from the 
HRC's jurisprudence. However, as pointed out earlier, the State is obliged under 
Article 7 to make statements obtained by maltreatment legally inadmissible as 
evidence. Thus, admitting such statements will definitely violate Article 7. In 
addition, the HRC has stated explicitly that in order to protect the freedom from self- 
incrimination guaranteed under Article 14(3)(g) and the freedom from torture or 
cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment guaranteed under Article 7 of the ICCPR, the 
law should require evidence obtained through any form of compulsion, whether it 
amounted to a violation of Article 7 or not, to be excluded. 29 If the voluntariness of 
25 Cf. Abad v. Spain, Communication No. 59/1996, U. N. Doc. CAT/C/20/D/59/1996 (1998) (CAT), 
? aras. 8.6 & 9. 
G Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States 
Parties to the Covenant, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add. 13 (2004), para. 15: General Comment 20, 
supra note 1, para. 14. See also supra para. 4.1.2. Cf. CAT, Arts. 12-13 in conjunction with Art. 16(1). 
57 also Aksoy v. Turkey (1997) 23 E. H. R. R. 553, paras. 97-98. 
Ibid. para. 18. 
28 General Comment 20, supra note 1, para. 14. Cf. ACT, Art 14 in conjunction with Article 16. Cf. 
also Dzentajl et a!. v. Yugoslavia, Communication No. 161/2000, U. N. Doc. CAT/C/29/D/161/2000 
(2002) (CAT), para. 9.6. 
29 General Comment 13, supra note 18, para. 14. 
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the confession is disputed by the accused, the State, according to the Committee, 
bears the burden of establishing that the incriminating evidence has been obtained 
voluntarily. 30 
B. Canada 
5.2 Right against self-incrimination 
The right against self-incrimination is protected in Canada through s. 12 of the 
Charter, which prohibits subjecting the accused to any cruel or unusual treatment; the 
privilege against self-incrimination, which is recognised under the common law; and 
the right to silence, which has been recognised as a principle of fundamental justice 
under section 7 of the Charter. The remedy for violating the right not to be subjected 
to ill-treatment or/and the principle against self-incrimination is represented in the 
exclusion of evidence under the common law voluntary confession rule, and the 
institution of disciplinary or criminal proceedings against the violator of the Charter 
right(s). These issues are treated separately in the following sections. 
5.2.1 Right against ill-treatment 
Section 12 of the Charter states that '[e]veryone has the right not to be subjected to 
any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. ' To the best of this writer's 
knowledge, in no case has section 12 been invoked by an accused to challenge the 
way in which he has been treated by the state authority in the context of the criminal 
justice system, or to have his confession excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter. In 
addition, under Section 269.1 of the Canadian Criminal Code torture constitutes a 
criminal offence punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen 
years. 31 According to Section 269.2 of the Criminal Code, torture is defined as: 
[A]ny act or omission [by an "official, or [any] person acting at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of an official"32] by 
which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person 
(a) for a purpose including 
(i) obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a 
statement, 
30 Singarasa v. Sri Lanka, supra note 20, para. 7.4; Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Committee, Romania, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. l 11 (1999), para. 13. 
31 The discussion of torture under Canadian law draws upon Macdougall, D, 'Torture in Canadian 
Criminal Law', CR., (6th) 24 (2005), 74. 
32 Criminal Code, s. 269.1. 
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(ii) punishing the person for an act that the person or a third person has 
committed or is suspected of having committed, and 
(iii) intimidating or coercing the person or a third person, or 
(b) for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, 
but does not include any act or omission arising only from, inherent in or 
incidental to lawful sanctions. 
With regard to incriminating statements obtained under torture, Article 269(4) of the 
Criminal Code makes such statements 'inadmissible in evidence, except as evidence 
that the statement was so obtained. ' It is also worth pointing out that other offences 
under the Criminal Code cover acts that might fail to engage Section 269 of the 
Criminal Code, such as assault, assault causing bodily harm, aggravated assault, 
murder, administering a noxious substance, extortion, and intimidation. The Canadian 
courts have not elaborated on the offence of torture because, as mentioned above, the 
courts have not faced cases in which a torture offence during the criminal proceedings 
has been allegedly committed. 33 
5.2.2 Privilege against self-incrimination & the right to silence 
The privilege against self-incrimination is a common law rule that entitles the accused 
to the right not be compelled to testify against himself. This principle confers on the 
accused the right to remain silent, which was previously limited to the trial stage. 
However, since the introduction of the Charter and by virtue of section 7, the 
Supreme Court extended the right to remain silent to the pre-trial stage. 34 The leading 
authority on the right to silence in the Charter era is Hebert. 35 In this case, the 
Supreme Court considered the admissibility of incriminating statements made by an 
accused, who was in custody, to an undercover officer posing as a cell mate, 
subsequent to his refusal to answer the police questions regarding his alleged 
involvement in an armed robbery, as his counsel advised him. The Court unanimously 
held that the statements were obtained in violation of the right to silence enshrined in 
section 7 as a principle of fundamental justice, and, hence, decided the statements 
should be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter. 
With regard to the scope of the right to silence, the Court asserted that the essence 
of the right is to grant the accused the choice of whether to speak to the authorities or 
not as the right is not designed to shield the accused from the investigation, but is 
33 Macdougall, supra note 31, p. 76. 
34 R. v Hebert, [1990] 2 S. C. R. 151; R v. Broyles, [1991] 3 S. C. R. 595. 
35 Ibid. 
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mainly concerned with preventing the authorities from compelling the accused to 
provide them with involuntarily statements, which are commonly damaging to their 
defence. 36 Therefore, the police must allow the accused to make an informed decision 
as to whether to exercise his right to silence or not, by allowing him to obtain legal 
assistance and by not tricking or forcing him to speak. As the Supreme Court stated: 
The Charter ... seeks to ensure that the suspect 
is in a position to make an 
informed choice by giving him the right to counsel. The guarantee of the 
right to counsel in the Charter suggests that the suspect must have the 
right to choose whether to speak to the police or not, but it equally 
suggests that the test for whether that choice has been violated is 
essentially objective. Was the suspect accorded his or her right to consult 
counsel? By extension, was there other police conduct which effectively 
deprived the suspect of the right to choose to remain silent, thus negating 
the purpose of the right to counsel? 37 
In R. v. Chambers38 the Supreme Court considered the proposition of modifying the 
right to silence by allowing an inference to be drawn from the silence of the accused 
in the face of police questioning. However, the Court rejected such a proposition and 
stated that it was 'a snare and a delusion' to inform the accused that he does not have 
to say anything when questioned, but nonetheless allow the fact that the accused 
exercised his right to silence to be put in evidence. 39 
5.2.3 Remedies 
Under Canadian law, two forms of remedies are available to an individual, whose 
rights not to incriminate himself and/or not to be subjected to ill-treatment have been 
allegedly violated. These remedies, namely, are the exclusion of confession evidence 
that has been involuntary obtained, and to have the official responsible for the 
36 Ibid. 175. 
37 Ibid. 177. 
38 [1990] 2 S. C. R. 1293. 
39 Ibid. 1317. The right to silence in the pre-trial stage in England was modified by the Criminal Justice 
and Public Order Act 1994. Section 34 allows a jury or magistrate to draw inference as appears proper 
from the accused's failure to mention, when questioned by the police, a fact relied upon in his defence, 
if the fact is one, in the light of the circumstances of the case, which the accused could be reasonably 
expected to mention. In addition, ss. 36 and 37 allow respectively an adverse inference to be drawn 
from the accused failure to give an explanation for objects, substances, or mark on him or in his 
possession or at the place where he was arrested, or from his failure to explain his presence at a 
particular place. This modification has been tightened by the fact that the European Court held that an 
adverse inference should not be drawn before the accused is given an opportunity to obtain legal 
advice, which led to the amendments of ss. 34,36 and 37 by the virtue of s. 58 the Youth Justice and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1999, in order to comply with the Convention's requirement. For a discussion 
of the modification of the right to silence under the English law and its implications under the ECHR, 
see Cheney, supra note 19, para. 3.7; Sanders, A& Young, R, Criminal Justice, 2nd edn (London: 
Butterworths, 2000), p. 251. 
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violation(s) to be subjected to disciplinary or criminal proceedings. These forms of 
remedies are discussed next. 
5.2.3.1 The voluntary confession rule 
The confession rule in its current state, according to the Supreme Court in Oickle, 
40 is 
concerned mainly with voluntariness, and therefore in cases where it is found that the 
confession is involuntarily supplied, the confession will be consequently ruled 
inadmissible. 41 In addition, it was stated that the objective of the confession rule is to 
strike an appropriate balance between, on the one hand, the interest of the accused not 
to make involuntary incriminating statements against himself, and, on the other hand, 
the interest of the public in investigating and solving crimes. 42 
Furthermore, the Court held, contrary to its previous holding in Hebert, 43 that the 
voluntary confession rule is a matter of common law rule, and, therefore, it is not 
based upon the Charter rights including the right to silence and the privilege against 
self-incrimination. This approach, as pointed out by the Court, has certain advantages 
for the accused including the application of the rule whenever the accused is 
questioned by a person in authority, as opposed to the Charter's requirements, which 
only come into play under, for example, ss. 7 and 10, when the accused has been 
deprived of his liberty by an arrest or detention. In addition, as a common law rule, 
the voluntary confession rule requires the Crown to establish the voluntariness of the 
confession beyond reasonable doubt, in contrast to the Charter which requires the 
individual, in order to obtain a remedy under s. 24 of the Charter, to establish on the 
balance of probabilities that his Charter right has been infringed. Finally, a violation 
of the confession rule will always result in the confession being excluded, while 
evidence coming under s. 24(2) of the Charter will only be excluded if the Court 
concludes that the admission of evidence would bring the administration of justice 
into disrepute. 44 
The Court identified four categories for the purposes of the voluntary confession 
rule: threats or promises, oppression, operating mind and 'other police trickery'. In 
determining whether the confession was voluntary or not in the first three categories, 
the determinative factor is the impact that these factors actually had on the will of the 
40 [2000] 2 S. C. R. 3. 
41 Ibid. p. 31. 
42 Ibid. p. 26. 
43 Supra note 34. 44 Oickle, supra note 40,24-25. 
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accused. The Court has stressed that any confession obtained by threats or promises, 
will lead automatically to the exclusion of such a confession. However, the use of the 
so-called moral or spiritual inducement is distinct as the police officer does not 
possess control over the suggested benefit, and therefore, if such inducement led the 
accused to confess, this confession cannot be contended to be involuntary. 
45 
Oppression could also lead the accused to confess, not because he wants to do so, 
but mainly to escape the aggressive atmosphere in which he is being questioned. 
Depriving a suspect from contacting the outside world for a long time without 
reasonable justification, denying him access to counsel, depriving him of food, 
sanitation, and sleep, and questioning him for endless hours are all factors that could 
amount to oppression, and which could render the confession involuntary and 
consequently inadmissible as evidence. 46 Regarding the requirement of the possession 
of an operating mind, the Court adopted the criteria suggested in Whittle, 47 which 
require the accused, in order for his confession to meet the voluntariness requirement, 
to possess the 'knowledge of what [he] is saying and that he is saying it to police 
officers who can use it to his detriment. 48 
In the case of the police trickery category, the overriding concern, according to 
the Court, is the integrity of the administration of justice, and therefore, the test of 
whether the evidence should be excluded or not will depend on the court's assessment 
of whether the admission of the evidence will bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute. Regarding the test upon which the administration of justice would be 
determined to have been brought into disrepute or not by the admission of evidence 
obtained through police tricks, the Court adopted the approach suggested by Lamer J. 
as he then was, in Rothman, 49 which is whether the trick is such as to shock the 
community. 50 Therefore, if the tactics used by the police are likely to shock the 
community, the confession must be excluded. 51 
The Court stressed the importance of videotaping police interviews as a means for 
minimising the occurrence of miscarriages of justice based upon involuntary 
confessions. Videotaping police interviews could discourage the police from adopting 
as Ibid. pp. 36-37. 
46 Ibid. pp. 38-39. 
47 [1994] 2 S. C. R 914,936. 
48 Ibid. 936. 
49 [1981) 1 S. C. R. 640. 
so Ibid. p. 697. 
51 Oickle, supra note 40,41-42. 
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illegal means of obtaining an involuntary confession, and allow the courts to 
supervise police practices. In addition, it could also protect police officers from 
allegations of misconduct made by the accused against them. Despite accepting the 
benefits of videotaping, the Court declined to hold non-recorded confessions 
inadmissible as evidence. 52 It should be noted though that provisional courts are 
heading towards requiring the electronic recording of confession evidence as a 
prerequisite for its admission. 53 In addition, it is the standard practice followed by 
police forces around Canada to videotape statements made by the accused in the 
police station, at least in serious offences. 54 
5.2.3.2 Complaints against the police 
The police in Canada are organised on a provincial and federal basis. Here only the 
complaint mechanism against the provincial police in Ontario will be presented, in 
order to illustrate how complaints against the police in Canada are dealt with. There 
are two different mechanisms under the Ontario Police Services Act 1990 (PSA), 
55 as 
amended by Bill 105,56 which deal with complaints against the conduct of police 
officers, depending on the nature of the alleged misconduct. The first mechanism 
deals with complaints relating to an alleged misconduct committed by a police officer 
in violation of the Ontario Police Code of Conduct, while the second mechanism deals 
with complaints that relate to criminal offences allegedly committed by police officers 
and which resulted in 'serious injuries' or death. These two mechanisms are discussed 
next. 
5.2.3.2.1 Disciplinary misconduct 
Complaints against the alleged misconduct of police officers are investigated by the 
municipal chief of police, 57 under the oversight of the Ontario Civilian Commission 
on Police Services (OCCPS). The OCCPS is an arm's length, quasi-judicial agency of 
52 Ibid. 30-3 1. 
s3 The Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Ahmed, Ont. C. A. (2002), para. 14, stated the following: 
Although the most recent case law from the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Oickle (2000), 
... and from this court in Moore-McFarlane has stated that it is not necessarily fatal if the 
police do not record a confession, recording is not only the better practice, but in most 
circumstances, the failure to record will render the confession suspect. 
54 FPT Heads of Prosecution Committee, Report of the Working Group on the Prevention of 
Miscarriages of Justice (2004), pp. 68-71, available at 
<http: //canada justice. gc. ca/en/dept/pub/hop/toc. html> (last visited Jan. 2,2006). 
55 R. S. O. 1990, c. P. 15 [hereinafter PSA]. 
56 An Act to renew the partnership between the Province, Municipalities and the Police and to enhance 
community safety, S. O. 1997, c. 8. 57 PSA, s. 60(4). 
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the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services. 58 Members of the 
OCCPS are appointed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council. 59 In addition to its 
review role during the complaints process, as discussed below, the OCCPS, inter alia, 
is empowered, on its own motion, 'to investigate, inquire into and report on the 
conduct ... of a police officer, a municipal chief of police, an auxiliary member of 
a 
police force, a special constable, a municipal law enforcement officer or a member of 
a board .0 Furthermore, the OCCPS 
is empowered under s. 73(1) of PSA on its own 
motion and at any stage in the complaints process 'to direct a chief of police ... to 
process a complaint as it specifies or assign the review or investigation of a complaint 
or the conduct of a hearing in respect of a complaint to a police force other than the 
police force in respect of which the complaint is made. ' 
Any member of the public is entitled to make a complaint about the conduct of a 
police officer. 61 A complaint can be delivered to the station or the detachment of the 
police force, to which the complaint relates, or to the OCCPS, personally by the 
complainant or his/her representative, or via mail, or telephone transmission of a 
facsimile. 62 If the complaint has been made to the OCCPS, the complaint must be 
referred to the chief of the police force to which the complaint relates. 63 
The chief of police on receiving a complaint has to determine within thirty days 
from receiving the complaint, 64 the nature of the complaint, that is to say whether it 
relates to the policies and the services of the police force, or to the conduct of a police 
officer. 65 If he determines that the complaint relates to the conduct of a police officer, 
he shall set up an investigation into the complaint and the investigation is to be 
reported in a written report . 
66 If, however, the chief declines to investigate the 
complaint because it relates to the policies or services of the force; the complaint is 
unsubstantiated; the complaint is frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith; the 
5g Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services, Annual Report 2004 (Toronto: Ontario Civilian 
Commission on Police Services, 2005), p. 5, available at <http: //www. occps. ca> (last visited Jan. 2, 
2006). 
59 PSA, s. 21(2). 
6° Ibid. s. 25(1)(a). The Commission, according to s. 25(1)(c) of the PSA, 'shall communicate its report 
of an investigation ... to the Solicitor General at his or her request and to the 
board or council at its 
request, and may communicate the report to any other person as the Commission considers advisable. ' 
61 Ibid. s. 56(1). 
62 Ibid. s. 57(2). 
63 Ibid s. 57(4). 
64 Ibid. s. 59(2). 
65 Ibid. s. 59(1). 
66 Ibid. s. 64(1). 
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complaint was made six months after the alleged conduct had occurred; or because 
the complainant was not directly affected by the alleged conduct, the chief must notify 
the complainant of his decision, and his right to appeal to the OCCPS within thirty 
days of being notified of the chiefs decision. 67 
If the complainant appeals against the chiefs decision to the OCCPS, the OCCPS 
shall 'endeavour to complete its review', without conducting a hearing, within thirty 
days of receiving the appeal. 68 The OCCPS, upon the completion of its review, 'may 
confirm the decision [of the chief of police] or may direct [him/her] ..., to process the 
complaint as it specifies or may assign the review or investigation of the complaint or 
the conduct of a hearing in respect of the complaint to a police force other than the 
police force in respect of which the complaint is made. 69 The decision of the OCCPS 
on this matter is final and binding. 70 
If the chief, at any time before or during an investigation into a complaint, 
considers the conduct complained of not to be of a serious nature, the chief has the 
discretion to resolve the complaint informally, if the parties to the complaint consent 
to the proposed resolution. 71 However, if an informal resolution has been attempted 
but failed, the chief of police is empowered to impose the penalty of forfeiture of not 
more than three days pay on the officer in question, without holding a hearing into the 
complaint, if the police officer accepts the proposed penalty. If the police officer in 
question does not consent to such a resolution, a hearing into the complaint must be 
held. 72 If the complainant does not agree with the chiefs determination that the 
conduct is not of a serious nature, he is entitled to appeal to the OCCPS. 73 
On the other hand, if the chief, at the conclusion of the investigation and after 
reviewing the written report submitted to him, concludes that the police officer may 
have committed a misconduct, he shall hold a hearing into the matter. 74 The chief of 
police may conduct the hearing himself, or may authorise a police officer, a former 
police officer of the rank of inspector or higher, a judge, or a former judge who has 
67 Ibid. ss. 59(2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7); 72(1), (2)(3), (4), (5). 
68 Ibid s. 72(7). 
69Ibid. s. 72(8) 
70 Ibid. s. 72(12) 
71 Ibid. S. 58(1). 
72 Ibid. s. 64(15 (1), (2), (3)). 
73 Ibid. s. 72(5). The appeal will be reviewed in the same manner as the appeal against the chiefs of the 
police decision not to investigate a complaint, as discussed above, is reviewed. 
? s. 64(7). 
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retired from office, to conduct the hearing. 75 The parties to the hearing are, the 
prosecutor, (who is a police officer of a rank equal to or higher than that of the police 
officer subject to the hearing, a legal counsel or an agent), appointed by the chief, the 
police officer under investigation, and the complainant. 76 The parties to the hearing 
must be given reasonable notice of the hearing, and each party is entitled to be 
represented by a counsel or an agent in the hearing. 77 Parties to the hearing must be 
given an opportunity to examine evidence and reports before the hearing. 
78 The oral 
evidence given at the hearing must be recorded. 79 If, at the conclusion of the hearing, 
the chief determines that a misconduct or unsatisfactory work performance is proved 
on clear and convincing evidence, the chief can impose on the police officer subject to 
the complaint any of the following penalties: 
(a) dismiss the police officer from the police force; 
(b) direct that the police officer be dismissed in seven days unless he or 
she resigns before that time; 
(c) demote the police officer, specifying the manner and period of the 
demotion; 
(d) suspend the police officer without pay for a period not exceeding 30 
days or 240 hours, as the case may be; 
(e) direct that the police officer forfeit not more than three days or 24 
hours pay, as the case may be; or 
(f) direct that the police officer forfeit not more than 20 days or 160 hours 
off, as the case may be. 8o 
A police officer is guilty of misconduct if he, inter alia: 81 
" used profane, abusive or insulting language that relates to a person's 
race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, 
sex, sexual orientation, age, marital status, family status or handicap; 
" is found guilty of an indictable criminal offence or a criminal offence 
punishable upon summary conviction, 
" without good and sufficient cause, makes an unlawful or unnecessary 
arrest, or 
" uses any unnecessary force against a prisoner or other person 
contacted in the execution of duty. 82 
75 Ibid. s. 76(1) 
76 Ibid. ss. 64(8), 69(3). 
77 Ibid. s. 69(4). 
78 Ibid. s. 69(5), (6). 
79 Ibid. s. 69(11). 
8° Ibid. s. 68(1). 
81 Ibid. s. 74(1)(a). 
82 Code of Conduct, 0. Reg. 123/98, s. 2 (1)(ii), 2(1)(ix), 2(1)(g). 
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The decision of the chief regarding the finding of misconduct or unsatisfactory work 
performance, or otherwise, can be appealed against to the OCCPS by either the 
complainant or the police officer subject to the complaint within thirty days of 
receiving notice of the chief's decision after the hearing. 83 If an appeal has been made, 
the OCCPS shall conduct a hearing into the appeal. The OCCPS after conducting the 
hearing, 'may confirm, vary or revoke the decision being appealed or may substitute 
its own decision for that of the chief .... '84 
An appeal against the decision of the 
OCCPS can be made in the Divisional Court, within thirty days of receiving the 
notice of the OCCPS's decision. 85 
5.2.3.2.2 Criminal offences resulting in 'serious injuries' or death 
The Special Investigations Unit (SIU), established under the PSA, is responsible for 
investigating criminal offences, which are allegedly committed by police officers, and 
which resulted in 'serious injuries' or the death of a citizen. 86 The SIU consists of a 
director, who is a civilian appointed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council on the 
recommendation of the Solicitor General, and investigators, who cannot be serving 
police officers. 97 The SIU has the jurisdiction to investigate, on its own motion, any 
alleged criminal offences committed by a police officer, which result in 'serious 
injuries' or death. 
According to Mr. Justice Osler, the first director of the SIU, 'serious injuries' 
within the meaning of the PSA, include: 
[T]hose [injuries] that are likely to interfere with the health or comfort of 
the victim and are more than merely transient or trifling in nature and will 
include serious injury resulting from sexual assault. "Serious injury" shall 
initially be presumed when the victim is admitted to hospital, suffers a 
fracture to a limb, rib or vertebrae or to the skull, suffers burns to a major 
portion of the body or loses any portion of the body or suffers loss of 
vision or hearing, or alleges sexual assault. Where a prolonged delay is 
likely before the seriousness of the injury can be assessed, the Unit should 
be notified so that it can monitor the situation and decide its 
involvement. 88 
83 PSA. s. 70(1), (2), (3). 
84lbid. s. 70(6) 
85 Ibid. s. 71(1). For further discussion of the police complaints system, see Usage, P, Report on the 
Police Complaint System in Ontario (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 2005), available at 
<http: //www. attorne aýX2 jLis. t ov. on. ca/enRlisli/about/pubs>(last visited Jan. 2,2006). 
86 Ibid. s. 113(1), (5) 
87 Ibid. s. 113(2), (3). 
88 As quoted in Adams, G, Review Report on the Special Investigations Unit Reforms Prepared for the 
Attorney General of Ontario (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 2003), p. 32 [hereinafter 
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Chiefs of the police forces, where they reasonably believe that an offence has been 
committed by a police officer and has resulted in 'serious injuries' or death, are 
required to report such an incident to the SIU. 89 Members of the police forces are 
required to 'co-operate fully with the members of the [SIU] in the conducting of 
investigations. '90 The director of the SIU, if he has reasonable grounds to do so, may 
lay criminal charges, which are to be prosecuted in criminal courts, against any officer 
who is allegedly involved in the incident being investigated. 91 
C. Saudi Arabia 
5.3 Right against self-incrimination 
Prior to the introduction of the CCP, the use of coercion in order obtain confession 
evidence from suspected criminals was permitted under the Saudi criminal procedure 
if permission to use coercion was obtained from the Ministry of Interior. A Directive 
from the Minster of Interior stated the following: 
We have received information that officers from the Police, the Anti-Drug 
Police Department and Customs, extract confessions from suspects 
through torture by hitting them by canes and electric cables without 
obtaining a permission from us or showing the suspect to a doctor 
beforehand as [our] instructions dictate, which makes innocent suspects 
confess to what they had been accused of because of the physical pain that 
they are suffering; that suspects are being threatened when they are sent to 
courts in order to confirm their confessions not to refuse to do so, 
otherwise they would be beaten up again; and degrading them by these 
methods. In order to investigate these allegations, a committee has been 
established ..., which confirmed the existence of 
these practices. 
We inform you that the instructions and the orders from the higher 
authority stress that harshness cannot not be used against suspects, and 
according to the decision of the Supreme Judicial Council No. 18 in 
6/1/1396 [18 January 1976] that [the use of harshness] is inconsistent with 
what [true] Muslim should be like, who has mercy on his fellow brothers 
even if they had been convicted of committing crimes.... Even if the 
accused confesses under torture, such a confession is inadmissible in 
Review Report], available at <http: //www attorneyeeneral. jus. gov. on. ca/english/about/pubs>(Iast 
visited Jan. 2,2006). 
89 Ibid. p. 31. 
90 PSA. s. 113(9). 
91 Ibid. s. 113(7). For further discussion of the SIU, see Landau, T, 'Back to the Future: The Death of 
Civilian Review of Public Complaints Against the Police in Ontario, Canada', in Civilian Oversight of 
Policing: Governance, Democracy, and Human Rights, ed. by L Goldsmith and C Lewis, (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2000), 77-78. 
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courts and cannot form the basis for judicial decisions. Hence, obtaining 
confessions from suspects should be done by conducting thorough 
investigation, confronting the accused with the evidence against him, and 
complying with what has been mentioned above ... anyone who violates 
these instructions will be punished severely. 92 
In addition, a Prime Ministerial Order stated that 'confessions must not be obtained by 
the use of torture, because torture makes the suspect confess even if he did not 
commit the crime that he is accused of. [Confessions should be obtained through] 
conducting a thorough investigation, and if the need arise to [torture the accused in 
order to make him confess], it must not be done without our permission. We have 
noticed in many cases that torture have been used to force the accused to confess and 
that is impermissible, except ifpermission from us has been obtained.... '93 
The use of torture on the basis of permission from the higher authority under the 
previous criminal procedure was based upon the minority Muslim scholars' opinion, 
discussed in Chapter three, which permits the use of torture where there is 
circumstantial evidence against the accused indicating that he has committed the 
offence of which he is accused, and that the accused is considered to be immoral (i. e., 
a persistent criminal). 94 This can be seen from what the Handbook of Criminal 
Procedure95 stated in this respect: 
Although the jurists of the Islamic Shari'ah permit inflicting on the 
accused some harshness to make him speak the truth, as al-Mawardi in al- 
Ahkain al-Sultaniah, Ibn Taymiyya in al-Siyasa al-Shar'iyya, and Ibn al- 
Qayyim in al-Turuq a1-Hukmiyya make clear, nonetheless the Ministry [of 
the Interior] takes care that none of this occurs without its permission, an 
exhaustive study of the matter by the specialists of the Ministry, existence 
of proofs and strong circumstantial evidence of the truth of the accusation, 
and the accusation being one of major crime like murder, theft, 
brigandage, rape, abduction, and drug-dealing. 96 
However, since the introduction of the CCP, the use of coercion for any purpose is 
prohibited by virtue of Article 2 of the CCP, which states, inter alia, that '[a]n arrested 
person shall not be subjected to any bodily or moral harm. Similarly, he shall not be 
92 Directive of the Minister of Interior No. 16/10708 (2 August 1989). 
93 Prime Ministerial Order No. 4/5716 (15 January 1986). 
94 See supra para. 3.3. 
95 Issued by the Ministry of Interior in 1980. It should be noted that the Handbook is not a statute, but 
rather collection of Council of Ministers Orders, Ministerial Order and directives that were collected in 
one dossier for easy reference. 
96 Ibid. p. 64. The translation is from Vogel, F, Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia 
(Boston: Brill, 2000), p. 239. 
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subjected to any torture or degrading treatment. ' In addition, Article 102 of the CCP 
states that '[t]he interrogation shall be conducted in a manner that does not affect the 
will of the accused in making his statements. The accused shall not be ... subjected to 
any coercive measures. ' 
It should be noted here that the use of coercion to obtain confession evidence 
prior to the introduction of the CCP was, as a general rule prohibited, as can be seen 
from above quoted directives. This is supported by the fact that torture was and still is 
criminalised under Article 2(8) of the Royal Decree No. 43 (1958). Article 2(8) states 
that '[a]nyone who mistreats [the public], abuses their official powers by torturing ..., 
violating personal liberties ... ' 
is guilty of a criminal offence and liable to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, or a maximum fine of twenty 
thousands riyals (approximately £3000). Thus, the effect of the CCP with regard to 
the use of coercion for the purposes of obtaining confession evidence is to extend the 
prohibition of coercion to those situations where torture could be used with the 
permission of the Ministry of Interior. 
Nonetheless, even after the introduction of the CCP, in practice there are still 
widespread allegations of torture. Almost in every case where a confession is used as 
evidence against the defendant, the defendant alleges that he had been subjected to 
torture in order to make him confess. How many of these allegations are true cannot 
be verified. However, the above quoted directives indicate that the phenomenon of 
using torture for the purposes of obtaining confessions, even without the permission 
of the Ministry of Interior, was very widespread prior to the introduction of the CCP. 
Thus, the question arises whether the phenomenon of coercing the accused to confess 
still exists even after the introduction of the CCP. 
The present researcher during his two visits to the Anti-Drug Police Department 
saw a tool, which, in the form it was, could be used only for beating suspects. In the 
first visit, there was what Saudis call an iqal, which is made of rubber (although it is 
mainly designed as an item of menswear, it is commonly used by Saudis during 
fights, or by fathers to discipline their children), on the chair next to the one that the 
investigator was sitting on during his interrogation of two suspects. 97 In the second 
visit, an iqal was on the floor of the hallway leading to the interrogation rooms. 98 The 
97 Observation, interrogation by Investigator Anonymous, H. R. [Pseudonym. ], Anti-Drug Police Department, Riyadh (June. 14,2004). Observation, Anti-Drug Police Department, Riyadh (Aug. 18,2004). 
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existence of an instrument of beating in an interrogation room and in plain view, 
where suspects are being interrogated, suggests that suspects, who are held in the 
Detention Centre of the Anti-Drug Police Department, are routinely beaten at the 
discretion of the investigator in order to make them confess. 99 
It is noteworthy that the present researcher has observed a number of 
interrogations that have been conducted in the building of the IPPC Branch in Riyadh, 
and, although during one of them some intimidating tactics (e. g., threats and pushing) 
were used, 100 in no interrogation was the suspect beaten by the investigator. 101 This 
could be due to, inter alia, the fact that it is almost impossible for an investigator to 
beat a suspect in the building of the IPPC without other people in the building, 
including police officers, investigators, and members of the public, finding out as a 
result of the accused screaming or their seeing some marks on the accused after he 
leaves the interrogation room, which indicate that he was beaten during the 
interrogation. 
Under Article 102 of the CCP, the accused must not be interrogated outside the 
relevant IPPC Branch, except where the investigator considers it necessary to do 
otherwise. However, in practice interrogations are routinely conducted in police 
stations, whether it is necessary or not, which gives the investigator the "perfect" 
opportunity to do whatever he wants to the accused without the fear of being found 
out. This is because police officers are subordinate to IPPC members, and sometimes 
they enjoy a friendly relationship, which would prevent or deter a police officer from 
reporting any incidents of ill-treatment that have allegedly taken place. In one 
incident, which took place at the Rudah Police Station in Riyadh, the investigator had 
DNA evidence against a suspect, who was accused of having forcible sodomy with a 
minor. Nonetheless, the accused denied the accusation against him. The investigator 
went to interrogate the accused in the police station, and, although the investigator 
claims that he only slapped him lightly on the face, 102 according to the accused, he 
was severely beaten in order to make him confess. Subsequently, the accused drank a 
99 See also Case No 1, infra note 118 and accompanying text. 100 Observation, interrogation by Investigator Anonymous, A. U. [Pseudonym. ], Investigation and 
Public Prosecution Commission Branch, Riyadh (May. 31,2004). 
101 Observation, interrogation by Investigator Hassen Al-Asaker, Investigation and Public Prosecution 
Commission Branch, Crimes Against Honour Division, Riyadh (June. 4,2004); Observation, 
interrogation by Investigator Abdullah Al-Muqbel, Investigation and Public Prosecution Commission 
Branch, Drug Crimes Division, Riyadh (Jun. 16,2004). 
102 Interview with Investigator Anonymous, A. S. [Pseudonym. ], Investigation and Public Prosecution 
Commission Branch, Riyadh (Oct. 5,2004). 
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shampoo in order to be taken hospital to escape being interrogated, and possibly being 
beaten again. ' 03 The allegation of beating in this case has never been investigated, and 
the accused was charged additionally with attempting to commit suicide, which is 
prohibited under Islamic law. '°4 
The question that these practices raise is whether there is a mechanism by which 
such incidents could be uncovered and properly investigated? This issue will be 
addressed later. '05 
5.3.1 Remedies 
There are two forms of remedy that an individual, whose right not to incriminate 
himself has been allegedly violated, can pursue: the exclusion of an involuntary 
obtained confession, and/or to have the official responsible for the violation subjected 
to disciplinary or criminal proceedings. These forms of remedy are discussed next. 
5.3.1.1 Exclusion of involuntary confessions 
The Saudi written law does not contain any provisions that deal with the admissibility 
of confessions obtained against the will of the accused. The only provision in the CCP 
that deals with confession evidence is contained in Article 162. It states that '[i]f the 
accused at any time confesses to the offence with which he is charged, the court shall 
hear his statement in detail and examine him. If the court is satisfied that the 
confession is genuine and sees no need for further evidence, it shall take no further 
action and decide the case. The court shall complete the investigation if it is 
necessary. ' However, Article 162 says nothing about confessions that have been, 
allegedly, obtained against the will of the accused. 
Nonetheless, under Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), by which the Saudi courts are 
bound, 106 the issue of involuntary confessions is fully dealt with. As discussed in 
Chapter three, there are two opinions regarding the use of coercive means, including 
torture, to obtain confessions. According to the majority of Muslim scholars, it is 
103 I learned of this incident during an interview with Waleed Aoun (Sep. 29,2004), infra ch. 7 note 
185, who was kept in the same detention centre as the accused in this incident. 
104 Interview with Investigator Anonymous, A. S., supra note 102. 
105 See infra para. 5.3.1.2. 
106 See supra para. 1.1. 
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impermissible to coerce the accused to make incriminating evidence against himself, 
and, hence, involuntary confessions are inadmissible as evidence. 
' 07 
In practice, the issue of whether a given confession has been voluntarily supplied 
by the accused or not for the purposes of determining the admissibility of such a 
confession, will depend almost exclusively on whether the confession has been 
judicially confirmed or not. In practice, there is a mechanism known as the 'judicial 
confirmation of confessions'. The confirmation mechanism is designed to ensure that 
'criminals who confess during the police investigation are usually in despair, which 
helps to extract confessions from them. They are likely to retract their confessions if 
they are given time to think about the consequences of their confessions. " 
08 'Thus, the 
confirmation of confessions must be carried out during and after regular hours. 
" 09 
The confirmation mechanism involves the verification of the identity of the 
accused, the voluntariness of the confession, and the content of the confession. Under 
the confirmation mechanism, when an accused person allegedly makes a confession, 
he is referred to a qadi, or three qadis, depending on the seriousness of the offence, 
"" 
along with the confession record that has been prepared by a police officer, 
investigator or an investigation clerk, as the case may be, and has been signed by the 
accused, in order to confirm his confession. 
Once the accused is in court, he is taken to the confessions office (mukitb al- 
iqrarat), where his handcuffs are taken off, and the statement that the accused has 
allegedly made regarding his involvement in the alleged crime is read out to him by 
the court clerk. "' Police officers are not supposed to enter the confessions office, and 
there is a sign on the office door, signed by the President of the Court, which reads: 
No police officer may enter the room or stand by the door'. If the accused does not 
understand Arabic, a translator will be present during the confirmation process to 
107 See supra para. 3.3. See also Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Initial report of State parties due in 1998: Saudi Arabia, CAT/C/42/Add. 2 
(2001), para. 44, available at <littp: //www. unhchr. ch/tbs/doc. nst> (last visited Jan. 2,2006). 
'08 Council of Minister Order No. 14060 (10 January 1963). 
109 Directive of the Minister of Justice No. 3/3222 (15 March 1963). This directive was based on the 
Council of Minister Order No. 14060, supra note 108. 
110 A confession which relates to an offence the punishment of which is amputation, stoning or death, 
must be confirmed by three gadis. Directive of the Minister of Justice No. 45/12/T (12 March 1980). 
1' 1 The account of the confirmation process presented here is based upon a two-days observation at the 
Summary Court, Riyadh (Sep. 14-15,2004); interview with Qadi Saleh Al-AlShiek, President of the 
Summary Court, Riyadh (Sep. 14,2004); interview with Qadi Tameem Al-Aunizan, Summary Court, 
Riyadh (July. 11-12,2004); and informal conversations with the court clerks involved in the 
confirmation process. 
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explain the content of the confession to the accused before he is asked whether he 
wants to confirm his confession or not. 
If the accused states that he gave the confession voluntarily, a summary of the 
content of the confession will be recorded in the court register, and the accused, along 
with the confession record and the court register, will be referred to the President of 
the Court in order to confirm the confession. When the accused appears before the 
President of the Court, he will be asked again as to whether the confession was 
voluntarily supplied or not. 112 If the accused states that the confession is voluntary, 
the President will print his signature, indicating that the confession has been 
confirmed on both the confession record and the court register. If, however, the 
accused states that the confession is not voluntary, the President of the Court will 
refrain from confirming the confession, and the refusal of the accused to confirm his 
confession will be indicated in both the confession record and the court register. 
On the other hand, if the accused in the confessions office states that he has been 
mistreated in order to make him confess, the confession record along with the court 
register will be referred to the President of the Court without the accused, where the 
President of the Court will print his signature on the confession record and the court 
register, and states that the accused refused to confirm his confession. In this case, 
even where there are apparent indications on the accused that he has been mistreated, 
the relevant court clerk, although he may advise the accused to meet with the 
President of the Court in order to make a complaint against the ill-treatment to which 
he had been allegedly subjected by the investigation authority, does not have the 
authority to allow the accused to appear before the President of the Court. The 
President of the Court will request the competent authority (i. e., the provincial 
governor's office) to investigate the alleged ill-treatment of the accused, only if the 
accused is brought to the court three times in order to confirm his confession, and he 
refuses to do so on the three occasions on the basis that he has been coerced in order 
to confess. 
It is worth mentioning here an incident, in which the accused had been reluctant 
to confirm the contents of his confession before the court clerk. The police officer, 
who was accompanying the accused from the police station, and was present in the 
112 It is worth mentioning, however, that in one incident, which has been observed by the present 
researcher, the President of the Court merely verified the identity of the accused, without asking him 
about the voluntariness of the confession. 
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confessions office during the whole confirmation process, although, on the order of 
the President of the Court, he should not have been there, said to the accused'you will 
be taken to the station, beaten, and then you will come back here to confirm your 
confession'. The court clerk did nothing regarding the officer's remark, except point 
out to the officer that the present researcher, who was present in the confessions 
office at the time, was a researcher observing how confessions are confirmed in 
practice. Eventually, the accused confirmed his confession, and the confession was 
consequently confirmed by the President of the Court. 
Where the accused confirms his confession before the qadi(s), and the confession 
is consequently judicially confirmed, the probative value and the voluntariness of the 
confession become almost indisputable at the trial stage, as will be shown below. The 
logic behind this is that the accused has been given the opportunity to retract his 
confession during the confirmation stage, but has confirmed his confession. ' 13 
Therefore, the retraction of confessions at the trial stage is seen as a tactical defence 
by the defendant to avert justice, and, hence, qadis pay little attention to allegations of 
mistreatment, which aim at the exclusion of a judicially confirmed confession. In 
addition, where a confession has been judicially confirmed, the burden of establishing 
the voluntariness or otherwise of the confession shifts from the prosecution to the 
(unrepresented) defendant. 
On the other hand, if the confession is not judicially confirmed, its probative 
value is very limited, as the investigative procedures are, judicially, perceived to be 
tainted with the suspicion that coercive measures might have been employed in order 
to force the accused to confess to a crime that he did not commit. Thus, the accused 
will be acquitted without the need to establish the fact of coercion; if the confession is 
not judicially confirmed, its voluntariness is disputed by the defendant and 
independent evidence pointing to the guilt of the accused is absent. ' 14 
Although there are no official statistics regarding the number of cases in which 
convictions are based solely or partly on confession evidence, according to one Qadi, 
convictions based on confession evidence account for around ninety percent of all 
convictions. 115 There seems to be two reasons to explain the heavy reliance on 
confession evidence as a means for securing convictions in Saudi Arabia. The first 
113 Interview with Qadi Tameem Al-Aunizan, supra note 111. See also Vogel, supra note 96, p. 238. 114 Ibid. 
1 15 Interview with Qadi Muhammad Al Jaarallah, General Court, Riyadh (Aug. 2-3,2004) 
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reason is that investigators believe that qadis have a strong faith in the reliability of 
confession evidence. Hence, investigators focus primarily on obtaining a confession 
from the suspect as the main means for establishing their case against that suspect. 
"G 
The second reason, which is highly relevant to the first, is that when a confession has 
been obtained and has been judicially confirmed, the prosecution at the trial stage 
does not need to do anything beyond presenting the confession evidence to the court, 
which will most likely convict the accused on the basis of such a confession. 
"7 
It is appropriate here to present three cases in which confessions that had been 
judicially confirmed were retracted by the defendants during their trial. These cases 
will, it is hoped, shed more light on qadis' attitude towards confession evidence 
obtained allegedly by coercion. In the three cases, a summary of the facts of the case, 
the dispute between the defendant and the prosecution regarding the voluntariness of 
the confessions, and the ruling of the court on the disputed confession and the reasons 
for them will be provided. 
Case No 1: 118 
This case concerns two Pakistani defendants, who were charged with drug trafficking. 
The two defendants were caught red-handed by the police selling a large quantity of 
hash (153,750 Kg) to a police informer. In addition to the drug-trafficking charge, the 
second defendant was also charged with smuggling drugs from Pakistan to Saudi 
Arabia with the assistance of his brother in Pakistan. Only the facts relating to the 
second defendant concern the subject under discussion. 
With regard to the drug-trafficking charge, the evidence presented against the 
second defendant was the testimony of two police officers from the arresting squad, 
who witnessed the second defendant, along with the first one, handing the drugs to the 
police informer, and receiving the money from him (180,000 Saudi riyal) before the 
two defendants were arrested. Regarding the drug-smuggling charge, the evidence 
presented against the second defendant was his confession, which had been confirmed 
by three qadis. During the trial, however, the defendant retracted his confession on 
the basis that it was obtained by torture, claiming the investigators threatened to cut 
116 Interview with Investigator Abdullah Al-Muqbel, Investigation and Public Prosecution Commission 
Branch, Drug Crimes Division, Riyadh (Jun. 29,2004). 
117 Interview with Qadi Tameem Al-Aunizan, supra note 111. 
115 General Court in Riyadh, Qadi Saleh Al-Aujri, court record (criminal) No. 34 (1424 H, 2004 A. D), 
(May. 15,2004). 
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off his tongue if he did not confirm his confession before the confirming qadis. When 
he was asked to provide evidence that he had been tortured, he did not provide any 
evidence. The Court found the accused guilty on all counts, and sentenced him to 
death, because his crimes constituted the ta'zir offence of spreading corruption on 
earth within the meaning of the Qur'anic verse 5: 33, to which the death penalty, at 
the discretion of the qadi, can be applied. ' 19 
The defendant appealed against his conviction with regard to the drug-smuggling 
charge on the basis that his judicially confirmed confession, which was the sole basis 
for convicting him of drug-smuggling, was involuntary. The appeal by the defendant 
was heard, in accordance with the Judicial Act 1975, by the same court that convicted 
the defendant of the drug-smuggling charge. 120 The defendant brought eleven 
witnesses, who were detained in the same facility as the defendant in the Anti-Drug 
Police Department in Riyadh when the torture, allegedly, took place. Two of the 
witnesses testified that they saw the defendant, among other suspects, being beaten 
with electric cables, canes, and iqals, while the other nine witnesses testified to what 
they considered as indications of torture such as bruises and cuts that appeared on the 
body of the defendant when he came back to the detention unit from the interrogation 
room. The Court noted that all the witnesses, when the hearing on the torture 
allegation took place, were convicted criminals, whose testimony under normal 
circumstances lacks credibility. However, as such illegal activities can be only by 
witnessed by people who are in detention, and that it was impossible that eleven 
witnesses of different nationalities, whose testimony corroborated the allegation of 
the defendant that he was tortured in order to make him confess, could conspire to lie, 
the Court accepted their testimony as credible and truthful. Therefore, the conviction 
of the defendant with regard to the drug-smuggling charge was quashed, and his 
sentence was reduced from death to fifteen years imprisonment for the drug- 
trafficking charge and his criminal record, which included a drug trafficking 
conviction. 
119 The Qur'anic verse, 5: 33, states that '[t]he punishment of those who wage war against Allah and 
His Messenger, and strive with might and main to spread corruption on earth is: execution, crucifixion, 
the cutting off of hands and feet from opposite sides, or exile from the land: that is their disgrace in this 
world, and a heavy punishment is theirs in the Hereafter. ' 
120 See supra para. 1.3.2. 
169 
Case No 2: 121 
This case was heard by three Court Qadis in the province of Al-Quseem. It should be 
noted that the case under consideration was decided before the CCP came into effect. 
However, given that the CCP does not include any provisions regarding alleged 
involuntary confessions, the same fiqh rules that applied to alleged involuntary 
confessions prior to the introduction of the CCP still apply to date. 
The case concerns sixteen defendants, six of whom were from the Philippines, 
and here only the case against the six Philippines will be presented, as the present 
researcher had the benefit of speaking to their lawyer. ' 22 All the defendants were 
charged with burgling domestic homes, commercial shops, and public schools. 
Fourteen of the defendants had confessed to the alleged crimes and their confessions, 
subsequently, were judicially confirmed. During the trial, all the fourteen defendants 
retracted their confessions on the basis that they had been obtained under torture. The 
Court convicted all the fourteen defendants, who confessed to the alleged crimes, 
while the other remaining two defendants, who did not confess, were acquitted. The 
Court based its judgment on the fact that the confessions of the fourteen defendants 
were judicially confirmed, and that the convicted defendants confessed in detail as to 
when and how the alleged crimes were committed, which indicated that the 
confessions, which constituted the sole basis for the convictions, were both reliable 
and voluntary. The lawyer for the six Philippine defendants appealed against the 
convictions of his clients on the basis that the evidence against the defendants (i. e., 
the confessions) was neither voluntary nor reliable. The following grounds were cited 
by the defence as the basis for their appeal. 
Firstly, when the case initially came to the trial Court, the Court decided to refer 
the case to the provincial governor's office in Al-Quseem province in order to 
investigate the defendants' allegations regarding the torture to which they had been 
subjected in order to force them to confess. As a consequence, a committee from the 
Public Security Department, which was the investigating and prosecuting authority in 
the case under consideration, was established in order to investigate the allegations of 
mistreatment. The report of the committee was confidential, and, hence, only the 
Qadis and the prosecutor were aware of its content. However, in the judgement, the 
121 The Second Criminal Division of al-Shari'ah Court, Buriadh. Judgment No. 3/6/M/J (25 February 
1999). 
122 Interview with lawyer Abdurrahman Al-Muqbel (Nov. 4,2004). 
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Court referred to the letter of the provincial governor to the Court, which stated that 
'the Court referred the case [to the provincial governor's office], because the 
defendants have alleged that they confessed because of the torture to which they had 
been subjected. An investigation has been conducted [into the alleged torture] ... and 
concluded that the defendants are innocent and there is no case against them. ' The 
defence argued in their appeal that the conclusion reached by the committee of the 
Public Security Department was conclusive evidence of the innocence of their clients 
as it came from the same authority that investigated and prosecuted the defendants in 
the case under consideration. 
Secondly, the contents of the fourteen defendants' confessions are contradictory, 
and some confessions contained some information the falsehood of which is beyond 
dispute. These contradictions include, inter alia, the following: 
" The first defendant of the six Philippines stated in his confession that after the 
end of the month of Ramadan in 1416 H (1996 A. D. ), he, along with the 
second, third, ninth, tenth, twelfth and the thirteenth defendant, broke into a 
jewellery shop and stole a large quantity of jewellery from it. However, 
according to the arrest record, which was indicated in the judgement, the 
twelfth defendant, who was the second Philippine defendant, was arrested on 
Ramadan 11,1416 H. This conclusively proves that the second Philippine 
defendant could not have actually participated in the commission of the 
alleged crime because he was already in detention. 
" The first defendant of the six Philippines stated in his confession that at the 
end of 1995 he, along with third and fourth Philippine defendants, burgled a 
house. However, the third and fourth defendants were on holiday in the 
Philippines at the end of 1995. 
" The investigation authority, as mentioned in the judgment, concluded that the 
seventh, eighth and ninth defendants were responsible for hiding the stolen 
jewellery, because each one of them confessed separately that all the stolen 
jewellery was in his possession. However, as it is illogical that each of the 
three defendants had the possession of the same stolen jewellery at the same 
time, at least two of the three confessions must be untrue. 
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Thirdly, the first defendant of the sixteen defendants, who had not confessed and was 
consequently acquitted, had been hospitalised for two weeks, as mentioned in the 
judgement of the Court, which was, according to the defendant, because of the torture 
to which he had been subjected by the police in order to make him confess. In 
addition, all of the six Philippines had been hospitalised for sometime during their 
time in detention, which lasted for almost three years before the court finally reached 
its decision on the case. The first Philippine defendant managed to obtain a medical 
report from the Buridah Central Hosptial. The report found the defendant to have 
suffered from bums on his body and from posttraumatic stress disorder. Finally, apart 
from the disputed confessions, there was no independent evidence that pointed to the 
guilt of the defendants, nor did any of the six Philippines or the other co-defendants, 
for that matter, have any criminal record. 
However, the Court of Appeal rejected the appeal of the six Philippine 
defendants, without providing any basis for rejecting the appeal. At the request of the 
six Philippine defendants, the King allowed an extraordinary appeal to be made to the 
Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), which also rejected the appeal. 
Case No 3: 123 
This case concerns five defendants, who were charged with stealing cars, kidnapping 
minors and having forcible sodomy with the kidnapped minors. Here only the facts 
relating to the charge against one defendant, who is referred to here as "defendant B", 
will be presented, as they relate to the subject under discussion here. Defendant B was 
only charged with kidnapping two minors and having forcible sodomy with them. The 
first piece of evidence against him was the testimony of a 14 year old boy. The 14 
year old boy testified that when he and the alleged second victim (hereinafter "A") 
were playing on their bicycles outside their house, a car stopped by; one man came 
out of it, who was identified by the witness as defendant B, grabbed the alleged 
victim, put him inside the car, and then the car left. 124 However, defendant B was 
123 General Court in Riyadh, Qadi Muhammad Bin Kuneen, court record (criminal) No. 1 (1424 H, 
2004 A. D), (24 May 2004). 
124 It should be noted here that under the CCP there are no provisions that regulate the procedures of 
the identification of suspects, nor does the judgement under consideration indicate how the 
identification was carried out. It should be noted also that identification testimony was responsible for a 
number of high profile miscarriages of justice under comparative jurisdiction. Hence, the credibility of 
the testimony of this witness, which has been completely accepted by the Court, is in doubt. This is 
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placed on an identification parade before A and the older brother of the 14 year old 
boy witness, who is aged eighteen years and who, after he was called by his younger 
brother to save A from the kidnappers, chased the kidnappers and got close to them 
but they managed to escape from him. While A failed to identify defendant B as the 
kidnapper, or the person who forcibly had sex with him, the second witness, when he 
testified during the trial to what he saw, was not sure if the defendants, including 
defendant B, were the persons who kidnapped A. 
The second piece of evidence against defendant B was his judicially confirmed 
confession. Defendant B alleged that he had been tortured in order to make him 
confess. When he was asked by the Court to supply evidence for his allegation, he 
pointed out that the first time he appeared before the confirming qadis in order to 
confine his confession, he refused to do so because, as he alleged, his confession had 
been obtained by torture. When he went back to the police station, according to him, 
he was tortured again in order to make him confirm his confession, which he did the 
second time he appeared before the confirming qadis. The Court acknowledged that 
the confession record showed that the defendant refused to confirm his confession the 
first time he was taken before the confirming qadis. It should be noted here that the 
other four co-defendants retracted their confessions at trial, but they all confirmed 
their confessions the first time they were taken before the confirming qadis. The 
Court ruled, with regard to the retracted confessions, that although 'the five 
defendants allege that they had been subjected to coercion in order to confess, their 
confessions had been judicially confirmed, and they have no evidence to prove it [i. e., 
the allegation of torture]. ' The Court decided to sentence defendant B to four years 
imprisonment on the basis of his alleged role in the crimes committed. 
5.3.1.1.1 Commentary 
In Case No. 1, the Court during the appeal stage gave the defendant the opportunity to 
establish his allegation that he had been subjected to torture in order to confess, which 
he did to the satisfaction of the Court. Consequently, the coerced confession was 
excluded. However, two considerations arising from the particular circumstances of 
this case should be mentioned here. Firstly, if the defendant's confession were 
accepted at the appeal stage as voluntary, the defendant would have been subjected to 
also supported by the fact that the alleged victim himself failed to identify defendant B as the 
kidnapper, or the person who forcibly had sex with him. 
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the irrevocable death punishment to which he was initially sentenced during the trial. 
Secondly, the defendant had been already convicted of another charge and was 
eventually, even after the exclusion of the coerced confession, sentenced to fifteen 
years imprisonment. 
Saudi Qadis, as discussed elsewhere, contend that there is no need to 
have 
lawyers in criminal trials because they are capable of protecting the interests of the 
accused. 125 However, in none of the cases presented above did the trial Court take an 
active role in verifying whether the contents of the confession were genuine, or 
verifying whether the confessions were voluntarily supplied. Indeed, in Case No. 2, 
there was ample evidence in the grounds on which the defence presented their appeal 
to the Court of Appeal and the SJC to show that the confessions, which constituted 
the sole basis for the convictions, were neither voluntary nor reliable. However, the 
Court of Appeal, and the SJC upheld the finding of the trial court, namely, that the 
confessions were voluntary and reliable, apparently because the confessions had 
been 
judicially confirmed. 
In Case No. 3, the accused argued that the fact that he did not confirm his 
confession the first time that he appeared before the confirming qadis because, as he 
alleges, he had been tortured in order to make him confess, indicates that he 
confirmed his confession the second time he appeared before the confirming qadis 
because he had been tortured; if he had not confirmed it the second time, he would 
have been tortured for a third time. The argument of the defendant seems to be very 
reasonable, and it sheds serious doubts on the voluntariness of his confession. 
Nonetheless, the Court did not accept his argument, nor did it seek to verify the 
voluntariness of his confession by, for instance, requiring the investigator, whose 
signature was on the confession record, to take the oath before the court and testify 
that the confession was voluntarily supplied. 126 Instead, the Court accepted the 
confession as voluntary without providing any reasons for its ruling, except that it was 
judicially confirmed. 
125 See supra para. 3.6.1.1. See also infra paras. 8.3-8.4. 
126 According to Qadi Muhammad Al Jaarallah, where it appears to the qadi that the accused refused to 
confirm his confession the first time he appeared before the confirming qadis on the basis that he was 
coerced to confess, it is the gadi`s duty to require those investigators who obtained the confession from 
the accused to testify before him that the confession was voluntarily supplied. Interview with Qadi 
Muhammad Al Jaarallah, supra note 115. 
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It is worth mentioning here that qadis who have been interviewed by the present 
researcher and who have expressed their view on the permissibility of the use of 
coercion to obtain confessions, subscribe to the minority Muslim scholars' view that 
coercion can be used to force the accused to confess where there is strong 
circumstantial evidence to suggest that the accused has committed the alleged 
offence, and that the accused is a persistent offender. 127 In fact, even the President of 
the SJC, Sheikh Saleh Al-Luhaydan, in addition to a well-known retired appellate 
Qadi, Sheikh Suleiman Al-Munia, 128 subscribe to such a view. 129 However, the fact 
that qadis subscribe to such a view does not mean that torture can be used in Saudi 
Arabia to obtain confessions, as the power to coerce the accused in order to make him 
confess is considered to fall within the realm of siyasa shar'iyya authority, which is 
only excisable by the ruler. 130 As the King of Saudi Arabia has declared in the CCP 
that the use of torture, for whatever purpose, is illegal, torture, notwithstanding qadis' 
view in this respect, becomes illegal. 131 However, the gadis' views on the issue of the 
permissibility of using torture to coerce the accused to confess means that, in practice, 
qadis, generally speaking, will not take allegations of torture seriously where the 
confession is considered to be reliable, and has been judicially confirmed, as they are 
primarily concerned with the reliability of the confession, rather than its 
voluntariness. This is supported by the views expressed by qadis on the allegations of 
torture with regard to confession evidence, ' 32 and from the cases presented above. 
In addition, as mentioned above, qadis have a strong faith in the effectiveness of 
the confirmation mechanism to eliminate the possibility of a coerced confession being 
introduced before the trial court. However, Case No I demonstrates vividly that when 
127 Interview with Qadi Saleh Al-Aujri, General Court, Riyadh (Aug. 4,2004); interview with Qadi 
Suleiman Al-Hudiathi, General Court, Riyadh (July. 18,2004) 
128 Al-Munia, S, Nadari'at Brait al-Muta'hm Hta Tathbut Idanth (The Theory of the Innocence of the 
Accused until he is Found Guilty)', in al-Muta'hm wa Huqugh fi al-Shay-iah al-Islamiah (The Accused's 
Rights in Islamic Shari'ah), ed. by Naief Academy for Security Sciences, 1 (Riyadh: Naief Academy 
for Security Sciences Press, 1986), pp. 267-282. 
129 Al-Lahaydan, S, 'Turuq al-Ithbt al-Sharai (The Rules of Proof under the Shari'ah)', in al-Naduah al- 
Ilmiah li Dirast Tadpeeq al-Tashiia al-Jenaei al-Islami wa Athrh fi Mukafhet al-Jeremiah fi al- 
Mamlaka al-Arabiyyah al-Saudiyyah (Scientific Conference for Studying the Application of the Islamic 
Criminal Law and its Impact in Reducing Crimes in The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia), I (Riyadh: The 
Ministry of Interior, 1976) pp. 113,135-136. 
130 See supra paras. 1.4 & 3.3. 
131 Interview with Qadi Tameem Al-Aunizan, supra note 111. 
132 Qadi Tameem Al-Aunizan of the Summary Court said to the present researcher that he does not take 
allegations of torture seriously if the confession has been judicially confirmed, and that he has never 
encountered a case in which a judicially confirmed confession was shown to have been obtained by 
torture. Interview with Qadi Tameem Al-Aunizan, supra note 111. See also Vogel, supra note 96, p. 
238. 
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the accused is faced with the real possibility that he will be tortured again if he does 
not confirm his confession the first or the second time he appears before the 
confirming qadis, he will confirm his confession to avoid this. Indeed, the existence 
of such a practice was acknowledged by the Government itself, as is clear from the 
Directive of the Ministry of Interior cited earlier-' 33 
5.3.1.2 Disciplinary and criminal actions 
According to Article 37 of CCP, the supervision over prisons and detention centres is 
entrusted to members of the Division for the inspection of prisons and places of 
detention of the IPPC Branch in the relevant province (hereinafter DIPD). Although 
the wording of Article 37 suggests that the role of the DIPD is confined to 'ensur[ing] 
that no person is unlawfully imprisoned or detained', in practice it extends to ensuring 
that detainees are treated in accordance with the law. 134 Hence, it is the duty of 
members of the DIPD, in accordance with Article 37 in conjunction with Article 2 of 
the CCP, which prohibits subjecting the accused to any form of ill-treatment, to 
ensure that the arrested and detained persons are not subjected to any form of ill- 
treatment. For the purpose of ensuring, inter alia, that Article 2 of the CCP is 
complied with in practice, Article 37 of the CCP requires members of the DIPD to 
conduct periodic and surprise visits to prisons and detention centres. In addition, 
members of the DIPD are required to receive and investigate complaints from 
detainees and prisoners regarding the lawfulness of their detention or treatment. 135 If a 
member of the DIPD finds irregularity in the treatment or the detention of the 
accused, a record of the irregularity must be made and transmitted to the competent 
authority, which shall take the appropriate action against those responsible for such 
irregularity. 136 
Members of the DIPD, in exercising their supervisory functions under the CCP, 
become supervisors of fellow IPPC members (i. e., those members who are 
investigators in the technical sense), and police officers. The mechanisms for 
investigating the alleged misconduct of a police officer or a member of the IPPC are 
treated separately next. 
133 See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text. 
131 Interview with Investigator Anonymous, H. N. [Pseudonym. ], Investigation and Public Prosecution 
Commission Branch, Riyadh (July. 6, Sept. 11,2004). See also Directive of the Head of the 
Investigation and Public Prosecution Commission No. H 12/3662 (3 January 2000), pp. 14-16. 
135 CCP. Art. 38. 
136 Ibid. Art. 25. 
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5.3.1.2.1 Investigation of misconduct by police officers 
When a DIPD member finds any irregularity committed by a police officer, the 
member concerned will file a report to his superior, who in turn will refer it to the 
Head of the DIPD. The Head of the DIPD, depending on the seriousness of the 
irregularity, will request either the Head of the Police Station, the Head of the Police 
Department or the provincial governor to investigate the complaint. Requests to 
investigate serious irregularities, including the mistreatment of the accused, are 
addressed to the provincial governor. The provincial governor acquires his authority 
to investigate the alleged misconduct of a police officer from Article 7(h) of the 
Provincial Administrative Law, ' 37 which states that the provincial governor has the 
authority to 'supervise the organs of the state and their employees in the province in 
order to ensure that they perform their duties well and with all trust and loyalty, 
taking into account the ties of the employees of ministries and various services in the 
region with their competent authorities. ' 138 It is worth mentioning here that members 
of the public, who commonly address their grievances against governmental bodies to 
the provincial governor (known as 'the policy of open door'), can also lodge a 
complaint with the provincial governor concerning the conduct of a given police 
officer. 
The complaints, however they originated, are dealt with in the same manner. The 
provincial governor upon receiving the complaint will decide, at his discretion, 
whether and how the alleged irregularity should be investigated. If the provincial 
governor decides that the alleged irregularity should be investigated, he usually sets 
up a committee consisting of three members: one from the police, one from the 
provincial governor's office and one from the DIPD, to investigate the alleged 
misconduct. Once the investigation into the alleged misconduct has been completed, 
the report of the committee and its recommendations regarding the alleged 
irregularity will be referred to the provincial governor. The provincial governor, at his 
discretion, will decide whether to take no action, to subject the alleged offender to a 
disciplinary hearing or to proceed with criminal proceedings. ' 39 
137 Issued by Royal Order No A/92 (1 March 1992). Published on Umm al-Qura (the Saudi official 
Gazette) No. 3397 on 6 March 1992. 
138 See also Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Initial report of State parties due in 1998: Saudi Arabia, CAT/C/42/Add. 2 (2001), paras. 
37,40, available at <Iittp: //www. unhchr. cli/tbs/dgc. nsf> (last visited Jan. 2,2006), 
139 Interview with Investigator Anonymous, H. N., supra note 134. 
177 
In the following sections the complaints against the police conduct whether they 
allegedly constitute a criminal offence or a disciplinary offence are discussed. 
5.3.1.2.1.1 Disciplinary proceedings 
If the complaint has been referred by the provincial governor to the Public Security 
Department in order that the disciplinary proceedings against the accused officer be 
instituted, the Head of the Provincial Force, the General Director of the Public 
Security, or the Minister of Interior, as the case may be, will decide whether to subject 
the officer who is the subject of the complaint to disciplinary proceedings, to impose 
an administrative penalty or to take no further action. 140 If the disciplinary 
proceedings are instituted against a non-commissioned officer, the officer will be tried 
before the Disciplinary Tribunal, which consists of three commissioned officers 
appointed by the Head of the Provincial Force. 141 If the accused is a commissioned 
officer, the Disciplinary Tribunal must consist of three commissioned officers: one 
member must be of a rank higher than that of the officer being tried, who acts as the 
head of the Tribunal, and two members who must be of the same rank of the officer 
being tried or above, to be appointed by General Director of the Public Security. 
142 If 
the officer, who is being tried, is found guilty of a disciplinary offence, he can appeal 
to the Disciplinary Appeal Tribunal. 143 The Disciplinary Appeal Tribunal consists of 
three officers: one officer of the rank of Zaeem or above, who acts as the head of the 
Tribunal, and two officers of the same rank as that of the defendant officer or above. 
The three officers are to be appointed by the Minister of Interior. A legal consultant, 
who is appointed by the General Director of Public Security, can participate in the 
appeal proceedings, but cannot participate in the decision-voting. 
'44 
It should be noted that the complainant, where the proceedings are the result of a 
public complaint, is not a party to the disciplinary proceedings, and hence he cannot 
attend the hearing before either the Disciplinary Tribunal or the Disciplinary Appeal 
Tribunal. 145 The decisions of the Disciplinary Tribunal become effective only if they 
are confirmed by the General Director of Public Security, whereas the decisions of the 
140 Internal Security Forces Code, issued by Royal Decree No. 30 (6 April 1965). Published in Umm a! - 
Qura (the Saudi official Gazette) No. 2072 (30 May 1965) Arts. 122,127 [hereinafter ISFC]. 
141 Ibid. Art. 130. 
112 Ibid. Art. 131. 
143 Ibid. Art. 146. 
144Ibid. Art. 134. 
145 Interview with Inspector Ahmed Al Htan, Member of the Disciplinary Tribunal, Public Security 
Department, Riyadh (Sep. 7,2004). 
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Disciplinary Appeal Tribunal, if the defendant is a commissioned officer, become 
effective only on the confirmation of the decision by the Minister of Interior. 
'46 
Disciplinary offences under the Internal Security Forces Code include, inter alia, 
the following offences: 
" the offence of assaulting a member of the public, which is punishable by a 
forfeit of not more than three months salary or/and detention for not more 
than six months; 147 
" the offence of entering private dwellings or detaining a person illegally, 
which is punishable by either the suspension of promotion for not more than 
two years, suspension from work for not more than six months; or detention 
for not more than two months; 148 and 
" the offence of mistreating the public and the abuse of official powers, by use 
of torture or by violating personal liberties, which is punishable by dismissal 
from the service or/and imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months. 
149 
5.3.1.2.1.2 Criminal proceedings 
Violations of the accused's rights, to liberty, to privacy, and not to be ill-treated 
constitute a criminal offence under Article 2(8) of the Royal Decree No. 43 (1958) 
(hereinafter Decree 43), which states that'[a]nyone who mistreats [the public], abuses 
his official powers by torturing ..., violating personal 
liberties ... ' 
is guilty of a 
criminal offence. 
Where the provincial governor decides that criminal proceedings should be 
instituted against the officer who is the subject of the complaint, the case file will be 
referred to the Supervision and Investigation Commission (SIC) to complete its 
investigation into the alleged misconduct and to institute the criminal proceedings 
against the accused officer before the Board of Grievances. The SIC is a 
governmental body entrusted with supervising the conduct of civil servants in relation 
to the discharge of their official duties, and linked to the office of the Prime 
146 ISFC, Art. 148. 
147 Ibid. Art. 168(b). 
148 Ibid. Art. 169(b), (d). 
1°9 Ibid. Art. 171. A request was made by the present researcher to obtain access to the case files of the 
Disciplinary Tribunal, but it was denied on the basis that the disciplinary proceedings are secret. 
Interview with Inspector Ahmed Al Htan, supra note 145. 
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Minister. 150 By way of exception, the investigation and prosecution of particular 
crimes including those crimes that fall under Article 2(8) of Decree 43 are assigned to 
the SIC. 151 Similarly, the Board of Grievances is essentially an administrative court, 
but by way of exception, it has been given the jurisdiction to try certain criminal 
offences including those offences that fall under Article 2(8) of Decree 43.152 It 
should be noted that the although the misconduct of the police officer is tried as a 
crime under Decree 43, the crime is, in essence, prosecuted as a disciplinary 
misconduct in the sense that it is a violation of the official Code of Conduct, rather 
than a violation of the criminal law. Hence, a member of the public, who allegedly has 
been a victim of a crime under Decree 43, cannot directly submit a complaint to the 
SIC, as the SIC only receives complaints against the misconduct of a given official 
from the state authority for which the accused official works, nor is he considered to 
53 be party to the proceedings. 
The Broad of Grievances has not defined the crimes falling under Decree 43. 
Instead, if the court found an abuse of power, it would declare that the defendant 
official was guilty of committing an offence under Article 2(8) of Decree 43, without 
necessarily specifying the nature of the offence. If the defendant official were found 
guilty of a criminal offence under Decree 43, he would be liable to imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding ten years, or a maximum fine of twenty thousands riyals 
(approximately £3000). This gives the trial court a wide discretionary power in 
determining the appropriate punishment to be imposed if the defendant official is 
found guilty. From the Board of Grievances' judgements on Decree 43 offences that 
have been available to the present researcher, it seems that qadis, in terms of 
sentencing, differentiate between, on the one hand, acts that can be considered as the 
overstepping of official powers in that although the act is criminal, the objective is 
"legal", and, on the other hand, those acts that are solely motivated by personal gain, 
so both the act and the objective are illegal. With regard to the former circumstances, 
in two cases where a police officer had been found guilty of mistreating the accused 
in order to make him confess, a fine was imposed on the defendant as a 
150 The Code of Conduct of Civil Servants, issued by Royal Decree No. M/7 (28 March 1971). 
Published in Own al-Qura (the Saudi official Gazette) No. 2365 (6 April 1971), Art. 1. 
151 Royal Decree No. M151 (17/7/1402 H, 1982), Art 2. 
152 Art. 8(1), (g) of the Board of Grievances Law, issued by Royal Decree No. M/51 (11 May 1982). 
Published in Umm al-Qura (the Saudi official Gazette) No. 2918 (22 May 1982). 
153 Interview with Saleh Al-Ali, the Acting Director of the Investigation Department, the Supervision 
and Investigation Commission, Riyadh (Jun. 6,2004). 
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punishment. 154 It is worth mentioning that in one of the two mentioned cases, the 
defendant police officer of the Police Anti-Drug Department had been previously 
convicted by the same court of a similar offence. 155 On the other hand, where the 
defendant official is found guilty of abusing his official powers for personal gain by, 
for instance, arresting individuals for the purpose of obtaining money illegally from 
them as a condition for their release, a custodial sentence is imposed. 
156 
5.3.1.2.2 Investigation of misconduct by a member of the IPPC 
Under the Code of the Investigation and Public Prosecution Commission (CIPPC), 
157 
the discipline of members of the IPPC is entrusted to the IPPC Administrative Board, 
which acts as a Disciplinary Tribunal. 158 Allegations of disciplinary misconduct can 
be investigated only by a member of the IPPC, who is appointed by the Minister of 
Interior on the advice of the Head of the IPPC. 159 If there is sufficient evidence that 
there has been misconduct, the disciplinary proceedings can be instituted only if 
approved by the Minister of Interior on the advice of the Head of IPPC. 
160 The 
decisions of the Disciplinary Tribunal are final. If the Disciplinary Tribunal finds the 
member concerned guilty of misconduct, there are two forms of discipline available to 
them: reprimand or retirement. If the former is imposed, it becomes effective only if 
an order of the Minister of Interior based on the advice of the Head of IPPC 
implementing the decision of the Disciplinary Tribunal is issued. If the latter is 
imposed, it becomes effective only if a Royal Order implementing the decision of the 
Disciplinary Tribunal is issued. 161 If the misconduct of a member of the IPPC 
constitutes a criminal offence, no investigative measure (i. e., arrest, search, etc) can 
be taken with regard to the alleged offence, nor can criminal proceedings be instituted 
against the member concerned, except with the permission of the Administrative 
Board of the IPPC. 162 
154 Board of Grievances, the Third Criminal Division, Judgment No. 871D/J/3 (1986); Board of 
Grievances, the First Criminal Division, Judgment No. 76/D/J/1 (1990). 
155 Ibid. 
'56 Board of Grievances, the Third Criminal Division, Judgment No -/D/J/3 (2000); Board of 
Grievances, the Third Criminal Division, Judgment No -/D/J/3 (2001). 157 Issued by Royal Decree No. M/56 (30 May 1989). Published on Umm al-Aura (the Saudi official 
Gazette) No. 3264 on 24 June 1989 [hereinafter CIPPC]. 
158 Ibid. Art. 15. 
159 Ibid. Art. 17. 
160 Ibid. Art. 18. 
161 Ibid. Art. 26. 
162 Ibid. Art. 19. 
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In practice, it is not clear how members of the IPPC are supervised when carrying 
out their investigative functions. In theory, the DIPD, which is responsible for the 
inspection of prisons and detention centres, and how detainees are treated under the 
CCP, as mentioned above, exercises supervision over fellow members of the IPPC 
with regard to issues that fall within the DIPD's jurisdiction (i. e., the treatment and the 
detention of the accused). However, one of the difficulties facing the DIPD, as 
acknowledged in one of its reports, is that 'the relationship between the DIPD and 
other Divisions of the IPPC, when the DIPD exercises its supervisory functions with 
regard to prisons and detention centres, which include the supervision on [other] 
members of the Commission, is unclear. " 63 This difficulty is caused by the fact that 
the IPPC, which conducts investigations into criminal offences, supervises itself when 
it is conducting those investigations. Indeed, in the IPPC Branch in Riyadh, the DIPD 
is located in the same building as other IPPC investigation and prosecution divisions. 
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that most members of the DIPD occupy the 
lower ranks in the IPPC hierarchy compared to those members in the other 
investigation and prosecution divisions. 164 This means, in practice, that a low-ranking 
member of the DIPD is supposed to supervise a higher ranking member of the 
IPPC. 165 It is worth mentioning, finally, that to date no member of the IPPC has ever 
been subjected to either disciplinary or criminal proceedings on the basis of a report 
compiled by a member of the DIPD. '66 
5.4 Comparison 
The Saudi and Canadian systems converge and diverge on an equal number of issues 
with regard to the right against self-incrimination. In terms of similarities, both 
systems recognise the right against ill-treatment, both criminalise torture, consider 
involuntary confession to be inadmissible as evidence, and adopt mechanisms for 
163 Directive of the Head of the Investigation and Public Prosecution Commission No. H 12/3662 (3 
January 2000), p. 11. 
16' Ibid. 
165 These factors may explain why the incident of torture, which was allegedly committed by 
Investigators from IPPC, has never been investigated by the DIPD in Case Nol, despite the fact that the 
Court in that case excluded the confession on the basis that the accused had been tortured. See Case No 
1, supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
'66 Written response from Advisor Dr. Humed Al-Muadi, Investigation and Public Prosecution 
Commission Branch, Riyadh (July. 13,2004); interview with Investigator Hassen Al-Asaker, 
Investigation and Public Prosecution Commission Branch, Crimes Against Honour Division, Riyadh 
(May. 23-25,2004); interview with Investigator Anonymous, D. N. [Pseudonym. ], Investigation and 
Public Prosecution Commission Branch, Riyadh (Aug. 22,2004). 
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investigating and disciplinarily or criminally prosecuting an alleged misconduct 
committed by a public official in violation of the accused's rights. 
In terms of differences, while the Canadian law recognises explicitly the privilege 
against self-incrimination and its logical consequence, the right to silence, the Saudi 
written law is silent on such a right. In addition, while the Saudi system gives the 
competent court a discretionary power in determining the nature of the punishment for 
crimes of torture, i. e., a fine or a custodial sentence, under Canadian law crimes of 
torture will entail the imposition of a custodial sentence. Furthermore, while the 
Canadian law incorporates the CAT's definition of the crime of torture into the 
Canadian criminal law, under the Saudi law the crime of torture remains undefined. 
Moreover, under the Canadian system the burden of establishing beyond reasonable 
doubt that the confession has been voluntarily supplied lies with the State. By 
contrast, under the Saudi system the burden of establishing the involuntariness of the 
confession, where the confession was judicially confirmed, and the voluntariness of 
the confession was subsequently disputed during the trial, lies with the defendant. 
With regard to the mechanism of investigating alleged misconduct by a public 
official, both the Saudi and the Canadian (as illustrated by the Ontario complaints 
system) complaints mechanisms recognise, to some extent, the victim of an alleged 
misconduct to lodge a complaint. However, there are two main differences between 
the Saudi and Canadian systems in this respect. The first difference is that under the 
Canadian mechanism the complainant is considered a party to any disciplinary 
proceedings instituted against the accused official, whereas under the Saudi 
mechanism the alleged victim of an official misconduct is not considered a party to 
the disciplinary proceedings instituted against the accused official. 
The second difference lies in the nature of the mechanism that is designed to 
investigate and institute disciplinary or criminal proceedings against an official 
against whom there is sufficient evidence that he has committed a disciplinary or 
criminal offence. The complaints mechanism under the Canadian system, where the 
alleged misconduct constitutes a disciplinary offence, entrusts the investigation of 
complaints and the institution of the disciplinary proceedings, where appropriate, to 
the chief of the police force whose member is the subject of the complaint, under the 
oversight of a civilian and independent body. Where the misconduct constitutes a 
criminal offence and resulted in 'serious injuries' or death, the investigation and the 
institution of criminal proceedings, where appropriate, are entrusted to a civilian and 
183 
independent body. By contrast, the Saudi system entrusts the investigation of alleged 
misconduct by a police officer and the institution of criminal or disciplinary 
proceedings against him, where appropriate, to the provincial governor, who is, in 
essence, considered to be the head of the provincial police force. Where the alleged 
misconduct is committed by a member of the IPPC, the Administrative Board of the 
IPPC, under the oversight of the Minister of Interior, is entrusted with investigating 
such allegations, and the institution of criminal or disciplinary proceedings against 
him, where appropriate. 
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Chapter Six 
The Right to Humane Treatment 
A. International human rights law 
6.1 Right to humane treatment 
Article 10(1) of the ICCPR states that '[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall be 
treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person. ' 
It should be recalled here that Article 10(1), according to the HRC, is absolute in the 
sense that it cannot be restricted even during a public emergency that threatens the life 
of the nation. ' The issue that arises under Article 10(1) is whether it provides 
additional protection to the right to humane treatment guaranteed under Article 7, or it 
is a mere confirmation of that right. Although a given treatment may engage both 
Article 7 and Article 10(1), there are obvious differences between the two Articles. 
Firstly, the essence of Article 10(1) is to expand the right to humane treatment under 
Article 7, by prohibiting all forms of ill-treatment, even those that do not meet the 
threshold of Article 7. Thus, a given treatment can be considered to be contrary to 
human dignity under Article 10(1), without meeting the more stringent standard under 
Article 7. In addition, whereas Article 7 requires the State to refrain from engaging in 
certain acts (i. e., torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment), Article 10(1) 
imposes on the State positive obligations to treat detainees in a manner that does not 
violate their inherent dignity. Finally, while Article 7 is concerned with the physical 
integrity of the person, Article 10(1) is mainly concerned with the conditions in which 
detainees are kept. 2 
In many cases, the HRC has found a given treatment to violate simultaneously 
Articles 7 and 10(1). 3 However, the focus here will be on the additional protection 
provided by Article 10(1), as Article 7 has been already discussed. 4 The HRC's 
starting point is that material resources do not constitute a valid justification for not 
1 See supra para. 4.2.2. 
2 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 21, Article 10 (Forty-fourth session, 1992), 
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies, U. N. Doc. HRI\GEN\l\Rev. 1 at 33 (1994) para. 2-3 [hereinafter General Comment 21]; 
Nowak, M, U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Strasbourg: N. P. Engel, 1993), pp. 186-189. 
3 See Joseph, S, et a!, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Cases, Materials, and 
Commentary, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 280-281. 
4 See supra para. 5.1.1. 
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ensuring that detention conditions are consistent with the inherent dignity of the 
detainees. 5 In addition, the HRC indicated that it will use the minimum standards 
included in the U. N non-binding resolutions, which are applicable to the conditions of 
detention, as its guide to the interpretation of the right to humane treatment under 
Article 10(1), in particular the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners 1957 (Standard Minimum Rules). 6 In fact, the HRC has, in effect, 
incorporated the provisions of the Standard Minimum Rules into Article 10(1), as can 
be seen from its following statement: 
As to the conditions of detention in general, the Committee observes that 
certain minimum standards regarding the conditions of detention must be 
observed regardless of a State party's level of development. These include, 
in accordance with Rules 10,12,17,19 and 20 of the U. N. Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, minimum floor space and 
cubic content of air for each prisoner, adequate sanitary facilities, clothing 
which shall be in no manner degrading or humiliating, provision of a 
separate bed, and provision of food of nutritional value adequate for health 
and strength. ' 
The HRC's jurisprudence makes it very clear that a failure to meet the above- 
mentioned standards will automatically result in finding a violation of Article 10(1). 
Thus, the HRC has found, inter alia, inadequate bedding (lack of mattresses and/or 
blankets), 8 overcrowded conditions, 9 unsanitary conditions10 and insufficient natural 
light'' to constitute a violation of Article 10(1). 
5 General Comment 21, supra note 2, para. 4. 6 E. S. C. Res. 663(XXIV) C, U. N. ESCOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 11, U. N. Doc. E/3048 (1957) 
(amended 1977) [hereinafter Standard Minimum Rules]. See General Comment 21, supra note 2, para. 
5. These resolutions also include, The Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any 
Form of Detention or Imprisonment G. A. Res. 43/173, U. N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 49, U. N. 
Doc. A/43/49 (1988) [hereinafter BPPDI]; the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, G. A. 
Res. 34/169, U. N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 185, U. N. Doc. AJ34/46 (1979); and the 
Principles of Medical Ethics relevant to the Role of Health Personnel, particularly Physicians, in the 
Protection of Prisoners and Detainees against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, G. A. res. 37/194, annex, 37 U. N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 211, U. N. Doc. 
A/37/51 (1982). For a discussion of these resolutions, see Bernard, S, 'An Eye for an Eye: The Current 
Status of International Law on the Humane Treatment of Prisoners', Rutgers L. J., (1994), 25. 
7 Mukong v. Cameroon, Communication No. 458/1991, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991 (1994), 
ýara. 9.3. See also Joseph, supra note 3, pp. 283-284. 
Morgan and Williams v. Jamaica, Communication No. 720/1996, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/64/D/720/1996 
(1998), para. 7.2; Blaine v. Jamaica, Communication No. 696/1996, CCPR/C/60/D/696/1996 (1996), 
$ara. 8.4. 
Portorreal v. Dominican Republic, Communication No. 188/1984, U. N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A143/40) 
at 207 (1988)., para. 9.2,11; Heniy v. Trinidad and Tobago, Communication No. 752/1997, U. N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/64/D/752/1997 (1999), para. 7.4; Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago, Communication No. 
845/1998, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/74/D/845/1998 (2002), para. 7.8. 
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B. Canada 
6.2 Right to humane treatment 
In Canada, correctional and detention facilities fall under the jurisdiction of either the 
federal or the provincial government. Here, the aim is not to give a comprehensive 
review of detention centres in Canada, but rather to illustrate, for the purposes of 
comparison, how the right of detainees to humane treatment is protected in Canada. 
Hence, the discussion here is confined to the right of detainees to human treatment in 
Ontario, for the reasons that will appear from the following discussion. 
There are no clear rules that govern the conditions of detention centres in Ontario. 
Apart from the problem of overcrowding in detention centres, which has been 
acknowledged by the Canadian Government, 12 most detention conditions have been 
revealed during sentencing hearings in which convicted persons argued for what has 
become known as 'enhanced credit' for the time that they spent in pre-sentencing 
custody. Under s. 719(3) of the Criminal Code, the sentencing judge has the discretion 
to take into account any time spent by the offender in the pre-sentencing custody 
when determining the period of the sentence remaining to be served by the offender. 
Commonly, sentencing judges give an enhanced credit ratio of 2: 1 (i. e., 2 days credit 
for each day spent in pre-sentencing custody). The rational behind this approach, as 
explained by Arbour J., of the Supreme Court in R. v. Wust, 13 is that: 
The often applied ratio of 2: 1 reflects not only the harshness of the detention 
due to the absence of programs, which may be more severe in some cases 
than in others, but reflects also the fact that none of the remission 
mechanisms contained in the Corrections and Conditional Release Act apply 
to that period of detention. "Dead time" [i. e., time spent pre-sentencing 
custody] is "real" time. 14 
However, sentencing judges have gone beyond the enhanced credit ratio of 2: 1 in 
calculating the pre-sentencing custody time where the conditions of the pre- 
10 Amendola v. Uruguay, Communication No. 25/1978, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 at 136 (1985), paras. 
11,13; Yasseen and Thomas v. Republic of Guyana, Communication No. 676/1996, U. N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/62/D/676/1996 (1998), para. 7.4; Matthews v. Trinidad and Tobago, Communication No. 
569/1993, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/62/D/569/1993 (1998), para. 7.3. 
11 Levy v. Jamaica, Communication No. 719/1996, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/64/D/719/1996 (1998), para. 
7.4. 
12 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Fourth Periodic Reports of States Parties 
Due in 1995, Canada, CCPR/C/103/Add. 5. (1997), para. 111. 
13 (2000) 143 C. C. C. (3d) 129. 
14 Ibid. p. 148. 
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sentencing custody where the offender has been kept have been 'particularly 
troubling'. 15 In R. v. R. B., 16 the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of sexual assault 
of his common law partner of two years. The offender spent his pre-sentencing time 
in the Toronto East Detention Centre. The offender argued that the conditions of his 
pre-sentencing custody justified the application of enhanced credit of more than the 
ratio of 2: 1 in the sentencing calculation. The cells of the Detention Centre, which 
measured 9 feet by 13 feet, had a desk, a stool attached to the floor, and an open toilet 
area. It also contained a compartment holding blankets, sheets and a mattress, in case 
a third person had to sleep on the floor. The cells were originally designed to sleep 
two persons in a bunk bed. Due to overcrowded conditions in the Detention Centre, 
the offender was placed in a cell with two detainees, and he slept on the floor for 
about one month and a half. The medical records of the offender showed that he 
suffered from psychiatric difficulties as a result of his detention. In determining that 
pre-sentencing custody should be given an enhanced credit ratio of 3: 1, Feldman J. of 
the Ontario Court of Justice stated that: 
The use of enhanced credit in sentencing represents, in my view, a 
principled approach by judges in responding to prolonged inequity or 
unnecessary hardship occasioned by prisoners where "the circumstances of 
the incarceration are particularly troubling. " 
It permits the Court to signal those with responsibility for the care and 
housing of prisoners in our Charter-based society that it is concerned about 
the conditions in the jails and their impact on the security interests and 
human dignity of individual inmates, as well as the public interest in the 
protection of these values. '7 
The conditions of the pre-sentencing custody of the offender in R v. Kravchov, 
'$ was 
more disturbing. The offender was remanded in the Metro West Detention Centre. 
The Detention Centre was originally designed to hold one person per cell, which 
included one bunk and a desk. Due to the overcrowded conditions, a second bunk was 
added to each cell. However, for a number of years now three persons are kept in 
each cell, due to the soaring number of detainees being remanded in the Detention 
Centre. The third person in the cell sleeps on a mattress on the floor, bordered by the 
toilet at one end and by a desk at the other end. The offender had spent seven months 
15 R. v. Dorian, [2003] O. J. No. 1415, p. 8. 
16 [2003] O. J. No. 5627. 
17 Ibid. para. 15-16. 
11 [2002] O. J. No. 2172. 
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of his pre-sentencing custody at the West Detention Centre, and for 75% of the time 
he slept on the floor. In expressing his dissatisfaction with the accommodation 
arrangements at the Detention Centre, the sentencing Judge stated that '[t]here was an 
odd debate among the witnesses about whether inmates on the floor generally 
preferred to sleep with their heads beside the toilet to be closer to the open grill at the 
door, or to sleep with their heads under the desk. Whatever the popular answer at "the 
West", the choice speaks for itself. '19 
In addition, during a strike that lasted eight weeks, the inmates spent 20 hours a 
day in their cells. The meals during the strike were served in the cells, and, due to the 
offender's sleeping position, he ended up eating his meal on the toilet as it was the 
only remaining fixture in the cell. During the strike, the cells were left unclean. The 
offender, as a result of the conditions of his remand, contracted a skin disease with a 
visible infection on his face and hand. During the eight-week strike period, the 
offender did not receive any medical care. After reviewing the U. N. Standard 
Minimum Rules, 20 which dictate that, save in exceptional circumstances, each inmate 
should occupy a room by himself, the sentencing judge decided to apply an enhanced 
credit ratio of 3,5: 1 in calculating the sentence of the offender. 
C. Saudi Arabia 
6.3 Right to humane treatment 
As pointed out earlier, the DIPD is responsible for ensuring that detention conditions 
are compliant with the law. 21 This includes ensuring that the conditions of detention 
are healthful (i. e., sufficient light and air), sanitary (i. e., clean) and safe (i. e, there is 
nothing that could undermine the safety of the detainees such as exposure to electric 
cables etc. ). 22 If the relevant Member of the DIPD finds the conditions of the 
condition unsatisfactory, he will report his findings to the competent authority. 23 
Under Article 5 of the Prison and Detention Code (PDC), 24 detention centres are 
"Ibid. para. 18. 
20 See supra note 6. 
21 See supra para. 5.3.1.2. 
22 Interview with Investigator Anonymous, H. N. [Pseudonym. ], Public Prosecution and Investigation 
Commission Branch, Riyadh (July. 6, Sep. 11,2004). 
23 See supra para. 5.3.1.2. 
24 Issued by Royal Decree M/31 (29 May 1978). Published on Umm al-Qura (the Saudi official 
Gazette) No. 2729 on 17 June 1978. 
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subject to administrative, judicial and health inspections in accordance with the 
implementing regulation of the of the PDC. However, to date, the implementing 
regulation of the PDC has not been issued, hence, it is not clear how the 
administrative, judicial and health inspections under Article 5 of PDC are supposed to 
be carried out in practice. 
In the remainder of this section, attention will be focused on the conditions of 
three detention centres that the present researcher was able to visit during his 
fieldwork period. It is worth pointing out first that detention centres are attached to 
each police station, and the accused will spend his pre-trial detention, which could last 
up to six months, in the police detention facility until he is either charged, in which 
case he is transferred to the general prison, or released. 
In the Detention Centre of the Anti-Drug Police Department in Riyadh, there are 
two detention units. 25 The present researcher was allowed to inspect one detention 
unit. The detention unit did not include any beds or mattresses and, hence, detainees 
sleep on the floor. The detention unit measures about 20 metres long, 15 metres wide, 
and 5 metres high. It sometimes holds up to 270 detainees. Due to overcrowding, the 
detainees sleep 'in turn' (i. e, one group sleeps, while the other stay awake until the 
first group wake up, so the second group can find enough space on the floor in order 
to lie down on to sleep) as there is no enough space on the floor on which all 
detainees can lie down on to sleep at the same time. 26 Food waste and the vomit of 
those detainees who have been arrested while on drugs, are left lying on the floor. The 
unpleasant smell of the detention unit can be noted from ten metres away. Due to the 
filthy conditions of the detention centre, the present researcher, although he covered 
his nose, could not step more than two feet into the detention unit. According to one 
investigator, he went inside the detention unit to persuade a detainee who refused to 
leave his solitary confinement cell, which is located inside the detention unit, to come 
out for interrogation. Subsequently, the investigator contracted a skin disease, which, 
according to the diagnosing doctor, was caused by encountering 'epidemic 
conditions'. 27 Although repeated requests have been made by the DIPD to the 
25 Observation, Detention Centre of the Anti-Drug Police Department, Riyadh (Jun. 15,2004). 
26 Interview with Investigator Anonymous, U. B. [Pseudonym. ], Investigation and Public Prosecution 
Commission Branch, Riyadh (Jun. 15,2004). 
27 Interview with Investigator Anonymous, W. B [Pseudonym. ], Investigation and Public Prosecution 
Commission Branch, Riyadh (June. 15,2004). 
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provincial governor to find a radical solution to the problem of the conditions of 
detention, the problem remains unresolved. 28 
In the Detention Centre of the But'ha Police Station, there are two detention 
units. 29 The first detention unit measures about 6 metres long, 5 metres wide, and 3 
metres high. During the present researcher's visit, the detention unit was holding 
twenty persons. The detention unit does not contain beds or mattresses, except a few 
old blankets. The detainees were lying down on the floor next to each other, with 
hardly any space between them. The light in the detention unit was very dim, and only 
one of the six lamps in the detention unit was working. The air conditioner in the unit 
is very old, and given that it is always on, due to the very hot weather in Riyadh 
during the summer, and the overcrowded conditions in the detention unit, the air- 
conditioning in the unit is very poor. There is one toilet room with a shower, which is 
located inside the detention unit. The state of the toilet is unsanitary and the drinking 
water tap is placed directly above the toilet. 
The second detention unit measures about 5 metres long, 4 metres, wide and 3 
metres high. As with the first detention unit, the second detention unit is overcrowded 
and, during the time of the visit, was being used to hold 22 detainees. The detention 
unit does not have beds or mattresses, except a few old blankets. The detainees were 
lying down next to each other without any space between them whatsoever for any 
movement. There is one toilet room with a shower inside the detention unit. The 
drinking water tap is placed inside the toilet room. The state of the toilet room is 
unsanitary. Although there is enough light inside the detention unit, the air- 
conditioning was very poor. The solitary confinement cells measure about one and a 
half metres long, half a metre wide, and 2 metres high. There is a toilet inside the cell, 
which occupies about a third of the cell space. The detainee sleeps on the floor, 
without a bed, mattress or blanket on the remaining two thirds of the cell space. There 
is no barrier between the toilet and the place where the detainee sleeps, nor is there 
any air-conditioning inside the cell. 
The Detention Centre of Maliz Police Station has two detention units. 30 However, 
because few detainees are held in the Detention Centre, the second detention unit is 
not used. The detention unit measures about 10 metres long, 5 metres wide and 3 
28 Interview with Investigator Anonymous, H. N., supra note 22. 
29 Observation, Detention Centre of al-But'ha Police Station, Riyadh (July. 4,2004). 30 Observation, Detention Centre of the Maliz Police Station, Riyadh (Aug. 15,2004). 
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metres high. It has four toilet rooms, without showers. During the present researcher's 
visit, there were only five detainees held in the detention unit. The air-conditioning 
was excellent, the conditions of the unit and toilet rooms were sanitary, and there was 
sufficient light in the detention unit. The detention unit does not have beds, or 
mattresses, except a few old blankets, so detainees sleep on the floor. There are also 
four air-conditioned solitary confinement cells. It is worth mentioning here an 
incident that the present researcher witnessed during his visit to Maliz Police Station. 
An investigator confronted an accused with the alleged victim of an indecent assault, 
who were both Philippine nationals, outside the detention unit. The accused, when the 
investigator was talking to the alleged victim some five metres away, showed the 
present researcher, who was observing the confrontation, what seemed to be a skin 
disease on his lower back, presumably believing that the present researcher was a 
person in authority who could help him with his problem. 31 
6.4 Comparison 
The Saudi and the Canadian detention centres suffer from the same problem, namely, 
overcrowding. However, the two systems differ in respect of the judicial response to 
the failure of the government under the respective systems to secure satisfactory 
detention conditions. The Canadian courts responded, firstly, by condemning inhuman 
detention conditions where and when they exist, and secondly, by giving an enhanced 
credit to the period spent by the offender in unsatisfactory pre-sentencing custody 
conditions. By contrast, the Saudi courts have not intervened at all in the problem of 




The Right to Liberty 
A. International human rights law 
7.1 Right to liberty 
Article 9 of the ICCPR states that: 
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his 
liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as 
are established by law. 
2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the 
reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges 
against him. 
3. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought 
promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise 
judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to 
release. It shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be 
detained in custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to appear for 
trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and, should occasion 
arise, for execution of the judgement. 
4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be 
entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that the court may 
decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his 
release if the detention is not lawful. 
Article 9(1) of the ICCPR guarantees two distinct rights: liberty and security of 
person. The discussion here is concerned only with the right to liberty, as security of 
person has no application in the pre-trial of the criminal process. 
' The right to liberty 
protects the physical liberty of individuals. 2 The obvious examples of interference 
with the right to liberty, as mentioned in Article 9(l), include arrest and detention. 
However, the right to liberty, unlike, for instance, the right not to be subjected to ill- 
treatment under Article 7, does not prohibit all kinds of interference with liberty, but 
only prohibits those interferences that are arbitrary or unlawful. 
See Pcez v. Colombia, Communication No. 195/1985, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/39/D/195/1985 (1990), 
para. 5.5. 
Cf. Engel and Others v. The Netherlands (No. 1) (1979-80) 1 E. H. R. R. 647, para. 58 
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In the following sections, the prohibition of arbitrary and unlawful deprivation of 
the right to liberty and the procedural safeguards designed to protect the right to 
liberty under Article 9, will be discussed in detail, including: 
" the right to be informed of the reasons for arrest and any charges against him; 
" the right to be brought promptly before a judicial officer; 
" the right be released on bail; 
" the right to be tried within reasonable time; and 
" the right to habeas corpus. 
7.1.1 Prohibition of arbitrary and unlawful deprivations of 
liberty 
In order for a deprivation of liberty to comply with Article 9(1), it must not be 
arbitrary, and it must be carried out 'on such grounds and in accordance with such 
procedures as are established by law'. 3 In order to satisfy the non-arbitrariness 
requirement, the deprivation of liberty, according to the HRC, must seek to secure a 
legitimate aim, necessary in the circumstances and proportionate to the aim pursued. 
4 
Consequently, the HRC has held that a detention, which did not aim, for example, 'to 
prevent flight, interference with evidence or the recurrence of crime' (i. e., does not 
secure a legitimate aim) to be arbitrary. 5 On the basis of the same reasoning, it can be 
persuasively argued that arresting someone without reasonable grounds for believing 
that he has committed an offence, or that he was going to commit an offence is 
arbitrary too. This is because the exercise of the power is not based on the reasonable 
grounds that the arrest is necessary for the purposes of effective law enforcement, 
which is the legitimate aim of the power to arrest in the context of the criminal 
justice. 6 
3 ICCPR, Art. 9(1). 
Alpken v. The Netherlands, Communication No. 305/1988, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/39/D/305/1988 
(1990), para. 5.8. Cf. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 27, Freedom of Movement 
(Art. 12), (Sixty-seventh session, 1999), U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. l/Add. 9 (1999), reprinted in 
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies, U. N. Doc. HRUGEN/1/Rev. 6 at 174 (2003), para. 13 [hereinafter General Comment 27]. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Article 5(1)(c) of the ECHR requires explicitly that in order for an arrest or detention of persons, 
which is effected for the purposes of criminal law enforcement, not to be arbitrary, it must be based on 
'reasonable suspicion of having committed and offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary 
to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so'. Cf also Fox, et al v. United 
Kingdom (1991) 13 E. H. R. R. 157, para. 32. 
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With regard to the proportionately requirement, the HRC has indicated that where 
measures less intrusive than the deprivation of liberty are available to secure the aim 
pursued, the deprivation of liberty would be considered disproportionate and, hence, 
arbitrary. In the case of C v. Australia, ' the HRC considered the practice of the 
Australian government whereby all persons who illegally enter the country and 
subsequently apply for refugee status are subjected to mandatory detention, without a 
review of the particular circumstances of each case or the need for detaining the 
person concerned to ensure that he does not abscond into the community while his 
refugee claim is being determined. As the HRC was of the opinion that less intrusive 
measures could have been adopted with regard to the applicant, such as the imposition 
of reporting obligations or sureties, it held that detention in this case was 
disproportionate to the end sought and, consequently, arbitrary in violation of Article 
9(1). 8 
With regard to the requirement of lawfulness, the HRC has not elaborated on the 
meaning of the phrase 'on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as 
are established by law' in the context of Article 9(1). However, the HRC has provided 
some guidance with regard to the lawfulness requirement under Article 17 (the right 
to privacy) in which unlawful interference with Article 17 are prohibited, which are 
equally applicable to the requirement of lawfulness under Article 9(1). In the 
Committee's view, in order for an interference to be considered lawful, it must be 
authorised by the national law, and the law itself must be consistent with 'the 
provisions, aims, and objectives of the Covenant'. 9 In addition, the law must set out 
precisely and in detail the circumstances under which restrictions on Article 9 are 
permitted. 1° Thus, where the law grants public officials discretionary powers, the 
scope of these powers must be sufficiently clear to ensure that the powers are not 
arbitrarily exercised. " Therefore, a law that grants wide and vague discretionary 
powers would be considered as failing to meet the lawfulness requirement. 12 
Communication No. 900/1999, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/76/D/900/1999 (2002). 
8 Ibid. para. 8.2. 
9 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 16, (Twenty-third session, 1988), Compilation of 
General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U. N. 
Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev. I at 21 (1994), para. 4. Cf. General Comment 27, supra note 4, para. 12. 
1° Ibid. para. 8. 
Cf. Olsson v. Sweden (1989) 11 E. H. R. R. 259, para. 61(c). ý2 Cf. Malone v. United Kingdom (1985) 7 E. H. R. R. 14, paras. 79-80,86-87. 
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7.1.2 Right to be informed of the reasons for arrest and any 
charges against him 
Under Article 9(2) a person who has been arrested, has to be informed of the reasons 
for his arrest and any charges against him. In applying Article 9(2), two issues will 
arise. The first issue concerns when the arrested person is entitled to be informed of 
the reasons for his arrest. The second issue concerns the amount of information 
required to be provided to the arrested person in order to comply with Article 9(2). 
Before addressing these issues, it is imperative first to determine the purpose of 
Article 9(2), which has a significant bearing on whether the timing or the amount of 
information in a given case is compliant with Article 9(2) or not. According to the 
HRC, the purpose of Article 9(2) is to give the arrested person the opportunity to 
make an informed decision as to whether to exercise his right to challenge the legality 
of his detention by way of habeas corpus under Article 9(4) in order to secure his 
release if he believes the reasons for his arrest to be unfounded. 13 In addition, 
apprising the arrested person of the reasons for his arrest enables him to refute the 
allegations against him and, thereby, secure his release without the need for applying 
for habeas cor pus. 14 
Under Article 9(2), the information regarding the reasons for the arrest must be 
given at the time of the arrest. The HRC held that a three-hour delay was not 
inconsistent with the requirement to inform the accused of the reasons for his arrest 
under Article 9(2). 15 On the other hand, a delay of seven days has been held to be 
inconsistent with the requirement of Article 9(2). 16 The HRC has not set a minimum 
time limit within which the arrested person has to be informed of the reasons for his 
arrest. However, a delay, exceeding twenty four hours would seem to breach Article 
13 Caldas v. Uruguay, Communication No. 43/1979, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 at 80 (1990), para. 13.2. 
C Fox, et a! v. United Kingdom, supra note 6, para. 40. 
Cf. Harris, D, at al, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (London: Butterworths, 
1995), p. 129. 
Is Michael, et al v. Spain, Communication No. 526/1993, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/526/1993 (1997), 
para. 12. 
6 Peter Grant v. Jamaica, Communication No. 597/1994, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/56/D/597/1994 (1996), 
para. 8.1. 
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9(2), as, if a such delay were permitted, the purpose of Article 9(2) would be 
effectively defeated. ' 7 
With regard to the information to be communicated to the arrested person under 
Article 9(2) of the ICCPR, the arrested person needs to be apprised of the factual and 
legal basis for his arrest. 18 Thus, the HRC has held, inter alia, that not informing the 
arrested person of the facts of the crime for which he was arrested, including the 
identity of the alleged victim, was inconsistent with the information requirement 
under Article 9(2). 19 
7.1.3 Right to be brought promptly before a judicial officer 
Article 9(3) stipulates that '[a]nyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be 
brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial 
power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. ' As the 
wording of Article 9(3) makes clear, it is the obligation of the State to bring the 
arrested or detained person promptly before a judicial officer. Thus, it cannot be 
argued, where the arrested or detained person has not been brought promptly before a 
judicial officer, that Article 9(3) has not been violated because the arrested or detained 
person did not request the review of his arrest or detention. 
20 
The wording of Article 9(3) seemingly suggests that only persons who have been 
charged with a criminal offence and subsequently are arrested or detained, are entitled 
to be brought before a judicial officer to review the need to detain them. This reading, 
in effect, prevents persons who have been arrested or detained but not yet charged 
from exercising the right to have the reasons for their detention reviewed by a judicial 
officer. However, such a reading is inconsistent with the purpose of Article 9(3), 
which is 'the protection of the individual against arbitrary interferences by the State 
with his right to libertyi21 and to keep pre-trial detention 'as short as possible'. 
22 Thus, 
17 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. 
1s Caldas v. Uruguay, supra note 13, paras. 13.2,14. Cf. Fox, et a! v. United Kingdom, supra note 6, 
para. 40. 
" Kelly v. Jamaica, Communication No. 253/1987, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/41/D/253/1987 at 60 (1991), 
0" 
ra. 5.8. 
Cf. TW v. Malta (2000) 29 E. H. R. R. 185, para. 43. 
21 Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom (1989) 11 E. H. R. R. 117, para. 58. 
22 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 8, Article 9 (Sixteenth session, 1982), Compilation of 
General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U. N. 
Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev. 1 at 8 (1994), para. 3 [hereinafter General Comment 8]. Cf. McGoff v. Sweden 
(1984) 6 E. H. R. R. CD 101, para. 26. 
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the purpose of Article 9(3) is defeated if it only applies to post-charge deprivation of 
liberty, as the State can escape the obligation under Article 9(3) by simply refraining 
from charging the accused. 
The HRC has not elaborated on this issue. However, the HRC's jurisprudence 
under Article 9(3), in particular the fact that the time to be considered under the 
promptness requirement runs from the moment when the arrest is made, suggests that 
Article 9(3) applies to all deprivations of liberty for the purposes of criminal law 
enforcement, regardless of whether there has been a charge or not. 
23 Alternatively, 
`charge' within the meaning of Article 9(3) is to be given an autonomous meaning 
similar to that of the concept of'charge' under Article 14, which considers a person to 
be charged for the purposes of Article 14 once he has been subjected to the State's 
coercive powers (i. e, arrested), regardless of whether or not he is considered to be 
formally charged under the domestic law. 24 
In order to comply with Article 9(3), the arrested or detained person must be 
brought promptly before a judicial officer. These requirements are discussed next. 
7.1.3.1 Promptness 
The requirement of promptness, according to the HRC, means that an arrested or 
detained person must be brought before a judicial officer within 'a few days' from his 
arrest or detention. 25 Although the HRC has not fixed a maximum time limit under the 
requirement of promptness, its jurisprudence suggests a delay that exceeds three days 
constitutes a violation of Article 9(3). 2G 
23 See ibid. para. 2; Kulomin v. Hungary, Communication No. 521/1992, U. N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/50/D/521/1992 (1996), para. 11.2; Borisenko v. Hungary, Communication No. 852/1999, 
U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/75/D/852/1999 (2002), para. 7.4; Freemantle v. Jamaica, Communicaiton No. 
625/1995, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/68/D/625/1995 (2000), para. 7.4; Silbert Daley v. Jamaica, 
Communication No. 750/1997, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/63/D/750/199 (1998), 7.1. It is also worth 
mentioning that under Article 5(3) in conjunction with Article 5(1)(c) of the ECHR and under Article 
7(5) of the ACHR, every person who has been arrested or detained for the purposes of criminal law 
enforcement, is entitled to be brought promptly before a judicial officer to review the grounds of his 
detention, and to be released if there are insufficient grounds for detaining him. 
24 The concept of'charge' within the meaning of Article 14 is discussed in detail infra para. 8.1.1 
25 General Comment 8, supra note 22, para. 2. 
26 Joseph, S, et al, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials, and 
Commentary, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 324-325. Similarly, the European 
Court held that a delay of four days and six hours was incompatible with the requirement of 
promptness under the corresponding provision in Article 5(3) of the ECHR. See Brogan and Others v. 
United Kingdom, supra note 21, para. 62. 
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7.1.3.2 Judicial officer 
Article 9(3) requires the detention to be reviewed by a 'judge or other officer 
authorised by law to exercise judicial power'. In the case of Kulomin v. Hungary 
27 the 
HRC stated that the exercise of judicial power within the meaning of Article 9(3) 
entails that the detention is reviewed by an 'independent, objective and impartial' 
authority. 28 Consequently, the HRC held that the Hungarian prosecutor, who reviewed 
the detention in the case under consideration, could not be regarded as a judicial 
officer because he lacked 'the institutional objectivity and impartiality' required by 
Article 9(3). 29 However, the problem with the HRC's ruling is that it did not specify 
why the Hungarian Prosecutor lacked the necessary 'institutional objectivity and 
impartiality', 30 nor was it clear from the parties' arguments how this conclusion has 
been reached. 
Given that the requirement of a judicial officer under Article 9(3) corresponds 
literally to the requirement of judicial officers under Article 5(3) of the ECHR, it is 
justified to draw upon the European Court's jurisprudence in this respect. According 
to the European Court, certain guarantees are required in order for an official to be 
qualified as a judicial officer within the meaning of Art 5(3) of the ECHR. These 
guarantees, as summarised by Judge Matscher of the European Court in his dissenting 
opinion in Huber v. Switzerland , 
31 are as follows: 
[I]nstitutional guarantees: independence vis-a-vis the executive and the 
parties; 
[P]rocedural guarantees: obligation of the official concerned to hear 
himself the accused brought before him; and 
[S]ubstantive guarantees: decision on the continuation of detention or 
release to be taken by reference to legal criteria, after circumstances 
militating for and against detention have been examined; power to order 
release if they are insufficient reasons to justify the detention. 
32 
The main issue raised in Huber concerned the last phrase of the first guarantee: the 
independence of the judicial officer from the parties (i. e., impartiality). The European 
27 Supra note 23. 
28 Ibid. para. 11.3. 
29 Ibid. 
70 A point of view which has been expressed in this case by Mr. Nisuke Ando in his dissenting opinion. 
See ibid. 
31 Judgment of 23 October 1990, A 188. 
32 Ibid para. 1 (Judge Matscher, dissenting). These requirements had been unanimously adopted by the 
European Court in Schiesser v. Switzerland (1979-80) 2 E. H. R. R. 417, para. 31. 
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Court considered whether the combination of the investigating and prosecuting 
functions by a judicial officer is compatible with the requirement of impartiality under 
Article 5(3) of the ECHR. The case concerned District Attorneys in Switzerland, who 
were empowered to conduct investigations into criminal offences, draw up the 
indictment and, in some cases, play the role of the prosecuting counsel against the 
accused who was detained by the same District Attorney. The Swiss government 
argued that District Attorneys were impartial as they were required to look for and 
consider incriminating and exonerating evidence in carrying out the investigation or 
drawing up the indictment, and that they were appointed for their posts by universal 
direct suffrage for a renewable term of four years. However, the European Court took 
the view that the combination of the investigating and prosecuting functions, despite 
the mentioned guarantees, whether in fact occurred or theoretically possible, opens to 
doubt the impartiality of the District Attorneys in charge of reviewing the detention. 
Therefore, they cannot be considered as judicial officers within the meaning of Article 
5(3) of the ECHR. 33 
A further question arises here is whether the exercise of investigating functions by 
an official responsible for reviewing the detention undermines his impartiality. This 
question concerns systems that adopt the inquisitorial mode of process, in which the 
investigating judge carries out the investigation and plays the role of a 'judicial officer' 
within the meaning of Article 9(3) or the role of'court' within the meaning of Article 
9(4). The European Court has, in many cases in which the impartiality of a given 
investigating judge was contested, answered the question before it without addressing 
whether the combination of investigating and judicial functions by the investigating 
judge is compatible with the impartiality requirement, as it was never raised before 
it. 34 
33 Ibid. para. 43. The need to the separation of investigating and prosecuting functions to satisfy the 
impartiality requirement under 5(3) was confirmed by the European Court in Brincat v. Italy (1993) 16 
E. H. R. R. 591, para. 21, when it stated that: 
[O]nly the objective appearances at the time of the decision on detention are material: if it then 
appears that the 'officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power' may later intervene, in the 
subsequent proceedings, as a representative of the prosecuting authority, there is a risk that his 
impartiality may arouse doubts which are to be held objectively justified. 
34 See Schiesser v. Switzerland, supra note 32; Huber v. Switzerland, supra note 31; Bezicheri v. Italy 
(1990) 12 E. H. R. R. 210; Brincat v. Italy, supra note 33. 
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It should be noted, however, that there is a wide scepticism about the impartiality 
of investigating judges within countries that adopt the inquisitorial mode of process. 
35 
The investigating judge, by virtue of being the master of the investigation, has the 
ultimate responsibility for the successful completion of the investigation. Thus, the 
investigating judge has a vested interest in keeping the accused in detention in order, 
for example, to pressure the accused to confess, which opens the impartiality of the 
investigating judge widely to doubt. 36 As Samet, eloquently, put it: 
[The very character of the role of the juge d'instruction] thus surprises and 
misleads, and it has become common to ask oneself whether the juge 
d'instruction is Salomon or Maigret, judge or investigator, defender of right or 
pursuer of wrongs. 37 
Therefore, it can be safely concluded that an official in charge of the investigation 
does not constitute 'a judicial officer' within the meaning of Article 9(3) of the ICCPR 
or Article 5(3) of the ECHR. 
7.1.4 Right to bail 
According to Article 9(3) of the ICCPR, an arrested or detained person 'shall be 
entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. It shall not be the general rule 
that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to 
guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and, 
should occasion arise, for execution of the judgement'. The quoted passage of Article 
9(3) guarantees an arrested or detained person two distinct rights: release on bail and 
trial within a reasonable time. Here attention will be focused on the former right as the 
latter is discussed in the next section. 38 Article 9(3) of the ICCPR states explicitly that 
the general rule is to release the arrested or detained person on bail, a rule that seeks 
to reinforce the fundamental principle that the accused is presumed innocent and must 
35 For a discussion of the impartiality of investigating judges under the French inquisitorial system, see 
Leigh, L& Zedner, L, A Report on the Administration of Criminal Justice in the Pre-trial Phase in 
France and Germany (London: HOMS, Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, Study no 1,1992), pp. 
23,48-49; Elliott, C, French Criminal Law (Devon: Willan Publishing, 2001), pp. 40-43. 
34 See Elliott, supra note 35, pp. 40-43; Harris, supra note 14, p. 147. 
37 As quoted in Bell, J, French Legal Cultures (Butterworths: London, 2001), p. 115. 
38 See infra para. 7.1.5. 
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be treated as such until he is proven otherwise in accordance with law, as dictated by 
Article 14(3) of the ICCPR. 39 
The combination of the right to liberty and the presumption of innocence dictates 
that the detention of the accused cannot be solely based upon a suspicion, however 
compelling, that the accused has committed a criminal offence. Therefore, there must 
be additional public interest grounds to justify the detention of the accused who is 
innocent in the eyes of the law, pending investigation or trial. 40 According to the 
Committee, pre-trial detention is considered necessary for the public interest if it is 
effected in order, for example, to prevent flight, interference with the course of justice 
or the commission of an offence while the accused is at large . 
41 Other grounds for 
denying bail on the basis of the public interest include the protection of the accused 
himself, and the prevention of the disturbance of the peace. 42 The burden of 
establishing that pre-trial detention is necessary for the public interest lies with the 
State. 43 Pre-trial detention for fear of the accused absconding cannot be interfered 
merely from, for example, the fact that the accused is a foreigner, 44 or from the fact 
that the potential sentence is sever. 45 
In the absence of public interests grounds for detaining the accused, he must be 
released on bail. Article 9(3) allows conditions to be attached to bail. It mentions that 
the granting of bail can be conditional on the accused's undertaking that he will attend 
his trial. However, other conditions that do not aim to ensure the attendance of the 
arrested or detained person at his trial are also permitted under Article 9(3) as long as 
they aim to secure a legitimate goal, such as preventing the accused from intimidating 
39 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 13, Article 14 (Twenty-first session, 1984), 
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies, U. N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev. I at 14 (1994), para. 7 [hereinafter General Comment 13]. 
40 W. B. E. v. The Netherlands, Communication No. 432/1990, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/46/D/432/1990 
(1992), paras. 6.3-6.4. Cf. Stogmuller v. Austria (1979-1980) 1 E. H. R. R. 155, para. 4; Tornasi v. France 
(1993) 15 E. H. R. R. 1, para. 84; C. C. v. The United Kingdom, App no. 32819/96, Report of 30 June 
1998, para. 43. Cf. also Dijk, , P, et a!, 
Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, 3rd edn (The Hague; Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1998), p. 461 & n. 998. 41 Ibid. 
42 Cf. Harris, supra note 14,139-142; Starmer, K, et a!, Criminal justice, Police Powers and Human 
Rights (London: Blackstone, 2001), pp. 110-113. 
43 Hill v. Spain, Communication No. 526/1993, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/526/1993 (1997), para. 12.3. 
W. v. Switzerland (1994) 17 E. H. R. R. 60, p. 84 (Judge Pettiti, dissenting). 
41, bid. 
45 Cf. Letellier v. France (1992) 14 E. H. R. R. 83, para. 43. 
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witnesses, or committing an offence while he is at large. The logic behind this, as 
observed by Harris et al, is that: 
[I]t would be unsatisfactory if Article 5(3) [of the ECHR, which 
corresponds literally to Article 9(3) of the ICCPR in this respect, ] did not 
allow any considerations other than appearance at trial to be taken into 
account when allowing bail. Such an approach might work to a person's 
disadvantage in that it might prevent his release altogether if, for example, 
a condition as to the suppression of evidence or the prevention of crime 
were not permissible. 46 
On the other hand, conditions that are not related to the purposes of the bail system, 
such as basing the amount of the financial guarantee as a condition of bail solely on 
the economic consequences of a given alleged crime that the accused has allegedly 
committed, constitutes a violation of Article 9(3). 47 
7.1.5 Right to trial within a reasonable time 
Article 9(3) entitles anyone who is under arrest or detention to 'trial within a 
reasonable time or to release'. The HRC has interpreted the quoted passage of Article 
9(3), to mean pre-trail detention period of the accused pending his trial must not be 
unreasonable. The requirement of 'reasonableness' means that pre-trial detention must 
be as short as possible. 48 Thus, where the length of the pre-trial detention is 
unjustified in the light of the circumstances of a given case, the detention would be 
considered as unreasonable, and, therefore, in breach of Article 9(3). 49 The time to be 
taken into account in deciding the reasonableness of the pre-trial detention runs from 
the moment a person is arrested until a decision on the merits of the case at the first 
instance has been reached. 50 The HRC has not elaborated on the factors to be taken 
into account when deciding whether or not the pre-trial detention is reasonable. 
Instead, the HRC has consistently held that, in the absence of a satisfactory response 
from the respondent state to a period of time that is prima facie unreasonable 
46 Harris, supra note 14, p. 142. 
47 Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, Argentina, U. N. Doc. A/50140, paras. 
144-165 (1995), para. 157. Cf. Neumeister v. Austria (No. 1) (1979-80) 1 E. H. R. R. 91, para. 14 
48 General Comment 8, supra note 22, para. 3. 
49 See Fillastre, et al v. Bolivia, Communication No. 336/1988, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/43/D/336/1988 at 
96 (1991), para. 6.5; Teesdale v. Trinidad and Tobago, Communication No. 677/1996, U. N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/74/D/677/1996 (2002), para. 9.3; Kone v. Senegal, Communication No. 386/1989, U. N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/52/D/386/1989 (1994), para. 8.7. 
50 Ibid. para. 6.5; Thomas v. Jamaica, Communication No 614/1995, U. N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/65/D/614/ 1995 (1999), para. 9.6. 
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(approximately sixteen months), the right to be tried within a reasonable time is 
violated . 
51 The HRC has developed a set of factors to determine whether the accused 
is tried without undue delay under Article 14 (3)(c), which equally applies to Article 
9(3) of the ICCPR. These factors include the complexity of the case, the conduct of 
both the accused and the State authorities. 52 
7.1.6 Right to habeas corpus 
In order to remedy any alleged violation of Article 9, Article 9(4) stipulates that any 
person who has been arrested or detained has the right 'to take proceedings before a 
court, in order that the court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his 
detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful'. As discussed earlier, 
Article 2(3) of the ICCPR guarantees a general right to an effective remedy. However, 
where there is an alleged violation of Article 9, only the right to habeas corpus can 
constitute an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 2(3). 53 It is also 
noteworthy that the general right to remedy under Article 2(3) and the specific 
remedy under Article 9(4) differs in that the former only applies where an individual 
has 'an arguable claim' that his Covenant has been violated, while the latter applies 
whenever there is a deprivation of liberty irrespective of whether there is an arguable 
claim that Article 9 has been violated or not. Furthermore, the right to habeas corpus 
is a continuing remedy in the sense that it is not sufficient only to allow a person who 
has been detained to have the lawfulness of his detention reviewed by a 'court', and 
then to keep him detained indefinitely without a proper judicial review over his 
detention. Detention is an exception that must not last more than it is strictly 
necessary to protect the public interest. Thus, it must be subjected to constant judicial 
supervision, preferably in the form of periodic reviews within reasonable intervals, to 
ensure that it is not prolonged more than is strictly required. 54 
Unlike Article 9(3), Article 9(4) requires the person who has been arrested or 
detained to take the initiative to assert his right to have the lawfulness of his detention 
51 n__ An n__ _r_ _ r_ -- - _. _ ni _ -ýnn aee supra nose wy. aee aiso Josepn, supra note zo, p.. 3ca. 
" Wolf v. Panama, Communication No. 289/1988, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/44/D/289/1988 at 80 (1992), 
para. 6.4; Stephens v. Jamaica, Communication No. 373/1989, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/55/D/373/1989 
(1995), para. 9.8; Michael, et al v. Spain, Communication No. 526/1993, U. N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/59/D/526/1993 (1997), para. 12.4. Cf. Kbnig v. FRG (1979-80) 2 E. H. R. R. 170, para. 99. 
53 See supra para. 4.1. 
54 Cf. Bezicheri v. Italy, supra note 34, para. 21. 
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reviewed by a 'court'. 55 However, the State on its part is obliged to make the remedy 
of habeas corpus available to any person who has been deprived of his liberty as soon 
as the deprivation of liberty has taken place in order to comply with Article 9(4). 
Therefore, if the law does not guarantees this right, delays its application, or if it is 
practically impossible to exercise it, Article 9(4) is violated regardless of whether the 
detention is lawful or not. Hence, the HRC held that the non-availability of the right 
of habeas corpus to the detained person until his detention was confirmed by an order 
of the Minister of Interior one week after the deprivation of liberty had taken place 
constituted a violation of Article 9(4). 56 The HRC also held that where a person was 
kept for three days in incommunicado detention, he had been practically denied the 
right to habeas corpus under Article 9(4). 57 
Once the arrested or detained person has asserted his right to habeas corpus, the 
'court' in charge of reviewing the lawfulness of the detention must take its decision 
'without delay. There is no maximum time limit within which the decision has to be 
taken, and whether the decision has been taken 'without delay' can be only determined 
in light of the circumstances of each case. 58 
For any mechanism dealing with alleged violations of the ICCPR provisions to be 
considered a remedy, it must be effective. The right to habeas corpus is not an 
exception to that rule. In order to enable the arrested or detained person to exercise his 
right to habeas corpus effectively, he must have access to a 'court'. During the 
detention review process, the detainee must be allowed to respond to any arguments 
put by the State against his release before the 'court', which is in charge of reviewing 
his detention, makes its decision on the merits of the request of the detainee to be 
released. 59 This does not necessarily have to be in the form of an oral hearing, and 
written proceedings seem to be sufficient to satisfy the principle of equality of arms in 
55 Stephens v. Jamaica, Communication No. 373/1989, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/55/D/373/1989 (1995), 
para. 9.7. 
Torres v. Finland, Communication No. 291/1988, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/38/D/291/1988 (1990), para. 
7.2. Similarly, the European Court has held that the non-availability of the right to habeas corpus to the 
accused for two weeks after his arrest constituted a violation of the right to habeas corpus under Article 
5(4) of the ECHR. See De Jong, et al v. The Netherlands (1986) 8 E. H. R. R. 20, para. 58. 
57 Hammel v. Madagascar, Communication No. 155/1983, U. N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/42/40) at 130 
1987), paras. 18.2,19.4,20. 
8 Torres v. Finland, supra note 56, para. 7.4. 
59 Cf. Sanchez-Reisse v. Switzerland (1987) 9 E. H. R. R. 71, para. 51-52. 
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this respect. 60 There is no requirement for the accused, or his representative, to be 
present at the bail hearing, where his absence from the hearing will not undermine his 
ability to challenge the reasons for his detention effectively. 61 
Additionally, the authority in charge of reviewing the lawfulness of detention 
must be impartial and independent in order to be qualified as a 'court' within the 
meaning of Article 9(4). 62 If the authority responsible for reviewing detention fails to 
meet the criteria of impartiality and independence required in order to qualify as 'a 
judicial officer' within the meaning of Article 9(3), as discussed above, it will a priori 
fail to meet the requirement of 'court' within the meaning of Article (4). Furthermore, 
in order for an authority to be qualified as a'court' within the meaning of Article 9(4), 
it must be able to review the 'lawfulness' of the detention in terms of its consistency 
with domestic law and the Covenant. 63 Finally, the authority reviewing the detention 
must be empowered to issue legally binding decisions, including the release of the 
detainee if the detention is found to be 'unlawful' within the meaning of Article 9(4). 64 
B. Canada 
7.2 Right to liberty 
There are various sections under the Canadian Charter that deal with the right to 
liberty, which include the following: 
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the 
right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice. 
9. Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned. 
10. Everyone has the right on arrest or detention: 
(a) to be informed promptly of the reasons therefor; 
(b) 
... (c) to have the validity of the detention determined by way of habeas corpus 
and to be released if the detention is not lawful. 
60 Cf ibid. 
61 Cf. ibid. para. 51. 
62 Torres v. Finland, supra note 56, para. 7.2. Cf. Dc Wilde, v. Belgium (No. 1) (1979-80) 1 E. H. R. R. 
373, para. 77. 
63 A v. Australia, Communication No. 560/1993, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (1997), para. 9.5; 
C v. Australia, supra note 7, para. 8.3. Cf. Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom, supra note 21, para. 
65. 
64 Ibid. Cf. Van Droogenbroeck v. Belgium (1982) 4 E. H. R. R. 443, para. 51. 
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11. Any person charged with an offence has the right: 
b) to be tried within a reasonable time; 
e) not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause. 
What follows is a discussion of the right to liberty and the safeguards, which are 
designed to protect this right, as guaranteed under the above-quoted sections. 
7.2.1 Section 7 
Section 7 of the Charter protects three rights, namely, the right to life, liberty and 
security of person. Section 7, however, does not provide unqualified protection for the 
rights it guarantees in the sense that the Charter does not prohibit all interferences 
with these rights. Instead, it prohibits interfering with section 7 rights without 
respecting the principles of fundamental justice. It follows that the analysis of section 
7 consists of two stages. In the first stage, it will be determined whether the 
applicant's right to life, liberty or security of person has been violated. In the second 
stage, if a violation of a section 7 right has been found, the question to be addressed, 
is whether the violation of the protected right conforms with the principles of 
fundamental justice. Hence, the analysis of section 7 in the following sections will 
focus on two issues. Firstly, to determine the meaning of the right to liberty in the 
criminal justice sphere; secondly, to determine those principles of fundamental justice 
with which a violation of the right to liberty has to accord in order to survive the 
Charter scrutiny. 
7.2.1.1 Liberty 
It should be noted from the outset that the Supreme Court throughout section 7 case 
law has refrained from determining the full scope of Article 7 with regard to both 
aspects: the rights it protects and the principles of fundamental justice. Instead, the 
Court preferred to address the scope of section 7 with regard to the case before them. 
The full scope will be determined gradually as the Court addresses alleged violations 
of the rights protected under section 7. G5 The full scope of the right to liberty is 
unclear as there are conflicting views outside the criminal law sphere. 66 However, in 
65 Morgentaler at al. v. R, [1988] 1 S. C. R. 30,51. 66 For a detailed discussion of the meaning of liberty under s. 7, see Garant, P, 'Fundamental Rights, 
Fundamental Justice', in The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 3rd edn, ed. by G Beaudoin & 
E Mendes, (Scarborough, Ont: Carswell, 1995), ch. 9, p. 12-16. 
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the context of the criminal justice system, the right to liberty protects, at least, against 
governmental interferences with the physical liberty of the individual. 
67 
6.2.1.2 Principles of fundamental justice 
The principles of fundamental justice have been subjected to extensive interpretation 
by the Supreme Court. The Court has stressed that the clause of the principles of 
fundamental justice is a qualifier of the right to life, liberty and security of person. 
Justice Lamer in the leading case of Re B. C. Motor Vehicle Act, 68 described the 
principles of fundamental justice in the following terns: 
The term `principles of fundamental justice' is not a right, but a qualifier 
of the right not to be deprived of life, liberty and security of the person; its 
function is to set the parameters of that right. 
Consequently, the principles of fundamental justice are to be found in the 
basic tenets and principles, not only of our judicial process, but also of the 
other components of our legal system. 
Whether any given principle may be said to be a principle of fundamental 
justice within the meaning of s. 7 will rest upon an analysis of the nature, 
sources, rationale and essential role of that6principle within the judicial 
process and in our legal system, as it evolves. 9 
Despite the apparent rejection of the Supreme Court to term the principles of 
fundamental justice as rights, they are, practically, in essence, constitutional rights but 
their existence is dependent on the breach of the rights protected by section 7. In other 
words, once the government interferes with the protected rights under section 7 (i. e., 
life, liberty or security of person), the individual becomes, as a consequence of the 
interference with his right, entitled to enjoy the protection of the principles of 
fundamental justice, the basic role of which, with regard to the criminal justice 
system, is to protect the integrity of the system by striking a fair balance between the 
interests of the accused to have his rights to life, liberty and security of person 
respected, and the interests of the society, inter alia, in effective law enforcement. 70 
It is noteworthy that there is a strong connection between section 7 and the other 
legal rights guaranteed by sections 8-14, as observed by the Supreme Court. On the 
67 Reference Re Sections 193 and 195. l (1)(c) Criminal Code, [ 1990] 1 S. C. R. 1123,1177. 
68 [1985] 2 S. C. R. 486. 
69 Ibid. at pp. 512-513. 
70 Cunningham v. Canada, [1993] 2 S. C. R. 143,151-152. 
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one hand, section 7 introduces and covers all the protection provided by ss. 8-14, 
which are tailored to deal with specific breaches of the principles of fundamental 
justice. " On the other hand, section 7 provides additional protection in the sense that 
it recognises and incorporates certain rights that are not specifically guaranteed by 
sections 8-14.72 The principles of fundamental justice, as applicable to the pre-trial 
stage of the criminal process, are, namely, the right to fair treatment and the doctrine 
of abuse of process, the presumption of innocence and the right to silence. These 
principles are discussed in the relevant sections. 
7.2.2 Right against arbitrary arrest or detention 
Section 9 of the Charter states that '[e]veryone has the right not to be arbitrarily 
detained or imprisoned. ' In order to engage the protection of section 9, there are two 
issues that have to be established. Firstly, the accused has to be detained within the 
meaning of section 9, and secondly, the detention must be arbitrary. The focus in the 
following sections will be upon these two issues. 
7.2.2.1 Detention 
The Supreme Court first considered the meaning of detention in Therens73 in the 
context of s. 10. In the Court's view, detention falls within the scope of section 10, 
where a police officer or an agent of the State 'assumes control over the movement of 
a person by a demand or direction which may have significant legal 
consequences... '74 Detention, as emphasised by the Supreme Court, extends to 
physical as well as psychological compulsion. Psychological compulsion could result 
in detention within the meaning of s. 10, where the person concerned submitting to 
detention has 'a reasonable perception of suspension of freedom or choice. 
75 In 
Hufsky, 76 where the Supreme Court considered the spot check procedure and whether 
it amounts to detention under section 9, it was held unanimously that the principles 
71 Re B. C. Motor Vehicle Act, supra note 68,502. 
72 Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, Restrictive Trade 
Practices Commission), [1990] 1 S. C. R. 425,465-470; R. v. Genereux, [1992] 1 S. C. R. 259,310. 
73 [1985] 1 S. C. R. 613. 
74 Ibid. at p. 642. 
75 Ibid. at p. 644. 
76 [1988] 1 S. C. R. 621. 
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developed in Therens with regard to the meaning of detention under s. 10, were 
equally applicable to s. 9.77 
The question that arises is whether an arrest could be considered as a detention 
within the meaning of Section 9. Unlike detention, the concept of arrest has received 
little attention from the Supreme Court. The only definition to be found in the current 
jurisprudence is one adopted 30 years ago where it was stated that 'arrest consists of 
the actual seizure or touching of a person's body with a view to his detention. The 
mere pronouncing of words of arrest is not an arrest, unless the person sought to be 
arrested submits to the process and goes with the arresting officer. An arrest may be 
made either with or without a warrant. '78 Although the Supreme Court has not stated 
explicitly that an arrest constitutes a detention within the meaning of Article 9, the 
definition of the arrest and detention, cited above, and the fact that the jurisprudence 
of the Supreme Court considers arbitrary arrest as contrary to Article 9, indicates that 
Article 9 applies to detention and arrest as well. 79 
7.2.2.2 Arbitrariness 
In order for a detention to meet the requirement of non-arbitrariness under section 9, it 
must be authorised by statute or common law, the power to detain must not provide 
unfettered discretion that could be exercised without being subjected to any criteria, 80 
and it must be based upon reasonable grounds that an offence has been, is being, or is 
going to be committed. 81 
In R. v. Duguay, 82 MacKinnon A. C. J. O., speaking for the majority of the Ontario 
Court of Appeal, made a clear distinction between arbitrariness and unlawfulness, in 
the sense that not every unlawful detention is necessarily arbitrary. In considering the 
power of the police to arrest without warrant where they have reasonable grounds to 
believe that an indictable offence has been committed under s. 450(1)(a) (now s. 
495(1)(a)) of the Criminal Code, MacKinnon A. C. J. O. emphasised that the reasonable 
grounds criterion has to be met in order for the arrest and the subsequent detention to 
77 Ibid. 632. 
78 10 Hals., 3rd ed., p. 342. Cited in The Queen v. Whitfield, [ 1970] S. C. R. 46, at p. 48. 
79 See, e. g., R. v. Duguay et al, (1985), 18 C. C. C. (3d) 289 (Ont. C. A. ), pp. 296-297. Appeal to the 
Supreme Court was dismissed. R. v. Duguay et al. [ 1989] 1 S. C. R. 93. 
8° Hufsky v. R, supra note 76,632-633. 
B1 R v. Iron, (1987) 33 C. C. C. (3d) 157,177. 
82 Supra note 79. 
210 
be lawful. It is not sufficient that the police officer subjectively believes that there are 
reasonable grounds that an offence has been committed, but those grounds must be 
justifiable from an objective point of view. However, reasonable grounds do not need 
to amount to a prima facie case in order for the arrest to be considered lawful. If the 
grounds on which the police base the unauthorised arrest fall short of what could 
constitute reasonable and probable grounds, the arrest, though unlawful, is 
nevertheless not arbitrary. However, if reasonable grounds do not exist at all, the 
arrest and the subsequent detention are deemed arbitrary contrary to section. 9.83 
7.2.3 Right to be informed promptly of the reasons thereof 
Section 10(a) entitles any person arrested or detained to be informed promptly of the 
reasons for his arrest or detention. Since refraining from informing that person of the 
reasons for his arrest will entitle him to resist the arrest, it is imperative, save in 
exceptional circumstances, that such a person be immediately informed of the grounds 
for the police action. 84 The Supreme Court in Evans, 
8S where the arrestee suffered 
from mental deficiency, held that what the arrestee or detainee needs to be informed 
of, does not necessarily have to take the form of a specific formula. The question 
should be whether, in light of the circumstances, the arrestee can be reasonably 
expected to understand what is happening to him and for what reason. This approach 
aims to protect the substance of the right to be informed by enabling the arrested 
person to make an informed decision whether to submit to the arrest or not, and 
whether to retain counsel, which could be only exercised in a meaningful way if the 
accused knows the extent of his potential jeopardy. 86 
7.2.4 Right to be brought promptly before a judicial officer 
Section 503(1) of the Criminal Code requires a police officer who arrests a person 
with or without warrant and does not release him within 24 hours from the time of the 
arrest, to bring the detained or arrested person to a justice of the peace without 
unreasonable delay, and in any event within 24 hours from the time of the arrest or 
detention if a justice of the peace is not immediately available. If the justice of the 
peace remains unavailable after 24 hours, the police officer must bring the arrested or 
g' Ibid. p. 296. 
84 R. v. Kelly (1985), 17 C. C. C. (3d) 419,424. 
85 [1991] 1 S. C. R. 869. 
86 Ibid. 888. 
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detained person before a justice of the peace as soon as possible. Once the arrested or 
detained person is brought before the justice of the peace, at what is known as 'the 
show cause hearing', 87 the justice of the peace reviewing the detention must release 
the accused, unless there is just cause, as discussed below, for detaining him. The 
review of detention is considered to be a judicial function. Therefore, the justice of the 
peace who is reviewing the detention must satisfy the requirement of impartiality and 
independence necessary for the exercise of judicial functions. 
88 If the accused is 
charged with an offence under s. 469,89 the justice of the peace must order the accused 
to be held in detention until, upon the application of the accused, his detention is 
reviewed by a judge of or a judge presiding in a superior court of criminal 
jurisdiction. 90 If the accused is detained, the detention order must include the reasons 
for denying bail. 91 
7.2.5 The presumption of innocence and the right to bail 
The presumption of innocence, in addition to being guaranteed under the Charter by 
section 11(d), which does not apply at the bail hearing, 92 is recognised as a principle 
of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter, with which a deprivation of life, 
liberty, or security of person has to accord. 93 The role of the presumption of innocence 
as a principle of fundamental justice is to establish the rule that the accused, during 
the bail stage, is presumed innocent until proven guilty. Apart from that rule, the 
presumption of innocence, at the bail stage, does not provide more protection beyond 
that being already provided by s. 11(e) of the Charter. In this respect, the Supreme 
Court stated that s. 11(e) 'define[s] the procedural content of the presumption of 
87 Delisle, R& Stuart, D, Learning Canadian Crirninal Procedure, 4th edn (Ontario: Carswell, 1996), 
248. 
Ell v. Alberta, [2003] 1 S. C. R. 857,871-872. 
89 These offences are '(a) an offence under any of the following sections: (i) section 47 (treason), (ii) 
section 49 (alarming Her Majesty), (iii) section 51 (intimidating Parliament or a legislature), (iv) section 
53 (inciting to mutiny), (v) section 61 (seditious offences), (vi) section 74 (piracy), (vii) section 75 
(piratical acts), or (viii) section 235 (murder); (b) the offence of being an accessory after the fact to high 
treason or treason or murder; (c) an offence under section 119 (bribery) by the holder of a judicial 
office; (c. l) an offence under any of sections 4 to 7 of the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes 
Act; (d) the offence of attempting to commit any offence mentioned in subparagraphs (a)(i) to (vii); or 
(e) the offence of conspiring to commit any offence mentioned in paragraph (a). 
90 Criminal Code, ss. 515(11), 522. 
91 Ibid. s. 515(5). 
92 R v. Frankforth, (1982) 70 C. C. C. (2d) 448, p. 451. 
93 R. v. Pearson, [1992] 3 S. C. R. 665,683. 
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innocence 
..., and constitute[s] 
both the extent and the limit of that presumption at 
[the bail] stage. '94 
Section 11(e) guarantees the accused the right not to be denied reasonable bail 
without just cause. In Pearson, 95 it was held that section 11(e) guarantees two distinct 
rights. In this connection, Lamer C. J. stated that: 
"Reasonable bail" refers to the terms of bail. Thus, the quantum of bail 
and the restrictions imposed on the accused liberty while on bail must be 
"reasonable". "Just cause" refers to the right to obtain bail. Thus bail must 
not be denied unless there is "just cause" to do so. The "just cause" aspect 
of s. 11(e) imposes constitutional standards on the grounds under which 
bail is granted or denied. 96 
However, Section 11(e), just like all of section 11 provisions, only applies once the 
accused is charged with a criminal offence within the meaning of Section 11. In the 
following sections, the concept of 'charge' within the meaning of s. 11, the right not to 
be denied bail without just cause and the right to reasonable bail will be treated 
separately next. 
7.2.5.1 'Charge' 
According to the majority of the Supreme Court in Kalanj, 97 spoken for by McIntyre 
J., the accused is charged within the meaning of section 11, once 'information is 
sworn alleging an offence against him, or where a direct indictment is laid against him 
when no information is swom. i98 In practice, 99 the accused is considered to be charged 
within the meaning of Article 11 in the following circumstances: 
" Where the accused has been arrested without a warrant and has not been 
released by the police, the accused is considered to be charged at the 
moment when the information alleging that he has committed a criminal 
offence is sworn within the 24 hours after the arrest of the accused upon 
his appearance before the justice of the peace; '°° 
94 Ibid. 688-689. 
95 Ibid. 
9G Ibid. at p. 689. 
97 [1989] 1 S. C. R. 1549 
9" Ibid. at p. 1607. See also R. v. Potvin, [1993] 2 S. C. R. 880,908-909. 
99 These circumstances have been conveniently summarised in Kalanj, supra note 97, pp. 1613-1617. 
(Lamer J., dissenting). 
100 See Criminal Code, s. 503(1). 
213 
" When a summons or an arrest warrant has been issued by a justice of the 
peace on his being satisfied that the case for compelling the accused to 
appear before him to answer the charge either by a summons or, if the 
public interest so requires, by arrest, has been made out on the basis of the 
information laid before him by the public prosecutor or a police officer, 
the accused is considered to be charged at the moment that the summons 
or the arrest warrant is issued; 101 or 
" If the accused had been arrested but the police officer had released him 
with the intention of compelling his appearance by way of summons, on 
the person giving a promise to appear, or on the person's entering into a 
recognisance before the officer with or without sureties, the accused is 
considered to be charged when the information alleging that he has 
committed a criminal offence is laid before a justice of the peace 'as soon 
as practicable after [the release of the accused] and in any event before 
the time stated in the appearance notice, promise to appear or 
recognisance issued to or given or entered into by the accused for his 
attendance in court. ' 102 
7.2.5.2 Right not to be denied bail without a just cause 
The right to bail under section 11(e) is not a free standing one in the sense that it can 
be denied if a just cause for denying bail exists. `Just cause' within the meaning of 
section 11(e) requires, according to Lamer C. J., in Morales, 103 that: 
First, the denial of bail must occur only in a narrow set of circumstances. 
Second, the denial of bail must be necessary to promote the proper 
functioning of the bail system and must not be undertaken for any purpose 
extraneous to the bail system. '04 
Under section 515(10) of the Criminal Code, there are four grounds upon which a 
justice of the peace or a judge could deny bail: 
" where the detention is necessary for the protection of the safety of the public, 
e. g, the accused might commit an offence while he is at large; 
101 See ibid. ss. 504,507(1), (2), (3), (4), (5). 
102 See ibid. s. 505. 
103 [1992] 3 S. C. R. 711. 
104 Ibid. p. 737. 
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" there is a substantial likelihood that if the person is released, he may interfere 
with the administration of justice by, for instance, intimidating a prosecution 
witness; or 
" it is necessary to ensure the attendance of the accused at his trial. 
These three grounds have been accepted under the Canadian jurisprudence as a just 
cause within the meaning of s. 11 (e) upon which the bail can be legally denied-' 
05 
The difficulty arises, however, with the fourth ground, which allows denying bail if it 
is necessary to uphold the public confidence in the administration of justice. Section 
515(10)(c) permits the detention of the accused: 
[O]n any other just cause being shown and, without limiting the generality 
of the foregoing, where the detention is necessary in order to maintain 
confidence in the administration of justice, having regard to all the 
circumstances, including the apparent strength of the prosecution's case, 
the gravity of the nature of the offence, the circumstances surrounding its 
commission and the potential for a lengthy term of imprisonment. 
The public confidence provision was enacted in 1997 after the Supreme Court had 
struck down, allegedly, a similar provision that allowed the denial of bail on the basis 
of public interest. 106 The enactment of s. 515(10)(c) provoked commentators to 
question the constitutionality of the new provision. It was argued that it violates the 
presumption of innocence which section 11(e) seeks to strengthen, as it allows 
detention, inter alia, upon a ground that is extraneous to the functions of the bail 
system. 107 The Supreme Court recently faced the question regarding the 
constitutionality of this provision. By a majority of five to four, the Supreme Court 
concluded in R. v. Hall, 108 that the respective provision, although unconstitutional in 
the part that permits denial of bail 'on any other just cause being shown, and without 
limiting the generality of the forging', the other part of the provision, which allows 
denial of bail on the basis of maintaining public confidence in the administration of 
justice, is, nonetheless, constitutional. 
cos See ibid. pp. 737-740. 
106 Ibid. 
107 See Strezos, L, 'Section 515 (10)(c) of the Criminal Code: Resurrecting the Unconstitutional Denial 
of Bail', C. R., (5th) 11 (1998), 43. 
log (2002), 167 C. C. C. (3d) 449. 
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The majority came to that conclusion on the basis that it passes the test of 
vagueness, and that it is necessary for the proper functioning of the bail system even if 
there is no risk of re-offending or absconding if the accused is released on bail. The 
majority argued that the section in question passes the vagueness test as it provides 
four criteria upon which the detention could be justified to maintain public confidence 
in the administration of justice as mentioned in section 515(10)(c) including, namely, 
the apparent strength of the prosecution's case, the gravity and the nature of the 
offence, the circumstances surrounding its commission and the potential length of the 
sentence, if the accused is found guilty. The majority, furthermore, argued that 
maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice is a function with which 
the bail system is concerned. The majority based their view largely upon the particular 
facts of the case. 109 Hence, it is important to consider the opinion of the majority in 
the context of the facts of that case. The accused was charged with first-degree 
murder. The victim was found dead in her kitchen with 37 separate stab wounds to her 
hands, forearms, shoulder, neck, and face. Her assailant had tried to cut her head off. 
There was strong evidence linking the accused to the crime. The murder received 
extensive media coverage and caused significant public concern. Against this 
background, McLachlin C. J., stated: 
To allow an accused to be released into the community on bail in the face 
of a heinous crime and overwhelming evidence may erode the public's 
confidence in the administration of justice. Where justice is not seen to be 
done by the public, confidence in the bail system and, more generally, the 
entire justice system may falter. When the public's confidence has 
reasonably been called into question, dangers such as public unrest and 
vigilantism may emerge. ' 10 
The minority of the Supreme Court, however, argued that it is difficult to see the link 
between, on the one hand, the factors to be considered for denying bail, and, on the 
other hand, retaining public confidence in the administration of justice. As a result, 
the factors mentioned in s. 515(10)(c) become the real test, and, therefore, where there 
is a strong prima facia case against the accused and the offence is serious, even if 
there is no risk of re-offending or flight, the accused would be denied bail. This 
conclusion is supported by the fact that the bail judge in the case under consideration 
'09 Ibid. 454 (per Mclachlin C. J. C. ). 
110 Ibid at p. 461. 
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concluded that detention was not necessary for preventing the accused from 
absconding as the accused had close family ties and the proposed security measures 
were sufficient to eliminate such a risk. In addition, there was no risk of the accused 
committing an offence if he was released on bail as the bail conditions that could have 
been imposed would have prevented such a possibility. "' Consequently, the minority 
concluded that the contested provision allowed the denial of bail on grounds 
extraneous to the bail system, and, therefore, denied the accused bail without just 
cause in violation of section 11(e). 12 
7.2.5.3 Right to reasonable bail 
If the accused is granted bail, the bail conditions must be reasonable in order to 
comply with the requirement of section 11(e). There is no detailed pronouncement in 
the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court regarding the conditions of bail. The Criminal 
Code, however, includes extensive provisions concerning the conditions that could be 
imposed upon the liberty of the accused if he is granted bail pending his trial. If a 
justice of the peace or a judge, as the case may be, is satisfied that there is no just 
cause for detaining the accused charged with an offence, the accused must be released 
if he accepts any of the requirements mentioned in s. 515 of the Criminal Code. 
7.2.6 Right to habeas corpus 
Section 10(c) of the Charter entitles the accused to have 'the validity of the detention 
determined by way of habeas corpus and to be released if the detention is not lawful. ' 
The right to habeas corpus, according to the Supreme Court, is not a remedy against 
the refusal to grant bail, as it would create 'a costly and unwieldy parallel system of 
bail review. " 13 Instead, the accused should seek the review of the grounds of his 
detention by a court through the bail system under the Criminal Code. Under the 
Criminal Code, the accused is entitled to make an application to have the order of his 
detention to be reviewed by a judge at any time before trial. ' 14 The accused is entitled 
to be present at the review hearing. 15 If an accused's application for release is 
rejected, he is entitled to request his detention to be reviewed, by a court, every thirty 
111 Ibid. 483-485 (per lacobucci J. ) (Major, Arbour and LeBel JJ. concurred). 
112 Ibid. 488. 
113 R v. Pearson, supra note 93, p. 682. 
114 Criminal Code, s. 520(1). 
113 Ibid. s. 520(3). 
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days, starting from the date of the decision of the judge who heard the previous 
application. 116 Where the accused is charged with an offence listed in section 469,117 
and his detention has been ordered by a judge of or a judge presiding in a superior 
court of criminal jurisdiction, '18 his detention can be only reviewed by the chief 
justice or acting chief justice of the court of appeal. ' 19 
7.2.7 Right to trial within a reasonable time 
Under section 11(b), the accused has the right to be tried within a reasonable time. 
Since the meaning of the charge for section 11 runs from the moment an information 
is sworn or where a direct indictment is laid against him when no information has 
been sworn, the pre-charge delay is disregarded in assessing the reasonableness of the 
post charge delay save in some circumstances in which it could be considered in the 
overall determination of the reasonableness of the post-charge delay. 
120 The majority 
of the Supreme Court in Morin, 121 held that the individual interests that section 11(b) 
seeks to protect are the right to liberty, the right to security of person, and the right to 
a fair trial. It seeks to protect the right to liberty by minimising the period during 
which the accused is detained, or released upon restrictive bail conditions. The right 
to security of a person is protected by seeking to minimise stigma, concerns, and 
anxieties resulting from being involved in the criminal process. The right to a fair trial 
is protected by ensuring that the proceedings take place while the evidence is fresh 
and available. 122 Therefore, the analysis of whether section 11(b) was infringed or 
not, is largely dependent upon the issue of whether or not one of the protected 
interests has been prejudiced by the delay. ' 23 
If it is established that the right to be tried within a reasonable time has been 
violated, the minimum remedy under section 24(1), according to the majority in 
116 Ibid. s. 520(8). 
117 See supra note 89. 
118 Criminal Code, s. 522 (1). 
119 Ibid. ss. 522(4) and 680. 
120 Carter v. The Queen, [1986] 1 S. C. R. 98,985-986; R. v. Morin, [1992] 1 S. C. R. 771,789. 
121 Supra note 1220. 
122 Ibid. 786. 
123 It should be noted though that the majority identified three other factors upon which the assessment 
of the reasonableness of the delay could be determined including (1) the length of the delay; (2) waiver 
of time periods; (3) the reasons for the delay, including (a) inherent time requirements of the case, (b) 
actions of the accused, (c) actions of the Crown, (d) limits on institutional resources, and (e) other 
reasons for delay. See ibid. 787-788. 
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Rahey, 124 which was expressed in three separate judgements, is a permanent stay of 
proceedings. 125 This is because, according to four Justices, the court has lost the 
jurisdiction to proceed. 126 As expressed by Lamer J., as he then was: 
If an accused has the constitutional right to be tried within a reasonable 
time, he has the right not to be tried beyond that point in time, and no court 
has jurisdiction to try him or order that he be tried in violation of that right. 
After the passage of an unreasonable period of time, no trial, not even the 
fairest possible trial, is permissible. To allow a trial to proceed after such a 
finding would be to participate in a further violation of the Charter. 127 
As a stay of proceedings is a drastic remedy, it was suggested that the courts in 
exercising their inherent power to control their own process, might expedite the 
proceedings of these cases by setting an early date for the crown to proceed. 
Subsequent failure to proceed at the fixed date, however, should result in the charge 
being dismissed. 128 
C. Saudi Arabia 
7.3 Right to liberty 
The right to liberty is enshrined in Article 36 of the Basic Law of Government, which 
states that '[n]o one shall be arrested, detained, imprisoned or have their actions 
restricted except in cases provided for by law. ' Similarly, Article 2 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure states that '[n]o person shall be arrested, ... 
detained, or 
imprisoned except in cases provided for by law. ' It is clear from the quoted Articles 
that the Saudi law does not prohibit interfering with the right to liberty, but only 
prohibits unlawful interferences with this right. Hence, the question that arises is what 
124 [1987] 1 S. C. R. 588. 
125 Ibid. Lamer J (Dickson C. J. C., concurred) p. 598, Wilson J. (Estey J. concurred) p. 618, and Le 
Dain J. (Beetz J. concurred) p. 615. This view was initially expressed by Lamer J. (Dickson C. J. C. 
concurred) in his dissenting reasons in Mills v. The Queen, [1986] 1 S. C. R. 863,948. 
126 Dickson C. J. C., Estey, Lamer and Wilson JJ. 
127 Rahey, supra note 124, at p. 615. 
128 This view was initially expressed by Justice Martin of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Regain v. 
Beason (1983), 7 C. C. C. (3d) 20 (Ont. C. A), 43. Since it was adopted by Lanier J. (Dickson C. J. C., 
concurring) for Supreme Court in Mills, supra note 125,947-948, when he stated that: 
It is, in other words, open to the courts to take preventive measures, based on their inherent 
power to control their process, prior to an actual violation of s. 11(b). Where, however, on 
balancing the various factors, the court decides that the accused's right to be tried within a 
reasonable time has already been contravened, a stay of proceedings will be the 
appropriate remedy. 
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are the permitted interferences with the right to liberty under Saudi law? The CCP 
permits the arrest and detention of suspected criminals with or without warrant if 
certain conditions are met. In the following sections, these permitted types of 
interferences with the right to liberty and the conditions governing them will be 
discussed. 
7.3.1 Arrest 
Article 35 of the CCP states that '[i]n cases other than those involving flagrante 
delicto offences, no person shall be arrested or detained except on the basis of a 
warrant from the competent authority. ' Thus, the criminal investigation police, 
according to Article 35, are only permitted to arrest without warrant in cases of 
flagrante delicto offences. If the offence is not flagrante delicto, the police must 
obtain an arrest warrant from the 'competent authority'. These types of arrests are 
discussed next. 
7.3.1.1 Arrest without warrant 
According to Article 33 of the CCP, the criminal investigation police are authorised to 
arrest anyone who is present at the scene of the crime and there is 'sufficient evidence' 
against him that he has committed a flagrante delicto offence. According to Article 30 
of the CCP, an offence is deemed flagrante delicto if- 
" the alleged offence is actually being committed, or shortly thereafter; 
" the victim of the alleged offence is found pursuing another person or that 
person is being pursued by a shouting crowd subsequent to the commission of 
the alleged offence; or 
" the perpetrator is found a short time after the commission of the alleged 
offence in possession of tools, weapons, property, equipment, or other things 
that indicate that he is the perpetrator of or an accomplice in the alleged 
offence. 
However, if the suspect is not present at the scene, the criminal investigation officer 
must issue a warrant for arresting that person. '29 
129 CCP, Art. 33. 
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7.3.1.2 Arrest with warrant 
If the crime is not considered to be flagrante delicto, the criminal investigation police, 
according to Article 35 of the CCP, must obtain an arrest warrant from the 'competent 
authority' before they can legally arrest the suspect. The difficulty with Article 35 is 
that it does not specify the 'competent authority' that has the authority to issue an 
arrest warrant. However, under the CCP, only members of the IPPC are authorised to 
issue arrest warrants. In this respect, Article 103 of the CCP provides that '[i]n all 
cases, the Investigator [i. e., members of the IPPC who are responsible for 
investigating crimes] may, as the case may be, summon any person to be investigated, 
or issue a warrant for his arrest whenever the circumstances of the investigation 
warrant it. ' In the same vein, Article 107 of the CCP states that '[i]f the accused fails 
to appear without an acceptable cause after having been duly summoned, or if it is 
feared that he may flee, or the crime [which the person is suspected of committing] is 
flagrante delicto, the Investigator may issue a warrant for his arrest even if the 
incident is of such kind for which the accused should not be detained. ' Therefore, it 
can be safely concluded that the IPPC is the 'competent authority' for issuing a pre- 
trial arrest warrant within the meaning of Article 35.130 
An arrest warrant can be issued only where the circumstances of the investigation 
require it, 131 there is a fear that the accused might flee or interfere with the course of 
justice, the crime is flagrante delicto, or the suspect was summoned and, without an 
acceptable excuse, did not appear before the investigator. 132 Therefore, under the 
CCP, arrests without warrant should occur less frequently than arrests with warrant as 
the former are only permitted in a small set of circumstances compared to the latter. 
However, a different picture appears in practice than that envisaged by the CCP. 
In practice, most of arrests are carried out without warrant whenever the police have 
grounds to believe that a given person has committed an offence and, in some cases, 
the grounds for arrest are not even reasonable enough to make the arresting officer 
10 See also Report of the Special Rapporteur, Dato' Param Cumaraswamy, on the Independence of 
Judges and Lawyers: Report on the Mission to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Submitted Pursuant to 
Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2002/43, U. N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 59th Sess, 
Item 11(d) of the provisional agenda U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4/2003/65/Add. 3, para. 51 [Hereinafter the 
Human Rights Commission Report]. 
Ill CCP, Art. 103. 
132 Ibid. Arty. 107. 
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believes that the arrested person has committed an offence. In practice, the case file 
only reaches the IPPC once the suspect has been identified and, consequently, 
arrested. 133 Hence, the investigator only issues an arrest warrant where the accused 
has been arrested and subsequently released on the condition to appear before the 
investigator whenever he is summoned for the purposes of the investigation but 
violates the condition for his release, an instance that accounts for a small portion of 
arrest cases. 134 
On the other hand, the most common cases in which the criminal investigation 
police carry out arrests without warrant is when the crime is flagrante delicto, an 
allegation was made by a member of the public or the alleged victim that someone 
had committed an offence, or when the police, and in particular the Criminal Inquiry 
and Search Division (Shuabi'at al-Tuhriaht wa al-Buhith al-Jenaei), which specialises 
in identifying and pursuing suspected criminals, after conducting their inquiries have 
become convinced that a specific person has committed an alleged offence. 
135 Under 
the CCP only in the first instance, the police are authorised to carry out arrests without 
warrant. Therefore, arrests without warrant in the second and third instances are 
illegal as Article 35 of the CCP clearly states that '[i]n cases other than cases 
involving flagrante delicto offences, no person shall be arrested or detained except on 
the basis of a warrant from the competent authority. ' 
There is also a second problem particularly with the arrests in the second instance, 
in addition to the absence of an arrest warrant, which is the absence of reasonable 
grounds to believe that the suspect has committed the alleged offence. This can be 
illustrated by two cases obtained from the files of the IPPC. 136 In the first case, a 
father of a 10 year old boy, based upon what his son had informed him of, made a 
complaint to the police alleged that his son, hereinafter referred to as "A", had been 
forced to have anal sex with a fellow student in his school, who was aged 12, 
hereinafter referred to as "B". In his complaint, the father alleged that B forcibly took 
133 Interview with Investigator Anonymous, D. N. [Pseudonym. ], Investigation and Public Prosecution 
Commission Branch, Riyadh (Aug. 22,2004); interview with Investigator Hassen Al-Asaker, 
Investigation and Public Prosecution Commission Branch, Crimes Against Honour Division, Riyadh 
(May. 23-25,2004). 
134 Ibid. 
135 Interview with Police Inspector Buder Al-Muqbel, Maliz Police Station, Riyadh (Aug. 10,2004). 
See also Waleed's case, infra note 185 and accompanying text 
136 The case files were obtained from Investigator Hassen Al-Asaker, Investigation and Public 
Prosecution Commission Branch, Crimes Against Honour Division, Riyadh (May. 25,2004). 
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A to a deserted place in the neighbourhood, where B forcibly inserted his penis into 
A's anus. The complainant also stated that after the alleged incident took place, B 
urinated in the mouth of the alleged victim, and threatened that he would kill him if he 
told anyone about what had happened. The police acting upon the complaint arrested, 
questioned, and detained B in the juvenile facility detention pending his appearance 
before the investigator on the following day. After appearing before the investigator, 
the detention of the suspect was extended to five days from the day of his arrest. 
However, neither the medical examination of the alleged victim's body or clothes, nor 
the examination of the scene supported that the alleged incident took place. As a 
result, the investigator decided to stay the case against B and released him because 
there was insufficient evidence against him. ' 37 
In the second case, a woman who was in her twenties, hereinafter referred to as 
"X", made a complaint to the police alleging that her female friend, hereinafter 
referred to as "D", conspired with a man to rape her. In her complaint, X alleged that 
a month before the date of her complaint, she and D went to a house that belongs to a 
female friend of D, hereinafter referred to as "H". When they knocked on the door of 
H's house, the door was opened by a man, who the victim alleges was, according to D, 
H's brother. After they sat down, D brought a glass of orange juice to X. After 
drinking the juice, X went into a coma. Upon waking up from the coma, X found 
herself alone and naked. After putting on her clothes, X went to the next room, where 
D was sitting. When X asked D about what happened to her, D denied having any 
knowledge. After the alleged incident took place, X went home without informing 
anyone of what had happened to her. Since then, X alleges that she repeatedly visited 
D to ask about the person who raped her, but D persistently denied having any 
knowledge about the alleged incident. 
The police, upon receiving the mentioned complaint, arrested D. They questioned 
D about the alleged incident and she was subsequently released upon the condition of 
appearing before the investigator when summoned. The investigator, after questioning 
D, who denied that the alleged incident had taken place, ordered the police to inspect 
the scene of the alleged incident. The apartment described by X was found to be 
occupied by single expatriates none of whom matched the description of the alleged 
137 Case File No. 2507401058. 
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rapist. As a result, the investigator decided to stay the case against D because there 
was insufficient evidence against her. 138 
In the two cases, not only did the police arrest the suspects without a warrant, but 
also they did not even have reasonable grounds to believe that the alleged offences 
had been actually committed, or that the suspects had committed the alleged offences. 
The police, after conducting their inquires upon the request of the investigator, found 
no evidence to support either that the alleged incidents took place or that the alleged 
suspects were involved in the alleged offences. Under the CCP, the police, upon 
receiving a complaint alleging that someone has committed an offence, are supposed 
to conduct their inquiries in order to determine, firstly, whether there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that an offence has been committed and, secondly, whether there 
are reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect has committed the alleged 
offence. 139 However, in the mentioned two cases, as in many other cases that involve 
complaints from alleged victims against a particular person, the police arrested the 
"suspects" first, and made inquiries later. 
These illegal arrests raise the question of why these types of arrests occur in 
practice in the first place, given that they are illegal under the CCP? The police, 
because of, inter alia, their insufficient legal training, seem to be unaware that arrests 
without warrant in cases other than those involving flagrante delicto offences are 
illegal under the CCP. '4° This proposition is enhanced by the fact that in a response to 
a question put to two police officers who were interviewed by the present researcher 
139 Case File No. 2504900190. 
139 Articles 27 and 28 of the CCP respectively state that: 
Criminal investigations officers shall, each within his jurisdiction, accept notifications 
and complaints communicated to them with respect to all crimes, inspect and the collect 
relevant information [regarding the alleged offences] .... 
The criminal investigation 
officers shall move to the crime scene to maintain its integrity and seize all that may be 
relevant to the crime, reserve evidence, and take whatever action required under the 
circumstances..... 
During the process of the police inquiries, the criminal investigation officer shall hear 
statements of those who may possess information with respect to facts and perpetrators 
of crimes, question any suspect, and enter the information in the relevant records. They 
may seek the assistance of experts, including physicians, and seek their advice in writing. 
140 Arrest without warrant prior to the introduction of the CCP, was regulated under the Statute of 
Principles of Arrest, Temporary Confinement and Preventive Detention 1983 (SPAD), issued by the 
Order of the Ministry of Interior No. 233 (24 October 1983). Article 2 of the SPAD, which the police 
presumably still rely on in carrying out arrests without warrant, states that '[w]henever there are 
indications which raise the suspicion that a person has committed an offence, he shall be arrested and 
brought immediately before the competent authority [for the purposes of interrogation in accordance 
with Article 3 of SPAD]. ' 
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regarding the standard practice followed by the police upon receiving a complaint that 
someone has committed an offence, they stated that if the suspect was identified in the 
complaint, he would be arrested for questioning before being released or detained, 
depending on the strength of the evidence against him, pending his appearance before 
the investigator the following day. 141 
7.3.2 Right to be informed promptly of the reasons for arrest 
Article 116 of the CCP stipulates that '[w]hoever is arrested or detained shall be 
promptly informed of the reasons for his arrest or detention .... '142 In practice, the 
arrested or detained person is informed of the reasons for his arrest or detention in the 
course of the police questioning sometime within the 24 hours following his arrest., 43 
In addition, the arrested or detained person will be informed of the reasons for his 
arrest or detention again once he appears before the investigator for interrogation 
within the 24 hours following his arrest as required under Article 109 of the CCP as 
discussed next. 144 
7.3.3 Right to be brought promptly before a judicial officer 
According to Article 109 of the CCP, where an arrest warrant has been issued, the 
arrested person must be brought immediately for the purposes of interrogation before 
the investigator. On the other hand, Article 34 of the CCP, which applies to arrests 
without warrant in cases involving flagrante delicto offences, requires the arrested 
person to be brought for the purposes of interrogation before the competent 
investigator within the 24 hours following his arrest. Based upon the case files that 
have been made available to the present researcher, it appears that arrests without 
warrant, which account for the majority of the arrests for criminal enforcement 
purposes, are treated for the purposes of the right to be brought before a judicial 
141 Interview with Police Inspector Buder Al-Muqbel, supra note 135; Interview with Police Chief 
Inspector Anonymous, A. X. [Pseudonym. ] (Aug. 15,2004). 
142 Similarly, Article 34 of CCP states that 'any arrested person must be advised of the reasons for his 
detention .... ' 143 Interview with Police Inspector Buder A1-Muqbel, supra note 135, Interview with Police Chief 
Inspector Anonymous, A. X., supra note 141. 
144 Article 101 of the CCP provides that '[w]hen the accused appears for the first time before the 
investigator for the purposes of the investigation, the Investigator shall take down all his personal 
information and shall inform him of the offence of which he accused. ' Observation, interrogation by 
Investigator Hassen Al-Asaker, Investigation and Public Prosecution Committee Branch, Crimes 
Against Honour Division, Riyadh (Jun. 5,2004); Observation, interrogation by Investigator Abdullah 
Al-Muqbel, Investigation and Public Prosecution Commission Branch, Drug Crimes Division, Riyadh 
(Jun. 16,2004). 
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officer, as arrests for flagrante delicto offences, even if they are not. Hence, the 
criminal investigation police take the accused before the investigator in the morning 
following his arrest, and the 24-hour period within which the accused has to be 
brought before the investigator seems to be, by and large, respected in practice. 
On the basis of the outcome of the interrogation and the information available in 
the case dossier, the investigator will determine whether there is sufficient evidence 
against the accused to extend his detention or not. If the evidence against the accused 
is insufficient, the investigator will recommend to the Head of relevant Division that 
the proceedings against the accused should be discontinued and, if the accused is 
detained, for him to be released. If the offence is non-major, the decision to 
discontinue the case and to release the accused becomes effective if it is endorsed by 
the Head of the relevant Division, whereas in major offences the decision only 
becomes effective if it is endorsed by the Head of the IPPC. '45 
On the other hand, if there is sufficient evidence against the accused that he has 
committed a major offence, or that the interest of the investigation requires his 
detention to prevent his fleeing or interfering with the administration of justice, the 
investigator shall extend the detention of the accused to five days starting from the 
day of his arrest. 146 If the investigator is of the opinion that the detention of the 
accused should be extended beyond the five-day period, the case dossier must be 
forwarded to the Chairman of the IPPC Branch in the relevant province before the 
expiry of the five-day period to consider whether the accused should be detained for 
further period(s) or be released. If the Chairman of the IPPC Branch is of the opinion 
that the detention should be extended, he can order the detention of the accused for a 
period or successive periods not exceeding in their totality 40 days from the day of 
arrest. 147 
If the investigator, after the expiry of the 40-day period, is of the opinion that the 
detention of the accused should be extended beyond the forty-day period, an 
application must be made to the Head of IPPC to detain the accused for a period or 
successive periods, none exceeding thirty days and not exceeding in their totality six 
months from the day of the arrest. After the expiry of the six-month period from the 
145 CCP. Art. 124. 
146 CCP, Art. 113. 
147 Ibid. Art. 114. 
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day of arrest, the investigator must either release the accused or transfer him to the 
competent court for trial. 148 
It is noteworthy that neither under the CCP nor in practice is it required that there 
must be a bail hearing at which the accused is present or represented by a lawyer, or 
that the views of the accused on his detention are taken into account before the 
decision regarding the extension of his detention is made. 149 In practice, the extension 
of the detention of the accused either by the investigator, the Chairman of the IPPC 
Branch in the relevant province or the Head of IPPC will depend almost entirely on 
the seriousness of the alleged offence. In following sections, permitted detention with 
regard to major and non-major offences is discussed. 
7.3.3.1 Detention in major offences 
Article 112 of the CCP states that '[t]he Minister of Interior shall, upon a 
recommendation by the Head of the Investigation and Public Prosecution 
Commission, specify what may be treated as a major offence requiring detention. ' 
According to the Order of the Minister of Interior No. 1245,30 September 2002, 
major offences within the meaning of Article 112 of the CCP include, inter alia, 
offences of al-hudud which are punishable by amputation, stoning, or death; murder; 
voluntary manslaughter; causing grievous bodily harm etc. Article 113 of the CCP 
states that '[i]f it appears, following the interrogation of the accused ... that there is 
sufficient evidence that the accused has committed a major offence ... the 
investigator 
shall issue a warrant for his detention for a period not exceeding five days from the 
date of his arrest. ' Therefore, Articles 112 and 113 suggest that where there is 
sufficient evidence that the accused has committed a major offence, his pre-trial 
detention is mandatory. The only exception to this rule is Article 114, which requires 
the release of the accused until he appears before the court, if the investigation is not 
completed within the six-month period from the day of his arrest. 
It should be noted, however, that Article 120 of the CCP suggests that an accused, 
against whom there is sufficient evidence to believe that he has committed a criminal 
offence, regardless of the nature of that offence, can be released by the investigator if 
178 Ibid. 
19 Interview with Investigator Hassen Al-Asaker, supra note 133; Interview with Investigator 
Anonymous, D. N., supra note 133; written response from Investigator Sulman Al-Jurba, Investigation 
and Public Prosecution Commission Branch, Crimes Against Honour Division, Riyadh (July. 14, 
2004). 
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the latter is of the opinion that the accused's 'release would not impair the 
investigation, and that there is no fear of his flight or disappearance, provided that the 
accused undertakes to appear when summoned. ' However, in practice, Article 120 is 
interpreted as not applying to major offences and, thus, where there is sufficient 
evidence against the accused that he has committed a major offence, his detention is 
mandatory, 150 unless Article 114 applies as mentioned above. 
7.3.3.2 Detention in non-major offences 
The accused cannot be detained if he is suspected of committing a non-major offence, 
unless it appears to the investigator that the interests of the investigation require his 
detention to prevent his fleeing or disappearing as permitted under Article 120 of the 
CCP. In practice, those accused of non-major offences are, in most cases, 
automatically released by virtue of Article 120 after being interrogated by the relevant 
investigator, "' on the condition that the accused appear before the investigator when 
summoned, and that he designate a fixed place of abode that is acceptable to the 
investigator. 152 
7.3.4 The status of the IPPC 
As discussed above, the IPPC plays a supervisory role over the police during the pre- 
trial stage, and it is entrusted with reviewing the need to detain the accused. Hence, 
this section will shed some light on the establishment of the IPPC, its organisation and 
functions, before exploring the status of the IPPC vis-a-vis the executive and the 
parties to the criminal proceedings, which could affect of the ability of the IPPC to 
exercise its oversight role in an independent and impartial manner, as it is required 
under international human rights law. 153 
7.3.4.1 Establishment, functions and organisation of the IPPC 
The IPPC was established by virtue of Article 1 of the Code of the Investigation and 
Public Prosecution Commission (CIPPC), 154 which states that 'in accordance with this 
150 Ibid. Written response from Advisor Dr. Humed Al-Muadi, Investigation and Public Prosecution 
Commission Branch, Riyadh (July. 12,2004). 
151 Observation, interrogation by Investigator Hassen Al-Asaker, supra note 144; Observation, 
interrogation by Investigator Abdullah Al-Muqbel, supra note 144. 
152 CCP, Arts. 120-12 1. 
1S3 See supra paras. 4.1.2,5.1.3 & 7.1.3.2. 
154 Issued by Royal Decree No. M/56 (30 May 1989). Published on Umm al-Qura (the Saudi official 
Gazette) No. 3264 on 24 June 1989 [hereinafter CIPPC]. 
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Code, a Commission shall be established and be called "the Investigation of Public 
Prosecution Commission". ' The IPPC was established with the aim of improving the 
operation of the criminal justice system in the light of the growing complexity of 
investigating and prosecuting criminal cases. '55 Prior to the establishment of the 
IPPC, the police under the Public Security Code, 156 and the Handbook of Criminal 
Procedure' 57 had the authority to investigate and prosecute criminal cases. Therefore, 
the establishment of the IPPC was seen as taking the responsibility of investigating 
and prosecuting criminals from the police and giving it to an entirely new institution. 
This change is, by any standards, radical and in the course of the this thesis it will 
become apparent whether the establishment of the IPPC or assigning the functions 
which are currently exercised by it, as discussed below, was the right type of reform 
required in order to draw an appropriate balance between, on the one hand, the need 
for investigating and prosecuting crimes effectively, and, on the other hand, the need 
to protect the rights of the accused. Under Article 2 of the CIPPC, the IPPC is 
responsible for the following tasks: 
(a) the investigation of criminal offences; 
(b) deciding at the end of the investigation whether to institute 
proceedings or to discontinue the case against the accused; 
(c) conducting prosecutions before the judicial authority; 
(d) the lodging of appeals against judgements; 
(e) the supervision of the implementation of penal judgement; and 
(f) the inspection of prisons, detention centres and any places in which 
penal judgements are enforced, hearing the complaints of prisoners and 
detainees, verifying the legality of their imprisonment or detention, 
ensuring that they are not kept in prison or detention beyond the 
prescribed period, taking the necessary measures to secure the release of 
anyone who is imprisoned or detained unlawfully and taking the legally 
required action against the persons responsible for such unlawful 
imprisonment or detention. 
Although the CIPPC was issued in 1989, it was not until October 3,1993 that the 
IPPC started to exercise its functions. 158 From when it started to exercise its functions 
in 1993 until 2002, when the CCP came into force, the IPPC's powers regarding 
155 Council of Ministers Order No. 140 (21 March 1989). 
'56 Issued by Royal Decree No. 3594 (January 18 1950). 
157 Issued by the Ministry of Interior in 1980. It should be noted that the Handbook is not a statute, but 
rather collection of Council of Ministers Orders, Ministerial Orders and Directives that were collected 
in one dossier for easy reference. 
ISS The Fourth Annual Report of the Investigation and Public Prosecution Commission (1999), p. 7 
[hereinafter Annual Report]. 
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investigation and prosecution were regulated mainly by the Public Security Code and 
the Handbook of Criminal Procedure. 159 Therefore, the effect of the change brought 
about by the establishment of the IPPC until the CCP came into effect in 2002, as far 
as investigating and prosecuting criminal cases were concerned, was confined to the 
institution that conducts the investigation and prosecution into criminal cases, rather 
than the rules under which these functions were exercised. It should be noted 
however, that to date, the IPPC has not fully assumed all its functions. For example, 
the investigation of crimes of theft in the city of Riyadh is still conducted by the 
police. 160 The main reason for this is logistical as the IPPC still does not have the 
manpower and the resources to exercise all the functions assigned to it by virtue of the 
CIPPC, which are enormous. 161 Despite this, the intention seems to be to allow the 
IPPC to assume its responsibilities gradually whenever it is ready for discharging 
them. ' 62 Hence, in this thesis, those functions that are not currently exercised by the 
IPPC for logistical reasons are not discussed. Rather, the attention will be focused on 
those functions that the IPPC currently exercises, in particular in the city of Riyadh, 
the capital of Saudi Arabia, and where the fieldwork for this thesis has been 
conducted. 
A Head, who is assisted by a number of deputies, presides over the IPPC, which is 
called the Main Branch and located in Riyadh. 163 The IPPC has a number of branches 
distributed throughout the provinces of Saudi Arabia, each of which is headed by a 
Chairman and staffed by a number of investigators. Each branch has a number of 
divisions, which are assigned different tasks; in the IPPC Branch in Riyadh, for 
example, there are six divisions as follows: 
"a division responsible for investigating cases involving offences against the 
person; 
139 Directive of the Ministry of Interior No. H 9/218 (27 May 1997). 
160 Interview with Police Inspector Buder Al-Muqbel, supra note 135; Interview with Investigator 
Anonymous, G. S. [Pseudonym. ], Investigation and Public Prosecution Commission Branch, Riyadh 
(Jun. 8, Sep. 11,2004). 
161 Annual Report, supra note 158, pp. 101-110. 
162 In 1997, IPPC assumed responsibility for investigating crimes against honour (e. g., rape etc. ) in the 
cities of Riyadh, Jiddah and Dammam. See Directive of the Ministry of Interior No. H 9/218 (27 May 
1997). Also in 1999, the IPPC assumed responsibility for investigating crimes against the person (e. g. 
murder etc. ) in the cities of Riyadh, Mecca, Madinah, the Eastern Province, Asser and al-Quseem. See 
Directive of the Ministry of Interior No. H 6/3525 (8 February 1999). 
163 CIPPC, Art. 1. 
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"a division responsible for investigating cases involving offences against 
property; 
"a division responsible for investigating cases involving offences against 
honour and morality; 
"a division responsible for investigating cases involving prohibited drugs; 
"a division responsible for the inspection of prisons and detention centres; and 
"a division responsible for public prosecution. 
The IPPC branches exercise the IPPC's statutory powers within their jurisdiction, 164 
while the main branch supervises the IPPC provincial branches under the relevant 
provisions of the CCP and CIPPC. 
7.3.4.2 The status of the IPPC vis-a-vis the executive authority 
Although the IPPC is not a judicial body, Article 5 of the CIPPC declares that 
'members of the [Investigation and Public Prosecution] Committee shall enjoy full 
independence and, in their work, they shall be subject only to the provisions of the 
Islamic Shari'ah and the Laws in force. No one shall interfere in their work. ' The 
supervision of the IPPC is entrusted to the Minister of Interior in accordance with 
Article 26 of the CIPPC. The Head of the IPPC is appointed by a Royal Decree on the 
advice of the Minister of Interior on the rank of Super Grade, 165 a rank that is directly 
below the rank of Minister in the governmental hierarchy. 166 Members of the IPPC, 
with the exception of the Head of the IPPC, are appointed and transferred by a Royal 
Decree on the decision of the Administrative Board1G7 of the IPPC and the advice of 
the Minister of Interior. ' 68 
Publicly, the Ministry of Interior, which is also responsible for the security 
forces, 169 contends that it does not interfere with the IPPC's work. 170 However, in 
16a Ibid. 
165 Ibid. Art. 10. 
166 Law of Ministers, Deputy Ministers and Officials of the Super Grade, issued by Royal Decree No 
M/10 (15 May 1971). 
167 The Administrative Board of IPPC, according to Article 4(a) of the CIPPC, consists of the Head of 
ICCP, his Deputy, and five members of the IPPC of the rank of Deputy Division Director (A) of 
Investigation and Prosecution or above, who are selected by the Minister of Interior on the advice of 
the Head of IPPC. 
168 CIPPC. Art. 10 
169 Public Security Code, Art. 3; the Handbook of Criminal Procedure, p. 8. 
170 Human Rights Commission Report, supra note 130, para. 44. 
231 
practice, the Minister of Interior, and his representatives at the provincial level (i. e, 
the provincial governors), 17 1 exercise some powers, which are assigned to the IPPC by 
virtue of the CCP or the CIPPC. Under Article 41 of the CCP '[a] criminal 
investigation officer may not enter or search any inhabited place, except in cases as 
provided for by law, pursuant to a search warrant specifying the reasons for the 
search, issued by the Investigation and Public Prosecution Commission. ' However, in 
practice search warrants are issued by the provincial governor, not the IPPC. 
172 
In addition, under Article 124 of the CCP, where there is insufficient evidence 
against the accused that he has committed a major offence, the proceedings can be 
discontinued against him. If he is detained, he can be released if it is recommended by 
the investigator in charge, and endorsed by the Head of the relevant Division and the 
Head of the IPPC. However, in practice, the provincial governor's office is consulted 
in some cases that involve the release of a person who is suspected of having 
committed a major criminal offence but there is not sufficient evidence to prosecute 
him. 173 Furthermore, the provincial governor's office has the authority, in practice, to 
investigate alleged professional misconduct committed by members of the IPPC. In 
practice, citizens commonly address their grievances against governmental bodies to 
the provincial governor (known as 'the policy of open door'), who, by virtue of Article 
7(h) of the Provincial Administrative Law, has the authority to 'supervise the organs 
of the State and their employees in the region in order to ensure that they perform 
their duties well and with all trust and loyalty, taking into account the ties of the 
employees of ministries and various services in the region with their competent 
authorities. ' 74 The provincial governor, where the complaint concerns the conduct of 
a member of the IPPC, instead of referring it to the IPPC Main Branch to be 
investigated in accordance with CIPPC provisions as discussed in Chapter five, will 
establish a committee composed of an official from the police and an official from the 
171 Provincial Administrative Law, issued by Royal Order No A/92 (1 March 1992). Published on Uninn 
al-Qura (the Saudi official Gazette) No. 3397 on 6 March 1992, Art. 5. 
172 The power to search is discussed in detail infra para. 9.3. 
173 Interview with Investigator Anonymous, D. N., supra note 133. See also Waleed's Case, infra note 
185 and accompanying text. 
174 See also Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Initial report of State parties due in 1998: Saudi Arabia, CAT/C/42/Add. 2 (2001), paras. 
37,40, available at <http: //www. unhchr. cli/tbs/doc. nsf> (last visited Jan. 2,2006) 
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provincial governor's office to investigate the complaint and question the member 
concerned and report back to the provincial governor. 175 
Finally, Article 37 of the CCP provides that '[t]he relevant members of the 
Investigation and Public Prosecution Commission [i. e., Members of the Division for 
the inspection of prisons and places of detention in the of the ICCP Branch in the 
relevant province] shall, at any time and without regard to official hours, visit the 
prisons and other places of detention falling within their jurisdiction to ensure that no 
person is unlawfully imprisoned or detained. ' However, in practice, while members of 
IPPC Division for inspecting prisons and places of detention are allowed to inspect 
most detention centres and prisons, they are not allowed, under the order of the 
Minister of Interior, to inspect the detention centre of the Secret Service (al-Muba'ith 
al-Ammah), 176 in which persons suspected of committing crimes against national 
security (i. e., political dissent or terrorism) are detained. 177 
7.3.4.3 The status of the IPPC vis-ä-vis the parties to the criminal 
proceedings 
Members of the IPPC are referred to by the CCP and the CIPPC as 'investigators', 
178 
compared to other inquisitorial jurisdictions which refer to what can be considered, 
despite some obvious differences, as their counterparts under the respective systems 
as 'investigating judges'. 179 The IPPC, as mentioned earlier, combines both the 
investigating and prosecuting functions. In this respect, Article 14 of the CCP states 
that '[t]he Investigation and Public Prosecution Commission shall be responsible for 
investigating and prosecuting crimes in accordance with its Law and the 
implementing regulation thereof. ' The CCP does not elaborate on whether the 
investigator who has conducted the investigation into a case can play the role of the 
175 See supra para. 5.3.1.2.2. Interview with Investigator Anonymous, B. B., [Pseudonym. ], 
Investigation and Public Prosecution Commission Branch, Riyadh (May. 29,2004). It is worth 
mentioning here that the provincial governor of Riyadh, for example, is Prince Sulman who is brother 
of both the King of Saudi Arabia and the Minister of Interior, and holds the rank of Minister, which is 
superior to that of the Head of IPPC. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
17 Interview with Investigator Anonymous, H. N. [Pseudonym. ], Public Prosecution and Investigation 
Commission Branch, Riyadh (July. 6, Sep. 11,2004); Interview with Investigator Anonymous, G. S., 
supra note 160. See also Directive of the Head of the Investigation and Public Prosecution Commission 
No. H 12/3662 (3 January 2000), p. 8. 
177 Directive of the Ministry of Interior No. S/1003 (21 January 1979); Directive of the Ministry of 
Interior No. 16/4941 (8 November 1980). 
178 With regard to the IPPC, see Arts. 9,16. With regard to the CCP, see Arts. 29,33,34,41,48 and 57. 
179 See generally, Elliott, supra note 35, pp. 34-38. 
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prosecuting counsel in the same case. However, in practice, as mentioned earlier, the 
tasks of investigating and prosecuting criminal cases are assigned to different 
Divisions within the IPPC Branches. In addition, in no case in practice, whether it has 
been investigated by the same investigator or by someone else from the investigation 
divisions, has an investigator played the role of the prosecuting counsel. 
' 80 
Under the CCP, there are no provisions that require the investigator to collect 
evidence in favour of the accused. In practice, the situation does not seem to be any 
different, as one investigator explained: 'I do not think that we look for the evidence 
that might exonerate the accused, but we look for the evidence that can incriminate 
him, and if no such evidence is found, this means the accused is innocent because the 
original status of the accused is innocence. i181 Another investigator put it in these 
words: 'We do not look for evidence that might exonerate the accused. The burden of 
refuting the accusation is upon him. " 82 
Once the investigation is completed, the investigator has to decide whether to 
bring a criminal prosecution or to discontinue the proceedings against the accused 
depending on the sufficiency of the evidence against him. If the investigator is of the 
opinion that there is sufficient evidence against the accused concerned, he draws up 
the indictment, refers the case to the competent court, and summons the accused to 
appear before that court. 183 There are no provisions under the CCP that regulate the 
drawing up of the indictment by the investigator. However, in practice, only evidence 
that has the potential of strengthening the case of the prosecution against the accused 
is included in the indictment. The reason for this, as one investigator put it, is that 'the 
indictment is a verdict on the guilt of the accused, and [, hence, ] it cannot include 
something that might exonerate him. ' 184 
It is appropriate to conclude the discussion of the status of the IPPC by presenting 
the details of a case that the present researcher encountered during his fieldwork 
period. Some aspects of the case do not concern the subject under discussion here; 
180 Interview with Investigator Anonymous D. N., supra note 133; interview with Investigator Hassen 
Al-Asaker, supra note 133; written response from Investigator Sulman Al-Jurba, supra note 149. 
181 Interview with Investigator Anonymous, D. N., supra note 133. 
182 Interview with Investigator Hassen Al-Asaker, supra note 133. 
183 CCP. Art. 126. 
184 Written response from Investigator Sulman Al-Jurba, supra note 149. Similar answers were 
provided by other Investigators. Interview with Investigator Anonymous D. N., supra note 133; 
Interview with Investigator Hassen Al-Asaker, supra note 133. 
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however, the full details of the case will be presented here and it will be referred to 
throughout the second part of this thesis when appropriate. The details of the case 
have been obtained from the person who was the subject of the investigation. 185 
The case concerns a Yemeni national named Waleed, 29 years old. He had been 
working in a furniture company in Riyadh for three months when the brother of the 
owner of the company (named Bunder, aged 28 years old, and who worked for his 
brother's company) disappeared on Saturday May 8,2004. On the following Monday, 
the owner of the company accused Waleed of having some involvement in Bunder's 
disappearance. The reason for his accusation was that Bunder and Waleed had 
developed some form of friendly relationship. However, Waleed explained that his 
relationship with Bunder was strictly professional and he was friendly to him because 
other workers, who believed Bunder to be troublesome, preferred to stay away from 
him. In addition, a week before Bunder's disappearance, Waleed's wife gave birth to a 
baby with minor health problems, and Bunder was calling him on a number of times 
to check on the health of his baby. As Waleed, in the week prior to Bunder's 
disappearance, was coming to work on a number of times late, and sometimes not 
turning up to work at all because of the circumstances regarding his recently born 
child, the owner of the company demanded Waleed be punctual, or resign. As a 
consequence, Waleed decided to resign. After accusing Waleed personally of 
kidnapping Bunder, the owner of the company decided to complete his resignation 
settlement and let him go. These events took place in the five days following Bunder's 
disappearance. 
On the sixth day, the owner of the company demanded a photo from Waleed as a 
condition for the settlement, and Waleed complied with his demand. Hours later, the 
owner of the company called Waleed again in order to ask Waleed to meet with him 
to settle his resignation. Upon meeting him, Waleed was asked to get into the car, in 
which a person, who was unknown to Waleed, was present. While Waleed thought 
they were heading to the company to settle his resignation, he was surprised when the 
car parked in front of the Criminal Inquiry and Search Division (Shuabi'at al-Tuhriaht 
wa al-Buhith al-Jenaei), which specialises in identifying and pursuing suspected 
criminals. 
185 Interview with Waleed Aoun (Sep. 29,2004) [hereinafter Waleed's Case]. 
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Waleed was arrested by the person who was present in the car, who was later 
revealed to him as a high-ranking officer of the Criminal Inquiry and Search Division. 
Waleed was taken inside the Division for questioning. During the questioning, which 
was conducted by the same officer who had arrested Waleed, Waleed was accused of 
kidnapping Bunder and the evidence presented against him was the testimony of a 
mobile phones shopkeeper. The shopkeeper testified that Waleed, on Sunday May 9, 
2004 at 8: 30 p. m. had sold him the mobile phone that the police believed belonged to 
Bunder. The mobile phone in question was seized during a police raid on the mobile 
shop, in which the shopkeeper was subsequently arrested, in order to check whether 
they were selling stolen mobile phones. Mobile phone shops are required under law 
not to purchase any used mobile phone without taking the personal information of the 
seller. The raided mobile shop, in purchasing the mobile phone in question, did not 
take the personal details of the seller. 
Under questioning, Waleed insisted that he could not have sold the mobile phone 
in question as he was at work from 5 p. m. until 10: 30 p. m. on the night that the 
mobile phone was allegedly sold, and his co-workers could testify to that. After five 
hours of questioning, he and the witness were transferred to the Detention Centre of 
the Rudah Police Station, where they were detained separately. On the following day, 
Waleed and the witness were taken to the IPPC Branch in Riyadh for interrogation. 
The same questions and answers were repeated before the investigator, who decided 
to release the witness on bail and to detain Waleed for further questioning. The 
missing person's car was found, without any fingerprints, somewhere in the district 
where Waleed lives. Therefore, the main evidence against Waleed remained the 
testimony of the shopkeeper. 
After three weeks of Waleed being detained, the police obtained a warrant from 
the provincial governor to search his house, in which nothing to indicate his guilt was 
found. After 10 weeks of Waleed being detained, his case file was sent to the 
provincial governor with the recommendation of the investigator for his release. Four 
weeks later, Waleed was finally released on the order of the provincial governor. 
During his time in detention, Waleed was interrogated about 30 times, in which the 
same questions and answers were repeated. During all his detention period, Waleed 
was not represented by a lawyer. His family sought the assistance of a lawyer in order 
get him out on bail, but they were deterred from hiring the lawyer because of the cost 
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involved, which is the equivalent of six months-salary of what Waleed used to earn 
during his previous job. A number of comments on this case are in order: 
" Waleed's arrest was illegal as the crime that he was accused of was not 
flagrante delicto and the police did not obtain a warrant from IPPC for his 
arrest. 
" Waleed's account of his whereabouts at the time when he allegedly sold the 
mobile phone in question was never checked by either the police or the 
investigator. If Waleed's account was, in fact, true, the only evidence against 
him, which was the testimony of the mobile phones shopkeeper, would have 
been completely refuted, and, thus, he would have been cleared of the 
kidnapping accusation. Waleed claims that the investigator did not even write 
down what he said in his defence against the kidnapping allegations, as it is 
required under the CCP. '86 
" There is no clear evidence to suggest that the mobile phone that the police 
and the investigator in charge believed it to be Bunder's, was actually his. In 
addition, the shopkeeper, who allegedly purchased the mobile phone in 
question from Waleed, was a suspect himself as the mobile phone was found 
in his shop. Oddly enough, the investigator released the shopkeeper on bail, 
and detained Waleed for about 100 days. Furthermore, Waleed claims that on 
the latter days of his detention he was confronted with the witness before the 
investigator, and the witness said that he was coerced by officers of the 
Criminal Inquiry and Search Division to testify against him. According to 
Waleed, the witness was, for two days, repeatedly suspended from a bar with 
handcuffs and his feet barely touching the floor. The witness was then shown 
a number of photos to identify the person who sold him the mobile phone. 
When he was eventually shown Waleed's photo, he denied that the person in 
the photo was the person who sold him the mobile phone. However, under 
police insistence that the person on the photo (i. e., Waleed) was the person 
who sold him the mobile phone, he went along with what they wanted. 
'" Article 101 of the CCP states that '[w]hen the accused appears for the first time before the 
investigator for the purposes of the investigation, the Investigator shall take down all his personal 
information and shall inform him of the offence of which he accused. The Investigator shall record any 
statements the accused makes regarding the accusation. ' 
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" Waleed's house was searched by a warrant from the provincial governor. 
Under the CCP, as will be shown later, search warrants must be issued by the 
IPPC; otherwise, the search is illegal. '87 
" Waleed's release was ordered by the provincial governor. Under the CCP, as 
discussed earlier, it is within the jurisdiction of the Head of the IPPC, on the 
recommendation of the investigator in charge and the Head of the relevant 
Division, to release the accused against whom there is not sufficient evidence 
to believe that he has committed a major offence. 
7.3.5 Right to habeas corpus 
Under the CCP, the accused can challenge his detention before a court only when, 
after being indicted by the IPPC, he is referred to the court for trial. In this respect, 
Article 123 of the CCP states that'[i]f the accused is referred to the court, his release 
if detained, or detention if he is not under arrest shall be within the jurisdiction of the 
court to which he has been referred. If lack of jurisdiction is determined, the court 
rendering the judgment of lack of jurisdiction shall have jurisdiction to consider the 
release or detention request, pending the filing of the case with the competent court. ' 
However, in practice courts do not exercise their judicial supervision on the detention 
of the accused after the case is referred to them. 188 Therefore, once the order for the 
detention of the accused, which is issued by the IPPC before he is referred to court, 
expires, the detention of the accused from that moment until the a final judgement is 
reached on the case becomes illegal as there is no order from the 'competent authority' 
for his detention as required under Article 35 of the CCP. 
7.4 Comparison 
Both the Saudi and the Canadian systems recognise the right to liberty. However, the 
right to liberty under the Canadian system is more expansive as it protects against 
arbitrary and illegal interferences with liberty. By contrast, under Saudi written law, 
187 See infra para. 9.3.1.2. 
lag Interview with Qadi Suleiman Al-Hudiathi, General Court, Riyadh (July. 18,2004); interview with 
Qadi Muhammad Al Jaarallah, General Court, Riyadh (Aug. 2-3,2004); interview with Qadi Salch Al- 
Aujri, General Court, Riyadh (Aug. 4,2004); Interview with Investigator Anonymous, H. N., supra 
note 176. 
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only illegal interferences with the right to liberty are prohibited. Hence, if an arbitrary 
arrest power were provided for by law, it would be found unconstitutional under the 
Canadian system, unless it were found to constitute a reasonable limit within the 
meaning of s. 1 of the Charter. However, it would be considered consistent with the 
Saudi written law, and given that there is no mechanism for constitutional review 
under the Saudi system, as discussed in Chapter four, the law in question cannot be 
challenged on the basis that it violates the Saudi constitution (i. e., the Shari'ah). 
The underlying difference between the Saudi and Canadian systems with regard to 
the right to liberty is the extent to which the respective systems recognise the 
fundamental principle of the presumption of innocence. While the principle of 
presumption of innocence enjoys a constitutional status under the Canadian Charter 
by virtue of being a principle of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter, neither 
the Saudi Basic Law nor the CCP recognise such a principle. The implication of this 
difference can be vividly illustrated by the difference in how the right to bail is treated 
under the Saudi and the Canadian systems. The Saudi CCP provisions, as they are 
currently interpreted in practice, deprive those individuals, against whom there is 
sufficient evidence that they have committed a major offence, of their right to liberty 
until a decision on the merits of the case has been reached, unless the investigation of 
the offence lasted for more than six months, in which case the accused has to be 
released until he appears before the court for trial, where he could, at the order of the 
judge, be detained. By contrast, the Canadian Charter entitles the accused to be 
released on bail unless there is a just cause for detaining him, regardless of the nature 
of the offence with which the accused is charged. 
Both systems recognise the right of the accused to be informed of the reasons for 
his arrest. However, under the Canadian Charter the accused has to be informed of the 
reasons for his arrest at the time of the arrest, save in exceptional circumstances, while 
under the Saudi CCP the accused is entitled to be informed of the reasons for his 
arrest sometime within the 24 hours from the time of his arrest. In addition, the 
accused is entitled under the Canadian Charter to be tried within a reasonable time. 
Where this right has been breached, the court will stay the proceedings permanently 
against the accused to remedy the violation of this right. By contrast, Saudi law does 
not recognise the right to be tried within a reasonable time and, hence, does not 
provide any remedy for its violation. Furthermore, the Canadian system considers 
'objective and reasonable grounds' that the accused has committed an offence or was 
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going to commit an offence as the criteria for whether the arrest is lawful or not. On 
the other hand, the Saudi system considers 'sufficient evidence' that the accused has 
committed an offence, or was on his way to commit an offence to be the requirement 
for a lawful arrest. Needless to say, both criteria are ambiguous, and without proper 
supervision over arrests, both criteria can be misinterpreted or abused in practice, 
which leads to the next difference. 
The supervision over arrests or detention under the Canadian criminal justice 
system is entrusted to the judiciary, as the review of the legality of detention is 
considered to a judicial function. The accused is required to be brought before a 
justice of the peace within 24 hours following his arrest, and entitled, as a general 
rule, to have his detention reviewed by a court every 30 days, and to be heard before a 
decision on the need to detain him is reached. In addition, the accused during his trial 
can contest the legality of his arrest in order to obtain a remedy under s. 24 of the 
Charter, including the exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of the illegal arrest, 
as will be discussed in due course. On the other hand, while under the Saudi system 
the supervision over arrests and detention is to the IPPC, there is no requirement that 
the review of detention is conducted in an impartial and independent manner. 
Although the accused is entitled to appear before the investigator following the 24 
hours of his arrest, he does not have the right to be heard before a decision on the 
extension of his detention is made, nor does he have the right to have the grounds for 
his pre-trial detention reviewed by a court. 
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Chapter Eight 
The Right to Legal Assistance 
A. International human rights law 
8.1 Right to legal assistance 
The right to legal assistance is guaranteed under Article 14(3)(b), (d) of the ICCPR, 
which states that: 
14(3). In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone 
shall be entitled ...: (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence 
and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing; 
(d) to be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through 
legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have 
legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him, 
in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment 
by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it. 
In discussing the right to legal assistance under Article 14(3)(b), (d), three issues will 
be addressed: the scope of the right to legal assistance; the conditions for the 
eligibility of free legal assistance; and the requirement of confidentiality, which is 
necessary for the effective exercise of the right to legal assistance. These issues are 
treated separately next. 
8.1.1 Scope of the right to legal assistance 
As with other guarantees under Article 14, the right to legal assistance only applies 
once the accused has been charged within the meaning of Article 14. Thus, if an 
individual wishes to invoke the protection of Article 14, he must first show that he has 
been charged within the meaning of Article 14 of the ICCPR. Unfortunately, the 
HRC's jurisprudence offers little help regarding the meaning of 'criminal charge' 
under Article 14. Given that the application of the right to a fair hearing tinder Article 
6 of the ECHR is also dependent on the accused being charged, it is justified here to 
draw upon the jurisprudence of the European Court in this respect. The test adopted 
by the European Court is not whether the accused has been formerly charged 
according to domestic law, but rather whether 'the situation of the [suspect] has been 
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substantially affected" by the proceedings taken by the State against him. Thus, 
Article 14 of the ICCPR comes into play as soon as the State starts to exercise its 
coercive powers over the individual concerned, which is, in the context of this 
discussion, as soon as the accused is placed under arrest. 2 
This proposition is also supported by the fact that the HRC in the case of Gridin v. 
Russian Federation3 held, without addressing the concept of charge under Article 14, 
that denying the accused access to legal assistance during the first five days of his 
detention, in which he was interrogated several times, breached Article 14(3)(b). 4 It is 
noteworthy that the HRC in the mentioned case did not rule that there was a violation 
of the broader right to legal assistance under Article 14(3)(d), but rather addressed the 
complaint under the right to communicate with one's lawyer under Article 14(3)(b). 
Nonetheless, if the accused's right to communicate with his lawyer under Article 
14(3)(b) applies upon arrest, then it can be assumed safely that the right to legal 
assistance under Article 14(3)(d) equally applies once the accused is placed under 
arrest. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that, in a recent case, the HRC stated 
that 'legal assistance should be available at all stages of criminal proceedingsi5 in 
order to comply with the requirement of Article 14(3)(d). 
Article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR requires explicitly that the accused is informed of 
his right to legal assistance. 6 The HRC has not yet elaborated on the requirement of 
information under Article 14(3)(d). However, it would seem that a failure to mention 
to the accused his right to legal assistance at the moment of his arrest, the time when 
the right to legal assistance comes into play, would violate the information 
requirement under Article 14(3)(d). This proposition is reinforced by the growing 
recognition of the importance of the role of legal assistance in the pre-trial stage of the 
criminal process. The right to legal assistance is considered, in essence, as the 
foundation of all procedural rights available to the accused at the pre-trial stage, as if 
he 'has no lawyer, [he is] less likely to be aware of [his] other rights and therefore to 
Deweer v. Belgium (1979-80) 2 E. H. R. R. 439, para. 46. 
2 See, e. g., Wemhoff v. FRG (1979-80) 1 E. H. R. R. 55, para. 9. 
3 Communication No. 770, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/69/D/770/1997 (2000). 
a Ibid. para. 8.5. See also Kelly v. Jamaica, Communication No. 537/1993, U. N. Doc 
CCPR/C/57/D/537/1993 (1996), para. 9.2. 
s Borisenko v. Hungary, Communication No. 852/1999, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/75/D/852/1999 (2002), 
para. 7.5. Cf. Quaranta v. Switzerland (1991) A 205, para. 36; Itnbrioscia v. Switzerland (1994) 17 
E. H. R. R. 441, para. 36. 6 Cf. also Imbrioscia v. Switzerland (1994) 17 E. H. R. R. 441 (Judge De Meyer, dissenting). 
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have those rights respected. ' Therefore, a failure to inform the accused of his right to 
legal assistance in effect denies him the effective exercise of all his procedural rights. 
8.1.2 Legal aid 
An accused charged with a criminal offence within the meaning of Article 14 is 
entitled to legal assistance free of charge if he lacks the financial means to hire a 
private lawyer and 'the interests of justice so require'. This provision is of great 
importance given that, in practice, most accused persons come from a poor 
background, which can hinder their ability to retain legal assistance. 8 The 'interests of 
justice' criteria relate mainly to the seriousness of the offence, including the severity 
of the potential punishment. Thus, the HRC held that the interests of justice do not 
require the State to assign a legal aid lawyer to the accused who is charged with an 
offence the maximum penalty of which is a fine. 9 
On the other hand, the HRC found it 'axiomatic' that the accused who is charged 
with a capital crime must be assigned legal assistance free of charge. 
10 Between these 
two ends of the spectrum, the HRC's jurisprudence provides little guidance. However, 
the European Court held, with regard to the right to free legal assistance under Article 
6(3)(c) of the ECHR, which corresponds literally to Article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR, 
that 'where deprivation of liberty is at stake, the interests of justice in principle call for 
legal representation'. 11 Given the growing recognition of the importance of the right to 
legal assistance, as mentioned above, and the fundamental right against non- 
discrimination with regard to the enjoyment of the Covenant rights under Article 2(1) 
of the ICCPR, it is justified to conclude that where an accused person lacks the 
financial means to retain a lawyer, the State is obliged under Article 14(3)(d) of the 
ICCPR to assign him legal assistance free of charge when the potential sentence for 
the offence with which he is charged involves imprisonment. 
Commission of the European Communities, Procedural Safeguards for Suspects and Defendants in 
Criminal Proceedings throughout the European Union: Green Paper From the Commission to the 
European Council, COM(2003) 75 final, para. 2.5. For an extensive discussion of the benefits of legal 
assistance, see supra para. 3.6.1.1. 
8 See, e. g., Waleed's Case, supra ch. 7 note 185 and accompanying text. 
9 O. F. v. Norway, Communication No. 158/1983, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 at 44 (1990), para. 3.4, 
5.6; Lindon v. Australia, Communication No. 646/1995, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/64/D/646/1995 (1998), 
para. 6.5. 
° Levy v. Jamaica, Communication No. 719/1996, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/64/D/719/1996 (1998), para. 
7.2. 
11 Benham v. United Kingdom (1996) 22 E. H. R. R. 293, para. 61. Cf. also Quaranta v. Switzerland, 
supra note 5, para. 33. 
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8.1.3 The confidentiality requirement 
Article 14(3)(b) guarantees the right of the accused to 'communicate with counsel of 
his own choosing'. According to the HRC, Article 14(3)(b) 'requires counsel to 
communicate with the accused in conditions giving full respect for the confidentiality 
of their communicationsi12 in order to ensure the effective exercise of the right to legal 
assistance. Thus, in the case of Gridin v. Russian Federation, 13 where the accused was 
prevented from communicating with his lawyer in private, the HRC held that Article 
14(3)(b) has been violated. 14 
Regarding confidential 'correspondence' between the lawyer and his client, they 
fall principally under the protection of the right to privacy enshrined in Article 17 of 
the ICCPR. Under Article 17, confidential 'correspondence' including those relating to 
the lawyer/client relationship are, in principle, privileged against search and seizure. 15 
However, interference with privileged 'correspondence' is not only a violation of 
Article 17, but has also serious implications for the fairness of the trial under Article 
14.16 If 'correspondence' between a lawyer and his client were not adequately 
protected, the accused would be deterred from giving his lawyer information that is 
necessary for the effective exercise of his right to defence. " As the European Court 
observed, 'where a lawyer is involved, an encroachment on professional secrecy may 
have repercussions on the proper administration of justice and, hence, on the rights 
guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention [Article 14 of the ICCPR]. "8 Thus, there 
must be adequate safeguards to ensure that any correspondence between the accused 
and his lawyer are protected against unlawful or arbitrary interference with them. As 
long as the contents of the correspondence fall under the lawyer/client privilege, they 
12 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 13, Article 14 (Twenty-first session, 1984), 
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies, U. N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev. 1 at 14 (1994), para. 9. 13 Supra note 3. 
14 Ibid. para. 5.8. Cf. S. v. Switzerland (1992) 14 E. H. R. R. 670, para. 48; Cf also ACI-IR, Art. 8(2)(d); 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 1957, E. S. C. Res. 663(XXIV) C, U. N. 
ESCOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 11, U. N. Doc. E/3048 (1957) (amended 1977), Rule 93 [hereinafter 
Standard Minimum Rules]; The Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form 
of Detention or Imprisonment G. A. Res. 43/173, U. N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 49, U. N. Doc. 
A/43/49 (1988), Principle 18(4) [hereinafter BPPDI]. 
is Van Hulst v. Netherlands, Communication No. 903/1999, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/82/D/903/1999 
(2004), para. 7.6; Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, Portugal, U. N. Doc. 
CCPR/CO/78/PRT (2003), para. 18. 
16 Cf. Campbell v. United Kingdom (1993) 15 E. H. R. R. 137, para. 46. 17 Cf. S. v. Switzerland, supra note 14, para. 48; Kopp v. Switzerland (1999) 27 E. H. R. R. 91, para. 74. 18 Nientietz v. Germany (1993) 16 E. H. R. R. 97, para. 3. 
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must be inadmissible in evidence in any criminal proceedings against the accused. 19 
The only exception to the principle of the legal privilege relates to 'correspondence' 
between lawyer and his client that is of criminal nature, i. e., does not relate to the 
accused's right to defence, which the principle is designed to protect. 20 
B. Canada 
8.2 Right to legal assistance 
Section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter states that everyone has the right on arrest or 
detention 'to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that 
right. ' The role of the right to retain and instruct counsel in the pre-trial stage as 
enshrined in section 10(b) of the Charter is to allow the accused to understand his 
rights, the chief amongst them being the right to silence, and equally important; to 
obtain professional advice on how to exercise his rights. 21 Section 10(b), according to 
the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, guarantees the accused two distinct rights, 
which in turn, places the police under two obligations. Firstly, the police must inform 
the arrestee or the detainee of his right to retain and instruct counsel without delay. 
Secondly, if the arrestee or the detainee does assert his right to legal counsel, the 
police must give him reasonable opportunity to obtain legal counsel, and must refrain 
during that period from questioning the accused until he obtains legal counsel. A 
further important issue that requires analysis under section 10(b) is whether section 
10(b) guarantees free and immediate legal advice upon arrest or detention to those 
who lack the financial means to retain legal counsel. The following sections will 
reflect upon these three issues. 
8.2.1 The informational duty 
It is clear from the wording of section 10(b) that the accused is entitled to be informed 
of his right to legal counsel. It follows that, where the accused has not been informed 
of his right to legal counsel, this on its own, will constitute a breach of section 10(b). 
There has been some confusion amongst police officers responsible for discharging 
19 Cf. BPPDI, supra note 14, Rule no. 18(5). 20 Van Hulst v. Netherlands, supra note 15, paras. 4.5,7.8,7.10-7.11. Cf. BPPDI, supra note 14, Rule 
no. 18(3), (5); Campbell v. United Kingdom, supra note 16, para. 48. 21 R v. Manninen, [1987] 1 S. C. R. 1233,1241-3. In this respect, see Boisvert, A, 'The Role of the 
Accused in the Criminal Process', in The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 3rd edn, ed. by G 
Beaudoin &E Mendes, (Scarborough, Ont: Carswell, 1995), ch. 11, pp. 18-22. 
245 
the informational duty as to what exactly the accused is entitled to be informed of 
under section 10(b). In Brydges, 22 the accused expressed concerns regarding his 
inability to retain a private lawyer, and the interviewing officer neglected to inform 
him of the existence of a free legal aid scheme in the Province of Manitoba where he 
was arrested. The accused, in his ignorance, therefore, did not insist on contacting the 
legal aid lawyer, and during the second interview made several statements that were 
relied upon by the prosecution in the trial. However, the Supreme Court held that 
these statements had been obtained in breach of section 10(b), as the accused had 
requested the assistance of a lawyer, but had refrained from using one due to fear of 
not being able to afford it and the police had, therefore, acted in violation of section 
10(b) by not informing him of the availability of the legal aid scheme. As a result, the 
Court imposed upon the police the duty to inform the detainee of the existence of any 
legal aid scheme(s) in their jurisdiction as part of the information component of 
section 10(b). 23 
However, the confusion persisted even after Brydges, due to the existence of two 
different legal aid schemes in Canada. Firstly, there exists the duty counsel scheme, or 
what has become known as `Brydges Duty counsel', which aims to provide the 
arrestee or detainee with immediate but temporary legal advice, irrespective of the 
accused's financial status. Secondly, there is the scheme known as `Legal Aid', which 
allows the accused to receive long-term legal assistance free of charge so long as the 
financial criteria, as established by the provincial legal aid plan, are met. 24 In Bartle, 25 
the appellant was arrested for impaired driving after he failed the roadside alert test. 
The arresting officer, who was reading the caution from a pre-printed card, advised 
the arrestee of his right to retain counsel but omitted informing him of the availability 
of immediate, preliminary legal advice by the duty counsel, and the existence of a 24- 
hour, toll-free legal aid telephone number, which was printed on his caution card. In 
addition, the arresting officer did not ask the appellant if he wanted to call a lawyer 
immediately, a question that was also clearly printed on his caution card. 
The Supreme Court, in applying a purposive interpretation of section 10(b), held 
that since the implementational duty of the State is not triggered unless the arrestec or 
22 [1990] 1 S. C. R. 190. 
23 Ibid. 215. 
24 R. v. Bartle, [1994] 3 S. C. R. 173,195-197. 
25 Ibid. 
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the detainee asserts his right to retain counsel, an arrested or detained person must be 
provided with all the information on the available services in their jurisdiction 
regarding the existence of free legal counsel before he can be expected to assert his 
right. However, the information that must be provided to the accused is not confined 
to the availability of duty counsel or legal aid, where they exist, but extends to 
information on how they can be accessed, (i. e., providing him with a list of telephone 
numbers of lawyers acting as duty counsel, or a 1-800 number). 
26 In this case, as the 
arresting officer failed to provide the accused with sufficient information regarding 
the availability of free and immediate legal counsel and how they could be accessed, 
the Supreme Court found a breach of section 10(b). 
27 The standard caution as a result 
of Brydges and Bartle, was modified to meet the constitutional requirement, and 
in 
the Province of Ontario, for example, the caution is given in the following terms: 
It is my duty to inform you that you have the right to retain and instruct 
counsel without delay. You have the right to telephone any lawyer you 
wish. You also have the right to free advice from a legal aid lawyer. If you 
are charged with an offence, you may apply to the Ontario Legal Aid plan 
for assistance. 1-800-265-0451 is a toll-free number that will put you in 
contact with a Legal Aid Duty Counsel for free legal advice RIGHT 
NOW. Do you understand? Do you wish to call a lawyer now? 28 
It should be noted that both cases deal principally with the right to be informed of the 
existence of the duty counsel and legal aid schemes, and how they can be accessed, 
but it does not extend to constitutionalise the right to free and immediate legal advice 
upon arrest or detention. 29 In other words, where the legal aid or duty counsel 
schemes do not exist, the accused is not entitled to be informed of them simply 
because they do not exist. 
The information regarding the right to counsel must be provided to an arrested or 
detained person without delay. Therefore, in the absence of exceptional 
circumstances, according to the Supreme Court in Debot, 30 the detained or arrested 
person should be informed of his rights immediately upon arrest or detention, and 
must not be questioned nor required to provide evidence, before the caution is given 
to him. If exceptional circumstances do exist, especially those which threaten the 
26 Ibid. 196-197. 
27 Ibid. 193,198,207-208. 
28 Devonshire, R., 'The Effects of Supreme Court Charter-Based Decisions on Policing: More 
Beneficial than Detrimental? ' C. R., (4th) 31 (1994), 82, pp. 86-87. 29 The right to free legal assistance is discussed infra para. 8.2.3. 30 [1989] 2 S. C. R. 1140. 
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safety of the arresting officer, such as a counterattack, the police are obliged to give 
the caution as soon as they get matters under control. 31 
8.2.2 The Implementational duty 
As mentioned above, the implementational duty is not triggered unless the arrestee or 
the detainee asserts his right to retain counsel. If the right to counsel is asserted, then 
the police are under two obligations, 32 as discussed next. 
8.2.2.1 The duty to afford the accused a reasonable opportunity to retain 
counsel 
As the detainee is under the control of the police, they must give him a reasonable 
opportunity to exercise his right to retain counsel. In order to discharge this duty, the 
police must facilitate his contact with a lawyer. In Manninen, 33 the Supreme Court 
held that the police conduct of not offering the accused use of a telephone available in 
the police station, although the accused did not ask to use the telephone, he had 
asserted his right to contact a lawyer, was contradictory to their duty to afford the 
accused a reasonable opportunity to retain counsel. In effect, the Court held that the 
right to counsel was breached by the way the police had behaved. 34 What constitutes 
`a reasonable opportunity' is also affected by the diligence of the accused in 
exercising his right. Reasonable diligence in this context means that the accused must 
show a real attempt to contact a lawyer. The requirement of reasonable diligence, 
according to the majority of the Supreme Court in Smith '35 aims at striking an 
appropriate balance between the accused's right to retain and instruct a lawyer of his 
own choosing and the public interest in investigating the alleged involvement of the 
accused in the offence under investigation. 36 While it was held that it is not 
inconsistent with reasonable diligence to attempt to contact a lawyer of one's choice, 
this right is qualified in the sense that it must be reasonable in the circumstances. It 
follows that, where the lawyer chosen is not available within a reasonable time (e. g., 
is on holiday), the accused should exercise his right by calling another lawyer. 37 
3 Ibid. 1163. 
32 Manninen, supra note 21,1241-1243. 
33 Ibid. 
34lbid, 1242. 
35 [1989] 2 S. C. R. 368. 
36 Ibid. 385. 
37 R. v. Ross, [1989] 1 S. C. R. 3,11-12. 
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8.2.2.2 The duty to hold off the investigation until the accused had a 
reasonable opportunity to retain counsel 
The second duty upon the police is to refrain from eliciting incriminating evidence 
from the accused until he is given reasonable opportunity to contact a lawyer. This 
duty is consistent with the purpose of the right to legal assistance, as this right would 
be meaningless if the police were allowed to question the accused before he knew his 
rights and how they could be exercised, which is what the right is specifically 
designed to achieve. As Lamer J., as he then was, put it in Manninen: 38 
The purpose of the right to counsel is to allow the detainee not only to be 
informed of his rights and obligations under the law but, equally if not 
more important, to obtain advice as to how to exercise those rights. In this 
case, the police officers correctly informed the respondent of his right to 
remain silent and the main function of counsel would be to confirm the 
existence of that right and then to advise him as to how to exercise it. For 
the right to counsel to be effective, the detainee must have access to this 
39 advice before he is questioned or otherwise required to provide evidence. 
The period during which the police have to refrain from questioning the accused is 
dependent on the circumstances of the case, and in particular on the diligence of the 
accused in pursuing his right, as discussed above, the availability of duty counsel, 40 
and the urgency of the investigation. 41 
8.2.3 Legal aid 
After Brydges, 42 several provinces attempted to secure, within their own jurisdictions, 
a duty counsel scheme, in order to conform with the Supreme Court's decision. 
However, as the Supreme Court observed in Prosper, 43 not all the provinces adopted 
the scheme including, namely, the provinces of Nova Scotia and Prince Edward 
Island. As a result, the Supreme Court was faced with the question as to whether 
section 10(b) created a positive constitutional obligation on provincial governments to 
ensure that free and immediate preliminary legal advice was available upon arrest or 
detention and, if it does not, what are the government's obligations, if any, in a 
jurisdiction where 'Brydges duty counsel' is not available to detainees? Despite 
38 Supra note 21. 
391bid. at pp. 1243-1244. 
4° See infra para. 8.2.3. 
41 [1988] 2 S. C. R. 980. 
42 Supra note 22. 
43 [1994] 3 S. C. R. 236. 
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acknowledging the importance of legal counsel in the pre-trial stage, the Supreme 
Court was opposed to constitutionalising the right to State-funded legal counsel, 
where the accused lacks the means to retain a private one. This opposition was based 
upon a number of considerations. Firstly, the apparent wording of section 10(b) does 
not make any reference to such a right. Secondly, the creators of the Charter 
considered including a clause guaranteeing the right to free legal counsel to those 
without the means to pay for it, and where the interest of the administration of justice 
so requires, but the proposal was rejected, apparently due to the costs involved. 
Lastly, and perhaps more importantly, the practical implications of obliging all 
provincial governments to secure a duty counsel scheme with the related consequence 
of failing to do so would mean a violation of section 10(b), would be far reaching. 44 
As Chief Justice Lamer, speaking for the majority of the Supreme Court in Prosper, 45 
put it: 
In effect, this Court would be saying that in order to have the power of 
arrest and detention, a province must have a duty counsel system in place. 
In provinces and territories where no duty counsel system exists, the 
logical implication would be that all arrests and detentions are prima facie 
unconstitutional. Moreover, devising an appropriate remedy under 
circumstances in which a government was found to be in breach of its 
constitutional obligation for failure to provide duty counsel would prove 
very difficult. Unless absolutely necessary to protect the Charter rights of 
individuals, I believe that a holding with implications of this magnitude 
should be avoided. 46 
In effect, the majority preferred to avoid inflaming a constitutional crisis, and adopted 
a less drastic approach by extending the period during which the police are obliged to 
refrain from eliciting evidence from the accused where a duty counsel scheme does 
not exist. In addition, Chief Justice Lamer warned provincial governments about the 
implications of not providing duty counsel services within their jurisdiction. It is 
significant that his Lordship pointed out the connection between the right to a fair trail 
and the availability of duty counsel upon arrest or detention, which had not been 
previously considered. He stressed the fact that evidence obtained in violation of the 
right to a fair trial, as enshrined in section 7 as a principle of fundamental justice, will 
always result in the tainted evidence being excluded. Therefore, the provincial 
44 Ibid. 266-267. 
4s Ibid. 
46 Ibid. at p. 267. 
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governments where duty counsel services are not available would have to accept such 
a risk. 47 
In New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J. ), 48 
Lamer C. J., elaborated on the conclusion reached by the majority of Court in 
Prosper'49 which rejected the submission that section 10(b) include the right to state- 
funded counsel. He stated that the Charter recognises the right to state-funded 
counsel, but not as an independent or an absolute right. The right to state-funded 
counsel, according to his Lordship, is part of the right to a fair hearing, recognised as 
a principle of fundamental justice under section 7. As such, the right to state-funded 
counsel becomes a constitutional right, where the fairness of the trial cannot be 
secured without it. In other words, Lamer C. J., attempted to reconcile two conflicting 
ends: avoiding imposing a positive constitutional obligation on the government to 
ensure that legal counsel services are freely available to those who lack sufficient 
means to afford them otherwise, and securing the fairness of the trial recognised by 
section 7 as a principle of fundamental justice. A compromise was struck by 
qualifying the previous statement made in Prosper by adding, in the case under 
consideration, that where an individual's life, liberty, or security is at stake, the 
circumstances of the case indicate that the accused cannot be afforded a fair trial 
without having the benefit of legal counsel, and he lacks the means to pay for it, then 
the government is constitutionally obliged under section 7 to provide him with one 
free of charge. 50 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that as a result of the Supreme Court's rulings in 
Prosper and New Brunswick, discussed above, 'Brydges duty counsel' scheme is now 
available in all provinces throughout Canada. 51 
8.2.4 Confidentiality of client-solicitor relationship 
The accused has the right to obtain legal counsel under s. 10(b) in private. 52 Where 
the circumstances under which the information regarding s. 10(b) right, discussed 
above, is given, lead the accused to reasonably believe that he cannot exercise his 
47 
Ibid. 273-274. 
48 [1999] 3 S. C. R 46. 
49 Supra note 43. 
so Ibid. 95-96. 
5' Verdun-Jones, S, A Review of Bgdges Duty Counsel Services in Canada (Ottawa: Department of 
Justice Canada, 2003), pp. 71-72, available at <http: //canada. iustiee. Cc. ca> (last visited Jan. 2,2006). 52 R v. Jackson, (1993) 86 C. C. C. (3d) 233,234. 
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right to obtain legal counsel in private, and such circumstances are known or ought to 
be known to the person giving the information, and he knows or ought to know the 
effects that such circumstances may reasonably have on the accused, the officer 
giving the information is constitutionally required under s. 10(b) to inform the accused 
of his right to retain and instruct counsel in private. Failure to do so, where the 
accused has refrained from retaining and instructing counsel in the reasonable belief 
that he does not have the right to do so in private, will constitute, on its own, a 
violation of s. 10(b). 53 
The communications between the accused and his lawyer are privileged against 
search or seizure. The privilege relating to the client-solicitor relationship acquires its 
constitutional status in Canada from its close connection to the right to full answer 
and defence and the right to a fair right trial enshrined in section 7, as principles of 
fundamental justice. Justice Major of the Supreme Court, in his dissenting reasons in 
Smith v. Jones54 expressed the principle underlying the client-solicitor privilege in the 
following terms: 
In Canada, everyone is entitled to retain legal counsel to defend and 
protect their interests. This right is particularly important in criminal 
proceedings. 
If the confidences clients share with counsel were not protected by 
privilege, it seems apparent that accused persons would hesitate to confide 
in their legal advisors, who in turn could not adequately represent them. 
The starting point of Canadian justice is that no one, no matter how 
horrible the alleged offence, be denied a full defence. Nor will they be 
prejudiced by retaining counsel and freely discussing the case with him or 
her. 55 
As a consequence, the Supreme Court held unanimously that the solicitor-client 
privilege was a principle of fundamental justice protected under section 7.56 
Regarding the procedure upon which claims of solicitor-client privilege can be 
determined with regard to documents seized in a law office, the Supreme Court in a 
recent case struck down a provision dealing with this issue under the Criminal Code. 
The Court found that the protection provided by the unconstitutional provision was 
53 Ibid. 
50 [1999] 1 S. C. R. 455. 
55 Ibid. at p. 462. 
56 Ibid. Cory J., p. 471 (L'Heureux-Dube, Gonthier, McLachlin, lacobucci and Bastarache JJ. 
concurred) Major J., p. 461 (Lamer C. J. C and Binnie J. concurred). 
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inadequate as it interfered with the privilege more than it was necessary. 57 The Court 
came to this conclusion for a number of reasons. Firstly, s. 488.1 (8) permitted a 
breach of the privilege without the knowledge or the consent of the privilege holder. 
Second, there was an absence of judicial discretion in the scheme under s. 488. (1), 
which meant that if the privilege holder or keeper failed to assert the privilege, the 
prosecution was entitled to access the seized documents. Finally, under s. 4881 (b), 
the Attorney General was permitted to inspect the documents seized, where the judge 
determining the application deemed it to be of assistance to him in deciding whether 
the documents were privileged or not. 58 The Court, as a consequence of invalidating 
the impugned provision, imposed general principles dealing with claims of privileged 
documents until the Parliament re-enact legislation dealing with this issue. These 
principles are as follows: 
" if the documents are known to be privileged documents, no search warrant 
shall be issued with regard to them; 
" the justice of the peace must be satisfied by the investigation authority that 
there is no existing alternative to the search of a law office; 
" the justice of the peace, before allowing a law office to be searched must 
demand the police to provide the maximum protection possible for the 
solicitor-client privilege; 
" all documents found in the possession of a lawyer must be sealed before 
being examined or removed from the lawyer's possession, unless the warrant 
authorises otherwise; 
" the lawyer and the client must be contacted at the time of executing the 
search warrant. In the event that they cannot be contacted, a representative of 
the Bar should be present to oversee the sealing and seizure of these 
documents; 
" the officer executing the warrant should report the efforts made to contact 
all potential privilege holders to the justice, and they should be provided with 
a reasonable opportunity to assert the privilege. If the claim of privilege was 
asserted, the issue has to be determined judicially; 
S' Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada (Attorney General), et a! (2002) 167 C. C. C. (3d) 1, at. 52. 58 Ibid. 4-27 & 32-34. 
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" if the efforts to notify the potential privilege holders are unsuccessful, the 
privilege keeper, or a lawyer appointed by either the Law Society or the 
judge, should be given a reasonable opportunity to examine the documents in 
order to determine whether to assert a claim of privilege or not; 
" the Attorney General is not permitted to inspect the documents in the 
course of the determination of the status of documents unless it is determined 
not to be privileged. The Attorney General could make submissions on the 
issue of privilege; 
" where it is determined that the sealed documents are not privileged, the 
documents can be used in the normal course of the investigation; and 
" where the documents are determined to be covered by the solicitor-client 
privilege, they must be returned immediately to the privilege holder, the 
privilege keeper, or to the lawyer designated by the Law Society or by the 
court. 59 
It should be noted, however, that the client-solicitor privilege is not an absolute one, 
in the sense that information that falls under the client-solicitor privilege can be 
disclosed where the exception to the rule applies. There are three exceptions to the 
client-solicitor privilege, which include the following circumstances: 
" where the non-disclosure of information falling under the client-solicitor 
privilege will impede the accused's ability to make full answer and defence 
against the charges against him; 
" where the communications between the accused and his client are of criminal 
nature, i. e., criminal in themselves or aim at the facilitation of the commission 
of a criminal offence; and 
" where the non-disclosure of privileged information threatens the safety of the 
public, e. g., serious harm will occur to a person, which could be prevented if 




In the above-mentioned circumstances, the information falling under the client- 
solicitor privilege can be disclosed as long as it relates directly to those 
circumstances. 60 
C. Saudi Arabia 
8.3 Right to legal assistance 
The CCP, without a precedent, is the first codified law in Saudi legal history to 
recognise the accused's right to seek legal assistance. Article 4 of the CCP entitles the 
accused at the investigation and trial stages to seek the assistance of a representative 
or a lawyer . 
61 Given that the accused is only entitled to seek the assistance of a lawyer 
during the investigation and trial stages, the right to legal assistance does not apply to 
the police enquiry stage, whether or not it involves a flagrante delicto offence, in 
which the police have extensive powers over the accused. The CCP does not specify 
the moment at which the investigation stage begins. However, in practice, the 
investigation stage is considered to begin from the moment that the accused, along 
with the case dossier, has been referred to the IPPC, usually within the 24 hours 
following the arrest of the accused. 62 
The CCP does not explicitly state that the accused has the right to contact his 
lawyer upon arrest or detention. However, this right is implicitly guaranteed under 
Article 35 of the CCP, which states that any arrested or detained person 'shall be 
entitled to contact any person of his choice to inform him of his arrest. ' According to 
Article 70 of the CCP, the investigator cannot separate the accused from his 
accompanying lawyer during the investigation stage. In addition, under Article 19 of 
the Law Practice Code (LPC)63 the 'investigation authorities' are required to 'facilitate 
the lawyer's discharge of his duty, and shall enable him to attend any interrogation .... 
His request [to, inter alia, attend the interrogation] shall not be denied except for a 
valid reason. ' If the relevant investigator decides to prevent a lawyer from attending 
60 Smith v. Jones, supra note 54, pp. 477-490. 61 See also CCP. Art. 64. 62 Written response from Investigator Sulman Al-Jurba, Investigation and Public Prosecution Commission Branch, Crimes Against Honour Division, Riyadh (July. 14,2004); interview with Investigator Hassen Al-Asaker, Investigation and Public Prosecution Commission Branch, Crimes Against Honour Division Riyadh (May. 23-25,2004). 63 Issued by Royal Decree No M138 (15 October 2001). Published on Umm al-Qura (the Saudi official Gazette) No. 3867 on 2 November 2001. 
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the interrogation of his client, the lawyer can appeal against the decision of the 
investigator by submitting a request to review the decision to the Head of the relevant 
Division, whose decision is final. The role of a lawyer during the interrogation is a 
passive one in the sense that he cannot intervene during the interrogation unless the 
investigator permits him to do so, and in any case, the lawyer is entitled to provide 
written observations to the investigator to be included in the case file. 65 
Article 84 prohibits the seizure of any correspondence between the lawyer and his 
accused client if they relate to the ongoing criminal proceedings against the accused, 
or any documents submitted by the accused to his lawyer, or representative, for the 
purposes of obtaining his legal advice, if these correspondences or documents are in 
the possession of the accused's lawyer or representative. 
There is no way of knowing how the CCP provisions relating to the right to legal 
assistance are implemented in practice for the simple reason that the right to legal 
assistance is hardly exercised by either accused persons during the pre-trial stage or 
defendants during the trial stage. During the present researcher's six-month fieldwork 
period, which was spent mostly in the IPPC Branch in Riyadh and the Shari'ah courts, 
he did not encounter any criminal case in which a lawyer was involved. Indeed, those 
IPPC Investigators who were interviewed by the present researcher encountered either 
a very small number of cases in which a lawyer representing the accused was 
involved, 66 or none at all. 67 Therefore, the question that arises is why, in practice, 
accused persons and defendants alike do not utilise such an important right? There are 
a number of factors that seem to contribute to this phenomenon. These factors include 
the following: 
" The accused is not entitled to be informed of his right to legal assistance, 68 
nor how he can, in practice, exercise it. 
64 Implementing Regulation of the Law Practice Code, issued by the Justice of Minister Order No. 4649 
17 August 2002). 
s CCP. Art. 70. 
66 Interview with Investigator Anonymous, D. N. [Pseudonym. ], Investigation and Public Prosecution 
Commission Branch, Riyadh (Aug. 22,2004); written response from Investigator Sulman Al-Jurba, 
supra note 62. 
67 Interview with Investigator Hassen Al-Asaker, supra note 62; written response from Investigator 
Thamer Al-Suniadi, Investigation and Public Prosecution Commission, Drug Crimes Division, Riyadh 
(July. 13,2004). 
6e Written response from Investigator Sulman Al-Jurba, supra note 62; Interview with Investigator 
Hassen Al-Asaker, supra note 62. 
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" As the CCP does not entitle those persons who lack the financial means to 
retain a private legal assistance to free legal assistance, they are practically 
deprived, by virtue of their financial status, from the right to legal 
assistance. 69 
" Law practice was only recognised by Saudi law as a profession as recently as 
2001, by virtue of the Law Practice Code. Prior to that date, there were no 
rules that regulated law practice, or that guaranteed and defined the rights and 
obligations of lawyers, which had deterred many law graduates from 
practicing law. 70 
" The Saudi society is not familiar with the concept and the benefits of legal 
representation .71 
Obtaining the services of a professional lawyer, particularly 
in criminal cases is seen as an indication of guilt, as it is commonly thought 
that if the accused were innocent, he would not need a lawyer to prove it. 
Hence, lawyers are perceived, among other things, as a hindrance to justice 
rather than a means of achieving it. This perception is even shared by 
judges. 72 Indeed, even lawyers do not consider providing their services to an 
accused person they consider 'guilty', as an ethical thing to do. 73 
" As a consequence of the last two mentioned factors, there is a limited number 
of practicing lawyers in Saudi Arabia. According to the Head of the 
Department of Law Practice in the Ministry of Justice, the governmental 
agency responsible for issuing licences for practicing law, as of September 
2004, there were only 600 practicing lawyers74 in a country with a population 
69 See, e. g., Waleed's Case, supra ch. 7 note 185 and accompanying text. 
70 Interview with lawyer Abdurrahman A1-Muqbel, Riyadh (Nov. 4,2004). 
71 Ibid. See also Report of the Special Rapporteur, Dato' Param Cumaraswamy, on the Independence of 
Judges and Lawyers: Report on the Mission to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Submitted Pursuant to 
Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2002/43, U. N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 59th Sess, 
Item 11(d) of the provisional agenda U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4/2003/65/Add. 3, para. 51 [Hereinafter the 
Human Rights Commission Report), paras. 37,91. 
72 Interview with Qadi Suleiman Al-Hudiathi, General Court, Riyadh (July. 18,2004); ); interview with 
Qadi Muhammad Al Jaarallah, General Court, Riyadh (Aug. 2-3,2004); interview with Qadi Tameem 
Al-Aunizan, Summary Court, Riyadh (July. 11-12,2004). See also Human Rights Commission Report, 
supra note 71, para. 37,91; Vogel, F, Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia (Boston: 
Brill, 2000), pp. 160-161. 
73 Interview with lawyer Abdurrahman Al-Muqpel, supra note 70. 74 Interview with Sheik Abdurrahman Al-Hutan, Head of the Department of Law Practice, Ministry of 
Justice, Riyadh (Sep. 19,2004). 
257 
of about 25 million. 75 The majority of those practicing lawyers are involved 
in commercial and civil cases, which are more profitable and culturally more 
acceptable to participate in. 76 
8.4 Comparison 
Although both the Saudi and the Canadian systems recognise the right to legal 
assistance, there are stark differences between the two systems in this respect. The 
underlying difference, from which all other differences flow, is how the role of legal 
assistance is perceived under the two systems. Under the Saudi system, legal 
assistance is considered, at best, a useful thing for the accused to have, but in cases 
where the accused does not have legal assistance, or his right to legal assistance has 
been violated, the fairness of the trial will not be seen to have been affected. At worst, 
legal assistance is considered an impediment to the ability of the investigating 
authority as well as the courts to arrive at the "proper" outcome regarding the guilt or 
the innocence of the accused. In contrast, under the Canadian system, legal assistance 
is considered indispensable if the fairness of the trial is to be secured. 
These differences, which are the result of the different perception taken by each 
system of the role on the right to legal assistance in the criminal process, can be 
summarised in the following points: 
" Under the Canadian system, the accused is constitutionally entitled to be 
informed of his right to legal assistance and how to exercise it, while under 
the Saudi system the accused does not have such a right. 
" The right to legal assistance under the Canadian system is a constitutional 
one, while the right to legal assistance is recognised statutorily under the 
Saudi system. 
" Under the Canadian system, the right to legal assistance comes into play the 
moment the accused is arrested or detained, while the right to legal 
assistance under the Saudi system applies to the investigation stage, i. e., 
after 24 hours following the arrest of the accused. 
75 Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations 
Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects, 
available at <http: //esa. un. or unpp> (last visited Jan. 2,2006). 76 Interview with lawyer Abdurrahman Al-Muqpel, supra note 70. 
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" Under the Canadian system, the accused is constitutionally entitled to an 
effective exercise of his right to legal assistance, if he asserts his right. This 
includes the duty of the police to facilitate the accused's exercise of his right 
to legal assistance, e. g., providing him with a telephone, and telephone 
numbers of legal services; the duty of the police not to question the accused 
until he has obtained legal assistance, and the duty of the police to allow the 
accused to obtain legal assistance in private. However, the Saudi system 
does not address how the accused, who is in the hands of the state 
authorities, can exercise his right to legal assistance in a meaningful way. 
" The right to free legal assistance is a constitutional right under the Canadian 
system, where the accused's right to a fair trial cannot be secured without it, 
and he lacks the means to retain a private lawyer. In addition, in practice, 
throughout Canada there is a duty counsel scheme by which the accused can 
readily obtain legal assistance free of charge upon arrest or detention. In 
contrast, the Saudi system does not recognise at all the right to free legal 
assistance irrespective of the circumstances of the case and the financial 
status of the accused. 
" Under the Canadian system, correspondence and communications between 
the accused and his lawyer are privileged against search and seizure, unless 
there are competing social interests that can override them. Under the Saudi 
system, correspondence and communication between the accused and his 
lawyer are privileged against search and seizure only if they are in the 
possession of the lawyer or the representative of the accused. 
" Where the accused's right to legal assistance has been violated under the 
Canadian system and the violation has resulted in the accused making 
incriminating statements, such statements will almost definitely be excluded 
under s. 24(2) of the Charter, as will be discussed later. By contrast, the 
Saudi system does not provide any remedy for the violation of the accused's 
right to legal assistance. 77 
'7 The exclusion of illegally obtained evidence under the Saudi and Canadian systems is discussed infra 
paras. 9.2.3 & 9.3.4. 
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Chapter Nine 
The Right to Privacy 
A. International human rights law 
9.1 Right to privacy 
Article 17 of the ICCPR states that: 
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his 
honour and reputation. 
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks. 
Article 17 guarantees the right to privacy. However, Article 17 only protects against 
arbitrary or unlawful interference with the right to privacy. It also requires the State to 
provide adequate safeguards to ensure the enjoyment of the right to privacy. In the 
following sections, attention will be focused on the interests protected under Article 
17, the legitimate limitations that can be imposed on those interests, the duty of the 
State to provide adequate protection against unlawful and arbitrary interferences with 
Article 17, and finally, the remedy of excluding evidence obtained in violation of 
Article 17. 
9.1.1 Interests protected under Article 17 
Article 17 protects six interests that fall within the realm of the private sphere: 
privacy, family, home, correspondence, honour, and reputation. Only three protected 
interests under Article 17 are relevant to this discussion: privacy, home, and 
correspondence. These three interests are interconnected and overlap in the sense that 
a given action can violate more than one interest at the same time. ' This is particularly 
true with regard to, on the one hand, the interest of privacy, and, on the other hand, 
the interests of home and correspondence, as privacy, if interpreted broadly, can 
encompass home and correspondence. Hence, the right to correspondence and home 
1 Cf. Harris, D, et al, Law of the European Convention on Hunan Rights (London: Butterworths, 
1995), p. 302. 
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could be viewed as specific examples of the interests protected under privacy. For the 
purposes of establishing a violation of Article 17, it is not necessary to determine 
precisely which interest has been allegedly violated, as an alleged violation of any 
interest connected with the private sphere can be based on Article 17 as a whole. 2 
Nonetheless, it is still necessary for determining the scope of Article 17 to define the 
protected interests under it. 
" Privacy: the HRC has not yet defined privacy within the meaning of Article 
17 of the ICCPR. 3 However, privacy can be defined as the freedom from 
illegal or arbitrary interferences with 'the particular area of individual 
existence and autonomy [, which, "includes all manifestations of privacy that 
do not fall under one of the special, usually institutional categories (home, 
correspondence, etc)", and] does not touch upon the sphere of liberty and 
privacy of others ., 
4 In this sense, the right to private life protects, inter alia, 
against unlawful and arbitrary interferences with the physical and 
psychological integrity of the individual. Thus, humiliating acts, such as 
insults or arbitrary intimate body searches, can violate Article 17, even if the 
suffering inflicted upon the person concerned as a result of them is not so 
severe as to engage Article 7 or/and Article 10 of the ICCPR. 5 
" Home: home within the meaning of Article 17 has been defined by the HRC 
as the 'place where a person resides or carries out his usual occupation. '6 
Therefore, the right to home protects against unlawful or arbitrary electronic 
surveillance (i. e., information collected from the 'home' through electronic 
listening or video devices), entry, and searches of private homes or business 
offices. 
2 Cf. Dijk, P, et al, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, 3rd edn (The 
Hague; Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1998), p. 489. 
3 See Coeriel, et al. v. The Netherlands, Communication No. 453/1991, U. N. Doc 
. 
CCPR/C/52/D/453/1991 (1994) (Mr. Kurt Herndl, dissenting). 
4 Nowak, M, U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Strasbourg: N. P. Engel, 1993), p. 294. S See Human Rights Committee, General Comment 16, (Twenty-third session, 1988), Compilation of 
General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U. N. 
Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev. 1 at 21 (1994), para. 8 [hereinafter General Comment 16]. See also Nowak, 
supra note 4, pp. 295-296 
6 ibid. para. 5. Cf. Niemietz v. Germany (1993) 16 E. H. R. R. 97, para. 29. 
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" Correspondence: correspondence within the meaning of Article 17 refers to 
all means of communications over distance. 7 It includes letters, telephone, 
telex, e-mail, telefax etc. Withholding, censoring, intercepting, recording, 
opening or reading 'correspondence' constitutes interference within the 
meaning of Article 17.8 
9.1.2 Limitations on the right to privacy 
As indicated earlier, the right to privacy under Article 17 is not absolute in the sense 
that it can be restricted under certain circumstances. For a restriction on the right to 
privacy to conform with Article 17, it must not be 'arbitrary or unlawful'. For a 
restriction to conform with the non-arbitrariness requirement, according to the 
Committee, the restriction must be necessary to protect 'the interests of society as 
understood under the Covenant', 9 and to be proportionate to the aim pursued. 1° For a 
restriction on Article 17 to be considered proportionate and, thus, not arbitrary, it must 
be established that the restriction is the least restrictive measure available to the State 
to secure the aim pursued. " Article 17 does not specify the legitimate purposes for 
interfering with Article 17. However, it is doubtless that an interference with Article 
17 for the purposes of collecting evidence or arresting a suspected criminal constitutes 
a legitimate goal for interfering with Article 17.12 
With regard to the requirement of 'lawfulness', according to the HRC for a 
restriction on Article 17 to be considered lawful within the meaning of that Article, it 
must be prescribed by law, and the law itself must comply with 'the provisions, aims 
and objectives of the Covenant. ' 13 Thus, if a given law allows, for example, intimate 
searches to be carried out by a person of the opposite sex, notwithstanding the search 
being lawful under the domestic law, it is nonetheless unlawful within the meaning of 
7 Nowak, supra note 4, p. 304. 
8 General Comment 16, supra note 5, para. 8. 
9 Ibid. para. 7. See also Coeriel et at. v. The Netherlands, Communication No. 453/1991, U. N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/52/D/453/ 1991 (1994), paras. 10.4-10.5. 
10 Ibid. para. 4. See also Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/1992, U. N. Doc 
CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994), para. 8.3. Cf. the meaning of arbitrariness under Article 9. 
11 Cf. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 27, Freedom of Movement (Art. 12), (Sixty-seventh 
session, 1999), U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add. 9 (1999), reprinted in Compilation of General 
Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U. N. Doc. 
HRI/GEN/l/Rev. 6 at 174 (2003), para. 14. 
12 See General Comment 16, supra note 5, para. 8. Cf. ECHR, Art. 8(2). 13 Ibid. para. 3. 
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Article 17, as it is contrary to the human dignity that is the essence of Article 17.14 In 
addition, the law must set precisely and in detail the circumstances under which 
restrictions on Article 17 may be imposed, 15 and it must provide adequate safeguards 
against unlawful or arbitrary interferences with the right to privacy. 16 Adequate 
safeguards against unlawful or arbitrary interferences with the right to privacy implied 
in the requirement of lawfulness, and expressly required under Article 17(2) are 
discussed next. 
9.1.3 Procedural safeguards 
A law that imposes restrictions on the right to privacy must be accompanied by 
adequate safeguards to ensure that the right to privacy is not arbitrarily or unlawfully 
interfered with. The HRC's jurisprudence seems to suggest that, under normal 
circumstances, there must be a judicial supervision including a prior judicial 
authorisation in order for an interference with Article 17 to conform with the 
Covenant, in particular where electronic surveillance is involved. 17 However, a prior 
judicial warrant is not of itself sufficient to make a given restriction on Article 17 
lawful, if the interference is not accompanied by appropriate safeguards. 18 Apart from 
the required judicial supervision over interferences with Article 17, the HRC has not 
elaborated on the required safeguards to protect against arbitrary or unlawful 
interferences with the right to privacy. However, in a series of cases concerning the 
right to privacy under Article 8 of the ECHR, the European Court has developed the 
required safeguards to protect against arbitrary and unlawful interferences with the 
right to privacy. According to the European Court's jurisprudence, the law must: 19 
" determine with reasonable clarity the scope of the authorities' discretionary 
powers with regard to permissible interferences with Article 8; 
14 Cf. ibid. para. 8. 
15 General Comment 16, supra note 5, para. 8. Cf. Huvig v. France (1990) 12 E. H. R. R. 528, paras. 33- 
35; Niemietz v. Germany, supra note 6, para. 32-33. 
16 Pinkney v. Canada, Communication No. 27/1978, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 at 95 (1985), para. 34; 
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, Russian Federation, U. N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add. 54 (1995), para. 19. Cf. Herczegfalvy v. Austria (1993) 15 E. H. R. R. 437, para. 89. 17 See Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, Zimbabwe, U. N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add. 89 (1998), para. 25; Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, 
Poland, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 110 (1999), 22. Cf. Klass and Others v. FRG (1979-80) 2 E. H. R. R. 
214, para. 56; Funke v. France (1993) 16 E. H. R. R. 297, para. 57. 
18 Cf Niemietz v. Germany, supra note 6, para. 37. 19 See Malone v. United Kingdom (1985) 7 E. H. R. R. 14; Olsson v. Sweden (1989) 11 E. H. R. R. 259; 
Kruslin v. France (1990) 12 E. H. R. R. 547; Huvig v. France (1990) 12 E. H. R. R. 528. 
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" define the categories of people liable to have their Article 8 right interfered 
with; 
" define the nature of the offences that may give rise to interference with 
Article 8; and 
" set a limit on the duration of the interference with Article 8. 
The above-mentioned safeguards, which the European Court developed under article 
8 of the ECHR, provide some guidance concerning the safeguards required under the 
corresponding provision in Article 17 of the ICCPR. It should be noted, however, that 
the more serious the interference with Article 17 is, the more protection the law must 
provide to comply with the Covenant. Whether a given set of safeguards is sufficient 
to comply with Article 17 requirements or not can only be determined in the light of 
the circumstances of each case. 20 
9.1.4 Remedy: Exclusion of illegally obtained evidence 
If the accused's right has been violated, he is entitled to a remedy under Article 2(3) of 
the ICCPR. The question to be addressed here is whether the admission of evidence 
obtained in violation of the accused's right, breaches the right to effective remedy 
under Article 2(3). It should be recalled here that the right to remedy refers to both the 
mechanism by which the violation is determined to have occurred or not, and the 
redress awarded if there is a violation. With regard to the former, the competent 
authority (i. e., the court) must first examine whether a Covenant right has been 
violated or not. Failure to examine an arguable claim that a Covenant right has been 
violated, in itself constitutes a violation of Article 2(3). 21 
If a violation of a Convent right is determined to have occurred and the violation 
resulted in the discovery of evidence against the accused, the competent authority 
must determine whether the exclusion of evidence is the appropriate remedy. The 
answer to this question will rest wholly on whether or not the admission of the tainted 
evidence violates the fairness of the trial. 22 As discussed earlier, evidence obtained in 
violation of the right against self-incrimination together with the right not to be 
subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or without it, will almost 
20 Cf. Klass and Others v. FRG, supra note 17, para. 50. 
21 See supra para. 4.1.1. 
22 Cf. Schenk v. Switzerland (1991) 13 E. H. R. R. 242, para. 46. 
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definitely undermine the fairness of the trial, and therefore, must be automatically 
excluded. 23 On the other hand, the effect of admitting evidence obtained in violation 
of other rights on the fairness of the trial must be determined in the light of the 
seriousness of the violation, the faith of the police and whether independent evidence, 
apart from the contaminated evidence, pointing to the guilt of the accused exists. 24 
B. Canada 
9.2 Right to privacy 
Section 8 of the Charter states that '[e]veryone has the right to be secure against 
unreasonable search or seizure. ' The scope of the right against unreasonable search or 
seizure was determined in the leading case of Hunter v. Southam. 25 Justice Dickson, 
speaking for the majority of the Supreme Court in that case, adopted the reasoning of 
Justice Stewart of the Supreme Court of the United States of America in Katz v. 
United States, 26 by stating that section 8 does not protect places but rather people, 
and, therefore, the underlying interest that section 8 seeks to protect is, at least, the 
right to privacy. The essence of this right is 'to be left alone by other people. '27 
However, the right to privacy under section 8 is not a free-standing one, but a right 
that protects individuals against unreasonable governmental interferences with their 
right to privacy. In other words, it only protects a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
As Justice Dickson put it: 
The guarantee of security from unreasonable search and seizure only 
protects a reasonable expectation. This limitation on the right guaranteed by 
s. 8, whether it is expressed negatively as freedom from "unreasonable" 
search and seizure, or positively as an entitlement to a "reasonable" 
expectation of privacy, indicates that an assessment must be made as to 
whether in a particular situation the public's interest in being left alone by 
government must give way to the government's interest in intruding on the 
individual's privacy in order to advance its goals, notably those of law 
enforcement. 8 
23 See supra para. 5.1.3. 
24 Cf. Cheney, D, et at, Criminal Justice and the Human Rights Act 1998,2nd edn (Bristol: Jordans, 
2001), para. 146-147; Starmer, K, et al, Criminal justice, Police Powers and Human Rights (London: 
Blackstone, 2001), pp. 202-205. 
25 [1984] 2 S. C. R 145. 
26 389 U. S. 347 (1967). 
27 Citing Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967), p. 350, in Hunter v. Southam, supra note 25, p. 
159. 
28 Ibid. 159-160. 
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In order to reconcile the competing interests of privacy and law enforcement, the 
police are required, where it is 'feasible', to obtain a prior judicial authorisation in the 
form of a warrant before they can conduct the search or seizure. Hence, a warrantless 
search is presumed unreasonable. 29 The rational behind this requirement was 
indicated to be that, if the right is to be meaningful, the aim should be to prevent the 
occurrence of unreasonable searches before they take place, rather than determining 
their validity after they have occurred. 30 In order to achieve that end, save where it is 
unfeasible, a prior judicial authorisation is a prerequisite for the constitutionality of an 
interference with the right to privacy. A search warrant has been defined by the 
Supreme Court as: 
[A]n order issued by a justice under statutory powers, authorising a named 
person to enter a specified place to search for and seize specified property 
which will afford evidence of the actual or intended commission of a 
crime. A warrant may issue upon a sworn information and proof of 
reasonable grounds for its issuance. The property seized must be carried 
before the justice who issued the warrant to be dealt with by him 
according to law. 
The issuance of a search warrant is a judicial act on the part of the justice, 
usually performed ex parte and in camera, by the very nature of the 
proceedings. 31 
I 
As pointed out earlier, any person, who seeks the protection of the Charter, bears the 
burden of establishing, on the balance of the probabilities, that his right has been 
interfered with. 32 Regarding warrantless searches, the accused has only to demonstrate 
the fact that the search was conducted without a warrant, and the burden will shift to 
the Crown to rebut the presumption that a warrantless search is unreasonable. In order 
to do so, the Crown must establish that the search is authorised by the law, and that 
the law itself as well as the manner in which the search was conducted are 
reasonable. 33 
291bid. 161. 
30 Ibid. 160. 
31 A. G. v. Maclntyre, [1982] 1 S. C. R. 175,179. 
32 See supra para. 4.3. 
33 Ibid. pp. 277-278 
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In the remainder of this section attention will be the requirement of a judicial 
warrant, the exceptions to the warrant requirement, and the exclusionary rule under 
s. 24(2) of the Charter as a remedy for violations of s. 8. 
9.2.1 The requirement of a judicial warrant 
As mentioned above, the minimum constitutional standard under section 8 is a prior 
judicial authorisation in the form of a warrant where it is feasible. For a warrant to 
meet the constitutional standard under section 8 of the Charter, it has to satisfy two 
requirements. Firstly, the person authorising the search has to make the assessment 
regarding the reasonableness of the grounds of the search in an independent and 
impartial manner. The person authorising the search does not have to be a judge, but 
at least he/she has to be capable of acting judicially. 34 The test to be applied in 
determining whether the officer empowered to carry out judicial functions (i. e., 
issuing a search warrant) is capable of discharging his duties impartially, is not 
dependent on whether there is a real bias in the case or not but, as Vancise J. A., 
speaking for the majority of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in R. v. Baylis, 35 put 
it, is 'whether any reasonable person would have a reasoned suspicion that the person 
authorising the search could not assess the evidence presented to him or her in an 
impartial, neutral, and detached manner. '36 The test of a real or reasonable 
apprehension of bias seeks not just to ensure that the probable grounds are actually 
assessed in an impartial and neutral manner, but also seeks to preserve the public 
confidence in the impartiality of those who are required to act judicially. 37 If the 
officer who issued the search warrant is determined to be lacking the impartiality 
requirement because of a real or reasonable suspicion of bias, the search warrant, 
irrespective of the belief of the officer executing the warrant, is considered to have 
been illegally obtained under the provision authorising it, and therefore the search is 
unreasonable in violation of section 8.38 
On the other hand, the independence of the judicial officer 'involves both 
individual and institutional relationships: the individual independence of [the judicial 
officer), as reflected in such matters as security of tenure, and the institutional 
34 See Hunter, supra note 25,161-162; Baron v. Canada [1993] 1 S. C. R. 416, p. 434. 35 (1988) 43 C. C. C. (3d) 514. 
361bid. 532. See also Valente v. the Queen, (1985] 2 S. C. R. 673, p. 685. 37 Ibid. 534-535. 
38 Ibid. 536-537. 
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independence of [the office] over which he or she presides, as reflected in its 
institutional or administrative relationships to the executive and legislative branches 
of government . '39 The test of whether a given officer, who 
is empowered to exercise 
judicial functions, meets the requirement of independence is dependent on whether a 
reasonable and informed person will perceive such an officer to enjoy the necessary 
objective conditions and guarantees of judicial independence. 40 
Secondly, the officer issuing the warrant must be satisfied upon reasonable and 
probable grounds established on oath that an offence has been committed and that 
evidence concerning the alleged offence will be found on the premises intended to be 
searched. 41 Vancise J. A., speaking for the majority of the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal in Turcotte, 42 explained this requirement in the following terms: 
In deciding whether to issue the search warrant, the justice of the peace 
must act judicially. He must consider whether what is alleged in the 
information is sufficient to give him jurisdiction to issue a warrant, that is, 
that he is satisfied that reasonable and probable grounds exist for believing 
that there is in the place to be searched anything in respect of which the 
alleged offence has or was suspected to have been committed. 
The justice of the peace cannot come to that conclusion unless the grounds 
of suspicion are revealed in the information by the informant. His 
conclusion must be based on facts. It is the judge who must be satisfied on 
the evidence presented that reasonable and probable grounds exist. 43 
If the warrant is found to be invalid in substance, because of the insufficiency of the 
grounds upon which the warrant was granted, the search will be ruled unreasonable, 
even if the police officer executing the warrant was acting in good faith. However, if 
the defect of the warrant is of a technical nature, which does not prejudice the interest 
protected by section 8, and the police officer executing the warrant reasonably 
believed that he was authorised by law to conduct the search, the reasonableness of 
the search cannot be contended to have been affected. 44 
39 Valente v. the Queen, [ 1985] 2 S. C. R. 673, p. 687. 4o Ibid. 689. 
41 Hunter, supra note 25,168. 
42 (1987), 39 C. C. C. (3d) 193. 
431bid. 205-206. (Talfis J. concurred. Bayda C. J. S. in a separate judgment concurred with the majority 
on this point). 
44 R. v. Harris (1987) 35 C. C. C. (3d) 1.23-24. 
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9.2.2 'Search and seizure' without warrant 
Under Canadian law, there are three powers to search that could be carried out 
without warrant: search in exigent circumstances, search incident to arrest, and search 
with consent. These powers are treated separately next. 
9.2.2.1 Search in exigent circumstances 
As mentioned above, a warrant is a prerequisite for the validity of the search where it 
is feasible to obtain one. The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court on the issue of 
whether or not exigent circumstances could justify a warrantless search of a dwelling 
house has been inconsistent. In Grant, 45 the Court held that where exigent 
circumstances exist, a warrantless search would not violate s. 8. These circumstances 
include, for example, 'an imminent danger of the loss, removal, destruction or 
disappearance of the evidence sought ... 
if the search or seizure is delayed. 06 
However, the Court in Silveira47 retreated from this position by refusing to 
recognise exigent circumstances as an exception to the warrant requirement. The 
Court's refusal to grant the police the power to search without warrant in exigent 
circumstances seems to be because it is inconsistent to do so with the purpose of the 
Charter, which is to constrain rather than authorise government actions. 48 This is 
supported by the fact that, as mentioned earlier, it is not inconsistent with Hunter to 
conduct a warrantless search in exigent circumstances because obtaining a warrant in 
these circumstances will not be feasible, and therefore, not required under Hunter. In 
other words, the Court had refused to grant the police a power, by the virtue of the 
Charter, and it is more likely that the Court saw the parliament to be the more 
appropriate authority to grant the police such a power. 
In response to that, the Criminal Code was amended to authorise a police officer 
to carry out a search without warrant where exigent circumstances exist, and the 
police officer has 'reasonable grounds to believe that there is in a building, receptacle 
or place: 
(a) anything on or in respect of which any offence ... has been or is 
suspected to have been committed, 
(b) anything that there are reasonable grounds to believe will afford 
evidence with respect to the commission of an offence, or will reveal the 
45 [1993] 3 S. C. R. 223. 
46 Ibid. 243. 
47 [1995] 2 S. C. R. 296. 
48 Hunter, supra note 25,157. 
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whereabouts of a person who is believed to have committed an offence, 
... or (c) anything that there are reasonable grounds to believe is intended to be 
used for the purpose of committing any offence against the person for 
which a person may be arrested without warrant, or 
(c. 1) any offence-related property[. ]'49 
9.2.2.2 Search incident to lawful arrest 
Search incident to arrest is an established common law exception to the presumption 
that a warrantless search is unreasonable. The rational behind this exception was 
explained in Stillman, 50 where the common law power to search a person who has 
been lawfully arrested was challenged. It was cited with approval in Stillman that: 
Searches made incidentally to an arrest are justified so that the arresting 
officer can be assured that the person arrested is not armed or dangerous and 
seizures are justified to preserve evidence that may go out of existence or be 
otherwise lost. 51 
It is common sense to note, as the Ontario Court of Appeal pointed out in Belnavis, 52 
that where the search supplies the reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest, the 
search cannot be justified as incident to the arrest. 53 In addition, if the arrest justifying 
the search is ruled to be unlawful, the search consequently will be ruled unlawful. 54 
The scope of the police's power to carry out a strip search incident to arrest was 
considered recently by the Supreme Court in Golden. 55 The Court defined a strip 
search as 'the removal or rearrangement of some or all of the clothing of a person so 
as to permit a visual inspection of a person's private areas, namely genitals, buttocks, 
breasts (in the case of a female), or undergarments. i56 The Court went on to 
distinguish between strip search and other types of search to which a person could be 
49 Criminal Code. s. 487.11 
S0 [1997] 1 S. C. R. 607. 
51 Per Hoyt C. J. N. B. in Paul (1994), 155 N. B. R (2d) 195, at p. 203, cited by Cory J. in Stillman, supra 
note 50, p. 639. 
52 (1996), 107 C. C. C (3d) 195. 
53 Ibid. 198. 
54 Stillman, supra note 50,634. 
55 [2001] 3 S. C. R. 679. For a full review of the position of strip search incident to arrest after Golden, 
see Gottardi, E, 'The Golden Rules: Raising the Bar Regarding Strip Searches Incident to Arrest', C. R., 
5th) 47 (2002), 48. 
Ibid. 706. 
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subjected depending upon the intrusiveness that the search poses to the privacy of 
individuals, 57 by stating that: 
This definition distinguishes strip searches from less intrusive "frisk" or "pat- 
down" searches, which do not involve the removal of clothing, and from more 
intrusive body cavity searches, which involve a physical inspection of the 
detainee's genital or anal regions. 58 
Consequently, it was held that the criteria applicable to a strip search are different 
from those applicable to a superficial search or what is known as a frisk search under 
Canadian law. Apart from the usual requirement applicable to any search incident to 
arrest, (i. e., the arrest to be lawful, the search to be truly incidental to arrest, and not to 
be carried out in an abusive fashion)59 the Court imposed the requirement that there 
must be reasonable and probable grounds for conducting the strip search itself 
Despite the acknowledgement of the Court of the high degree of intrusiveness that 
strip searches pose to the right to be secure against unreasonable search, the Court 
refrained from imposing a warrant requirement on the police before conducting the 
strip search. 60 However, while it is recognised that search incident to arrest is an 
established exception to the presumption that a warrantless search is unreasonable, 
because of the intrusiveness strip search poses to the physical integrity of the person, 
even if it is carried out as incident to arrest, it is presumed unreasonable. 61 This 
presumption will be rebutted, if the Crown shows that, first, the strip search was not 
conducted as a matter of routine police policy. Second, the strip search was based 
upon reasonable and probable grounds related to the preservation of evidence that 
might be destroyed, or to ensure the safety of the arresting officer or of the accused 
himself by disarming the arrestee. Lastly, the Crown must show that the search was 
conducted in a reasonable manner, having regard to the guidelines set out in Golden. 62 
57 The minority of the Court spoken for by Bastarache J (McLachlin C. J. and Gonthier J. concurred) 
saw no need to distinguish a strip search from other types of search and therefore, reasonable and 
probable grounds relating to the strip search is not a prerequisite for carrying out the strip search, a 
point of view that has been rejected by the majority. Ibid. 689-690. 
81b id . at p. 706. 59 Cloutier v. Langlois, [1990] 1 S. C. R. 158,186. 
60 Ibid. 728. 
6l Ibid. 736. 
62 Ibid. 733-734. The Court found the guidelines set out in the English legislation, the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), to be consistent with the constitutional requirement of s. 8 and 
consequently adopted them as a framework for the police in deciding when and how to conduct the 
strip search incident to arrest in compliance with the Charter. These guidelines are as follows: 
1. Can the strip search be conducted at the police station and, if not, why not? 
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Failing to meet any of these requisites will lead to the conclusion that the search is 
unreasonable under section 8 of the Charter. 
9.2.2.3 Search with consent 
In order for a consent to constitute a valid basis for carrying out a search, the consent 
has to be an informed one, in the sense that the accused knows that he has the right to 
refuse the search, but he nonetheless consents to it. If the accused does not possess 
this knowledge, the alleged consent of the accused cannot be contended to be the 
ground for the search. This approach was based on the coercive nature of the police 
action, which might convey the impression to the accused that he is obliged to comply 
with the request of the police, while he actually has the right to do otherwise. As Le 
Dain C. J. of the Supreme Court put it in Dedman: 63 
Because of the intimidating nature of police action and uncertainty as to the 
extent of police powers, compliance in such circumstances cannot be 
regarded as voluntary in any meaningful sense. The possible criminal 





The Supreme Court in Bor"den65 further stressed that the accused must know exactly 
what his options are. 66 It should be noted, however, that the police are not required to 
inform the accused that he has the right to refuse in the sense that a failure to inform 
2. Will the strip search be conducted in a manner that ensures the health and safety of all 
involved? 
3. Will the strip search be authorised by a police officer acting in a supervisory capacity? 
4. Has it been ensured that the police officer(s) carrying out the strip search are of the same 
gender as the individual being searched? 
5. Will the number of police officers involved in the search be no more than is reasonably 
necessary in the circumstances? 
6. What is the minimum of force necessary to conduct the strip search? 
7. Will the strip search be carried out in a private area such that no one other than the 
individuals engaged in the search can observe the search? 
8. Will the strip search be conducted as quickly as possible and in a way that ensures that 
the person is not completely undressed at any one time? 
9. Will the strip search involve only a visual inspection of the arrestee's genital and anal 
areas without any physical contact? 
10. If the visual inspection reveals the presence of a weapon or evidence in a body cavity 
(not including the mouth), will the detainee be given the option of removing the object 
himself or of having the object removed by a trained medical professional? 
11. Will a proper record be kept of the reasons for and the manner in which the strip search 
was conducted? 
For a discussion of the power to conduct an intimate or strip search under PACE, see Zander, M, The 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984,3rd edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1995), pp. 115-119. 63 [1985] 2 S. C. R. 2. 
64 Ibid. at p. 29. This approach was subsequently adopted by the unanimous Court in R. v. Mellenthin, 
1992] 3 S. C. R. 615,622-623. 
s [1994] 3 S. C. R. 145. 
66 Ibid. 162. 
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will not amount to a violation of s. 8. However, the failure to inform the accused of his 
right to refuse, in the totality of the circumstances, might lead the search to be 
declared unconstitutional. 67 The final word in this context is that the consent is not 
required to take any form in order to be valid, as long as the person consenting 
possesses the knowledge required for making an informed decision. 
9.2.3 Remedy: The exclusionary rule 
Section 24(2) of the Charter states that '[w]here ... a court concludes that evidence 
was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed 
by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard 
to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. ' The approach of the exclusionary vile under 
section 24(2) with regard to evidence obtained in violation of a Charter right, as 
described by Lamer J., as he then was, in Collins, 68 is 'an intermediate position' 
between the common law, under which every reliable and relevant evidence is 
admissible even if it is obtained by illegal means, and the exclusionary rule under the 
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 69 under which any 
evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable search or seizure is 
inadmissible. 70 As such, it has been stated that section 24(2) does not create an 
automatic exclusionary rule whenever the evidence is determined to have been 
obtained in violation of a constitutional right, nor could it be used for disciplining the 
police. 71 Instead, it obliges the courts to exclude any evidence obtained in violation of 
a constitutional right, the admission of which is deemed to bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute in the eyes of a reasonable man, who is dispassionate and fully 
appraised of the circumstances of the case concerned. 72 
As has been pointed out elsewhere, the burden of establishing that a violation of a 
constitutional right or freedom has occurred always rests with the party seeking the 
67 See R. v. Lewis (1998) 122 C. C. C. (3d) 481,488. 
68 [1987] 1 S. C. R. 265,280. 
89 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961). 
70 For a discussion of the exclusionary rule under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States, see generally Packer, H, The Limits of the Criminal Sanctions (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1968), 198-201; Uglow, S, Criminal Justice, 2nd edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2002), 76. 
71 Collins, supra note 68,275. 


















protection of the allegedly impugned right. 73 In order for a remedy under section 
24(2) to be granted, the accused also bears the burden of satisfying two further 
inquiries. Firstly, it must be shown, on the balance of probabilities, that the evidence 
was obtained in a manner that violated any of the rights recognised by the Charter. In 
order to satisfy this, it is sufficient, generally speaking, to establish that there is a 
temporal link between the violation and the subsequent discovery of the disputed 
evidence. 74 The outcome of the second inquiry is determined upon the basis of the 
effect of the admission of the tainted evidence upon the repute of the administration of 
justice. In Collins, 75 the Supreme Court established three sets of factors to be 
considered for the purposes of the second inquiry. These three categories include the 
effect of the admission of the tainted evidence on the fairness of the trial, the 
seriousness of the violation, and the effect of excluding the tainted evidence on the 
repute of the administration of justice. 76 
The first and the most important category concerns the fairness of the trial. The 
Supreme Court in Stillman, 77 elaborated upon the evidence that could affect the 
fairness of the trial. The analysis established in Stillman consists of two inquires. The 
first inquiry concerns the nature of the tainted evidence as to whether it is conscriptive 
evidence (i. e., self-incriminating evidence), or non-conscriptive evidence. The 
evidence is deemed to be conscriptive if the accused is compelled to incriminate 
himself through the use of a statement, his body, or bodily samples obtained from 
him. If the evidence is concluded to be non-conscriptive, the test concerning the effect 
of the admission of the tainted evidence on the fairness of the trial will be answered in 
the negative and the court must proceed to consider the other factors. On the other 
hand, if the evidence is determined to be conscriptive, the court must proceed to the 
second stage of the analysis, which is to determine whether the evidence would have 
been discoverable had the Charter right not been violated. At this stage of the 
analysis, the Crown bears the burden of establishing, on the balance of probabilities 
that either there were constitutional non-conscriptive means to which the police could 
73 See supra para. 4.3. 
74 R V. Strachan, [1988] 2 S. C. R. 980,1005-1006. 
75 Supra note 68,293. 
76 Ibid. 285-286; summarised in Strachan, supra note 74,1006. 77 Supra note 50. 
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and may have resorted to discover the tainted evidence, or that the tainted evidence 
would inevitably have been discovered. 78 
If the evidence is determined to be conscriptive and non-discoverable in 
accordance with the Stillman test, the conclusion will inevitably be that the fairness of 
the trial is affected and, consequently, the admission of the tainted evidence would 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and, therefore, must be excluded. If, 
on the other hand, the admission of the tainted evidence for whatever reason is 
determined not to affect the fairness of the trial, the evidence must be considered 
under the other two sets of factors under the Collins test. 
The second set of factors relates to the seriousness of the violation. These factors 
include whether the violation was committed in good faith or was deliberate and 
wilful, whether there were urgent circumstances justifying the violation, whether the 
violation was of a technical nature, and whether there were legal alternatives by which 
the tainted evidence could have been obtained. The final set of factors concerns the 
effect of the exclusion of the evidence on the repute of the administration of justice. 
This category revolves around the seriousness of the offence and the potential length 
of the sentence that the accused would receive if found guilty. 
The courts, in dealing with evidence obtained in violation of a Charter right must 
balance the above-mentioned factors in deciding whether the admission of the 
impugned evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute or not. 
C. Saudi Arabia 
9.3 Right to privacy 
The right to home and correspondence under the Saudi law is enshrined in Articles 37 
and 40 respectively of the Basic Law of Government, which state that: 
Homes are inviolable, and shall not be entered or searched without the 
permission of the owner except in cases provided for by law. 
Telegraphic, postal, telephone, and other means of communications are 
protected. They shall not be seized, delayed, read or listened to except in 
cases provided for by law. 
78 Ibid. 668-71. For a critical review of the discoverability test, see Stuart, D, 'Eight Plus Twcnty-Four 
Two Equals Zero', C. R., (5th) 13 (1998), 50. 
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The right to privacy is also expanded by Article 40 of the CCP, which states that 'the 
privacy of persons, their homes, offices, and vehicles shall be respected. The privacy 
of a person protects his body, clothes, property, and belongings. The privacy of a 
home covers any fenced area or any other place enclosed within barriers or intended 
to be used as a home. ' As can be seen from the above quoted Articles, the right to 
privacy under Saudi law is a qualified one in the sense that it could be interfered with 
in cases provided for by law. Permitted interferences with the right to privacy are 
entry into private premises, search of either persons or premises, and seizing anything 
from them. It also includes the interception of private communications. These forms 
of interference with the right to privacy are discussed in the following sections. 
9.3.1 Permissible interferences with home 
The criminal investigation police officers are authorised to enter private premises for 
purposes other than those of search and seizure, and to enter private premises for the 
purposes of conducting search and seizure with or without warrant depending on the 
circumstances of the case as discussed next. 
9.3.1.1 Entry, search and seizure without warrant 
The police can enter private premises without warrant, but not to search or seize 
anything from them if the suspect, who is being hotly pursued by the police, enters 
into private premises, 79 or there is a request for help from within private premises, or 
in the case of a demolition, drowning, fire, or the like. 80 In the these circumstances, 
the CCP does not seem to authorise the criminal investigation police to do anything 
beyond the purpose of their entry (i. e., arresting the suspect in the former, or, in the 
latter incident, responding to the circumstances on the basis of which the police 
officer entered the premises) . 
81 However, once the police officer legally enters the 
house, and comes across an offence being committed (i. e., flagrante delicto), the 
police officer, by virtue of his powers relating to flagrante delicto offences, as 
discussed below, can search the premises and seize anything relating to that crime 
from it. 
79 CCP. Art. 41. 
80 Ibid. 
at See Margalani, K, Ijurat al-Thubed wa al-Tahgeeq al-Jenaei (The Criminal Investigation 
Procedures), 2nd edn (Riyadh: Alnarjes Press, 2004), pp. 183,190. 
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One the other hand, the criminal investigation police, where the offence is 
flagrante delicto, 82 are authorised under Article 43 of the CCP to 'search the home of 
the accused and collect relevant items that may help uncover the truth [regarding the 
crime under investigation], if there are strong indications that such items exist there. ' 
In addition, the criminal investigation police are authorised to enter and search private 
premises and seize anything from them where the owner or the occupier of the 
premises consent to it. 83 
9.3.1.2 Entry, search and seizure with warrant 
The criminal investigation police are authorised to enter, search private premises, and 
seize items from them, if they possess a warrant issued by the Investigation and 
Public Prosecution Commission. In this respect, Article 41 of the CCP states that '[a] 
criminal investigation officer may not enter or search any inhabited homes except in 
cases provided for by law, pursuant to a search warrant specifying the reasons for the 
search, issued by the Investigation and Public Prosecution Commission. However, 
other premises may be searched pursuant to a search warrant, specifying the reasons, 
issued by the Investigator. ' Article 41 does not specify the person within the IPPC 
who is authorised to issue a warrant for searching private homes. However, the 
proposed implementing regulation of the Code of Criminal Procedure (PIRCCP) 
determines the Chairman of the IPPC Branch in the relevant province to be the person 
who is authorised under the CCP to issue a warrant for searching private homes. 84 
Therefore, homes can be searched if a warrant authorising the search is issued by the 
Chairman of the IPPC Branch in the relevant province, while other private premises 
(e. g., business offices) can be searched by a warrant from the Investigator. Warrants 
for searching private homes, according to Article 80, can be issued if there is an 
indictment against the owner or the resident of the house to be searched regarding his 
commission or participation in the commission of a criminal offence, or there are 
strong indications that the owner or the resident of the house to be searched is in 
possession of items relevant to the crime under investigation. 
If the search warrant has been issued according to Articles 41 and 80 of the CCP, 
the criminal investigation police can seize anything relevant to the crime under 
a2 For what constitutes a flagrante delicto offence, see supra para. 7.3.1.1. 83 CCP, Art. 37. 
sa PIRCCP. Art. 41(1). 
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investigation, 85 and in particular, anything which is likely to have been used in the 
commission of that offence or obtained as a consequence of the commission of an 
offence, and anything that may be useful in determining the truth about the crime 
under investigation. 86 However, if the criminal investigation police incidentally come 
across anything the possession of which is illegal, or anything that might reveal the 
truth regarding another criminal offence, the criminal investigation police may seize 
these things. 87 
9.3.1.3 Search of homes: Safeguards 
Only the accused's home can be subjected to search, unless it appears that there are 
strong indications that the search of another person's home is useful for the 
investigation, in which case a search warrant authorising the search of that person's 
house can be issued. 88 The search warrant authorising the search must include the 
reasons for the search. 89 The search must be conducted in the presence of either the 
owner of the house, his representative, or an adult member of his family residing with 
him. They are entitled to be shown the search warrant and a note to that effect must be 
made in the record. However, if none of these persons is available, the chief of the 
neighbourhood or two witnesses must be shown the search warrant and be present 
during the search. 90 The search, except in flagrante delicto offences, can be carried 
out only between the sunrise and the sunset. 91 If the accused is a woman, and none of 
her relatives is present during the search, the criminal investigation police conducting 
the search must be accompanied by a woman. 92 The criminal investigation police 
conducting the search of a house in which some women live, must be accompanied by 
a woman during the search, unless the crime under investigation is flagrante delicto. 
In addition, the women inside the premises to be searched should be given a chance to 
veil or to leave the premises, and to be provided with necessary assistance as long as 
it does not prejudice the search or its results. 93 
as CCP. Art. 45. 
Be Ibid. Art. 80. 
87 Ibid. Art. 45. 
88 Ibid. Art. 54. 
891bid. Art. 41. 
90 Ibid. Art. 46. 
91 Ibid. Art. 51. 
92 Ibid. Art. 52 
n Ibid. Art. 53 
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The extent to which the above-mentioned provisions are respected in practice is 
unclear, as search of private homes in practice are rarely conducted. 94 The reason for 
this seems to be the inviolability that homes enjoy under the Saudi unwritten (i. e., 
Islamic law) and written laws (i. e., the Basic Law and the CCP). What is clear, 
however, is that search warrants, in practice, are issued by the provincial governor 
rather than the Chairman of the IPPC Branch in the relevant province as required 
under Article 41 of the CCP, as mentioned above. 95 Apart from the illegality of such a 
warrant, and, consequently, the search itself, such practice raises other issues as well, 
as can be seen from the following case. 
The case involves the search of the home of a person who was suspected of 
committing a drug trafficking offence. 96 The police staged an entrapment operation, 
by managing to get the suspect to agree to sell a police informer an illegal substance 
(pills). Prior to the operation taking place, the informer was provided with numbered 
cash notes (i. e., cash notes of which the police note down the distinguishing numbers 
printed on the face of them before they are given to the informer), and was searched 
before he met with the suspect. After meeting the suspect under the police 
surveillance, the informer went back to the police officers with pills that he, allegedly, 
purchased from the suspect. In these types of operation, the police usually arrest the 
suspect immediately after the sale and purchase takes place. However, in this case the 
police did not manage to arrest the suspect because they lost him in the traffic. Hence, 
the police requested the informer to contact the suspect and tell him that his car had 
broken down and that he needed his help. Upon meeting the informer, the suspect was 
arrested and searched by officers from the Anti-Drugs Police Department, but the 
numbered cash notes used, allegedly, for purchasing the pills from him were not 
found in his possession. According to the testimony of the police officers involved in 
the arrest, the suspect, after being confronted by the police regarding the selling of 
pills to the police informer, consented to his home being searched. In searching his 
home, the police found the numbered cash notes, and illegal substances including pills 
94 Interview with Investigator Hassen Al-Asaker, Investigation and Public Prosecution Commission 
Branch, Crimes Against Honour Division, Riyadh (May. 23-25,2004). 
95 Written response from Investigator Sulman Al-Jurba, Investigation and Public Prosecution 
Commission Branch, Crimes Against Honour Division, Riyadh (July. 14,2004); interview with 
Investigator Anonymous, D. N. [Pseudonym. ], Investigation and Public Prosecution Commission 
Branch, Riyadh (Aug. 22,2004). See also Waleed's Case, supra ch. 7 note 185 and accompanying text. " The case file was obtained from Investigator Anonymous, J. A. [Pseudonym. ], Investigation and 
















and hash. Although the police, as they claim, had had the consent of the accused 
before they searched his home, they obtained a search warrant for searching the 
accused's home. The relevant text of the search warrant reads as follows: 
According to your request No..... regarding the person named ... who is 
accused of selling illegal substances, illegal substances have been purchased 
from him, he was arrested and he lives in the district of ... with 
his family. 
Regarding your request to search the home of the above-mentioned accused, 
we do not object to that as long as the accused was caught red-handed. 
The conduct of the search in this case raises a number of issues. Firstly, if the police 
had the consent of the accused to search his home, as they allege, why did they 
request a search warrant authorising the search? According to the investigator in 
charge of this case, the accused claimed that he did not consent to the search but the 
police had beaten him up and searched his house against his will. His claim is 
supported by the suggestion of the investigator in charge of the case under 
consideration that the arresting squad obtained the search warrant after the search of 
the accused's home had actually taken place, in order to avoid any liability if the 
accused were to deny that he had consented to the search. 97 The fact that the search 
warrant did not contain the time at which the warrant was issued supports the 
investigator's suggestion, and the accused's claim. Secondly, the search warrant was 
issued on the basis that the accused was caught red-handed. However, as mentioned 
above, the police, according to their own testimony, which was included in the case 
file, lost the suspect in the traffic, and when he returned to meet the informer, after 
being searched by the police, the numbered cash notes were not found upon him. 
Hence, the police, at best, had only reasonable grounds to suspect that the accused had 
committed an offence. Finally, and more importantly, the search warrant was issued 
by the provincial governor in violation of the CCP. 
9.3.2 Search of persons 
Search of persons can be carried out without warrant if the criminal investigation 
police officer, while conducting the search of the suspect's house, finds indications 
indicating that the suspect or any person present in the premises, possesses anything 
97 Interview with Investigator Anonymous, J. A. [Pseudonym. ], Investigation and Public Prosecution 
Commission Branch, Riyadh (Aug. 11,2004). According to Investigator Anonymous D. N., supra note 













that might be useful for uncovering the truth. 98 In addition, once the accused has been 
lawfully arrested, the criminal investigation police are empowered to search that 
person. 99 Furthermore, the investigator is empowered to search the suspect or any 
other person if there are strong indications that they are concealing something that 
might reveal the truth. 100 The scope of the power to search a person extends to his 
body, clothes, and belongings. 101 If the person to be searched is a woman, she must be 
searched only by a woman. 102 
9.3.3 Interception of private communications 
Article 55 of the CCP states that '[m]ail, cables, telephone conversations and other 
means of communication shall be inviolable. They shall not be intercepted or be 
subjected to surveillance except pursuant to an order stating the reasons thereof and 
for a limited period as herein provided for. ' The CCP empowers the Head of the 
IPPC to authorise the interception of private communications including snail, 
publications, parcels and telephone conversations. 103 According to Article 56 of the 
CCP, the warrant is subject to three conditions. 104 Firstly, the warrant must include 
the reasons for issuing it. Secondly, the warrant is only valid for a period of ten days, 
and it can be renewed for further periods if the Head of the IPPC determines that the 
renewal of the warrant is necessary for the purposes of the investigation. Finally, the 
warrant could be issued only with regard to an offence that has been committed. 
Therefore, a warrant for intercepting private communications cannot be issued in 
order to prevent the commission of a criminal offence. 
The present researcher has not encountered during his fieldwork period a case in 
which interception of private communications was employed by the IPPC in the 
investigation of a criminal offence, or that the contents of private communications 
have been used, during the trial, as evidence against the accused. 
9.3.4 Remedy: Exclusion of illegally obtained evidence 
As discussed earlier, it is within the jurisdiction of the trial court to review the legality 
of the procedural acts taken during the pre-trial stage of the criminal process, and to 
98 CCP. Art. 44. 
99 Mid. Art. 42. 
100 Ibid. Art. 81. 
101 Ibid. Art. 42. 
102 Ibid. Art. 42. 






















annul any act that is contrary to the Saudi written or unwritten law. If acts subsequent 
to the annulled act are taken based on that act, such acts are invalid too. 105 This would 
suggest that evidence that has been obtained in violation of the Saudi written or 
unwritten law can be excluded on the basis that it has been obtained through an 
invalid act. In addition, under the Shari'ah general principles, it is within the 
jurisdiction of the trial court to exclude illegally obtained evidence if the admission of 
it is contrary to the public interest (i. e., the admission of such evidence would bring 
less benefit to the administration of justice than the harm it would cause to it). 106 
However, in practice, as pointed out earlier, the Saudi criminal courts do not 
engage in reviewing the legality of procedures taken during the pre-trial stage of the 
criminal process, with the exception of procedures relating to confession evidence 
obtained by torture, for the reasons that have already been discussed. 107 
9.4 Comparison 
Both the Saudi and Canadian systems recognise the right to privacy, and the State's 
right to impose restrictions on it for advancing public interest goals. However, there 
are three main differences between the two respective systems in this respect. Firstly, 
the right to privacy under the Canadian system is more expansive as it protects against 
arbitrary and illegal interferences with privacy. In contrast, the Saudi written law only 
prohibits illegal interferences with the right to privacy, but does not prohibit arbitrary 
interferences with privacy. The second difference is that under the Canadian system 
there is an emphasis on the requirement of obtaining a prior authorisation from an 
independent and impartial judicial officer, where feasible, before intruding on the 
right to privacy, in order for the intrusion to be considered constitutional. On the other 
hand, while under the Saudi system the authorisation of an interference with the right 
to privacy is entrusted to the IPPC, there is no requirement that the authorising officer 
is independent or impartial and, in practice, it is the provincial governor who 
authorises permissible interferences with the right to privacy under Saudi law. The 
third difference concerns the remedy for violating the right to privacy. The Canadian 
Charter requires the exclusion of any illegally obtained evidence, the admission of 
103 See supra para. 4.5. 
106 Interview with Qadi Tameem Al-Aunizan, Summary Court, Riyadh (July. 11-12,2004). See also 
sura paras. 1.2.2 & 3.7.1. 













which would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. In contrast, under the 
Saudi system, although in theory evidence obtained illegally can be excluded, if 
admitting such evidence is contrary to the public interest, in practice, every relevant 
and credible evidence is admissible, regardless of the legality of the means by which 
it has been obtained. 
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Conclusion of Part Two: 
Evaluation 
As the aim of this thesis is to examine the extent to which Saudi pre-trial criminal 
procedural law and practice comply with international human rights standards, this 
Part has sought to provide a comprehensive picture of how human rights examined in 
this thesis fare under the Saudi criminal justice system. The establishment of the IPPC 
and the introduction of the CCP signify the recognition by the Saudi Government of 
the problems from which the Saudi criminal justice system has been suffering. The 
establishment of the IPPC was intended to create a more accountable criminal justice 
system by subjecting the police to the supervision of the, supposedly, independent 
IPPC. The CCP, for its part, was introduced to enhance the protection of the accused 
by providing him with safeguards that had not existed prior to the introduction of the 
CCP, most notably the right to legal assistance. 
However, although the recent reforms have solved some problems, they have 
created new ones. Before discussing these problems, it is important to point out the 
source of these reforms. While the CCP provisions have been largely borrowed from 
the Egyptian Code of Criminal Procedure, ' the IPPC, in terms of its combination of 
the investigating and prosecuting functions, has been roughly modelled on the 
Egyptian Department of Public Prosecution. 2 The basis for choosing Egypt as a model 
for the Saudi reforms is unclear, given that Egypt suffers from its own human rights 
problems. 3 
In the following paragraphs, the Saudi criminal justice system with regard to each 
right examined in this thesis will be evaluated. 
r Law. No. 150 of 1950 as amended by Law. No. 174 of 1998. For a discussion of the Egyptian Code 
of Criminal Procedure, see Abu Sad, M, Al-Musuah al-Jinaieh al-Haditha: al-Taleeq a'1 Qanun al-ljrat 
al-Jinaieh (The Modern Criminal Treatise: Commentary on Criminal Procedure), 2nd edit (Al- 
Mansurah: Dar al-Fikr wa al-Qanun, 2002). 
2 For a discussion of the investigating and prosecuting functions of the Egyptian Department of Public 
Prosecution, see Hassen, A, Mabid'a al-Fasel bain Sultati al-Itham tiva al-Tahqeeq (The Principle of 
Separation between Prosecuting and Investigating Powers) (Alexandria: Dar al-Fikr al-Jamie, 2004), 
pp. 573-608. 
For an overview of human rights conditions in Egypt, see Conclusions and Recommendations of the 
Committee against Torture, Egypt, U. N. Doc. CAT/C/CR/29/4 (2002); Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Committee, Egypt, U. N. Doc. CCPR/CO/76/EGY (2002); Amnesty International, 
Egypt: No Protection - Systematic Torture 
Continues (Nov. 2002), available at 
<http: //www. ainnestg> (last visited Jan. 2,2006). 
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Right to an effective protection 
As argued in Chapter three, the accused's rights guaranteed under international human 
rights law are equally recognised under the Islamic Shari'ah. According to the Basic 
Law of Government, as discussed in Chapters one and two, the Shari'ah is the law of 
the land, and human rights are protected in accordance with the Shari'ah. Therefore, 
the accused's rights under international human rights law, by virtue of being 
recognised by the Shari'ah, are constitutional rights under Saudi law. However, the 
problem with the provisions of the Shari'ah, in the Saudi context, as discussed in 
Chapter one, is that they are largely left uncodified and, hence, subject to differing 
interpretations, as can be illustrated by the position of Muslim scholars on the 
permissibility of using coercion in order to make the accused confess. This factor has 
the potential of undermining the protection that the Shari'ah affords the accused in the 
pre-trial stage of the criminal process. 
This problem is exacerbated by the absence of a constitutional review in Saudi 
Arabia, by which the State's (siyasa) laws and actions can be reviewed in order to 
determine their compatibility with the Shari'ah law. In the absence of a constitutional 
review, an individual's constitutional right(s) can be interfered with, without him 
having the opportunity to challenge the unconstitutionality of such interference. The 
CCP provisions with regard to the right to liberty in cases that involve the commission 
of a major offence are a case in point. The CCP, as interpreted in practice, makes the 
detention of up to six months of a person who is suspected of committing a major 
offence, mandatory, even if his release on bail is not contrary to the public interest. 
This provision is unconstitutional because it permits interference with the right to 
liberty without the existence of necessity, upon which interference with an 
individual's rights under the Shari'ah (i. e., the Constitution) can be justified. If the 
Saudi system provided a constitutional review, any person detained under the 
provision in question could apply for a constitutional review to have this provision, to 
the extent that it allows the accused's detention where there are no grounds to support 
that his detention is in the public interest, declared without force or effect, and, 
consequently, to have his request for bail granted. However, as things stand, accused 
persons against whom there is sufficient evidence that they have committed a major 
offence are subject to mandatory detention under an unconstitutional provision 
without having any remedy to enforce their right to liberty. 
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With regard to the legality review, although in practice it is not conducted 
because, according to Saudi qadis, the CCP provisions on annulment are ambiguous, 
there is no logical reason that prevents the courts from, at least, reviewing the legality 
of a given procedural act, and declaring such an act to be illegal, if this is the case, 
without addressing the consequences for such a declaration. The fact that qadis do not 
even review the detention of the accused when he appears for the first time before 
them for trial, contrary to the requirements of the CCP, demonstrates that the problem 
is not so much that the provisions of the CCP regarding annulment are unclear than 
that qadis consider the procedural rules to be mere "technicalities". Therefore, where 
these "technicalities" have been disregarded, the qadis should focus on the substantive 
issue involved in the case, which is, in their view, the guilt or the innocence of the 
defendant, rather than "wasting" the trial time on "side" issues. As shown in Chapters 
six and eight respectively, there are illegal practices such as arrest without warrant in 
cases where the law requires obtaining a warrant from the IPPC before carrying out 
the arrest, or conducting a search of private homes on the basis of a search warrant 
obtained from the provincial governor, in violation of the law that requires warrants 
for searching private homes to be obtained from the IPPC. The fact that the courts do 
not review the legality of these practices allows these practices to continue, thereby 
undermining the rule of law, the respect for which is indispensable if the accused's 
rights are to have any practical meaning. 
The reply to the logic behind the Saudi courts' approach towards illegal practices 
committed by the State in its pursuit of (private) criminals can be found in the 
inspiring and eloquent words of Justice Brandeis of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, when he expressed his dissenting opinion in the case of Obnstead iv. United 
States: 4 
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall 
be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the 
citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be 
imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is 
the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the 
whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government 
becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to 
become a law unto himself, it invites anarchy. To declare that in the 
administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means - to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction 
4 
277 U. S. 438 (1982). 
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of a private criminal - would bring terrible retribution. Against that 
pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face. 5 
Thus, the absence of a constitutional and legal review under the Saudi legal system 
leaves the rights of the accused open to arbitrary and illegal attacks by the state 
authorities and wholly undermines the protection that Saudi law affords the accused 
during the pre-trial stage of the criminal process, as will be further demonstrated 
below. 
Right against self-incrimination 
Saudi (written) law does not recognise the right against self-incrimination; neither 
does it recognise the fundamental principle of the presumption of innocence. Hence, 
investigators are justified in their belief as in their practice, that it is the duty of the 
accused to prove his innocence, not the opposite. The omission of the right against 
self-incrimination and the presumption of innocence, therefore, has the potential to 
encourage investigators to put pressure on the accused "to speak the truth", with the 
likely consequence of violating the right against ill-treatment. In addition, although 
subjecting the accused to any form of ill-treatment, irrespective of its purpose, is 
prohibited under the CCP, in light of the remedies available under Saudi law to deal 
with alleged violations of the right against ill-treatment, one is justified in concluding 
that coercing the accused to confess is condoned, if not indirectly encouraged, in 
practice. 
With regard to the admissibility of the confessions obtained through violation of 
the right against ill-treatment, there is a lack of explicit prohibition of the use of such 
evidence in any criminal proceedings against the accused. The most damaging aspect 
of the Saudi legal system with regard to confessions obtained in violation of the right 
against ill-treatment is the 'confession confirmation mechanism'. The confirmation 
mechanism, as mentioned earlier, does not aim to verify the voluntariness of the 
confession, but is mainly designed to undermine the accused's right to challenge the 
voluntariness of his confession at the trial stage. The confirmation mechanism could 
be argued, therefore, to have the effect of encouraging the investigating authority to 
violate the accused's right against ill-treatment in pursuit of a confession. This 
proposition is supported by the fact that the confirmation mechanism, as illustrated by 
5 Ibid. p. 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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the cases discussed earlier, has been used by investigators in practice to judicially 
confirm confessions as voluntary, which, in the light of the facts of the case, would be 
considered by any reasonable person to be otherwise. Worse still, as Cases No. 2 and 
3, discussed earlier, vividly show, qadis might ignore obvious signs that the accused 
has been mistreated in order to make him confess, where the confession has been 
judicially confirmed, if they believe such a confession to be reliable. Even where the 
confession has been established to have been obtained under torture, and consequently 
such a confession is excluded, as in Case No 1, discussed earlier, the courts do not 
specify why such evidence is excluded, neither do they condemn the ill-treatment to 
which the accused has been subjected. 
With regard to disciplinary or criminal actions available under Saudi law as a 
means to remedy alleged violations of the right against-ill-treatment, these remedies 
fail to meet the requirement of effectiveness under Article 2(3) of the ICCPR because 
complaints against the police and the IPPC are neither investigated nor prosecuted by 
an independent and impartial authority. Neither a police officer nor a member of the 
IPPC can be subjected to a disciplinary or criminal investigation without the 
permission of the executive authority represented by the Minister of the Interior and 
the provincial governor, to whom the police and the IPPC are answerable at the 
provincial and the national level. Similarly, no disciplinary or criminal proceedings 
can be instituted against either a police officer or a member of the IPPC without the 
permission of either the Minister of the Interior or the provincial governor. The 
ineffectiveness of these mechanisms is evident from the fact that none of the IPPC 
investigators who allegedly mistreated the accused in the cases discussed above has 
been subjected to investigation, much less subjected to disciplinary or criminal 
prosecution. 
Finally, although torture is considered to be a criminal offence under Saudi law, 
the fact that the Board of Grievances, which is responsible for trying crimes of torture, 
sentences those officials who are convicted of torture to a fine, reduces further the 
effectiveness of this mechanism as a means for remedying the violation of the 
accused's right not to be ill-treated, or as a means of deterring public officials from 
abusing the right of the accused not to be ill-treated. 
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Right to humane treatment 
Overcrowding, lack of proper sleeping arrangements, and unsanitary conditions are 
common features of Saudi detention centres. Even where the detention conditions 
seemed to be good compared to the conditions of other detention centres, as is the 
case of the Detention Centre of the Maliz Police Station, one detainee contracted a 
skin disease during his time in detention. Needless to say, these detention conditions 
violate the right to humane treatment under Article 10(1) of the ICCPR. The 
underlying problem seems to be the lack of recognition on the part of the Saudi 
government of the adverse effects of poor detention conditions on the physical and 
psychological well being of the detainees, and its unwillingness to commit sufficient 
financial resources to improve the conditions of these detention centres. 
Right to liberty 
The CCP provisions have strengthened the right to liberty under Saudi law in a 
number of respects. The CCP entitles the accused to be informed promptly of the 
reasons for his arrest or detention, and to be brought before the IPPC within 24 hours 
from the time of his arrest in order to have his detention reviewed. However, Saudi 
law suffers from serious shortcomings with regard to the right to liberty as well. The 
Basic Law of Government as well as the CCP only prohibits illegal interferences with 
the right to liberty. Thus, a given law cannot be challenged on the basis that it permits 
an arbitrary interference with the right to liberty. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the 
CCP, as interpreted in practice, allows the accused to be detained for up to six months 
if there is sufficient evidence against him that he has committed a major offence, even 
if the detention of the accused is not necessary for the public interest. This power is 
clearly in violation of the prohibition of arbitrary interference with the right to liberty 
under Article 9(1) of the ICCPR. 
The most deficient aspect of the Saudi system with regard to the right to liberty is 
that it does not subject the legality of deprivations of liberty and the need to detain the 
accused pending investigation or trial to the oversight of an impartial and independent 
authority. The Saudi system seems to consider the IPPC an adequate safeguard 
against illegal interference with the right to liberty. However, the IPPC fails to meet 
the requirements of a judicial officer' within the meaning of Article 9(3) and the 
requirements of a 'court' within the meaning of Article 9(4) of the 1CCPR in every 
respect. In terms of impartiality, the CCP confers on the IPPC judicial powers 
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including issuing arrest and search warrants, and reviewing the detention of the 
accused. However, at the same time, the CCP entrusts the IPPC, inter alia, with the 
investigation of criminal offences, including the conduct of interrogations, and 
evidence gathering among others. The exercise of these investigative functions by the 
IPPC undermines its ability to exercise its judicial functions impartially. The fact that 
some of the IPPC investigators are so eager to build a case against suspects to the 
extent that they are prepared to mistreat suspects in order to obtain incriminating 
evidence from them, and the fact that the IPPC investigators are not required under 
the CCP to gather exculpatory evidence, nor do they in practice, and include such 
evidence, if it exists, in the indictment, underline the IPPC's lack of impartiality. 
The supposed judicial character of the IPPC is also undermined by two additional 
factors. First, the IPPC is subject to the supervision of the Minister of the Interior (i. e., 
an executive body), who is also the head of the security forces. The second factor is 
the inability of the IPPC to either challenge the illegal exercise of its statutory powers 
by the executive branch, namely provincial governors, such as the issuing of search 
warrants by the provincial governor in violation of the CCP, which requires search 
warrants to be issued by the IPPC, or challenge illegal police practices such as the 
carrying out of arrests without warrant in cases where the CCP requires the obtaining 
of a warrant before an arrest can be legally made. The lack of independence of the 
IPPC is also evident from the fact that the IPPC in some cases that involve the 
commission of a major offence does not release the accused before consulting the 
provincial governor, although the CCP clearly states that it is within the jurisdiction of 
the IPPC to release the accused in this case. The lack of impartiality and 
independence of the IPPC, therefore, makes the IPPC neither fit to exercise the 
judicial functions that are currently assigned to it, nor to offer an effective protection 
against violations of the accused's rights, including the right to liberty. 
Another serious shortcoming in Saudi law is that, as mentioned above, it does not 
recognise the fundamental principle of the presumption of innocence. In fact, the CCP 
provisions and the way they are implemented in practice underline the fact that the 
accused in Saudi Arabia is presumed guilty until he establishes his innocence. The 
presumption of innocence operates in the pre-trial stage of the criminal process as a 
procedural rule that regulates the treatment of the accused by the state authorities. The 
omission of the presumption of innocence could be argued, therefore, to be the source 
from which all other shortcomings of Saudi law and practice with regard to the right 
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to liberty flow. Apart from the mandatory detention of persons who are accused of 
committing a major offence, as discussed above, which implies a presumption of 
guilt, the presumption of guilt in practice is evident in the police practice of arresting 
any person against whom a complaint has been made by a member of the public 
alleging that that person has committed an offence. In this case, as explained earlier, 
the police will arrest the "suspect" without inquiring into the reliability of the 
complaint, or whether there is sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable person 
would believe that the person under complaint has committed a criminal offence. 
Apart from the illegality of such a practice, it demonstrates not just that the 
presumption of innocence does not exist under the Saudi system, but that a 
presumption of guilt operates in its place. 
Finally, Saudi law does not recognise the right to be tried within a reasonable 
time, and it is difficult to judge whether, despite the omission of such a right, it is 
respected in practice or not. It is worth pointing out, however, that the CCP allows the 
accused to be detained for to up six months prior to being charged, which could 
interfere with the right of the accused to be tried within a reasonable time if the facts 
of the case do not make the length of the pre-charge delay justifiable. 
Right to legal assistance 
The CCP is, without precedent, the first codified law in Saudi legal history to 
recognise the right of the accused to legal assistance. However, Saudi law in respect 
of this right have serious shortcomings. In violation of Article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR, 
Saudi law does not require the accused to be informed of his right to legal assistance. 
In addition, Saudi law does not provide provision for free legal assistance to those 
arrested or detained persons who lack the means to afford a private lawyer, 
irrespective of the seriousness of the offence and the complexity of the case, in 
violation of Article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR, which requires any person charged within 
the meaning of Article 14 (i. e., arrested or detained) to be provided with free legal 
assistance if the 'interests of justice so require'. Furthermore, Saudi law does not 
guarantee an effective exercise of the right to legal assistance as it does not address 
how the accused, who is in the hands of the state authorities, can exercise his right 
effectively. Finally, as discussed above, the Saudi courts do not conduct a legality 
review. Thus, where the accused's right to legal assistance has been violated, the 
accused will not be afforded any remedy. 
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Right to privacy 
Saudi law recognises both the right to privacy and the State's right to impose 
restrictions on it in pursuit of effective law enforcement. In practice, search of private 
homes is rarely conducted due to the inviolability that homes enjoy under Saudi 
written and unwritten law. However, Saudi (written) law and practice contravene its 
own legal standards and, by definition, international human rights standards at various 
levels. To start with, Saudi written law only protects against unlawful interference 
with the right to privacy. In fact, the CCP contains provisions that permit arbitrary 
interference with the right to privacy. Article 80 of the CCP permits the search of 
private homes with warrant if there is an indictment against the owner or the resident 
of the house, even if there are no good reasons to make the search of the accused's 
home necessary for the public interest in order, for instance, to uncover evidence 
relating to the crime under investigation. Needless to say, indicting the accused does 
not by itself make the search of his house necessary for the public interest. The effect 
of this provision, therefore, is to allow interference with the right to privacy, which is 
not necessary for the public interest and, hence, arbitrary. This provision violates both 
the Shari'ah rules, which only allow the interference with an individual's right where 
it is necessary, and international human rights standards, which adopt the same 
requirement. 
In addition, the CCP does not provide any safeguards with regard to the search of 
persons, in particular, where the search involves the stripping of the accused or the 
inspection of his private parts. While the CCP regulates the circumstances in which 
the accused can be searched, the manner in which the search is to be conducted is left 
completely to the discretion of the searching officer, with the exception of the search 
of women, in which case the searching officer has to be a woman. The absence of 
adequate safeguards, therefore, leaves the right to privacy under Article 17 of the 
ICCPR, and more worryingly, the right against torture, and against inhuman, cruel or 
degrading treatment under Article 7 of the ICCPR open to abuse by the state 
authorities. 
In terms of practice, the CCP requirements with regard to the search of homes do 
not seem to be respected. As is clear from the case discussed earlier, the police 
routinely search homes without warrant in cases where the CCP requires the police to 
obtain a warrant from the IPPC before conducting the search. Secondly, search 
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warrants in practice, where they are obtained, are issued by the provincial governor in 
violation of the CCP, which entrusts the power to issue search warrants to the IPPC. 
Finally, where the search is allegedly illegal, the Saudi courts, as discussed above, 
will not address the question of the legality of the search and, therefore, will not 
consider whether the evidence obtained in violation of the accused's right to privacy 
should be excluded. While there is no requirement under international human rights 
law that evidence obtained in violation of the accused's right should be automatically 
excluded, not reviewing the legality of the search by which the evidence against the 
accused has been obtained, nevertheless, constitutes, on its own, a violation of the 
right to remedy under Article 2(3) of the ICCPR. 
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Conclusion 
The adoption of the UDHR by the United Nations in 1948 signified the change of the 
status of individuals under international law from subjects of the State, which could 
treat them as it saw fit, to autonomous human beings with inalienable rights. Since 
1948, a large number of international and regional human rights treaties have been 
adopted with the sole aim of ensuring the protection of these inalienable rights. Until 
very recently, Saudi Arabia considered itself not to be subject to the rules of 
international human rights law. Two lines of argument had been advanced by Saudi 
governments over the years to legitimatise their opposition to the application of 
international human rights law to Saudi Arabia. First, the international human rights 
law is based upon Western values, which makes it inapplicable to non-Western states, 
including Saudi Arabia. Second, Saudi Arabia is governed by God's Divine law (i. e., 
the Shari'ah), which provides a complete and comprehensive protection to 'human 
rights'. Therefore, international human rights law would not provide any further 
protection to 'human rights' in Saudi Arabia than God's (perfect) law already does. 
However, while these arguments point out several facts about the international 
human rights law vis-ä-vis the Shari'ah law, namely that international human rights 
law has been based on the natural rights theory, which has been developed in the 
West, and differs from the Islamic definition of human rights, which considers them 
entitlements from God, and that some aspects of international human rights law are in 
conflict with the Shari'ah norms, they contain some elements of falsehood as well, 
which are clear from the Shari'ah position on the rights examined in this thesis. 
Firstly, it assumes that the observance of any given human rights standard requires, by 
definition, the departure from the Shari'ah norms. This assumption, as far as the 
accused's pre-trial rights are concerned, has been shown in this thesis to be completely 
false. In fact, as far as the rights examined in this thesis are concerned, there is a 
complete harmony between the Shari'ah and international human rights law in terms 
of the values they seek to protect to the extent that it can be persuasively argued that 
recognition of the former requires recognition of the latter. Secondly, it assumes that 
because Saudi Arabia subjects itself to the Shari'ah law, it will not benefit in any way 
from the rules of international human rights law. This assumption has also been 
shown to be false in that the Shari'ah law, with regard to the issues examined in this 
thesis, only mentions the principles and the values that underline the Islamic criminal 
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justice system, and leaves the State to decide how these principles and values are to be 
protected in a given time and place in the light of the circumstances of that time and 
place. Given that both the Shari'ah law and international human rights law in terms of 
the pre-trial process aim to ensure that those persons who are suspected or accused of 
committing a criminal offence are treated in a dignified and fair manner, without 
prejudicing the public interest in effective law enforcement, the adoption of 
international human rights norms, which are designed to achieve this aim, will 
reinforce the underlying principles and values of the Shari'ah in Saudi Arabia. 
The recognition by the Saudi Government of the deficiency of their stance on 
international human rights norms has led to the change of their stance from total 
opposition to those norms, regardless of their compatibility with the Shari'ah, to the 
acceptance of those norms that do not conflict with the Shari'ah. While this qualified 
acceptance, viewed from an international human rights viewpoint, is not acceptable, 
as cultural distinctiveness does not constitute a valid ground under international 
human rights law for the departure from its norms, it is nonetheless far more sincere 
and pragmatic than the previous position. It is pragmatic in the sense that it minimises 
the external criticism of the human rights situation in Saudi Arabia, and sincere in that 
it reflects the principles of the Shari'ah, which weigh the legitimacy of things in terms 
of their compatibility with its ideals, rather than their place of origin. This thesis 
adopts an approach that endorses this position and argues in favour of the adoption of 
this approach by human rights scholars and activists interested in furthering the cause 
of human rights in Muslim states in general, and in Saudi Arabia in particular. 
By focusing on the commonly shared values, human rights will gain in legitimacy, 
the lack of which represents the biggest obstacle to the advancement of human rights 
in Muslim countries. This approach will add a much needed cultural legitimacy to the 
struggle for human rights in Muslim societies, which is currently mainly fought 'on 
their behalf by Western non-governmental organisations and human rights scholars. It 
will equally deprive unelected and unpopular governments that are engaged in 
widespread human rights violations against their people, from the disguise of cultural 
distinctiveness. Thus, criticisms of these violations, or even the imposition of 
economic or military sanctions against the perpetrators of human rights violations, 
where appropriate, would be justified from both viewpoints: the local culture and 
international human rights law. 
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In adopting this approach, this thesis has also sought to demonstrate that it is 
possible to evaluate the laws and practices of Muslim states, at least with regard to 
some issues, on the basis of international human rights law without violating the 
principle of cultural relativity. This, it is hoped, will give more cultural credibility to 
its evaluation of Saudi law and practice in the eyes of the Saudi populace who, in the 
final analysis, are meant to enjoy the protection of international human rights law. 
Consequently, the recommendations of this thesis will have a more realistic prospect 
of being implemented in practice. The only challenge this approach faces, which is 
constantly raised by universalists, is that it will subject the application of international 
human rights law to the mercy of local cultures, which are often at variance with 
international human rights norms. However, this approach does not claim, nor does it 
aim, to solve areas of conflict between the Shari'ah and international human rights 
law. Rather, it seeks to justify the implementation of international human rights norms 
that have the support of the Shari'ah, but have been systematically denied to citizens 
of Muslim states in the name of cultural distinctiveness. In doing so, it will also create 
a culture that is more receptive to human rights ideas, thereby creating a climate of 
dialogue in which human rights issues can be openly and respectfully debated, with 
the result of reaching an acceptable resolution to this conflict. 
Given that the Shari'ah can be cited for justifying the implementation of 
international human rights standards in the pre-trail process in Saudi Arabia, rather 
than the basis for departing from them, the critical question that arises in this context 
is, why does not the reality of the human rights situation in Saudi Arabia reflects the 
ideals of the Shari'ah? The short answer to this question is that a system is only as 
good as the people who run it. This is precisely where one of the underlying problems 
for the apparent lack of respect for human rights in Saudi Arabia lies, even those the 
Shari'ah recognises. Since the unification of Saudi Arabia in 1932, the Shari'ah has 
always enjoyed a constitutional supremacy over the state legislative authorities. Under 
the Shari'ah law, qualified jurists or qadis (i. e., mujtihdeen) have a wide law-making 
power by virtue of the concept of the ijtihad, which empowers them to comprehend 
and develop God's law. Therefore, the responsibility for guarding the Constitution 
(i. e., the Shari'ah), devising and developing legal rules to deal with pressing social 
problems and needs in Saudi Arabia lies principally with the judiciary. However, the 
lack of legal creativity on the part of the Saudi gadis, their inability or unwillingness 
to exercise their law-making power under the concept of Utihad, and their content 
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with the status quo and resistance to adopting a system of binding precedents by 
which the development and the application of law can be systematised and unified, 
has left the Saudi legal system paralysed in responding adequately to the challenges it 
faces, including the need to provide effective protection to human rights. 
The response of the government to this problem has been to make wider use of its 
siyasa powers in order to fill the gaps in the law that are not addressed by the ulama, 
the interpreter of the Constitution, and to give practical meaning to the principles it 
embodies. However due to the ideological stance of the ulama on the scope of the 
ruler's power to legislate under the Shari'ah, and their ignorance of the underlying 
values and objectives of the Saudi siyasa laws, the Saudi ulama, by virtue of their 
control over the judiciary, have undercut the practical value of these laws by refusing 
to lend support or legitimacy to these laws, which weakened the prospect of their 
enforceability in practice. In effect, this has undermined the respect for the rule of law 
in the eyes of both state officials, who are responsible for implementing these laws, 
and citizens, who are subject to these laws. 
The laws relating to the issues examined in this thesis have not escaped this 
problem. While the CCP suffers from serious shortcomings in terms of its 
compatibility with both the Islamic Shari'ah and international human rights standards, 
it is undoubtedly, in the context of the Saudi Arabia, progressive and a step in the 
right direction. However, the CCP's practical value, in terms of the protection it 
provides to the accused, has been significantly undercut by the fact that many of its 
provisions are routinely disregarded in practice. Under the CCP, there are two 
authorities that are entrusted with ensuring the implementation of the CCP provisions 
in the pre-trial process: the courts and the IPPC. With regard to the former, qadis, as 
with all siyasa laws, have taken no steps whatsoever to ensure that the CCP 
requirements are complied with in practice. In fact, qadis themselves have 
disregarded the provisions of the CCP, which can be illustrated by the fact that they 
do not review the detention of the accused when he appears before them for the first 
time, as required under the CCP. 
The underlying cause of this problem is the lack of proper education and training 
of qadis. Qadis, in particular, seem unable to know how to apply the provisions of the 
CCP in practice, much less understand the principles underlying these provisions. 
This is clear from the court's lack of exercise of its supervisory role over the pre-trial 
process conferred upon it by the CCP in the form of the legality review. In this 
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respect, the attitude of the courts is not even justified by the ulama's empty argument 
of the non-permissibility to issue siyasa laws in areas that fall within the realm offiqh, 
which is to be adjudicated according to qadis' ijtihad. The CCP provisions are only a 
codification of the qadi's power under the Shari'ah law. Currently, qadis view their 
role in the criminal process to be confined to the determination of the guilt or 
innocence of the accused, but it does not extend to deciding whether the state 
authorities have in the process complied with the requirements of the law. This 
position is driven by the unawareness on the part of the courts of the impact of what 
takes place in the court room with respect to the rule law. In ignoring the provisions 
on the legality of procedural acts, the courts reduced the law to empty rhetoric, the 
disregard of which does not result in any sanction. Hence, those law enforcement 
officials responsible for violating the accused's rights would be excused in thinking 
that procedural rules are mere "technicalities", the violation of which is always 
justified by the "end". 
It is evident from the discussion of the Canadian system that the respect for the 
rights that the accused enjoys under the Charter is not due to the constitutional status 
of the Charter per se, but the readiness of the Canadian courts and, in particular, the 
Supreme Court, firstly, to interpret the Charter in a manner that makes the exercise of 
the guaranteed rights practical and effective, and, secondly, to enforce the rights 
protected under the Charter through various strategies available to them. Stay of 
proceedings and the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence are just a few examples 
of these strategies. One particular strategy, which is known in Canada as 'enhanced 
credit', is worth recalling here. Without even relying on the Charter rights, the courts 
responded to poor detention conditions by giving an enhanced credit to time spent in 
pre-sentencing custody when determining the period of the sentence remaining to be 
served by the offender. This approach can indeed be described as a judicial 
innovation. In adopting such an approach, and in the process exposing poor detention 
conditions, the courts ensured that the adverse effects of poor detention conditions on 
the human dignity of the accused have been adequately addressed, and that these 
unacceptable conditions are brought to the attention of the public, thereby placing 
pressure on the government to resolve the problem of poor detention conditions. 
That is to say, whatever changes are made to Saudi law, they will not materialise 
in practice unless the judiciary are prepared to enforce them. Only the proper 
education and training of qadis can yield this result. Currently qadis are chiefly 
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educated in fiqh, with little or no education at all in modem law. Modem law is 
viewed by conservative ulama as a man-made law, the study of which constitutes an 
insult to the perfection and the divinity of the Shari'ah law. The curriculum of 
Shari'ah law schools, from which qadis are recruited, does not include any courses on 
modem law, not even Saudi Arabia's siyasa laws. By way of a compromise, the 
conservative ulama agreed to the teaching of siyasa laws during the postgraduate 
study, which Shari'ah schools graduates, who are appointed as qadis, are required to 
undertake before they take their posts. However, while this development is welcome, 
it is inadequate for two reasons. The study of siyasa laws is optional. Therefore, a 
Shari'ah law school graduate could become a qadi without coming into contact with, 
much less understand, Saudi Arabia's written laws. Secondly, text books on courses 
relating to, for example, the Saudi criminal procedure, are chiefly those that were 
written in the medieval age by jurists such as Ibn Al-Qayyim (d. 751 H), and Ibn 
Farhoun (d. 799 H), which can hardly be relied upon to develop the critical capacity 
of the would be qadis, in order to enable them not just to apply and interpret the law 
coherently and systematically, but to develop the law in a way that is consistent with 
the Shari'ah's underlying principles and values in light of the modem time's needs 
and problems. Thus it is recommended, as a matter of urgency, that the education and 
training programs of up and coming qadis are improved, in order to facilitate the 
emergence of competent and creative qadis who can then go on, via the practice of 
ijtihad, to develop what is, in essence, the Saudi common law (i. e., fiqh), in a 
systematic and coherent manner, and exercise their crucial role as the guardians of the 
Constitution. 
The second authority responsible for the enforcement of the CCP provisions in the 
pre-trail process is the IPPC. The CCP entrusts the supervision of the police and the 
exercise of judicial functions including the issuing of arrest and search warrants, the 
review of the detention and the prosecution of criminal cases to the IPPC. However, 
due to the lack of impartiality and independence of the IPPC, it has failed to discharge 
adequately its supposed role as the guardian of the accused's pre-trial rights. The lack 
of independence of the IPPC is due to the fact that in law as well as in reality it is 
subject to the supervision of the Minister of the Interior and his provincial 
representatives, i. e., the provincial governors, which give them the power, in practice, 
to interfere in the IPPC's exercise of its statutory powers, despite the statutorily 
guaranteed independence of the IPPC. On the other hand, the IPPC's lack of 
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impartiality stems from its central role in the investigation process, during which it is 
also empowered to exercise judicial functions. 
Thus, in the light of the existing system's structure, the problem of the lack of 
accountability, and with it the disrespect for the rule of law, would persist. It should 
be recalled here that IPPC was modelled on the Egyptian Public Prosecution 
Department. In addition, entrusting the IPPC with judicial and investigative functions 
was aimed at improving the effectiveness and accountability in the criminal justice 
system. However, there is no evidence from the Egyptian literature that the Public 
Prosecution Department has managed to achieve these aims, and this thesis has 
vividly demonstrated that while some new, although very limited, form of 
accountability came about by virtue of the establishment of the IPPC, the police and 
the IPPC still remain unaccountable. The routine disregard for the CCP provisions by 
both the IPPC and the police underlines that fact. With regard to effectiveness, there is 
no clear evidence to suggest that the establishment of the IPPC has speeded up the 
operation of the criminal justice system, or that the IPPC is better at investigating 
crimes than the police were. 
Given that the IPPC has failed to achieve its principal objectives, a rethinking of 
the structure of the existing system is essential. Currently, the IPPC is invested with 
too much power: the authorisation of taking coercive measures against the accused, 
the investigation of crimes, the supervision of the police, the prosecution of criminal 
cases, and the lodging of appeals against judgements. In order to make the system 
more accountable, there is a need to divest the IPPC of most of its existing powers in 
favour of other criminal justice agencies. The responsibility for investigating crimes 
and the decision whether to charge suspects should be returned to the police. The 
IPPC should only retain, in addition to the power of lodging an appeal against 
judgements, the power to decide whether to institute criminal proceedings against 
those individuals who have been charged by the police, and, where the proceedings 
have been instituted, to conduct the prosecution before the criminal courts. With 
regard to the authorisation of coercive measures and the pre-trial supervision of the 
police, these functions, ideally, would be better entrusted to the courts. However, as 
mentioned above, due to lack of proper legal training and education, the courts 
currently are neither capable nor competent to discharge these functions adequately. 
Thus, the only way to ensure that the power to authorise coercive measures is 
exercised competently, independently and impartially, and that the police are 
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subjected to an effective supervision, is to create a new category of judges with the 
sole purpose of exercising these functions. Judges serving in these courts should be 
recruited from among either modem law school graduates, or Shari'ah law school 
graduates, who have received adequate training and education in modem law. The 
jurisdiction of the proposed pre-trial judges should extend to review any alleged 
violations of the accused's pre-trial rights, and to afford the accused an effective 
remedy where a violation is found to have occurred. 
This recommendation is by any measure very radical and it may take years to 
implement. However, given that the IPPC is currently under development, it would be 
easier to correct the mistake in the structure of the existing system at this time, rather 
than continue with it, which will only serve to make the resolution of this problem 
costlier and more difficult. Providing better training and education to qadis and the 
restructuring of the existing system should ensure that the law is rigorously 
implemented, and whoever violates the law is held fully accountable. 
With regard to the law itself, as opposed to its implementation, it has been shown 
in Part Two of this thesis that Saudi law fails to meet international human rights 
standards in many respects. The following recommendations will only address those 
shortcomings that undermine the essence of each right under discussion in this thesis. 
Right against self-incrimination 
It has been pointed out that there are several factors that undermine the right against 
self-incrimination. Most notably, Saudi law does not explicitly guarantee the right 
against-self incrimination, the presumption of innocence, or, explicitly, prohibit the 
admission of evidence obtained in violation of the right against self-incrimination. In 
addition, the remedies that the law provides for alleged violations of the right against- 
self incrimination have been shown to be ineffective. While the 'confessions 
confirmation mechanism' has been used in practice to verify the voluntariness of 
confessions that do not appear to have been voluntarily supplied, the mechanism for 
investigating and prosecuting those accused of violating the right against ill-treatment 
is neither impartial nor independent. Finally, sentencing officials convicted of torture 
to a fine renders the criminalisation of torture an ineffective remedy for combating 
violations of the right against ill-treatment. It has been shown that the combination of 
these factors has left the accused's right against self-incrimination open to abuse by 
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law enforcement officials. Thus, it is recommended that the law be amended to reflect 
explicitly the following principles: 
a. the right against self-incrimination and the right to silence; 
b. the presumption of innocence; and 
c. the prohibition of the admission of confessions obtained in violation of the 
right against self-incrimination. 
In addition, the 'confessions confirmation mechanism' should be abandoned, and the 
jurisdiction to review the voluntariness of confessions should be given to the proposed 
pre-trial judges. The burden of establishing the voluntariness of the confession, where 
it is disputed by the defendant, must be placed on the shoulders of the prosecution. 
The proposed pre-trial judges, as part of their jurisdiction to review allegations of 
violations of the accused's pre-trial rights, should have the jurisdiction to discipline 
and to recommend the prosecution of any official against whom there is sufficient 
evidence that he has committed a criminal offence. Any person convicted of a crime 
of torture must be given a custodial sentence, the length of which is to be determined 
in the light of the circumstances of the case, and the need for deterrence in order to 
ensure that the practice of torture is completely stamped out. Furthermore, provisions 
for compulsory and complete electronic recordings of interviews and interrogations 
should be introduced. Finally, the attendance of the accused's legal counsel at the 
interrogation of his client, where he requests his attendance, should be considered as a 
precondition for the admissibility of any incriminating statements made by the 
accused during the interrogation. These modifications should ensure that illegal 
interferences with the right against self-incrimination are prevented; where there is an 
alleged violation of this right, such an allegation is reviewed in an independent and 
impartial manner, and if the allegation is established to be true, an effective remedy is 
granted as required under international human rights law. 
Right to humane treatment 
The conditions of detention centres in Saudi Arabia are largely inconsistent with 
international human rights requirements. They are neither consistent with the human 
dignity of the accused, nor do they guarantee his health and safety. To ensure that 
these problems are rectified, a minimum regarding detention conditions must be 
introduced. Hence, it is recommended that the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the 
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Treatment of Prisoners 1957 be incorporated into Saudi law. In order to ensure that 
these Standard Minimum Rules are met in practice, sufficient material resources must 
be committed to building new detention facilities, in which persons who are to be 
detained for more 24 hours be held, and to improving the conditions of the existing 
detention centres to hold those detainees who are to be held for less than 24 hours. 
The reason for this is that the existing detention centres seem to have been originally 
designed to hold detainees for a couple of hours, hence the lack of appropriate 
sleeping arrangements in these facilities, as opposed to general prisons, which have 
proper sleeping arrangements. Both types of detention facilities should be subjected to 
appropriate health and judicial inspections, to ensure that the conditions of the 
detention centres do not fall below the minimum proposed standards. 
Right to liberty 
It has been shown that Saudi law not only does not prohibit arbitrary detention, but in 
fact allows it, as exemplified by the mandatory detention of those persons accused of 
committing a major offence, which also undermines the presumption of innocence. In 
addition, arrests not based upon sufficient evidence that the accused has committed an 
offence in violation of Saudi law are routinely carried out in practice. The law does 
not guarantee that the initial review of detention is conducted by an independent and 
impartial officer, nor does it subject the detention to a periodic review by a 'court'. 
The law neither recognises the presumption of innocence, nor the right to be tried 
within a reasonable time. Suffice to say that, with regard to the right to liberty, Saudi 
law falls far below what is required under international human rights law. 
In order to make the law compliant with international human rights requirements, 
the law must be amended to prohibit arbitrary arrest or detention, and provisions on 
mandatory detention must be repealed. It is recommended that the factors to be 
considered when determining whether to detain the accused or not contain explicit 
reference to the principle of the presumption of innocence. This will enforce the right 
to liberty, thereby ensuring that detention is only ordered where a legitimate public 
goal cannot be secured without it. 
The recommendation of entrusting the proposed pre-trial judges with the power to 
authorise coercive measures against the accused should be sufficient to ensure that the 
need to arrest the accused is independently and impartially reviewed. When the 
accused is arrested, he should be brought before the proposed pre-trial judge to assess 
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the need for his continuing detention. The latter recommendation should ensure that 
the practice of arbitrary arrests, which currently widely exists, is eliminated. 
However, there is a need to introduce new provisions to the law to ensure that the 
accused at the bail hearing is given an effective opportunity to challenge the reasons 
for his detention, and that the detention is reviewed periodically. The first need can be 
met by entitling the accused to seek the assistance of a legal counsel upon arrest or 
detention, and to be provided with legal assistance free of charge, if the accused does 
not have the financial means to afford a private lawyer. In order to meet the latter 
need, the law should be amended to permit the review of the detention by the 
proposed pre-trial judge every 30 days. 
Finally, the law should be amended to include the right to trial within a reasonable 
time. More importantly, the law must provide the accused with an effective remedy 
against its violation. Thus, it is recommended that the accused be given the right to 
apply to the proposed pre-trial judge where his right to be tried within a reasonable 
time is, allegedly, threatened with violation, or has been violated. It is recommended 
that the proposed pre-trial judge be given the power to expedite the proceedings, 
where the right to be tried within a reasonable time is threatened with violation, or to 
halt the proceedings where the right to be tried within a reasonable time has been 
violated. 
Right to legal assistance 
Saudi law currently entitles the accused at the investigation stage to the right to legal 
assistance. Despite this, in practice, the right to legal assistance is very rarely utilised 
by accused persons and defendants alike. Without taking the appropriate measures to 
ensure that the effective exercise of the right to legal assistance is guaranteed in law 
as well as in practice, the impact of any modifications to the existing system will be 
undercut by the fact that the accused is not aware of his rights, which undermines the 
prospect of having these rights respected. 
Hence, it is recommended that the law be amended to guarantee the right to legal 
assistance upon arrest or detention, and to have legal assistance free of charge if the 
accused lacks the means to afford a private lawyer. In addition, the accused should be 
informed in clear and simple language of his right to legal assistance and, in order to 
ensure that this requirement is complied with in practice, be provided with a written 
note explaining to him in a language that he understands his right to legal assistance 
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and be required to sign for the written note acknowledging its receipt. As suggested 
earlier, the attendance of the legal counsel at the interrogation of his client, where the 
accused requests his attendance, should be considered as a precondition for the 
admission of any incriminating statements obtained from the accused. With regard to 
the confidentiality of the communications between the accused and his client, the law 
should ensure that the accused is given the opportunity to communicate with his 
lawyer in private, and that documents that relate to the client-lawyer relationship are 
exempted from search and seizure. If there is a dispute regarding the confidentiality of 
a given document, it should be reviewed by the proposed pre-trial judge before such a 
document is seized or used in evidence against the accused. 
Right to privacy 
It has been shown that, with regard to the right to privacy, Saudi law falls below 
international human rights requirements in a number of respects. The law does not 
prohibit arbitrary interference with the right to privacy. In fact, the law allows 
arbitrary interference with home in that it allows the search of the house of an indicted 
accused without the existence of grounds that make the search necessary for the 
public interest. Hence, it is recommended that a prohibition on arbitrary interference 
with the right to privacy is introduced to the law, and that the power to conduct 
arbitrary searches is repealed. Another area of deficiency in Saudi law is that it leaves 
the manner of searching persons completely at the discretion of the searching officer. 
Hence, there is a need to introduce a set of safeguards to ensure that the inherent 
dignity of the person being searched is not violated by the manner in which the search 
is conducted. Furthermore, the practice in Saudi Arabia is that warrants for searching 
houses are issued by the provincial governor in violation of 
Saudi law itself. As was 
suggested earlier, coercive measures, including the power 
to authorise the search of 
private homes, should be entrusted to the proposed pre-trial 
judges. In addition, as the 
proposed pre-trial judges would have the jurisdiction to afford the accused an 
effective remedy, the law should include an explicit provision empowering pre-trial 
judges to exclude any evidence the admission of which would bring less benefit to the 
administration of justice than the harm it would cause to 
it. The latter two proposed 
modifications should ensure that the need to search the accused's house is reviewed in 
an independent and impartial manner, and violations of 
the rights of the accused, 
including the right to privacy, are adequately dealt with. 
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The implementation of these recommendations should bring Saudi criminal 
procedural law and practice into line with international human rights standards. The 
changes to both the law and the implementation process should be carried out 
simultaneously in order to ensure that the changes to the law are reflected in reality. 
Studying the experience of foreign legal systems, on which these recommendations 
have been largely drawn, is indispensable for building on these recommendations, or 
even adopting different ones that could lead to the same goal. However, studies of 
foreign legal systems must focus on those systems under which human rights are 
respected in law as well as in reality. As such, the study of Western systems, for the 
purposes of reforming the Saudi criminal justice system, is indispensable, given the 
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